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Abstract
Purpose — This thesis explores the role of accounting in the process of financialisation in
the Chinese context. In particular, it examines the use of accounting discourse by the China
Iron and Steel Association (CISA) to resist the financialised price of iron ore during the 2009
and 2010 iron ore price negotiation. Contingent upon this thesis, financialisation is defined as
the rising significance of the financial sector in the global iron ore market in general and the
adoption of the index linked iron ore pricing mechanism of in particular. The investigation
illustrates how the traditional annual negotiation based iron ore pricing mechanism that had
been used for nearly four decades shifted towards the financialised index pricing model in
2010, and analyses why, as the largest iron ore importing and consuming market in the world,
the Chinese iron and steel industry, and its associated use of accounting discourse, failed to
resist the financialisation of iron ore price in its negotiation with the three major global iron
ore suppliers (i.e. BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce—the Big Three
hereafter).
Design/methodology/approach — The theory and methodology adopted in this thesis stem
from Marx’s study of Political Economy. Drawing from Capital Volume III, a Marx-informed
theoretical framework for financialisation is developed that examines the interaction among
productive, commercial, and financial capital as a result of the conflict between the
corresponding social relations and productive forces. Based on Marx’s work in The German
Ideology, the methodological framework focuses on material production. More specifically,
three levels of analyses are conducted to explore (1) the mode of production underneath the
accounting discourse regarding iron ore price, (2) the interaction among the different modes
of production identified, and (3) the potential of the discourse to change the status quo from a
class perspective.
Method/data—The data collected and analysed in this thesis are from (1) iron ore price
related news from Sina Finance (one of the most popular websites in Mainland China) during
the 2009 and 2010 iron ore price negotiations, (2) official announcements and documents of
the CISA, (3) annual reports from major Chinese steel plants and the Big Three, and (4) other
types of publicly available information related to the Chinese iron and steel industry. Then
these materials are sorted into three main groups according to the producers of the discourse
(Marx & Engels, 1974, p.47): (1) the CISA and the major Chinese steel plants; (2) the small
and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry; and (3) the Big Three. Based
iii
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on Marx’s methodological framework, the analysis begins with presenting the relevant
accounting discourse produced by each group, then delving into the underlying mode of
production for the discourse, exploring the interaction among the three groups via their social
relations and the corresponding productive forces, and finally examining the nature of the
CISA from a class perspective. After completing Marx’s analysis of the discourse, a
comparative study is conducted that connects relevant accounting concepts and standards
with the two pricing methods argued by each group and Marx’s concept of capital.
Findings —There are three reasons behind CISA’s failed attempt to resist financialisation.
First, the financialisation of iron ore price is an inevitable trend as a result of and the solution
to the intensified conflicts between the social relations among the three groups which have
rendered the traditional annual pricing could no longer meet the increased demand for iron
ore in the Chinese market. Second, the CISA did not recognise the interaction among
productive, commercial, and financial capital. Thus, the association missed the opportunity of
launching China’s own index price which might have otherwise taken the priority in iron ore
pricing. Third, in opposing the financialised index price, the CISA did not take into account
the interest of the working class which, according to Marx (Marx & Engels, 2008), would
lead to the “fall (of the financial capitalist) and the victory of the proletariat” (ibid, p.51).
Instead, the association was concerned with the interest of the central government. In relation
to accounting, the research demonstrates that accounting is a malleable tool capable of
accommodating various socio-political contexts and, correspondingly, supporting different
arguments. However, a detailed reading of relevant accounting standards and the conceptual
framework shows that the adoption of the financialised price of iron ore is not only the direct
consequence of the shift in relevant pricing mechanisms but a result of the underlying social,
economic, and political structure comprised of contradictions in social relations and
productive forces from which neither the shift in iron ore pricing nor the evolution of
accounting concepts and standards can escape.
Research contributions — The contributions of this study are three-fold. First, in relation to
extant accounting literature, the research has studied financialisation in the Chinese iron and
steel industry which passively participated in the process of the shift in iron ore pricing
mechanism and accepted the resulting financialised index price. The analysis goes beyond the
use of the same set of accounting discourse (i.e. transparency, fair price, representation of
market, etc.) by the Big Three and the CISA to argue for and against, respectively,
financialisation, to explore the interactive process among interested parties. Moreover, in
iv
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response to Arnold’s (2009) call for the examination of “how financial reporting standards
have shaped and been shaped by the financialisation of the economy” (p.806), the thesis has
studied and applied relevant accounting concepts and standards in the context of the
financialisation of iron ore price in China. Second, in relation to theory, the thesis has
developed a theoretical framework for financialisation based on Marx’s analysis of capitalism
(primarily from Capital Volume III) that explores the broad movement of productive,
commercial, and financial capital as well as the corresponding social relations and productive
forces. This demonstrates the feasibility and suitability of applying Marx’s classical theory in
the contemporary case of financialisation. Third, in relation to methodology, the thesis
proposes a Marx-informed discourse analysis drawing from The German Ideology. It leads
the analysis of accounting discourse to modes of productions which constitute and condition
the discourse (Marx & Engels, 1974). Thus, this research contributes a Marx-informed
methodological approach to studies of Political Economy of Accounting in general and of
accounting discourse in financialisation in particular.
Future research — Directions for future research are suggested in the following. First, while
the period (from 2008 October to 2010 May) for which the thesis is concerned witnessed the
soaring price of iron ore skyrocketed by nearly 200%, the price experienced dramatic
decrease in the following three years (from 2012 to 2015). Thus, it is of particular interest to
investigate factors behind the price drop, with particular reference to Marx’s (1959, p.203)
view regarding the limits upon commercial and financial capital. Second, CISA’s
dramatically changed attitude towards the financialisation of iron ore price merits further
exploration. Although the association reiterated, throughout the two annual negotiations from
2008 to 2010, that iron ore index was speculative and could easily be manipulated (Li RX,
2010d, 2010e), it launched its own index price one year later (in 2011 October). Subsequently,
also worth exploring is a comparative study between the Platts index (adopted by the Big
Three) and CISA’s index in terms of data assessment and organisational structure. Fourth,
given the contradiction between the discourse of certain officials at the CISA and their actual
behaviour during the period examined, the identity and accountability of the CISA need to be
investigated in a wider social and political context.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1. The Research Topic
The evolving nature of accounting has not only reflected the changes in its technical tools
(Carmona & Ezzamel, 2007), but also revealed the ever-perplexing form of accounting
representations alongside social development. Indeed, accounting information nowadays
carry more ramifications than simply communicating economic events to interest parties,
rather they reflexively and selectively construct reality (cf. Hines, 1988; Willmott & Sikka,
1997). It is not only the formal statements of accounting like financial reports (Tinker, 1980),
management budgets (Boland & Pondy, 1983), and even social and environmental disclosure
(Spence, 2007) that exhibit such a socially constructive and reflective capacity, but also the
discursive practice of accounting (Arnold & Hammond, 1994; Ding & Graham, 2007). This
thesis investigates and evaluates the role of accounting discourse in the context of the
Chinese iron and steel industry, with particular reference to the financialisation of the iron ore
price in 2010.

Financialisation is generally understood in the literature of critical accounting as the
economic and political growth of the financial sector (Andersson et al., 2006; Arnold, 2012;
Zhang & Andrew, 2014). Contingent upon the context of the thesis, the term financialisation
refers to the rising significance of financial institutions in the global iron ore market through
the adoption of the index based iron ore pricing mechanism in 2010. Historically, the price of
iron ore was determined once a year through an annual negotiation between the world’s
major sellers and buyers since the late 1960s (Blas, 2010). These include the three mining
corporations including BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (the Big
1
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Three hereafter) on the sellers’ side, and the leading steelmakers on the buyers’ side. As
China became the largest iron ore importing and consuming economy in 2004 (Zhu, 2012),
the Chinese iron and steel sector began to join the annual negotiation. However, China did
not reach any agreement with the Big Three for 2009 and 2010 when the concept of index
pricing was proposed by BHP Billiton whereas the Chinese side strongly opposed it. In 2010
April, the quarterly indexed iron ore pricing system officially replaced the traditional annual
negotiation based pricing mechanism in the global market. The standard assessment for iron
ore became 62% Fe as the prevalent grade in the spot market of Qingdao (China), and the
index is assessed on a CFR (Cost and Freight1) basis. Consequently, despite being the world’s
largest iron ore importing and consuming economy, the Chinese iron and steel industry had to
accept the newly adopted iron ore index price for the second quarter in 2010 (i.e. from April
to June) that exhibited a nearly 100% increase compared to the 2009 annual price (Blas, 2010;
Sina Finance, 2 April 2010; The Beijing News, 8 April 2010). Alongside the shift in pricing
mechanism was the emergence of the associated financial derivatives such as swaps and
futures actively traded in the financial market (Holes, 2013). Thus, researchers (Wang et al.,
2010; Xiao et al., 2012; Xie, 2012; Wang et al., 2014), commentators (Chen SS, 2010d; He,
2010b), market participants (Li RX, 2010e; He, 2010a; Chen YM, 2010), and government
officials (Li RX, 2010d) point out that iron ore has now been equipped with characteristics of
financial capital and its price has become financialised.

While the adoption of the quarterly index price is widely regarded as a result of the rising
economic and geopolitical significance of iron ore (Blas, 2010), the thesis pays specific
attention to the role of accounting discourse. In particular, the interpretation and use of

1

CFR refers to Cost and Freight. It is a trade term that requires the cost of the product being shipped and the shipping cost.
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accounting information by China Iron and Steel Association (as the representative of the
Chinese iron ore importers) in the 2009 and 2010 annual price negotiations are collected and
analysed. In so doing, the research explores two areas that have been given insufficient
attention in the extant accounting literature.

First of all, there is a lack of research interest in exploring the role of accounting discourse in
opposing financialisation. As shown in the literature review section of the thesis, the extant
accounting research primarily focuses on how accounting promotes financialisation (Power,
2010; Nolke & Perry, 2008; NewBerry & Robb, 2008; Arnold, 2009; Muller, 2014; Zhang &
Andrew, 2014). Thus, the first research question in this thesis focuses on how accounting
discourse is used by the Chinese iron and steel industry at the 2009 and 2010 annual
negotiations to resist the financialisation of iron ore price. Based on the publicly available
documents and relevant financial news in the Chinese media, this thesis also plays a role in
helping Western audience understand the extent to which accounting and financialisation are
interpreted and used in the Chinese context. This is achieved through not only identifying and
analysing the accounting discourse put forward by the Chinese side, but also applying
relevant accounting concepts and standards to the actual case study per se (i.e. the annual
negotiation based price vis-à-vis the index price).

Secondly, there is little examination of the particular process regarding how financialisation
is first proposed, then resisted, and finally implemented in a socialist market economy. While
this may be because of the language issue as well as the ideology in the Chinese context
which, as claimed by its national leaders (Deng, 1993; Jiang, 2006b, 2006c), is based on
Marxism, this thesis addresses both by analysing the Chinese media coverage, as the main
3
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source of data within a Marx-informed Political Economy framework. Thereby, the second
research question concentrates on the reasons behind China’s failed attempt to resist the
financialisation of iron ore price.

1.2. Marx in the Chinese context
The application of Marx’s work in the research is threefold. First, this thesis considers Marx’s
theory as part of the socio-political background in which the investigation is carried out. In
relation to China’s political context, Marxism is considered as an important theoretical basis
for the Communist Party of China (CPC) and has become the dominant discourse in People’s
Republic of China (PRC) since its birth in 1949. While the government of CPC has,
alongside the opening reform since the late 1970s, shifted its focus from class struggle to
economic development (Jiang, 2006c, p.334) from the period of Chairman Mao to the current
president Xi Jinping, dominant ideologies have always been claimed by the national leaders
and government as the application of Marxism in the Chinese context resulting from the
practical experience and the collective wisdom of the CPC and the Chinese people (see Jiang,
2006a, p.157, 2006b, p.8; Hu, 2006). In relation to the Chinese iron and steel market, the
industry has always been treated as a key strategic sector for national defence and economy
(Movshuk, 2004). Historically, it has been under strong government influence during famous
political campaigns such as the Great Leap Forward Movement (1958-1960), the Three-Year
Natural Disaster (1959-1961), and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) in which ideological
input significantly intervened with industrial output (Rawski, 1976). To date, most of China’s
major steelmakers are still state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Despite the fact that these SOEs
are listed in stock exchanges, the Chinese government holds at least 51% of their shares2.
2

Further information regarding the shareholding structure of China’s major steel plants is depicted in Figures 6.2-6.6 in
chapter six.
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China Iron and Steel Association (CISA hereafter) as the representative of the country’s iron
and steel industry is also closely related to the government in terms of funding and staffing3.
Bear in mind the government ideology, not surprisingly, the CISA also claims to follow the
theoretical guidance of Marx (CISA, 2011b, 2013b). Therefore, in this aspect, the use of
Marx-informed theory for financialisation and methodology for discourse analysis sheds light
on both the application of Marxism in the Chinese context as well as the contemporary
significance of Marx in modern capitalist economy.

1.3. Theorising Financialisation
Second, this thesis theorises the financialisation of the global iron ore pricing mechanism
with particular reference to Marx’s Capital and The Communist Manifesto. Financialisation is
a relatively recent term that represents the economic and political growth of the financial
sector (Arnold, 2012). The ramifications of financialisation have attracted significant interest
from researchers across different disciplines such as political economy, finance, and
accounting (see Boyer, 2000; Feng et al., 2001; Stockhammer, 2004; Crotty, 2005, 2009;
Orhangazi, 2008; Lapavitsas, 2011; Arnold, 2012; Zhang & Andrew, 2014). However,
relatively insufficient attention has been given in exploring the interactive process between
the financial and the non-financial sectors in a wider socio-political context based on a Marxinformed theoretical framework. Therefore, largely drawing from Marx’s Capital (Volume
III), this thesis has developed a framework to study financialisation in the Chinese context.
Although Marx did not refer to the exact word financialisation due to the specific period in
which he lived and studied, he did in fact comment on the finance and banking sector as

3

A detailed analysis of CISA’s history and organisational structure is provided in section 6.1.1.
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“an immanent form of the capitalist mode of production, and… a driving force in its
development to its highest and ultimate form… (and) at the same time… the most potent
means of driving capitalist production beyond its own limits, and one of the most
effective vehicles of crises and swindle” (Marx, 1959, p.433).

Thus, bear in mind Marx’s emphasis on the mode of production, the thesis connects Marx’s
classical concepts of productive and commercial capital with the contemporary phenomenon
of financialisation by demystifying the seemingly self-expanding nature of financial capital.
In so doing, the actual process of financialising iron ore price is explored, with particular
reference to the Chinese iron and steel sector as the traditional industrial economy vis-à-vis
the financial market based index.

1.4. Methodological Framework
Third, this thesis has developed a research methodology for discourse analysis based on Marx.
Marx’s work has been one area of interest in the field of political economy, and also received
attention from critical accounting researchers (see Bryer, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1999a, 1999b,
2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Tinker et al., 1991; Tinker & Carter, 2003;
Tinker & Gray, 2003; Toms, 2005). Critical Perspective on Accounting also published one
special issue4 on Marx and accounting. However, Tinker (1999, p.652) remarked that much
of the extant accounting literature applying Marx’s work has been confined largely to an
economistic reading of Marx, leaving his philosophical and political materials untouched.
Thus,
“what Marx bequeathed to us was not a definitive analysis of capitalism, but some
important methodological-political tools for engaging and re-engaging a social system
that is itself in constant renewal and transformation” (Tinker, 1999, p.655).

4

Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 1999, vol.10, no.5.
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Responding to Tinker’s (1999) call for engaging Marx’s work as a methodological tool
capable of exploring contemporary issues, the thesis contributes to the literature by
developing a Marx-informed methodology to analyse the discourse regarding the pricing
mechanism of iron ore. Primarily drawing upon Marx’s Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844 and The German Ideology as the philosophical side of Marx (Tinker,
1999), the thesis has explored the ontological, epistemological, and methodological positions
of Marx, and thereby put forward a methodological framework through which discourse is
analysed.

For Marx, there is a dialectic between humans and the external environment, a constantly
changing process where “circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances”
(Marx and Engels, 1974, p.59). The way in which humans interact with the outside world is
juxtaposed with a third factor—society (Marx, 1974, p.92). Thus, to study the discourse put
forward on the surface level, we should analyse not only the producers of discourse and the
environment in which they operate, but also delve into the social relations between the two
(Marx and Engels, 1974, p.64). Furthermore, Marx assigned the material focus on productive
activities with this form of social relations, since “(t)he first historical act is… the production
of the means to satisfy their (human) needs, the production of material life itself” (ibid, p.48).
The way in which society moves forward hinges upon the shift in the mode of production that
“is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation (i.e. social relation)… and this
mode of co-operation is itself a ‘productive force’” (ibid, p.50). Social change is triggered
and realised through the contradiction between productive forces and the associated social
relations that has become a fetter upon the former (ibid, pp.87-89).
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With his emphasis on production, Marx considered that discourse “only arises from the need,
the necessity, of intercourse with other men” (ibid, p.51). Thus, discourse is treated as a
social product produced by individuals who actively engage themselves in a web of social
relations. Since discourse is in its nature “practical” (ibid, p.51), it is also conditioned by the
existing productive forces and corresponding social relations therein. Thus, conflicts in
discourse “only occur because existing social relations have come into contradiction with
existing forces of production” (ibid, p.52). The specific context from which discourse derives
is civil society which “embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a
definite stage of the development of productive forces… and… transcends the Sate and the
nation (ibid, p.57). As such, analysis of discourse should be conducted from a worldhistorical (ibid. p.56) perspective. Taking into account the dialectic interplay between
discourse and material production, social change is triggered and realised upon the
coincidence of revolutionary ideas and a revolutionary class (ibid, p.65; see also Tinker, 1999,
p.646).

Accordingly, this thesis concentrates on how the financialisation of iron ore price is
interpreted through Marx’s emphasis on production. As such, this thesis has undertaken a
three-level analysis to address the research questions above. As Marx’s analysis “set(s) out
from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process” (ibid, p.47), the first stage
investigates the producers of the accounting discourse, and, more importantly, the productive
activities that constitute and condition the basis of their discourse. Three groups of discourse
producers in the Chinese iron and steel industry are identified, including (1) the CISA as
China’s representative throughout the negotiations, (2) the Big Three as the major suppliers
of iron ore, and (3) the Chinese small and medium enterprises as other stakeholders. The
corresponding mode of production underneath each group is explored. Then, the second stage
8
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focuses on the interaction among the modes of production with the associated productive
forces and social relations. The shift from traditional annual negotiation based price to the
financialised index price is considered the result of as well as the solution to the contradiction
between relevant productive forces and social relations. Viewed in this way, the analysis has
revealed the particular conflicts in the social relations among the three groups and changes in
the related productive forces. In doing so, financialisation is analysed in relation to capitalist
development. The third stage examines the identity and accountability of the CISA from a
class perspective, exploring the possibility of changing the status quo (Marx & Engels, 1974,
p.123). The analysis continues to address the research question by comparing the application
of Marxism in China with Marx’s projection in The Communist Manifesto, investigating the
ramifications of Marx in terms of his theoretical relevant and the practical experience in the
Chinese context.

As the analysis in the thesis begins with the accounting discourse regarding the price of iron
ore, the research concludes with the implications of accounting with regard to the
financialisation of iron ore price and the Chinese context. While the relationship between the
international accounting standards, accounting conceptual framework, and financialisation
has been studied by a number of accounting researchers (see Zhang & Andrew, 2014; Muller,
2014), this thesis takes a different approach and seeks to apply accounting regulation in
practice—the financialisation of the iron ore pricing mechanism. By comparing the two
pricing methods, and the supporting discourse from each group, with relevant accounting
concepts and standards, this thesis further locates financialisation in a socio-political context
comprised of conflicts in social relations and productive forces from which neither the shift in
iron ore pricing nor the development of accounting concepts and standards can escape.
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The sources of data for addressing the research questions of this thesis are archival and
divided into four categories. The first category refers to China’s media coverage of the 2009
and 2010 iron ore price negotiations. The second category is the set of official
announcements, policies, and regulations regarding the price of iron ore and the Chinese steel
and iron industry put forward by the CISA and the Chinese government. The third category
consists of the annual reports of major players on the supply and demand chain including
China’s state-owned steel conglomerates and the Big Three. The fourth category includes
other types of publicly available information regarding the price of iron ore such as the iron
ore index assessment method.

1.5. The Structure

The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter Two Background presents a brief
history of the Chinese iron and steel industry and the contemporary landscape of the
international iron ore market. Chapter Three Literature Review: Political Economy of
Accounting examines the extant Political Economy of Accounting (PEA) literature with
particular reference to Marxist accounting studies, as well as researches addressing
accounting and financialisation. It provides an overview of what the existing research has
explored, and thus identifies the potential areas of interest to which this thesis is directed.
Chapter Four: Theorising Financialisation in Iron Ore Market presents a theoretical
discussion of financialisation based on the extant literature, and then explores a Marxinformed theory of financialisation on which this thesis is framed. It specifically defines
financialisation in the context of this research. Chapter Five Methodology: A Marx informed
Discourse Analysis discusses the philosophical underpinnings of Marx and puts forward the
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methodological framework for discourse analysis. It clarifies the theoretical foundations and
the specific method adopted in this thesis.

Chapter Six: Different Interpretations of Iron Ore Price—Identifying Modes of Production
undertakes the first level analysis that focuses on the exploring the corresponding mode of
production behind the discourse on the surface level. This chapter begins with discussing the
accounting discourse from each group regarding iron ore price, and then investigating the
producers of discourse in detail and their underlying modes of production.

Chapter Seven: Shift to Financialisation of Iron Ore Price—Interaction among Modes of
Production fulfils the second level analysis. It explores the social relations and the relevant
productive forces among the three groups as well as the corresponding conflicts therein. By
providing a detailed story of how the global iron ore market has gradually opened its door to
trading companies and financial investors other than its traditional customer (i.e. the
steelmakers), this chapter illustrates the reasons behind the emergence of the financialised
price of iron ore in the Chinese market. As such, it demonstrates that the financialisation of
iron ore price is an inevitable trend as a result of as well as the solution to the contradiction
between the social relations and the productive forces therein. It also evaluates CISA’s view
on financialisation, alongside the corresponding discussion of Marx’s opinion on the same
subject matter.

Chapter Eight: Financialisation vs. State—A Class Analysis takes the analysis to the third
level that examines the role of the CISA from a class perspective. In particular, it compares
CISA’s mindset with the views of (1) a capitalist, (2) a proletarian government, and (3) the
11
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working class. Through the class analysis, this chapter illustrates that CISA’s interpretation of
interest was largely confined to the national interest of the CPC government, while leaving
the interests of the oppressed classes such as the small and medium enterprises and ordinary
workers untouched. In this sense, Marx’s description of communism in The Communist
Manifesto that projects the fall of capitalism (and financialisation) and the victory of the
proletariat (Marx & Engels, 2008, p.51) is not realised in the context studied in this thesis.
Chapter Nine: Discussions and Conclusion summarises the three-level analysis and presents
a comprehensive answer to the research questions. Taking into account the findings from the
Marx-informed discourse analysis, implications for accounting in general and the accounting
concepts and standards regarding the financialisation of iron ore price in particular are
explored with reference to Marx’s concepts of capital. The suggestions for further research
and the contribution of this thesis are outlined.
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This chapter provides the socio-political and economic context in which the current analysis
of accounting discourse is carried out. The structure of the chapter is organised as follows.
The first section (2.1.) presents a brief history of the Chinese iron and steel industry from the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to date. The second section (2.2.)
depicts the contemporary landscape of the global iron ore market.

2.1. Chinese steel and iron industry
Historically, the Chinese steel and iron industry has always been tainted with political
correctness. Its early days since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in
1949 were characterised by a number of political turmoils, including the Great Leap Forward
Movement (1958-1960), the subsequent three-year natural disaster (1959-1961), the
Recovery and Readjustment (1961-1965) and later the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976),
where ideological input significantly intervened industrial output (Rawski, 1976; Wang, 1986;
Peng, 1987). It was not until the late 1970s when Deng Xiaoping regained the political power,
the opening reform was introduced, transforming the primary goal of the nation from class
struggle to economic development; government-planned economy to market-based economy;
and, public ownership to private ownership, and the development of the iron and steel sector
gradually stabilised.

In the following two decades (1980-2000), the iron and steel industry continued to be the
major focus of the opening reform. Since 1996, China has become the largest producer of
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iron and steel in the world (Trench, 2004). However, there emerged a major production
bottleneck caused by the shortage of iron ore. According to Ji Yuanjing, the then minister of
the Metallurgy Industry, the supply shortage of iron ore due to the decline in domestic iron
ore production must be eliminated by all means, and the import of iron ore may be increased
dramatically (Economic Daily, 1991).

Apart from the supply of iron ore, government attention was also given to the structural
reforms of SOEs. For example, the modern enterprise campaign was initiated in 1992,
shifting many SOEs from “social and economic conglomerates responsible for social goods
such as cradle-to-grave welfare for employees and their dependents… (to) purely economic
entities… which can be expected to operate in a much more entrepreneurial way and to
compete in international as well as domestic markets” (Hassard et al., 1999, p.55). In the iron
and steel sector, 11 steel manufacturers were corporatized after the Company Law came into
effect in 1994 (World Bank, 1997). In 1993, Mananshan Steel became the first publicly listed
SOE in the country, followed by other major steel makers (Movshuk, 2004). Notwithstanding
the reform, the state still maintained its ownership in the SOEs even after they were
corporatized or listed on stock exchanges. In other words, while relieving the SOEs’ socialwelfare burden, the socialist government gave steel firms more responsibility for their own
profits and losses and thus guided them towards a market-oriented direction, without
privatising the very state-owned assets.

Following the Fifteenth CPC Congress in 1997, the ‘grasp the large, release the small’
initiative was introduced in response to inefficient SOEs. It suggested that government should
only maintain ownership over the largest SOEs and in the meantime relinquish control over
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the small and medium SOEs (Naughton, 2007). The iron and steel industry implemented the
initiative vigorously through a series of mergers and acquisitions around the top four steel
makers: Baosteel, Shougang Steel, Ansteel, and Wuhan Iron & Steel. In 2009, the State
Council introduced the Iron & Steel Industry Adjustment and Revitalisation Plan which
suggests that major SOEs take the lead in the industry wide mergers and acquisitions across
different regions in the country. Specifically, the State Council (2009) expected to see the
formation of extra-large steel conglomerates including Baosteel group, Anben group, and
Wuhan Iron & Steel group, each of which will have the production capacity of more than 50
million tons.

Alongside the ongoing programmes of SOE reforms, several controversies loomed large on
the public agenda. The first was the drastic reduction in work force at SOEs. Under the
pressure of being closed down or bankrupt, some steel corporations increasingly found
themselves to be overstaffed and considered laying off their employees from 16 up to 50 per
cent (Hassard et al., 1999). The previous highly regarded ‘iron rice bowl’ (a metaphor that
likens the life-long secured social welfare enjoyed by SOE employees) of the permanent SOE
employees no longer existed and redundant full-time workers were increasingly replaced with
part-time and contract-based workers. Secondly, the divestment of social welfare previously
provided by large and medium SOEs further added to the instability of China’s society. As
stated earlier, the social service components were separated from enterprises and shifted onto
local authorities, which casted great doubt on the quality and quantity of the new social
welfare system. This leads to the third problem. As more and more workers were laid off and
social burdens were increasingly transferred onto local governments, the nature of SOEs
became problematic, which has been shifted from socialist development into private profit
motive.
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Turning into the 21st century, reforms are still undergoing and infrastructure construction
continued and expanded all over the country. The depletion of mineral resources (Brett &
Ericsson, 2006), the growing need of iron ore for industrial production (Hu et al., 2010), and
the below average quality of domestic iron ores (Lu & Li, 2009) have been driving the
unprecedented demand for iron ore in the country. In fact, China has become the largest iron
ore importer in the world since 2004, followed by South Korea and Japan (Zhu, 2012).

Despite its leading role in iron and steel production worldwide, the Chinese iron and steel
sector has experienced significant economic hardship in recent years and even exhibits an
industry wide loss in the first half of 2012 (Bao, 2012). To improve corporate performance,
many steel makers choose to rely on their accounting magic and financial arrangement. For
instance, Wuhan Iron and Steel has changed its accounting estimate policy by adding an extra
three years to the useful life of property, plant and equipment (PPE) to increase the net profit
figure by RMB 148 million, i.e. approximately AUD 23 million (Wuhan Iron and Steel Co.,
Ltd, 2012). Similarly, SGIS, one subsidiary of Bao Steel, has also increased the useful life
and the residual value of its PPE, and at the same time reduced the respective depreciation
rate, contributing to an increase in net profit of RMB 289 million, i.e. approximately AUD 45
million (SGIS Songshan Co., Ltd, 2012).

In addition to changes in accounting estimate, related-party transaction is another tool.
Baoshan Iron & Steel raised RMB 9.1 billion profits resulting from the related party
transactions with the Baosteel group5 (Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd, 2012a, 2012b). The
5

In April 1 2012, within the same group, Baoshan Iron and Steel Corporation sold part of its stainless steel division and
specialty steel division to Shanghai Bao Steel Stainless Steel Corporation, Bao Steel Specialty Steel Corporation, and Bao
Steel Group at the price of RMB 46.9 billion, i.e. AUD 7.2 billion (Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd, 2012b)
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company will also spend RMB 5 billion, i.e. approximately AUD 770 million on share
buyback to boost up the firm value (Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd, 2012c). As such, the
firm’s financial capital will be effectively eroded.

While the corporations exonerate themselves from these technical irregularities in the name
of protecting shareholder interest and of better presenting a true and fair view on PPE
(Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd, 2012c; SGIS Songshan Co., Ltd, 2012), the industry as a
whole tend to attribute such arrangements ultimately to the soaring price of iron ore from the
upper stream (Zheng & Huang, 2011) and the sluggish demand of steel products from the
lower stream (Bao, 2012). However, as mentioned earlier, China has become the largest
importer of iron ore in the global market since 2004, then the questions are asked: Why does
the Chinese industry still suffer from the prohibitive price of iron ore? What are the
institutional arrangements and who are the major players in the global iron ore market? What
is the involvement of the Chinese industry in this global market? In particular, how has the
language of accounting been used in the market? Therefore, it is to the issue of international
iron ore trading between the Chinese industry and the global mining oligopolies that we now
turn to.

2.2. The global iron ore market
With the increasing industrialisation and urbanisation, iron ore has been considered as the
second largest open-traded commodity following crude oil (The Economist, 2012). The
global iron ore market has long been a seller-dominated space due to the substantial
imbalance of the iron ore supply and demand and the high level of monopolisation (Hou &
Yang, 2009). Currently, the market is dominated by the three global oligopolies─ BHP
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Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (Vale hereafter), which have the
control over 35% of world’s total production of iron ore and nearly 70% of the seaborne iron
ore market (UNCTAD, 2011).

Until 2010, the pricing process of iron ore has been settled annually in private through a
bilateral negotiation between the Big Three and the leading purchasers in the world, where
the former takes precedence over the later (Wilson, 2012; Xiong, 2012). As the largest
purchaser and importer of iron ore in seaborne trade (Yellishetty et al., 2010), China became
the major representative on the demand side in the annual pricing negotiation. Baosteel, as
the country’s largest steel enterprise, participated in the negotiation on behalf of the Chinese
steel and iron industry since 2004 (Wang, 2007; Sinan Finance, 21 April 2010). However, for
the 2009 and 2010 iron ore price negotiations, it was the China Iron and Steel Association
(CISA hereafter) that sat behind Baosteel and negotiated with the Big Three directly (Xu,
2009c; Zhang XD, 2009e).

Largely due to the political scandal in 2009 in which four members at Rio Tinto’s China
office including Stern Hu, the then chief representative of the firm at the iron ore price
negotiation table, were arrested by the Shanghai Public Security Bureau under the charge of
bribing Chinese steel firms for inside information on the annual price negotiation (Bloomberg,
2009), China did not reach any annual price agreement with the Big Three. Instead, the CISA
(2009b) turned to Fortescue Metals Group (FMG), Australia’s third largest iron ore supplier,
and reached a half year price agreement. In the subsequent year (2010), the Big Three
decided to change the annual price mechanism from the traditional annual negotiation model
to a quarterly index system. That is, similar to other globally traded commodities, the new
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price will be the average spot market index price during the previous quarter (Mining Weekly,
2010a, 2010b; Dow Jones, 2010). The Chinese steel firms were then left with no option but to
accept the quarterly index mechanism (China Daily, 2010). Soon after the quarterly
mechanism was introduced, the global market witnessed a sky rocketed price rise by 99.7%
in April 2010 (Wilson, 2012).

While the Big Three claim that the new system would bring more transparency than the
previous annual negotiation (BHP Billiton, 2009) and reflect a more market oriented system
(Vale, 2010), the quarterly pricing mechanism, according to Wilson (2012), has by far only
favoured the mining oligopolies by further increasing the iron ore prices and undermining the
cartelisation effort and thus the bargaining power of Chinese steel firms. In response, the
CISA contended that using the foreign index fails to reflect the true state of the market and
the financialisation of the iron ore exacerbates the price manipulation and speculation.

Faced with the rising prices of iron ore, the China Beijing International Mining Exchange
(CBMX) together with the CISA and the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals Minerals &
Chemicals Importers & Exports have also launched China Iron Ore Spot Trading Platform in
May 2012. Iron ore derivatives like swaps and futures are not allowed in this system in order
to ‘better reflect the price based on actual supply and demand’, said Wang Xiaoqi, the deputy
chairman of the CISA (cited in Stanway, 2012), and therefore stabilise the global iron ore
prices (Du, 2012). At the same time, many Chinese steel firms and the CISA have also
expressed their willingness to a return to the annual pricing mechanism (Stanway, 2012).
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Thus, while both the Big Three and the Chinese government call for a true market-oriented
pricing system of iron ore, two competing trading platforms have been set up respectively by
both parties. Then the questions are posed: how is the accounting discourse used by both
parties to justify their preferred pricing method including index price, spot price, and the
annual negotiation based price? Interesting still, how can the Chinese government alone
justify their support for the market-based pricing system on the one hand and their favour in a
return to the annual negotiation pricing mechanism on the other?

To answer the questions above, a critical examination of the relations between the Chinese
government, the state-owned steel firms, the global capitalist oligopolies (i.e. Big Three), and
the use of accounting language is needed. However, while extant academic literature has
largely focused on the Chinese SOE reforms (Tung, 1981; Hassard et al., 1999; Nolan &
Yeung, 2001; Liu & Otsuka, 2004), the technical and energy efficiency of the Chinese iron
and steel sector (Jefferson, 1990; Ross & Feng, 1991; Sugimoto, 1993; Movshu, 2004; Zhang
et al., 2006), the econometric models of iron ore pricing (Hou & Yang, 2009; Sun & Xiang,
2011; Zheng & Huang, 2011; Zhu, 2012), and the foreign policies and relations regarding
mineral resources (Kirk, 2004; Pei, 2005; Yao & Sutherland, 2009; Yao et al., 2010; Wilson,
2011, 2012), yet research addressing the interactional relationship between the Chinese steel
SOEs and global mining oligopolies has been sparse and little interest has been shown in the
accounting arena.

To fill the literature gap, this research focuses on the use of accounting discourse in the
interaction between the Chinese steel and iron industry and the Big Three. The Political
Economy of Accounting (PEA) approach is considered as the theoretical framework.
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According to Tinker and Neimark (1987), this approach analyses “the ways various social
protagonists use accounting information… to mediate, suppress, mystify and transform social
conflict” (pp.71-2), and “places class relations at the forefront of the analysis and is…
concerned with the effects of accounting information… on the distribution of income, wealth,
and power” (p.72). It is adopted for the study for the following reasons.

First, as the Chinese market has been one of the fastest developing and one of the most
politically controlled in the world, using PEA enables this study to investigate more on the
social and political dimensions of such an economy. In particular, the Marxist concepts and
frameworks on which many of the PEA researchers so far have drawn (e.g. Bryer, 1991, 1993;
Neu & Taylor, 1996) is well suited to the analysis relating to the Chinese communist
government, the very origin of which is initially inspired by Marxism (Deng, 1993).

Secondly, the most distinctive feature of China’s economic reform that the country’s steel
and iron industry exhibits also adds to the uniqueness of this study. That is, whereas many
Chinese SOEs are increasingly corporatized and privatised, the entire iron and steel sector has
always been politically regarded as a strategic industry where national defence and natural
resources are at stake, and thus remains subjected to state control by allowing only a small
portion (less than 50%) of the iron and steel SOEs’ shares available on stock markets
(Movshuk, 2004). Therefore, notwithstanding their subsidiaries listed domestically and
overseas, these government-owned steel makers are effectively and essentially the “SOEs in
the guise of a modern corporations” (OECD, 2000, p.18). In other words, while at the
forefront of China’s globalised economy, the industry also contains most of the socialist
political characters (i.e. state ownership). As PEA is concerned with how accounting
information mediates, sustains, and perpetuates contradictions and class conflicts (Neu &
21

Chapter 2 Background
Taylor, 1996), it is thus argued that conflicts between economic reform and social welfare at
macro level, and at micro level between employees of SOEs, government officials, and the
newly emerged private entrepreneurs will be better analysed via the lens of PEA.

Thirdly, the class conflict in fact extends beyond the national boundaries to the international
arena. Mainly because of the impending depletion of China’s mineral resources and the
growing demand for iron ore as the raw materials to steel manufacturers (Brett & Ericsson,
2006), China has now become the single largest purchaser and importer of iron ores from the
three global mining oligopolies from capitalist economies──BHP Billiton, Vale, and Rio
Tinto. The iron ore trading between socialist SOEs and capitalist oligopolies therefore
contributes novelty to this PEA study through bringing the political focus out from any single
dominant form of society, whether socialism or capitalism, to a contemporary and interactive
platform.

Having pointed out the rationale behind the adoption of the PEA branch under the critical
accounting research paradigm, it is then of necessity to explore the existing PEA literature in
order to direct the research interest of the study. The next chapter is thus turned towards this
end.
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The previous chapter has introduced the background of the Chinese steel and iron industry
and the global iron ore market, which directs the research interest towards the field of
political economy. This chapter is thus dedicated to explore the extant PEA literature. In
doing so, it provides an overview of what the existing research has explored, and, based on
previous studies, identifies the particular theoretical and methodological approaches worth
further investigation in the thesis.

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The first section (3.1.) presents the
early development of PEA literature in the early 1980s. The second section (3.2.) discusses
Marx-informed accounting researches as one major stream of PEA. Other streams of PEA are
delineated in the third section (3.3.). The fourth section (3.4.) summarises the research topics
examined and methodologies used in the extant PEA studies, and then identifies the literature
gap to which the current research is able to contribute. Subsequently, the direction of research
interest is then specified in the fifth section (3.5.).

3.1. Early development of PEA
Although the concept of political economy has long been developed by scholars such as
Smith (1980), Ricardo (1952), and Marx (1887, 1956, 1959), the first study that incorporates
the political economy of accounting may perhaps be the work of Tinker (1980). In his paper
‘towards a political economy of accounting: an empirical illustration of the Cambridge
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controversies’, Tinker (1980) began with comparing how accounting concepts such as profit
and rate of profit were explained under neo-classical economics and classical political
economy. While the former saw profit as an indicator of economic efficiency and focused on
the forces of production covering the technical factors of the input and output quantities and
transformation coefficients, the latter considered profit as the return to capitalists and
concentrated on the social relations of production incorporating the distribution of power
among different classes in society and the social structure which enforced such a division of
power. Before Tinker (1980) went on to apply the two theoretical perspectives into a case
study of a Scottish iron ore company, he elaborated on the Cambridge Controversies (cf.
Sraffa, 1960; Robinson, 1961; Dobb, 1973) in order to highlight the tautological explanation
of marginalism:
“we begin by asking how the rate of profit is determined and the answer is with reference
to the quantity of capital and its marginal revenue product. We then ask how these are
determined and the reply is by assuming a division of future income and discounting the
returns to capital with the market rate of interest. All that has been said is that the market
rate of interest is a function of the market rate of interest (and an assumed income
distribution)” (Tinker, 1980, p.153).

Facing with the inability of marginalist theory to explain how income is distributed and
further how capitalism works, the classical political economy was reinstated to supplement
neo-classic economics with social and political concepts. Then, by adopting a political
economy viewpoint, Tinker (1980) interpreted the accounting data of a Scottish mining firm
(Delco) operating in Sierra Leone via three different periods in which the three respective
socio-political structures predominated (i.e. early colonial, late colonial, and post-colonial
periods). Market efficiency and social stability were analysed together, leading to a deeper
understanding that the distribution of accounting profit among different parties was a
reflection of the socio-political foundations that existed and changed in Sierra Leone.
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In so doing, Tinker (1980) powerfully substantiated the logical inconsistency of neo-classical
economics and the imperfect market competition, and then guided us towards and laid out a
general framework for further PEA researches based on two dimensions of capital. The first
was the physical instruments of production as the ‘economic forces of production’, and the
second the relationship of people in social institutions as the ‘social relations of production’
(p.154) (emphases added). To relate the former with the latter, an institutional realm was
presented to ensure that characteristics of social relations were considered for economic
production. According to Tinker (1980), PEA attempts to embrace the institutional
arrangements such as politics, education, religions, law, the military, social welfare, culture,
science, etc. While he explicitly stressed the importance of analysing accounting information
as a result of the corresponding institutional interactions, he also placed accounting onto the
institutional level as one of the factors determining and reinforcing the social distribution of
wealth, serving as an intermediary between society and economy.

This is not surprising to Cooper (1980). In his discussion of Tinker’s (1980) study, he
suggested that the assumptions underlying capitalism overwhelmed accounting. That is, the
institutional structure of capitalism within which concepts and ideas such as private property
rights and existence of market were conceived and nurtured was generally taken for granted
by accounting practitioners and researchers. As such, it is suggested that Tinker’s (1980) case
study of Delco failed to distinguish clearly capitalist principles from the then political
regimes throughout the three periods (early, late, and post-colonial periods) in Sierra Leone,
not to mention the interaction between the former and the latter. In the words of Cooper
(1980), this deficiency led to the rather blurred identification of the periodisation analyses
and the vague qualitative explanation. In the final part of Cooper’s (1980) commentary, by
regarding accounting itself as a form of ideology which “prevent(s) us from understanding
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the society in which we live and the possibility of changing it” (Shaw, 1972, p.33), he pointed
out the emancipatory potentials of PEA research in relation to a more holistic approach to
assess accounting in organisations and society.

Cooper and Sherer (1984) went on to further specify the emancipatory characteristics of PEA
in their study to assess the value of corporate accounting reports. Having pointed out the
incomplete analyses of accounting reports by the private value and the social value
approaches due to their shareholder and manager oriented foci, Cooper and Sherer (1984)
suggested the PEA approach. Here, the authors emphasised the three distinguishing elements
that PEA should possess: (1) the recognition of “power and conflict in society”; (2) the
specification on “historical and institutional environments” in which accounting operates; and,
(3) “the adoption of a more emancipated view of human motivation and the role of
accounting in society” (pp.218-219). While the first two features accorded with Tinker’s
(1980) elaboration on PEA, the third element specified the more emancipated roles of human
motivation and accounting as to proactively “change and reflect differing interests and
concerns” (Cooper & Sherer, 1984, p.219). Nevertheless, a theoretical framework for PEA is
yet to be presented. Apart from the three distinguishing features of PEA, Cooper and Sherer
(1984) also set out three imperatives for doing PEA research: ‘be normative, be descriptive
and be critical’ (p.219). However, these are said to be simply the “common-sense advice for
any critical researcher” (Owen, 2010, p.35), and again suffers from being too general and
lacking specific theoretical supports.

Following the research by Tinker (1980) and Cooper and Sherer (1984), Tinker and Neimark
(1987) adopted the PEA approach to examine the suppressive role of female workers at
General Motors (GM) as reflected in corporate annual reports for the period from 1917 to
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1976. By recognising the political power of accounting annual reports, their longitudinal
review demonstrated how the accounting annual reports were deliberately designed as
“ideological weapons aimed at influencing the distribution of income and wealth, in order to
ensure the company’s continued profitability and growth” (p.72).

Also noteworthy is the work of Tinker, Merino and Neimark (1982) conducted in the PEA
tradition. While the study critiques the Positive Accounting Theory (PAT), it discusses the
concept of value extensively including the classical political economy (cf. Ricardo, 1952),
and does point out that Marx’s theoretical contribution “offers one of the most promising
sources of radical thought” (Tinker et al., 1982, p.182). Drawing on the Marxist labour theory
of value, Tinker et al. (1982) critiqued the ahistorical and asocial character of utility-based
marginalist value and thus illustrated how PAT reinforced and sustained the social relations
of capitalism. Then alternative ways of conducting radical accounting researches were
introduced, warning us against narrowly construing and so localising (and limiting) radical
criticisms, and directing further critical studies towards “an overall context of social conflict”
(Tinker et al., 1982, p.191) at organisational and international levels.

So far it has been discussed that the need for PEA was established, in response to the logical
inconsistency of marginalism, as an alternative solution to supplement neo-classic economics
with socio-political forces in accounting studies. The social significance of accounting was
substantiated in a PEA tradition. Although an intellectual cul-de-sac was made in PEA at this
stage, there existed a few areas underdeveloped. First, in relation to the theoretical framework
for PEA, while Tinker (1980) introduced the social dimension of capital, Cooper and Sherer
(1984) suggested an ‘imperatives and features’ approach, and Tinker et al. (1982) discussed
the classical political economy and, inter alia, the labour theory of value, an agreed or
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particularly favoured established PEA procedure is yet to be developed. Secondly, the
specific data subject to PEA investigation also remained limited to either the elements of
financial statements (Tinker, 1980), corporate annual reports (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Tinker
& Neimark, 1987), or theoretical debate between neoclassic economics and labour theory of
value (Cooper, 1980; Tinker et al., 1982). Furthermore, while the socially constructive and
reflective role of accounting was illustrated, the critical potential of PEA to emancipate and
ultimately change the accounting arena is yet to be seen. Having pointed out the literature gap
insofar as PEA is concerned, further research is discussed in the following to see the
continued development of PEA.

3.2. Marxist PEA
Although Ricardian or Marxian theories were suggested by Tinker et al. (1982), at least
implicitly, as potential theoretical frameworks for PEA, much of the PEA studies undertaken
so far has come from the Marxian strand (Owen, 2003). The central contribution in this
strand should be attributed to the sustained research effort of Rob Bryer. The following
section is thus directed towards a detailed discussion of Marxian PEA studies and the work of
Rob Bryer in particular.

3.2.1. Elements of financial statements in Marxist PEA
Bryer’s (1991) longitudinal case study specifically incorporated Marx’s Capital. With
particular reference to Marx’s (1981) ‘great railway swindle’, Bryer (1991) explored the
financing of the British railways in the mid-nineteenth century which was generally regarded
by economic historians as the ‘temporary aberrations of laissez faire capitalism’ on one hand
and, on the other hand, as the ‘product of a rational and rapacious social hierarchy’ from
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Marxian point of view. While Bryer (1991) noted the difficulties in undertaking PEA
research that “(n)ot only must the investigator have a clear grasp of the conceptual
foundations of accounting, but must also interrogate the historical, economic, social and
political contexts of its practices” (p.440), he agreed with PEA’s three distinctive features
suggested by Cooper and Sherer (1984).

In another historical study, Bryer (1993) examined the emergence of modern financial
reporting (MFR) in Britain in the nineteenth century. Rather than agreeing with the
appearance of ‘managerial capitalism’ which considered management as a new powerful
class, Bryer (1993) adopted Marx’s prediction of ‘investor capitalism’ which saw the rise of
MFR as imperative to the general socialisation of capital. In analysing the historical
development of the MFR, he delineated the relations between the published company
accounts, the early auditing practice, and the shareholders’ collective need. Particularly, he
focused on the role of depreciation accounting as a major tool for management manipulation
(being either understated or overstated) serving investor interests, and thereby demonstrated
an efficient British capital market in the late nineteenth century.

Building on his previous study (Bryer, 1993), Bryer (1994) presented a theoretical paper
evaluating the theoretical relevance to accrual accounting between Marx’s labour theory,
modern theory of finance (MFT) and MFR. He compared concepts of the general rate of
profit, required rate of return, and capital asset pricing model under MFT with those under
Marxian views, and also corresponded concepts such as the objective of accounting, profit,
capital, production costs, inventories, historical cost, depreciation, current cost accounting
and goodwill from MFR with their Marxian counterparts. As such, he demonstrated the
superiority of Marx’s labour theory of value in investigating critical roles of accounting in

29

Chapter 3 Literature review: Political Economy of Accounting
modern capitalism. One key emphasis here by Bryer (1994) was surplus value as the ‘critical
question in political economy’.

Bryer’s interest in comparing the conceptual distinctions and overlaps between Marx and
accounting continued in another paper (Bryer, 1999a). Similar to his previous work (Bryer,
1994), Bryer (1999a) contended that while the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s
(FASB) conceptual framework derived from marginalism was ambiguous and subjective,
Marx’s interpretation of financial accounting lay out a scientific foundation for critical
accounting. More specifically, he traced the contemporary elements of financial statements
(i.e. asset, liabilities, equity, profit, revenue, gain, and expense) back to Marx’s theory of
capital in order to elucidate the suitability of the Marxian accounting concepts. Lay in the
centre of his critique here was the ‘circuit of industrial capital’6 and ultimately the theory of
surplus value as the origin of profit which reproduced and circulated capital. For Marx,
accounting “allows total social capital to observe the generation of surplus value and the rate
of return on capital” (Bryer, 1999a, p.586). It can be argued that this paper is a key study in
PEA literature incorporating Marxist thoughts.

While Bryer’s (1999a) methodological contribution may well be as the first PEA research
that compares the accounts of contemporary financial reporting with their Marxian
counterparts and points out a Marxian foundation for critical accounting, his paper (Bryer,
1999a) has also attracted a number of criticisms from the same issue of Critical Perspective
on Accounting7. For instance, drawing from Derrida’s analysis, Robson (1999) refuted the

6

According to Marx, industrial capital circulates from initial capital to commodities (including labour power and means of
production) necessary for production, and from production to commodities or services ready for sale, and then from sale of
goods or services to a greater amount of capital. Part or all of the new capital will then be reinvested, and capital increases
again; this is the circuit of industrial capital.
7

Critical Perspective on Accounting, (1999), vol.10, no5.
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relevance of Marxist accounting, because “Marx was not primarily concerned to explain how
business people calculate ‘profit’ except to show it was an ideological gloss” (p.624-5).

Macve (1999) argued that Bryer (1999a) misunderstood Marx’s circuit of capital in that his
(Bryer, 1999a) explanation of Marx’s capital circulation was similar to normal introductory
economics except the mentioning of surplus value. And, even with the resort to the theory of
surplus value which Bryer (1999a) seemed only to discuss in the process of production rather
than ‘the circuit of capital’, he failed to resolve the incorrigible issues in modern financial
accounting such as rules of recognition and measurement, as the Marxist thoughts to which
Bryer (1999a) referred were obsolete and thus unable to provide a critical basis for
accounting.

From a broader perspective, Tinker (1999) used the term ‘Praxis-to-Disclosure Reductionism’
to comment on both Bryer (1999a) and Macve’s (1999) overemphasis on Marx’s role ‘in
measuring and disclosing profit’ (Tinker, 1999, p.645). While Bryer (1999a) devoted the
entire paper to demonstrate the superiority of Marxist accounting over that of the FASB,
Macve (1999) simply adopted the same reasoning line to constrain the critical potential of
Marx’s theory to financial reporting, stating “there is no self-evident Marxist accounting, as
Rob Bryer or Richard Macve would seem to believe” (Tinker, 1999, p.647), and Marx would
not be “so stupid as to expect to launch the next revolution by rejigging financial reporting
practice” (ibid, p.649). According to Tinker (1999), some researchers (including Bryer and
Macve) simply relied on the ‘economistic caricature’ of Marx while ignoring much of the
philosophical and political Marx. Instead, Tinker (1999) pointed out that what Marx
emphasised was “not a definitive analysis of capitalism, but some important methodologicalpolitical tools for engaging and re-engaging a social system that is itself in constant renewal
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and transformation” (p.655). Clearly, Tinker (1999) here was less interested in the
‘economistic’ stance of Marx (on the early capitalism), but more concerned with tapping the
methodological and political potentials out of Marx and applying them into the social
struggles of a contemporary capitalist world such as the diminished role of the state, foreign
policy, human rights, and environmental degradation. In commenting on the current variety
of capitalism, he also mentioned China as one type of “hegemonic structures of capitalism”
(Tinker, 1999, p.655). Thus, Tinker (1999) after all agreed that Marx’s thoughts could
revitalise critical accounting research.

In the same issue of Critical Perspectives on Accounting still, Bryer (1999b) responded his
critics by (re)-emphasising his Marxist focus on the notion of accountability. That is, by
presupposing an objective ideal of accounting derived from his understanding of Marx, “only
objective accounts could allow investors to judge management’s behaviour; to punish or
reward them for their stewardship of capital” (Bryer, 1999b, p.684). Notwithstanding the
criticisms from different commentators, Bryer (1999b) reached the conclusion that, in general,
all of them acknowledged the potential for Marxist accounting and welcomed further
Marxian studies in PEA.

To summarise the discussion so far, despite some criticisms (Robson, 1999; Macve, 1999;
Samuelson, 1999), the application of Marxist theory into critical accounting research has
offered us a more fundamental conceptual framework, in comparison to marginalism, of
accounting which questions the very nature of capitalism (Bryer, 1999a, 1999b). However, as
Tinker (1999) indicated, the emancipatory potential of Marxist accounting was not to be
restricted within the confines of conceptual framework and financial disclosure, but to serve
as a methodological tool examining conflicts in society at large. Therefore, the following
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section is dedicated to see how Marx’s thoughts explore the issues of accounting other than
financial reporting.

3.2.2. Accounting change in Marxist PEA
3.2.2.1. Marxist accounting and the transition to capitalism
Bryer’s (2000a, 2000b) later studies were concerned with the changed roles of accounting ‘as
products and producers’ (p.131) of the transition in England from feudalism to capitalism, by
linking Weber’s (1964) discussion on the calculative mentalities of accounting with Marx’s
political economy. In his theory paper (Bryer, 2000a), the accounting evolution during the
transition period corresponded with different forms of extracting surplus value from labour,
through the “feudal mentality of maximising consumable surplus” to a “transitional
‘capitalistic’ mentality” (p.136). While the feudal mode of accounting focused on revenue
and expense accounts, the capitalist mode of accounting relied on the production and sale of
commodities to generate surplus value, albeit indirectly, and thus profit. With different
calculative mentalities in the transition elucidated above, Bryer (2000a) further assigned them
with the respective forms of accountability: “feudal accountability meant… peasants, were,
ultimately, personally accountable to their lord”, whereas capitalist accountability meant
“(m)anagement is… accountable to social capital for the realised rate of return on capital
employed in production, and investors are accountable to each other, by means of profit and
loss accounts and balance sheets” (ibid, p.142).

According to Bryer (2000a), it was the class struggle in agriculture and international trade
between the long established feudal merchants and the newly emerged middle class investors
in the sixteenth and the early seventeenth century that led to the bourgeois revolution and the
beginning of modern capitalism in England. He regarded the changes in accounting practice
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as an inevitable product of and the solution to these class conflicts (Bryer, 2000a). To test
these theoretical arguments via concrete examples, Bryer’s (2000b) archival research
presented a case study of the changed accounting system of the English East India Company
(EIC) during its period of bourgeois revolution and the transition to a joint stock body. In
particular, he examined the company’s financial statements and meeting minutes and the
corresponding legal documents regarding the development of the accounting system
alongside the historical development of the EIC. Consistent with his theory paper (Bryer,
2000a), Bryer (2000b) elucidated the transition from the feudal mode of accounting and
accountability through to the single entry bookkeeping and into the double entry bookkeeping
(DEB), as reflected in the changes from the particular accounting terminologies like stock,
capital, surplus, the ‘true and fair view’, and the capital maintenance to the general practice
like auditing and DEB. In addition to the accounting evolution in EIC, Bryer (2000b) was
also concerned with the changes in accounting methods in agriculture. He analysed the
accounts, texts, and literature of the farmers during the English agrarian revolution and
demonstrated the ‘capitalistic spirit’ gradually exhibited in these evidence. This was more
specific in Bryer’s (2006a) another paper dedicated to the genesis of England’s capitalist
farmers.

While Bryer (2000a, 2000b) successfully analysed the accounting evolution not as an
historical phenomenon but as a result of class struggles leading to modern capitalism, he also
explored the underlying context in which such transitions took place. In this aspect, the sociopolitical side of Marx referred by Tinker (1999) is investigated. However, whether or not
Bryer (2000a, 2000b) considered the exploitation superimposed upon the working class and
poorer countries by the EIC and other capitalists, from Tinker’s (1999) perspective, remains
arguably blurred.
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3.2.2.2. Marxist accounting and Industrial Revolution
Having presented a Marxist accounting history during England’s transition to capitalism,
Bryer (2005) extended his interest to the British Industrial Revolution (BIR). Consistent with
the findings in his previous papers (Bryer 2000a, 2000b), Bryer (2005) argued that “the
primary cause of variations in accounting during the BIR was variations in the social relations
of production” (p.25). Based on the accounting textbooks and the archives of the 25 leading
BIR enterprises and other secondary evidence that Bryer (2005) drew from previous studies,
he demonstrated that “the industrial revolutionaries did not just happen to also be capitalists”
(p.45), and therefore “the BIR was a capitalist revolution” (p.62). Although Bryer (2005) has
led us to understand the accounting implications for economic and social change, his study
focused largely on the accounting changes in business enterprises while leaving the social
and political ramifications unexplored.

Based on the Marxian political economy of accounting from which much of Bryer’s work has
derived, Toms (2005) conducted a longitudinal case study of the British Cotton Industry from
1700 to 2000. Unlike Bryer, Toms (2005) incorporated the Marxian framework, Bryer’s
Marxist accounting, and capital market theories to develop a PEA model for accounting
change. In particular, his model consisted of four quadrants / categories, each of which
representing the degree of productive resource centralisation and of capital socialisation.
Viewed in this model, he then located the (both financial and management) accounting
change at the core of and as a resolution to the contradiction between the centralisation of
resources and the socialisation of capital.
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3.2.2.3. Accounting for Global Capitalism: capital, labour, and professional service
In addition to Bryer, Hanlon (1996, 1997) was also concerned with accounting change.
Although Hanlon did not specify his work as that of Marxist, the locus of his study
considered the issues of class, and the social relations of production. However, unlike Bryer
(2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006a) and Toms (2005) who delved into the particular changes in
accounting methods and policies, Hanlon (1996, 1997) focused more on the changed
accounting profession as a whole at a macro level. That is, he would rather take the
accounting profession as a prototype within the increasingly globalised working environment
which has changed professional labour from a social service sector in the public interest, to a
commercialised ethos in the private interest. According to Hanlon (1996), professional
accountants, as a service class, serve as a control mechanism to assist capitalists in
controlling productive forces worldwide, and in allocating “surplus value to those
geographical regions and / or economic sectors that give the highest return of capital” (p.343).
The working class, on the other hand, has been increasingly excluded from the middle class
and of course from the accounting profession due to an underprivileged social and
educational background.

While agreeing with Hanlon (1996) that global capitalism has changed the accounting
profession, Arnold and Cooper (1999) examined how the latter has also promoted and
reinforced the former in the context of the neo-liberal privatisation movement and the global
restructuring of class relations. Their class analysis (Arnold & Cooper, 1999) explored the
changed relations between labour, capital, government and the accounting profession in the
case of the privatisation of a UK port. In particular, they illustrated the role of accounting
valuation in executing the neo-liberal transformation of asset ownership from public to
private hands, and from the less and under-developed to the developed countries. Social
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struggles where capital was favoured and labour marginalised were thus masked by the
seemingly technical and neutral accounting techniques, and the redistribution of wealth and
the raw exploitation achieved.

To summarise so far, while the changes in accounting techniques and regulations were
analysed, assigned with a capitalist mentality, and associated with respective underlying class
struggles and contradictions (cf. Bryer, 2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006a; Toms, 2005), the
changed accounting profession per se as an expert labour (middle) class was also elucidated
with its relation to capital and working class (Hanlon, 1996; Arnold & Cooper, 1999). The
socially reflective and constructive role of accounting seemed to be demonstrated, whereas
Hanlon (1997) presented his reservation on this point that “the service class (accountants) has
agency but it is still limited in its capacity (as derived from capitalism) to create and shape
(social) change” (p.853). Indeed, the PEA literature and accounting change in particular
discussed hitherto has predominantly remained their focus within capitalist societies, lacking
an alternative perspective from a non-capitalist context. Furthermore, the evidence and data
involved in PEA research so far were largely secondary, including accounting statements and
reports (Tinker, 1980; Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Tinker & Neimark, 1987; Bryer, 2000b),
survey and interview of accountants (Hanlon, 1996), historical archives (Bryer, 2000b, 2005,
2006a; Toms, 2005; Arnold & Cooper, 1999), and statistical results (Hanlon, 1996).
Responding to these issues, the following section is thus directed towards how Marxist PEA
develops through the use of primary data in a non-capitalist context.

3.2.3. Discursive formation of accounting in Marxist PEA
Neu and Taylor’s (1996) study is one of the very first PEA researches that incorporate the use
and abuse of accounting discourses and calculations with Marxian thoughts. It also concerns
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the accounting impact in a dual context including one typical capitalist society and a less
developed country. While putting the accounting discourse into the context of both a
Canadian university (Queen’s University) and the South African transnationals financed by
the university investment, Neu and Taylor (1996) argued that:
“(1) the ideological effect of accounting (as a distributive and hegemonic mechanism) is
to foreclose other narratives and value positions, (2) in doing so, accounting plays a
central role in the accumulation of capital and the appropriation of surplus value, and (3)
accounting is able to fulfil these functions not only because it harmonises with other
discourses but also because accounting expertise is asymmetrically distributed” (p.437).

To this end, they built up a theoretical link of accounting discourse between the Canadian
university as at the core of the modern capitalist world and the South African firms at the
periphery, in order to reveal the exploitative social relations inflicted by the multinationals
and rationalised and perpetuated by accounting.

In addition, unlike Bryer who adopts an accounting centric perspective, Neu and Taylor
(1996) situated the accounting discourse among other discourses (whether competing or
supportive) and in general the historical and socio-political background of both the Canadian
university and South Africa. In so doing, as claimed by Neu and Taylor, “one can step
outside the ‘commonsensical’ and see the relationship between anti-divestment interests and
discursive strategies” (ibid, p.440). Having presented a detailed discussion of the Canadian
and the South African contexts, Neu and Taylor (1996) examined the university board
meeting minutes on the controversy of the pro- and anti-divestment of university fund debate.
Not only did they elaborate on the constructive meanings of accounting calculations, but they
also analysed the rhetorical use of terms such as ‘academic freedom’, ‘fiduciary
responsibility’, and ‘economic autonomy’.
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By viewing accounting discourse among the meeting discussions, it is demonstrated that the
expert culture and ideological effect of accounting eclipsed the exploitation of the Africans,
masked the financial interest derived from surplus value, and sustained the status quo.
However, while indicating the possibility of bringing social change, Neu and Taylor (1996)
seemed to agree with Hanlon (1997) that constructive role of accounting remained largely
limited in favour of the powerful (capitalists) in the context of modern capitalism.

The above section has investigated and evaluated the extant PEA literature conducted in a
Marxist tradition. The aspects examined so far include the accounting conceptual framework,
accounting history, and accounting discourse. Whilst Tinker (1980) stressed the power of the
state as one of the critical elements for PEA, the implications for government were not well
researched as thoroughly as would have been possible with a few notable exceptions (Tinker,
1999; Bryer, 1991, 2000a, 2000b; Arnold & Cooper, 1999). Instead, many tend to
concentrate on the influence that industries and capitalists have on accounting (cf. Hanlon,
1996). Such a trend, according to Woodward and Woodward (2000), is even more prevalent
in the non-Marxist strand of PEA. Thus, it is to the non-Marxist stream PEA literature that we
now turn.

3.3. Alternative PEA
3.3.1. Bourgeois PEA
Although ‘political economy’ has always been one distinguishing feature of Marxist studies,
the term can also refer to bourgeois political economy when it comes to PEA research
(Arnold, 1990). While Marxist PEA focuses on issues of social relations of production and
class struggle, bourgeois political economy largely neglects these concerns and adopts a
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pluralistic view of the world (Parker, 2005). In fact, these two approaches are fundamentally
different and irreconcilable, because Marxism often trivialises the issues which are regarded
by the bourgeois view as being significant. More importantly, according to Gray et al. (1995),
bourgeois political economy is one essential approach to the study of accounting disclosure
of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), as some elements of CSR, albeit trivial under
Marxism, are to some extent bourgeois by their nature.

For instance, Guthrie and Parker’s (1989) longitudinal analysis of the CSR disclosure of an
Australian mining company (Broken Hill Pty) centred on the power of the corporation and
thus corporate reporting. Through the examination of the firm’s annual reports in 100 years,
they demonstrated the legitimacy theory’s inability of explaining CSR reporting and then
pointed to the robust potential of PEA, suggesting corporate disclosure as a “proactive
process of information…designed to set and shape the agenda of debate and to mediate,
suppress, mystify and transform social conflict” (Guthrie & Parker, 1989, p.351). However,
the explanatory potential here was only contained at the level of corporate executives who
utilised CSR for a self-interest motive, leaving the production and distribution of profit
untouched (see also Woodward & Woodward, 2000).

Moreover, the PEA approach was simply presented as an alternative to legitimacy theory,
with no further theoretical or methodological discussions presented by Guthrie and Parker
(1989). Similarly, Adams et al.’s (1998) enquiry into the CSR disclosure by a number of
European companies suggested the “ability of political economy theory to explain
motivations for corporate social disclosure decisions” (p.18). Again, they also simply pointed
out a PEA direction for CSR disclosure without further researches.
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Following Guthrie and Parker (1989), Abeysekera (2003) considered the intellectual capital
reporting (ICR) as a tool to better manage the relationship between corporations and their
respective socio-political and economic arrangements. He too centred his theoretical analysis
on corporations while downplaying the role of the state. Faced with the Marxian criticisms
(cf. Arnold, 1990; Tinker et al., 1991) of the bourgeois political economy and supporting the
Marxist stream of PEA, Gray et al. (1995) suggested, at the same time, that, by agreeing on a
lower level of political economy, different theories would not compete against one another
but enrich our understanding of CSR practices.

3.3.2. Other PEA
Accounting regulation has long been regarded as a result of complex power struggles among
different interest groups (cf. Chand & Cummings, 2008; Palmrose, 2009), and thus has
attracted the attention of some PEA studies. For example, Perry and Nolke’s (2006)
theoretical paper examined the International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB)
introduction of fair value accounting as an instrument of neo-liberalism reflective of the
changed social relations of production in favour of private capital while downplaying the role
of the state. Arnold’s (2012) case study of the accounting reform in the aftermath of the East
Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s considered the political power exerted by the alliance
between the Anglo-American finance sector and the US government over the accounting
harmonisation in emerging economies and global financial integration in general.

Unlike Perry and Nolke (2006) and Arnold (2012) who focused on the political significance
of the global financial capitalists (primarily from the US), Rosser (1999) studied the power of
domestic bureaucratic forces within developing economies on opposing the introduction of
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Western accounting standards. Similarly, Zhang et al. (2012) demonstrated the fair value
accounting as a tool of neo-liberalism in the context of China through a qualitative analysis.

Also noteworthy is the quantitative PEA study of Owen (2003) examining the correlation
between accounting firm mergers and the increase in profit margins of large accounting firms.
To this end, he adopted Cowling’s (1982) monopoly capitalism model which identified the
relationship between the level of industry profit margin and the level of industrial
concentration and merger activity to measure the degree of monopoly. As such, Owen (2003)
using on the statistical data involved including the fees, staff salaries and staff members in
large British accounting firms has illustrated the applicability of Cowling’s (1982) monopoly
model.

3.4. Conclusion
Summarising findings of the previous research as has been elaborated above on the political
economy of accounting, the following six key viewpoints are suggested:
(1) Both the Marxist and the bourgeois steams of the political economy of accounting
literature have been reviewed: the Marxist PEA studies have addressed accounting
conceptual framework (Bryer, 1991, 1994, 1999a; Macve, 1999), accounting and social
change (Bryer, 1993, 2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006a; Toms, 2005; Hanlon, 1996; Arnold &
Cooper, 1999), and ideological effect of accounting discourse (Neu & Taylor, 1996); the
bourgeois stream is interested in CSR disclosure (Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Adams et al.,
1998) and ICR (Abeysekera, 2003), and other PEA researches explore accounting
standards and regulation (Rosser, 1999; Perry & Nolke, 2006; Zhang et al., 2012; Arnold,
2012).
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(2) While Marxist accounting emphasises the dominant role of the state in shaping and being
shaped by accounting (Tinker, 1980), other PEA studies consider the power of
corporations as the primary factor. Furthermore, most of the social contexts on which
Marxist accounting scholars have focused remain within the capitalist paradigm, thereby
limiting the emancipatory potential of PEA. Similarly, most of the organisations and
institutions that extant PEA research concentrates on are private in nature with a few
notable exceptions (Neu & Taylor, 1996; Rosser, 1999).
(3) Marxist PEA often considers accounting change as the catalyst for as well as the solution
to social struggle. The class relations discussed only refer to those between feudal lords
and merchants (Bryer, 2000a, 2000b), between capital and labour (Bryer, 2000b, 2005,
2006; Toms, 2005), between global capitalists and emerging economies (Arnold, 2012),
between capital, labour, the accounting profession, and the capitalist state (Tinker, 1980;
Hanlon, 1996; Arnold & Cooper, 1999). Little attention has been given to the class
relation between global capitalists, a socialist government and the corporations therein.
(4) Indeed, the underlying socio-political environment in which extant PEA studies have so
far analysed refers primarily to capitalist ideology. Only a few researches consider more
than one dominant ideology deriving from either one single transitional society
historically (Bryer, 2000a, 2000b) or two different societies contemporarily (Neu &
Taylor, 1996). For those studies (Neu & Taylor, 1996) which involve both the core
capitalist country and the periphery, the role of accounting has been explored only within
the core, not the periphery.
(5) Although extensive studies have been undertaken in either a Marxist or a bourgeois
political economy tradition, there is no theoretical framework on which PEA scholars
agree.
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(6) The contemporary PEA literature on the use of accounting discourse in transitional
economies with competing ideologies has been sparse.

3.5. Directions of research interest
To fill the void in extant literature, this research explores the use of accounting discourse as
the product of as well as the solution to the social conflicts between the global capitalist
oligopolies, the Chinese socialist government and the corresponding SOEs in the Chinese
context. To make this analytic task feasible, the research focus is to move from the particular
to the general, as reflected in the following three inter-related areas.

3.5.1. Interaction between the global capitalist economy and a socialist market
As illustrated earlier, insufficient attention from the extant PEA literature has been given to
the interaction between two competing socio-political contexts. One exception is the
investigation of Neu and Taylor (1996) that situates accounting discourse into a dual context
where one capitalist society reacts to a less developed nation. At present, one of the most
conspicuous comparisons in this regard is that between China and the developed capitalist
economy. Therefore, while Neu and Taylor (1996) demonstrate the ideological role of
accounting language in appropriating surplus value for an advanced capitalist economy, the
current research studies how the discursive practice of accounting discourse, with specific
reference to the pricing mechanism of iron ore, has been used for a socialist state and against
capitalist oligopolies (i.e. the Big Three).
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In particular, such specific environment in which the accounting discourse is put forward
involves two paradoxical and yet interacting socio-political contexts, namely the Chinese
steel and iron industry and the global mining oligopolies. First, they are paradoxical in that
while the majority of China’s leading steel corporations are SOEs formed and controlled by
the socialist government and claim to be in the interest of the nation, the Western mining
oligopolies (i.e. BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Vale) are founded by private capital investment
and operate in the interest of shareholders. Secondly, they are also interacting in that the
Chinese iron and steel industry has been the biggest purchaser and importer of iron ores from
the mining oligopolies since 2004 (Zhu, 2012). Moreover, from a macro institutional
perspective, the newly established quarterly index pricing system for seaborne iron ore gives
rise to another set of interaction between the increasingly financialised global iron ore market
and an industry wide stagnation (Bao, 2012) of the Chinese iron and steel sector. The role of
accounting in such an interaction between finance and manufacturing leads to the next
discussion on the circuits of capital.

3.5.2. Circuits of capital
Originating from Marx’s Capital, an economy involves operations of distinct circuits of
capital----production, commerce, and finance (Grady & Ackroyd, 2013). While Bryer (1999a)
derives accounting concepts (asset, liability, equity, revenue, and expense) and various
financial statements from Marx’s (1956) circuit of industrial capital which consists of
production and commerce, Hanlon (1996) demonstrates the new role of accounting
profession in helping the capitalist class control productive labour and promote a global
financial system. Furthermore, Arnold (2012) characterises these finance capitalists as a new
ruling class which, at least temporarily, takes precedence over all other activities of the
business world and even directs the global accounting harmonisation. However, research on
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the interaction between productive, commercial, and financial capital has been sparse with a
few exceptions (e.g. Arnold and Cooper, 1999). Furthermore, most of the studies examining
the relationship between production, commerce, and finance often presuppose the supreme
power of finance and therefore focus on the process regarding how financial capital
dominates productive and commercial capital. This thesis then studies the interaction between
the global iron ore market and the Chinese steel and iron industry via the lens of the
productive, commercial, and financial capital. Questions are asked: will the production and
commerce capital always passively accept the institutional arrangements by finance capital?
If not, how will the productive and commercial side compete with their financial counterpart?
In such scenario, is accounting still promoting the finance sector as elucidated by previous
studies (e.g. Hanlon, 1996; Arnold & Cooper, 1999; Arnold, 2012) or can accounting be in
favour of the production and commerce to compete with finance, and how and why?

To fill the literature gap and answer the questions above, therefore, this thesis explores the
proactive confrontation of the productive and commercial with financial capital. In particular,
I will elaborate on the use of accounting discourse by the Chinese steel and iron industry in
resisting the financialised pricing mechanism of iron ore. Moreover, the unique characteristic
of Chinese SOEs as operating (and monopolising) in a socialist market economy and at the
same time being increasingly involved with globalised markets will be taken into
consideration. In so doing, I will address the ‘why’ question as to the reasons that accounting
discourse is set to serve the interests of productive and commercial capital, and ultimately
failed to resist the participation of financial capital in the global iron ore market.
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3.5.3. Social change and class conflicts
At a deeper level, the broader socio-political context in which the shift from the long term
negotiation pricing model to the quarterly index pricing mechanism took place will be
examined. Based on the extant literature and Marxist PEA in particular, social change comes
as the consequence of the class conflicts between the social relations of production and the
productive forces (Bryer, 2000a, 2000b; Toms, 2005; Arnold & Cooper, 1999). Accounting
in itself is also part of such changes (Neu & Taylor, 1996; Hanlon, 1997). Thus, the analysis
of accounting discourse in this thesis goes beyond the confines of the iron ore price, and
extends to the relevant social relations and productive forces with which the Chinese steel
and iron industry and the Big Three are concerned.

Furthermore, unlike the previous studies that concern the issue of class, this thesis explores
the major state-owned steel enterprises, as a relatively new type of class, in the so called
socialist market with Chinese characteristics—a term used by the CPC government to
describe the combination of planned economy with free market (see Deng, 1993, p.149; Jiang,
2006a, pp.198-205, 2006b, p.17). In this context, the former Chinese president Jiang Zemin
commented on the development of SOEs as “not only an important economic issue, but also a
significant political issue” (Jiang, 2006c, p.71). Thus, while Bryer (2000a) explained the
capitalist accountability that “management is… accountable to social capital for the realised
rate of return on capital employed in production, and investors are accountable to each other”
(p.142), the present research contributes to the literature by exploring the accountability of
China’s SOEs from a class perspective.

To address these directions of interest (3.5.1.—3.5.3.), and given that there is not any
methodological framework for PEA upon which researchers have hitherto unanimously
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agreed or used, this thesis has thus developed the methodological and theoretical framework
in the following two chapters (chapter four and chapter five). To this end, this research draws
primarily from Marx’s discussion of finance in Capital, and his philosophical and
methodological thoughts in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and The German
Ideology, for several reasons. Firstly, Marx’s theory serves as part of China’s social and
political context in which the research is carried out. As mentioned in section 1.2., Marxism
has always been considered as a vital theoretical basis for the CPC since the establishment of
People’s Republic of China (Jiang, 2006a, p.157, 2006b, p.8; Hu, 2006). Secondly,
responding to Tinker’s (1999) call for engaging Marx’s work as a methodological tool
capable of exploring contemporary issues, the current research aims to develop a Marxinformed methodology to study the accounting discourse regarding the price of iron ore.
Thirdly, while the concept of capital movement, and particularly the industrial capital, has
been explored by scholars such as Bryer (1999a) and Grady and Ackroyd (2013), the concept
of financial capital and its relationship with the productive and commercial capital from a
Marx’s perspective remains largely under researched. To fill the gap, this thesis also engages
in a theoretical discussion of financial capital based on Marx’s work, contingent upon the
case of the shift in the iron ore pricing mechanism. This is discussed in the next chapter.
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This chapter provides a theoretical discussion of the extant literature on financialisation, in
order to develop the theoretical framework for studying the financialisation of iron ore price
in this thesis. The chapter is structured as follows. The first section (4.1.) introduces the term
financialisation in general. Section 4.2. first reviews the existing literature of financialisation
from (Post-) Keynesian perspectives and subsequently presents a critique on this approach.
Then, based on Marx’s Capital, section 4.3. is directed towards a Marxist framework of
financialisation which explores the relationships between productive, commercial, and
financial capitalists, and between financial capitalists and ordinary workers, in the context of
contemporary capitalism. Section 4.4. pulls the arguments together and provides implications
of the Marxist approach for further research directions, specifically indicating research
potentials for critical investigations in accounting literature. In the final section (4.5.), the
term “financialisation” is defined, contingent upon the current case study of the financialised
price of iron ore in the global market.

4.1. Introducing Financialisation
Although the term financialisation has only been popularised in recent decades, it has been
applied to the examination and analysis of a wide variety of phenomena ranging from the
globalised financial markets (Arnold, 2012), the growing significance of shareholder value in
management decision making and corporate strategy (Crotty, 1990; Boyer, 2000; Feng et al.,
2001; Andersson et al., 2006; Lazonick, 2008; Andersson et al., 2010b), the increased
financial investment and income streams from non-financial sectors (Stockhammer, 2004;
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Crotty, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008), the recent global financial crisis (Crotty, 2009; Lapavitsas,
2011), and the international financial reporting standards (Nolke & Perry, 2008; Zhang &
Andrew, 2014; Muller, 2014; Haslam et al., 2015). Despite the fact that extant research has
approached financialisation from the aforementioned perspectives, the concept remains
elusive with no precise definition agreed upon. At a minimum, as has been broadly analysed,
financialisation refers to the economic and political growth of financial markets and financial
institutions. For instance, Arnold (2012) defines financialisation as a political product leading
to economic transformations wherein financial capital dominates over domestic as well as
global economies. The specific way in which financialisation has gained its prominence,
according to Krippner (2005), lies in its pattern of accumulation with profit directly and
increasingly garnered through financial channels rather than through production and
commerce.

To further explore the social, economic, and political ramifications of financialisation, this
chapter presents two theoretical reviews of two different approaches—(Post-) Keynesian, and
Marxist. In particular, while the (Post-) Keynesian perspective has been widely applied in
extant literature of financialisation, a Marxist political economy framework in this respect has
been given relatively less attention. To fill this gap, I begin with a critique of the (Post-)
Keynesian and then focus on a Marxist approach. By so doing, it is hoped to shed light on a
new understanding of financialisation, which will then inform the theoretical lens of the
thesis.
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4.2. (Post-) Keynesian approaches to Financialisation
4.2.1. Extant review on literature of (Post-) Keynesian financialisation
Much of the contemporary research in the area of financialisation has been developed in the
(Post-) Keynesian tradition, examining the relationship between flourishing financial markets
and stagnating non-financial sectors. In particular, a common presumption here is that, since
ownership dominates management, financial enterprise comes to dominate non-financial
enterprise. For instance, Crotty (1990) presents three (Post-) Keynesian views on financial
sector domination with specific reference to Keynes (1936), Tobin (1977), and Minsky (1975,
1982, 1983). Keynes (1936) argued that stockholders and the financial market in general take
precedence over management in calculating the expected rate of profit on capital, and,
consequently, an equity market populated by comparatively ill-informed stockholders
dominates management decision-making in non-financial sectors. In this sense, it is argued, a
disquieting instability informs the financial sector where a large number of ignorant
speculators trade for short-term capital gains.

Contrary to Keynes’ (1936) assumptions of irrationality and ignorance in capital markets, yet
claiming his theory to be an appropriate extension of Keynes, Tobin (1977) puts forward an
efficient and stable financial market with rational investors. Under such circumstance,
stockholders and managers will share identical information with the shared purpose of
maximising the value of stock. However, as Tobin (1977) points out, while market investors
as shareholders initiate and continuously evaluate the economic activities of the enterprise,
managers become passive agents who execute business decisions made by the efficient
market. In other words, the financial market is portrayed as dominant, and management
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(particularly those with a non-financial background) becomes at best functionary and perhaps
redundant.

Similar to Tobin (1977), Minsky (1983) not only treats shareholders and managers as
theoretically identical, but also considers that the financial sector dominates the real sector8.
For Minsky, the real sector has always been guided by finance, in that
“(t)he profitability of existing capital… can only change if investment and expected
investment decline. Thus we have to look elsewhere—to arguments other than those
derived from assumed properties of production functions and hand waves with regard to
over-investment… The natural place to look… is in the impact of financing relations”
(Minsky, 1983, p.13).

Therefore, since finance directs the development of the real sector, economic instability is
again rooted in financial markets.

While disagreeing with Tobin (1977) and Minsky’s (1983) alignment with neo-classical
theory, Crotty (1990) argues that owners and managers are in fact conceptually different
regarding their respective roles and objectives. Rather than assuming the notion of a pure
dictatorship of finance, Crotty (1990) champions a particular type of “semiautonomy”
between financial and nonfinancial sectors where “both management and wealth-holder
decisions have macroeconomic effects that change the environment within which the other
agent operates” (p.537). In the era of contemporary capitalism, however, Crotty (1990) does
recognise the constraint superimposed by financial markets upon management, and he

8

The use of the terms “real sector” and “real economy” here refers to the non-financial sector within the same economy.
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reaches the same conclusion as those of Keynes, Tobin, and Minsky that “financial markets
dictate enterprise investment decisions” (p.540).

More recently, based on the Post-Keynesian theory of investment (Lavoie, 1992),
Stockhammer (2004) explores the potential negative impact that financialisation has on
capital accumulation and growth of the real sector. In particular, and consistent with Lavoie
(1992), Stockhammer (2004) proposes that the goal of the firm is not simply about
profitability, but covers a wide range of aims such as organisation growth, market expansion
and so forth. However, the shareholder revolution (Lowenstein, 2004) coupled with the neoliberal movement has shifted the decision-making power from management to financial
market investors and made profit maximisation the single most important aim of the firm. As
such, the increasing power of the financial sector, which seeks short term capital gains
(Schaberg, 1999), would intrinsically suffocate the long term growth of the real economy.

Similar to Stockhammer (2004), Orhangazi (2008) also proposes the negative impact of
financialisation on real capital accumulation. However, unlike Stockhammer (2004), who
analyses the depressive effects regarding investment behaviour of non-financial businesses at
a macro-economic level, Orhangazi (2008) attributes the issue, at the firm level, to not only
the increased financial investment (see also Crotty, 2005) but also the increased payments
that the real sector has made to financial markets (e.g. Boyer, 2000; Aglietta & Breton, 2001).
Although this is substantiated by his econometric tests, Orhangazi (2008) limits his findings
to the context of US economy, and warns those countries shifting towards the US-style
financial system about the potential impediments brought by finance.
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To sum up the (Post-) Keynesian approach discussed above, financialisation is portrayed as
the expansion of financial markets and institutions in both size and power. The financial
sector has grown so fast that it is now threatening the growth of real economy with its
endogenously generated financial instability (Crotty, 1990, 2009) and its depressive impact
on the real sector. However, this view is problematic for several reasons, and the following
section thus provides a critique of the Post-Keynesian approach to understandings of
financialisation.

4.2.2. Critiques on (Post-) Keynesian approach to Financialisation
An important limitation of the (Post-) Keynesian approach is that it restricts the
understanding of financialisation to a comparison of financial and non-financial sectors.
Further, within these two broadly defined ‘sectors’, consideration is limited to interactions
that take place within the confines of the owner-manager paradigm: business owners /
shareholders represent the interest of financial markets, and managers operate to achieve
growth in real sectors. In reality, this is not always the case. On the one hand, not all nonfinancial businesses have been fully capitalised in stock markets, especially in those
developing countries to which most of the productive activities in the developed world are
outsourced. Thus, company owners operating in emerging economies are not from financial
sectors and prefer long term business growth as opposed to short term capital gains. On the
other hand, corporate managers nowadays focus not only on the real growth of firms, but also
on the short term gains. This is partly because of the ex post factors such as performance
related payment schemes and stock options that have turned management of non-financial
firms into “financial market players” (Rossman & Greenfield, 2007, p.2) seeking short term
investment gains, particularly when there exists long-term uncertainty (McSweeney, 2009).
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A second limitation relates to the working class, which has been increasingly influenced by
financialisation, in at least two aspects. First, the rising significance of finance has not only
shifted the decision making power from managers to shareholders, but it has also deprived
employees of their political and economic bargaining capacity: the long established wagesproductivity-profit nexus that has traditionally ensured workers’ status has been gradually
eroded by modern corporations via downsizing, casualisation, and outsourcing, in an attempt
to please financial market investors. In other words, ordinary workers (and particularly those
from non-financial sectors) have been increasingly subjected to the instability and insecurity
of their jobs in the name of financial restructuring (Arnold & Cooper, 1999; Rossman &
Greenfield, 2007). Even the daily lives of ordinary workers have become deeply implicated
in activities of financialisation: mortgage payments have now become commonplace and
often necessary in housing and vehicle markets (Cook et al., 2009), and the increasingly
privatised and financialised pension and insurance funds rely heavily on financial markets
(Cutler & Waine, 2001). Further, due to the unstable nature of financial institutions and
systems, responsibilities and risks have been shifted from the market to individuals and
households in times of economic crisis (Langley, 2004, 2006; Dixon & Monk., 2009). The
crux of the matter then becomes the wide ranging influence that finance has on normal
workers in terms of household income, consumption, savings and investment. Overall, taking
the working class into consideration, financialisation can be located and assessed in society at
large; locking financialisation inside the commercial world would “hide as much as (it) …
reveal(s)” (Tinker & Carter, 2003, p.578), resulting in a fundamental disregard of labour in
both academic research and government policy.

Stepping outside of the owner-manager-labour conflict, the (Post-) Keynesian dichotomy of
financial and non-financial sectors simply assumes a strong sense of homogeneity, by
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universalising different data and analyses from various non-financial firms. Whilst in so
doing the contrast and conflict between financial and non-financial sectors can be easily
established, it nevertheless overlooks some critical difference within the real sector. The
traditional political economy approach (e.g. Smith, 1980; Ricardo, 1952), for instance, would
emphasise on the value of labour and hence the process of production. From Marx’s
perspective, there exists a critical difference between productive and commercial sections
within the same non-financial sector: whilst commercial as well as financial activities
appeared long before the birth of capitalism, or in Marx’s (1959, p.424) words, the
“antediluvian” age, it is the (capitalist mode of) production which separates human labour
from the means of production, and which enables large scale production and has thus given
rise to capitalism. Turning to the contemporary stage of economic globalisation, many, if not
most, non-financial firms in advanced capitalist economies have already outsourced
manufacturing activities to the developing world, whereas the commercial sector remains
comparatively less affected. Viewed in this way, the (Post-) Keynesian approach seems to be
overly reductionist as it takes the entire non-financial sector as the subject of analysis while
neglecting the endogenous heterogeneity and hybridity from within.

From the perspective of the exogenous relationship that exists between financial and nonfinancial sectors, it has been shown that much of the (Post-) Keynesian literature has either
presumed or hypothesised the deterministically depressing effect that financialisation would
have on non-financial sectors, leaving no room for the positive side (if any) of finance, and
assigning the real sectors with a purely passive role (e.g. Crotty, 1990, 2009). Had finance
presented no benefits towards social and economic progress in its earlier stage of
development, it would not have risen to such prominence in contemporary capitalist societies.
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On the other hand, also of particular relevance is how productive and commercial activities in
the real sector as the subject engage and interact with finance as the object. After all, if
financialisation, as generally agreed in extant literature, refers to the increase in the size and
power of financial markets and institutions, a richer story could be told by paying particular
attention to the historical and institutional settings ranging from the rise of finance, its
interaction with other parts of the economy, and its present dominance. To state it simply,
what should be noted is the historical and geographical contingency of capitalism (e.g. Hall &
Soskice, 2001) in general and financialisation (e.g. Arrighi, 1994, 2007) in particular. For
instance, in the early stage of capitalism, Marx (1959) points out that finance (in the form of
interest-bearing capital) enabled the refining of production “by ruining the feudal lord and
small-scale producer… and centralising the conditions of labour into capital” (p.426). In this
sense, finance was subordinated in general to the “conditions and requirements of the
capitalist mode of production”, recruiting new forces of industrialists and merchants and thus
reinforcing the supremacy of capital (pp.428-9). When capitalist development reached its
maturity in one region, it became highly likely that the (financial) capital would flow to those
less developed areas, which would subsequently become involved with the production and
trade. Viewed in this way, finance, as the extant literature would agree, may slow down the
growth in the local “real economy”, but it does not necessarily bring the negative effects on
non-financial firms elsewhere. That is, from a world-system perspective (Power, 2009) that
considers financial and non-financial sectors as the common elements across regional and
national boundaries in the contemporary business world, it is less surprising that finance may
not be as detrimental as was seen in any individual areas or countries alone. Thus, to fully
appreciate how finance has affected, and been affected by, the real economy, there is an
urgent need to first of all recognise the historically and geographically contingent nature of
financialisation, and then to (re-)define the concept of financialisation appropriate to the
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specific temporal and spatial context within which it corresponds, without presupposing or
universalising any findings from local to global.

Once we realise that financialisation should be analysed within the international political
economy as a whole, another limitation of the (Post-) Keynesian approach becomes apparent.
This limitation relates to the selection and use of data. While many studies collect and
analyse the data from financial and non-financial sectors in developed countries (e.g. the US
and the UK) (e.g. Andersson et al., 2006; Andersson et al., 2010; Haslam et al., 2015), some
other researchers (e.g. Grabel, 1995; Demir, 2007) have used the data from developing
nations. However, little connection has been made between developed and developing
countries, nor is there any reflection on the actual process in which any two different
countries interact. Further, the empirical analyses in (Post-) Keynesian studies are not always
conclusive, nor are the statistical findings overwhelming (e.g. Stockhammer, 2004;
Orhangazi, 2008; van Treeck, 2009). Therefore, faced with the limited use and analysis of
data, attention should be turned to the overlapping areas between developed and developing
countries where the financial capital coordinates and / or competes with the real sector therein.

To summarise the critique so far, the (Post-) Keynesian approach to financialisation limits the
interaction between financial and non-financial within the owner-manager paradigm while
ignoring the broader social implications of financialisation on ordinary people. It reduces the
complexity by universalising the distinctions between production and commerce. Taking the
financial and non-financial together, (Post-) Keynesian literature fails to recognise the
interrelationship between the two, by assuming the deterministically detrimental effects of the
former on the latter. This is, at least in part, due to the limited selection and use of data which
constrain the analyses within national contexts, and thereby overlook the interrelationship
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between finance and real sectors globally. Given these deficiencies, what has yet to be
accomplished is a closer examination of the process of how financialisation coordinates and /
or competes with non-financial sectors, particularly in the context of manufacturing sectors,
without presupposing the dominance of any party, on a global scale that sees advanced
capitalist economies interacting with emerging markets.

Although a concrete exploration as such (of the proposed approach above) is lacking in
literature as well as theory, there does exist another stream of studies which exhibits the
potential to satisfy this demand and thus merits further elaboration, namely the Marxist
political economy approach towards financialisation. As urged by Crotty (1990) that
“Marxists will have to take financial phenomena more seriously than they have traditionally
done” (p.541), already many Marxian researchers have begun to investigate financialisation
in terms of the conflict between financial capitalists and industrial capitalists (Dumenil &
Levy, 2004), financial expropriation of the working class (Lapavitsas, 2009a； Fine, 2010),
poverty (Fine, 2007), global and geo-political relocation of production, commerce, and
finance (Grady & Ackroyd, 2013), and the global financial crisis (Lapavitsas, 2009b).
However, it is argued here that a detailed theoretical framework for financialisation largely
remains absent. The following section, therefore, attempts to theorise financialisation towards
the Marxist political economy approach, by referring primarily to Marx’s (1887, 1956, 1959)
Capital.

4.3. Marxian approach to financialisation
While Marx never actually refers to the term “financialisation”, its theoretical underpinnings
for radical analysis of the political economy accounting can be found in Marx’s concept of
interesting-bearing capital / loanable capital (Capital, Vol III, chapters 21-25). That is,
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Marx’s concept of the money capital traded as a commodity that accrues revenue in the form
of interest. This interest, furthermore, is argued to result from the profits generated by the
investment projects of the manufacturing and commercial capitalists. Although Marx was
rarely concerned with other types of financial capital / financial assets in his work, as many,
if not most, of the financial instruments nowadays have only been invented and popularised
in the last several decades, he did refer to the financial products other than interest-bearing
capital and consider them to be the “derivatives of this form (interest-bearing capital) and
presuppose its (interest-bearing capital’s) existence of” (Marx, 1959, p.256). Admittedly,
some might maintain that, even with the recognition of interest-bearing capital, Marx’s
interpretation is limited to the particular social, political, historical, and technological
background in which he lived. However, we endeavour here to place financialisation (in the
form of interest-bearing capital) in Marx’s Capital not simply as a part of the history that
Marx has studied, but with the aim of developing and applying “some important
methodological-political tools (that Marx bequeathed to us) for engaging and re-engaging a
social system that is itself in constant renewal and transformation” (Tinker, 1999, p.655; see
also Cooper & Tinker, 1994; Cooper, 1997).

Seeing in this way, interest-bearing capital has to be the point of departure for developing a
Marxist theoretical framework for financialisation. Therefore, the following sections first
(section 4.3.1.) present the often mystified nature of interest-bearing capital in particular
relation to its self-expanding pattern; second (section 4.3.2.), attempt to demystify such an
accumulation by establishing the affiliation between the movement of interest-bearing capital
with that of the industrial (which contains productive and commercial) capital; third (section
4.3.3.), explore the interrelationship between finance (as represented by interest-bearing
capital), production, and commerce further via the concept of idle money; fourth (section
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4.3.4.), following the discussion of idle money, investigate the link between finance and the
working class; and, finally (section 4.4.), present further directions for critical analyses of
financialisation within Marx’s political economy framework.

4.3.1. The mystified nature of (financial) capital
Although Marx’s (1959) discussion of interest-bearing capital in Capital did not begin until
Chapter 21 Volume III, in analysing the “General Formula for Capital” from Volume I he
already pointed out, albeit briefly, the often mystified and circular nature of (financial) capital.
Capital, Marx (1959) argues, is self-expanding in that money transforms from its monetary
value as financial (or interest-bearing) capital to take on a functioning capital guise, which, in
turn, further enhances the wealth of the financial capital. In other words, when money is
transferred from a financial capital-holder to a functioning capital-holder, the functioning
capital-holder converts the money into commodity capital (in the form of labour), which is
used to generate a return (profit) that eventually flows back to the financial capital-holder in
the form of interest. Seen in this way, lending money is nothing more than the financial
capital-holder giving away the functioning right (i.e. the profit-making ability) of the
monetary capital to a functioning capital-holder (i.e. the borrower) in exchange for an interest
payment. This enables money to “become a commodity… sui generis” (Marx, 1959, p.222)
which takes the form of capital. More importantly, unlike other commodities which
depreciate over time, money as a commodity not only remains intact but also increases its
value over time through consumption (except the case of inflation).

Marx argued that, because money has the capacity to create more money, an “automatic
fetish” is created, along with a “mystification” of the nature of capital:
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“It is the capacity of money, or of a commodity, to expand its own value independently
of reproduction—which is a mystification of capital in its most flagrant form… a form in
which the source of profit is no longer discernible, and in which the result of the
capitalist process of production—divorced from the process—acquires an independent
existence” (ibid, p.256) (emphasis added)

More significantly, this mystification of capital has led many to take the interest income as
the natural product of capital, so that capital is considered to be
“a self-regulating automaton, as a mere number that increases itself… (and) the law of its
growth (as) in the formula s = c(1 + i)n, in which s = the sum of capital + compound
interest, c = advanced capital, i = rate of interest… and n stands for the number of years
in which this process takes place” (p.258).

Even more romanticised has been that, when capital, and so is its self-expanding magic, is in
the hands of the borrower, she or he will be able to literally pay the interest and the principal
by creating and using new loans, arriving at the “pleasant progression of an infinity of loans”
(ibid, p.259). As such,
“(i)n its capacity of interest-bearing capital, capital claims the ownership of all wealth
which can ever be produced, and everything it has received so far is but an instalment for
its all-engrossing appetite. By its innate laws, all surplus-labour which the human race
can ever perform belongs to it” (p.259)

Interestingly and ironically, regarding the aforementioned law of capital growth as well as the
“pleasant infinity of loans”, parallels can still be drawn with today’s financial world, with
regard to both commercial arena and academic circle, where interest / discount rates are
widely applied in calculating present as well as future values of capital investment, the
Capital Asset Pricing Model, for instance. Despite the contemporary relevance of such “laws
of capital growth” (i.e. s = c(1 + i)n, or, M– M’), Marx (1959) considers these laws as
superficial and thoughtless, and hence his investigation continues, devolving deeper the
mystified character of capital. For him, the ability of money to reproduce and increase itself
is “by no means a feature of interest-bearing capital alone” (ibid, p.227) but is in fact
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representative of the total circuit of capital movement as a whole. That is, neither the ex ante
transfer of capital from lender to borrower nor the ex post receipt of capital from borrower to
lender is a part of capital circulation. Rather, it simply helps prepare and supplement the real
circulation process to be later carried out by industrial capitalists. Thus, the rate of interest to
a large extent should depend on the general condition of the productive and commercial
activities within the same economy. Viewed in this way, the movement of interest-bearing
capital should not be the concluding remark here to understand finance, but rather the point of
departure to fully appreciate how money as interest-bearing capital creates more money with
regard to the circuits of industrial capital. Therefore, the following section considers the
production and circulation of industrial capital and then explores its interaction with interestbearing capital.

4.3.2. The demystification of capital
According to Marx (1956), industrial capital consists of two parts: production and commerce,
which move as a circuit whereby commercial capitalists first spend money on labour and the
means of production which are then put into the sphere of production by productive
capitalists. Once the production process has been completed, during which time surplus value
is extracted, the finished product becomes a commodity available for sale in the hands of
commercial capitalists. Finally, when the sale is made, the surplus value is realised in
monetary form as profit. Once the initial money has been put back to businesses, the
industrial circuit can be reproduced, and even expanded if surplus value (i.e. the profit), or
part of it, is reinvested. Here, one common factor that flows from the productive to the
commercial activities is surplus value: whilst it is extracted originally from the exploitation of
human labour in the sphere of production, its monetary value can only be realised in the
subsequent commercial transactions; and, when the realised surplus value is employed to
63

Chapter 4 Theorising Financialisation in Iron Ore Market
initiate new commercial activities, the production scale can be extended and thereby
generates new surplus value that, in turn, leads to more commercial transactions.

Having demonstrated the movement of industrial capital and the role of surplus value as the
link between productive and commercial activities, the broader circulation between
production, commerce, and interest-bearing capital is delineated in five phase in Figure 4.1
below.

In the first phase, M – M, the interest-bearing / financial capitalist lends money (M) as a
commodity to the industrial capitalist who later utilises the money as productive and
commercial capital (M). In the second phase, M – C, the previously borrowed money is
converted into commodity capital (C) which is then spent on the productive capital including
labour power (L) and means of production (MP) in the third phase (P). When the use-value of
labour (L) and means of production (MP) are consumed in production process (P),
commodities and /or services are produced with greater exchange value (C’) which are then
sold for greater monetary value (M’)in the fourth phase. In the fifth phase, while being able to
retain the profit (∆M) generated from phases two to four, the industrial capitalist returns the
original money (M) to the financial capitalist, with an interest payment (iM) which is a
portion of the profit (∆M). With its reflux to the lender, the capital is “always ready to
perform the same process over again” (Marx, 1959, p.226).
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Taking the five phases as a whole, Marx (1959) argues that
we shall see that a definite amount of value is continually advanced, and that this same
amount plus surplus-value, or profit, is withdrawn from circulation. The actual acts of
exchange do not, at any rate, reveal how this process is promoted. And it is precisely this
process of M as capital, on which the interest of the money-lending capitalist rests, and
from which it is derived (pp.226-7) (emphases added)

To put it simply, the above quotation from Marx (1959) demystifies the previously mystified
self-expanding nature of capital, by revealing the true identity of the surplus value originating
from the exploitation of human labour in the sphere of production. The participation of the
interest-bearing capital does not change or produce any individual value of the commodities
or services produced; it does affect however the way in which the surplus value (previously
extracted from production) is to be distributed. While sharing a portion of surplus value with
industrial capitalists, the interest-bearing capitalists not only successfully avoid the trouble of
employing capital in the actual production and circulation of the goods and services in the
first instance, but also make invisible the real exploitative process from which he or she later
benefits. By so doing, interest appears only as interest, the natural product of capital, whereas
the surplus value that generates the interest is no longer the subject matter. This, viewed by
Marx (1959), is how financial capital is mystified, assigned with an independent existence,
and deemed to be self-creating and self-expanding.

In addition, the demystification of the circuit of capital also reveals the status of surplus value
that permeates the broad circulation of capital from finance to production. Now the question
becomes to what extent the three types of capital collaborate and / or disarticulate with one
another in relation to surplus value. The answer, according to Marx (1959), is twofold. At the
manifest level, since part of the profit generated and realised by the productive and
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commercial capitalists is to be absorbed by financial capitalists, there exists a paradoxical
relationship between the two: the more the surplus value is extracted by one party, the less
stays in the hands of the other.

At the latent level, however, the relationship between the two parties may not be as
antagonistic as that between surplus value and labour wages. That is, while the qualitative
difference between surplus value and wages results in “the quantitative division of the
produced value”, the “qualitative differentiation” that distinguishes interest-bearing
capitalists from their productive and commercial counterparts “proceeds rather from the
purely quantitative division of the same sum of surplus-value” (Marx, 1959, p.238)
(emphases in original). For Marx (1959), the distribution of surplus value among productive,
commercial, and financial capitalists is not considered as any class antagonism, but rather as
the conflict that takes place among different fractions within the same capitalist class.
Therefore, despite the internal conflict among interest-bearing, productive, and commercial
capitalists, their collective interest in the form of surplus value may still be able to expand at
the expense of the working class. That is, to increase the interest of one particular type of
capitalists does not necessarily mean to jeopardise the interest of other capitalists; instead,
human labour can be the source of value that contributes to the entire capitalist class.

To summarise the discussion so far, the inter-relationship between the circuits of productive,
commercial, and financial capital is presented in the flow of the surplus value which can
directly be generated via the capitalist mode of production, and part of which will also flow
to financial capitalists in the shape of interest revenue. Through this way, not only can the
interest-bearing capitalists avoid employing capital for the real production of surplus value by
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lending money to productive and commercial capitalists in the first place, but the conflict in
re-distributing profits between the two is also insulated from class antagonism as in between
labour and capital. Although interest-bearing capitalists share the surplus value generated by
productive and commercial capitalists, they are not necessarily antagonistic against one
another, as any conflict in allocating the surplus remains within the same capitalist class. On
the other hand, letting go of the question whether or not interest-bearing capital will always
be in conflict with productive and commercial capital, the point we can reach at this stage is
that any analysis of finance and hence financialisation would be incomplete without referring
to its non-financial counterparts within the same economy.

Furthermore, while, in theory, the relationship between the financial, productive and
commercial capitalists may not always be as competing as it seems to be, it is also difficult to
draw a clear distinction among the three parties in practicality. For instance, productive,
commercial, and financing activities may be carried out simultaneously by the same
industrial capitalists who receive the previous separately distributed shares of profit
(Stockhammer, 2004). This is especially so in the context of neo-liberal movement and
financial market deregulation where non-financial corporations have become increasingly
involved in financial activities (e.g. Orhangazi, 2008). Given the discussion above, it may be
inappropriate to assign a passive role to the non-financial sector in its interaction with
financial market, since, first of all, their interest may not be antagonistic as that in between
labour and capital, and, second, the former may sometimes become the latter, thus blurring
conflicts between the two. Viewed in this way, our focus becomes the extent to which
production and commerce contribute to, and / or even possess control over, the rise of finance.
Therefore, the question is no longer what the three types of capital produce and share (i.e.
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surplus value, or, ∆M)), but rather what initiates the movement of the three. It is to this
question that the following section is now turned.

4.3.3. The intra-relationship between finance, production and commerce
According to Marx (1959), the deeper intra-class relationship among the three types of capital
manifests itself via idle money. Here, the term “idle money” does not mean the money of the
idle people, but refers to the existing surplus value in the form of money held by productive
and commercial capitalists, which stays outside industrial circulation and thus “does not take
part in the process of creating surplus-value” (ibid, p.47). It takes the forms of either an actual
money hoard such as reserve fund that ensures the continuity of the industrial and
commercial capital circulation, or “mere outstanding money (such as) claims on debtors by
capitalists who have sold C’ (commodities)” (ibid, p.48), that are waiting to be transformed
into the “really functioning capital” (ibid, p.48). Activities dealing with this idle money were
at first simply safekeeping and bookkeeping by the “cashier of the merchants and industrial
capitalists”, and later became “supplemented by lending and borrowing and by credit” (Marx,
1959, p.212) in the hands of the interest-bearing capitalists. In other words, the initial start-up
interest-bearing capital originally comes from production and commerce. Viewed in this way,
the money lending and borrowing activities are not the pure advance of the interest-bearing
capitalists, but the application of the idle money previously generated by productive and
commercial capitalists, and, as demonstrated earlier, a subsequent redistribution of surplus
value among production, commerce, and finance within the same capitalist class. Even in
extreme scenarios where all the idle money utilised by interest-bearing capital originate from
productive and commercial capital, the interest revenue generated therein may ultimately
accrue to the latter two. In such cases, the productive and commercial capitalists themselves
become the interest-bearing capitalists; the non-financial sectors provide the start-up capital
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of, and are consequently entitled to all the profits from the financial sector. Seeing in this way,
it is no longer appropriate to separate interest-bearing capitalists from their productive and
commercial equivalents by simply gazing at the sectors in which they operate: productive
capitalists may penetrate financial sector and interest-bearing capitalists can also come from
non-financial sectors. Therefore, our analysis must look beyond sectorial boundaries and
perceive the specific capitalist activities which can then be effectively distinguished as
financial or non-financial. While this explains the vague demarcation between finance and
non-finance, it still leaves us the question whether the interest-bearing capital would always
dominate.

Although this was the case in the pre-capitalist ages where usurer’s capital, the antiquated
form of interest-bearing capital, impoverishes and paralyses production by taking away the
means of production, and perpetuates such miserable conditions (Marx, 1959, p.425), modern
capitalism has aligned, and even subordinated the interest of the usury capital with that of
capitalist production by concentrating in the first place the means of production. So were
born the banking and credit systems, through which the previously deemed notorious usurer’s
capital was disguised, legitimised, and promoted in its new form as interest-bearing capital,
serving as the “most developed product” and an “immanent form of the capitalist mode of
production, and… a driving force in its development to its highest and ultimate form” (p.433).
Interest-bearing capital obtains social and political legitimacy through the modern credit
system on the one hand, and, in return for such recognition, it has become a subordinate form
of capitalist production on the other. In this sense, finance no longer impedes, but rather
assists, and even by itself becomes the capitalist mode of production. While Marx (1959)
later points out the potential dominant power of finance over commerce and industrial
production, as the “most potent means of driving capitalist production beyond its own limits,
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and one of the most effective vehicles of crises and swindle” (p.433), he also emphasises the
inter-dependence between finance, commerce and production in that
“as long as the capitalist mode of production continues to exist, interest-bearing capital,
as one of its forms, also continues to exist and constitutes in fact the basis of its credit
system” (p.433).

While interest-bearing capital should indeed be subordinated to its productive counterpart in
Marx’s theory, yet the question remains in reality that nowadays the former still dominates
the latter, in some, if not many, developed capitalist economies (Grady & Ackroyd, 2013).
Then can we follow the general assumption put forward by many other researches (e.g.
Crotty, 1990, 2009; Arnold, 2012) that the financial market (i.e. interest-bearing capital)
takes precedence over the rest of the economy both economically and politically? Here,
unlike much of the extant literature with the concluding remark that financial sector must be
balanced with, if not subordinated to, non-financial sectors, we would rather take this
conclusion as the point of departure in answering the above question in reality. Of course,
Marx (1959) did not address the issue directly, which might have been due to the historical
stage of capitalism development that he studied at the time, as well as his major focus on
capitalist production. But this does not mean that our exploration will be limited to an
“economistic” reading of Marx here; it is rather through Marx’s dialectical methodology that
certain insights can be obtained (Tinker, 1999).

Delving into this question in reality (through Marx’s dialectic), we must first revisit the
previously illuminated vague demarcation between financial and non-financial sectors. For
instance, a productive capitalist may him or herself become an interest-beating capitalist
when the former converts his or her idle money into the interest-bearing capital and engages
in the corresponding financial activities thereafter. Therefore, it is now rather unrealistic to
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discuss the sectorial dominance of financial over non-financial, but to only perceive whether
financial activities throughout the entire economy take precedence over non-financial
activities. And, since capitalists have the capacity to initiate and extract surplus value from
productive, commercial, and interest-bearing activities, therefore, whether or not to become
financial or non-financial capitalists or both hinges upon their individual choices. Then our
question becomes how capitalists choose the appropriate activities. While Marx did not
specifically answer this question, he did point out the sole purpose of all capitalists, namely,
producing surplus value for capital expansion (Marx, 1959, p.172). Now the answer becomes
even clearer: capital, and hence capitalists, will always follow whichever sector that extracts
the highest surplus value. At this stage, two points can be put forward. First, financial
activities will take over the non-financial in an economy where the profit from the former is
higher than that of the latter. However, when the profit as such is lower, then the first
statement is inversed. This is the second point. Albeit seemingly contradictory and mutually
exclusive, the two statements are in fact complementary and dialectical with the same
fundamental and ultimate purpose as to maximising surplus value for self-expansion. If we
adopt a world-system perspective (Power, 2009) that views world economies as a whole,
neither financial nor non-financial activities would dominate one another within capitalist
world economies. Taking the contemporary capitalist context into consideration, parallels
with both points can be found in developed (Orhangazi, 2008) and developing countries
(Grady & Ackroyd, 2013) respectively.

To summarise our discussion so far, the intra-relationship between productive, commercial,
and interest-bearing capitals is presented first through idle money and second with the
conceptual ambiguities which blur the demarcation between financial and non-financial
sectors. Then turning our focus onto the specific activities (productive, commercial, and
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interest-bearing) that capitalists choose to take, a dialectical relationship has been
demonstrated: there is no fundamental difference between financial and non-financial
capitalists or activities; and if there does exist difference, it will only be historical and
geographical.

4.3.4. Conflict between financial capitalists and the working class
Having considered the dialectical relationship between finance, production, and commerce as
existing within the same capitalist class, attention should now be turned to financialisation
and its influence on ordinary workers. As demonstrated earlier, in addition to the job
insecurity brought by, however indirectly, financial market investors, the money-dealing
activities of interest-bearing capitalists have nowadays been increasingly interwoven with the
income of ordinary workers directly(housing mortgage payments for instance). Questions can
now be asked as to: first, if there exists the class conflict between workers and interestbearing capitalists; second, if conflict does exist, whether it will be equally irreconcilable as
that between labour and production, and; third, if so, how the working class should (re)act
against the interest-bearing capital.

It may be that Marx’s analysis of the relationship between workers and interest-bearing
capitalists in Capital was somewhat incomplete and unfinished, perhaps due to the historical
limitation on the development of capitalism that he experienced and analysed, However,
certain insight can still be obtained from his limited writings regarding the subject matter in
Capital, as well as through the methodology of historical materialism. To begin with, in
considering the pre-capitalist economies, Marx in fact noticed the two ways in which money
dealing activities (in the form of usury) took place between different capitalists, and between
workers and capitalists:
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The characteristic forms… in which usurers’ capital exists in period antedating capitalist
production are of two kinds… The same forms repeat production themselves on the basis
of capitalist production, but as mere subordinate forms. They are then no longer the
forms which determine the character of interest-bearing capital. These two forms are:
first: usury by lending money to extravagant members of the upper classes, particularly
landowners; secondly, usury by lending money to small producers who possess their
own conditions of labour (Marx, 1959, p.424).

Under modern capitalism, not only has usurers’ capital been made subordinate to the
capitalist mode of production that determines the “character of interest-bearing capital” as
discussed in the previous section, but the lower class target that usurers used to deal with has
also changed from the independent small producers mainly consisting of peasants with their
own means and conditions of production, to proletariat labour without the means of
production. In particular, while the self-employed peasants and artisans borrowed money for
their own small scale production, the wage-labour under the capitalist mode of production
“has no occasion to borrow any money as a producer” (Marx, 1959, p.425), as both the
condition and the product of the labour are now in the hands of capitalists. Instead, Marx
(1959) went on and argued that “when he (the worker) does any money borrowing, he does
so, for instance, at the pawnshop to secure personal necessities” (p.425). Here, interestbearing capital in no way directly assists the labour production, but only provides the worker
with the money for subsistence purposes, or, to put it simply, for the reproduction of the
labour force. In this way, the same view point as concluded previously can be reached, albeit
from a different perspective: the worker-capitalist relationship. That is, interest-bearing
capitalists maintain the supremacy of capital not only through financially supporting
capitalist production but also by sustaining the regeneration of labour power.

From the workers’ point of view, on the other hand, the question remains still unanswered
regarding the class conflict between ordinary workers and interest-bearing capitalists. While
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Marx (1959) did not address this problem explicitly, he did point out the parasitic effect of
interest-bearing capital upon the working class that “interest-bearing capital retains the form
of usurer’s capital in relation to persons or classes, or in circumstances where borrowing does
not, nor can, take place in the sense corresponding to the capitalist mode of production”
(p.428). Now the answer to our first question becomes apparent. The class conflict does exist
between workers and interest-bearing capitalists, and it does not ameliorate the exploitative
condition that usurers imposed on the peasant class.

But can we equal this present class conflict to its pre-capitalist counterpart? Or, is there any
new element that distinguishes the contemporary one from the previous? Here again,
although Marx (1959) did not point out this relationship directly, it is through his problematic
that the answer flows. First of all, since interest-bearing capital belongs to the capitalist mode
of production with the potential to even become, in itself, the “highest and ultimate form” of
the latter, and also because the “immediate purpose and compelling motive of capitalist
production” (p.167) is the expansion of capital by surplus value, then the conflict between
interest-bearing capitalists and workers would seem to be no more different from that
between production and labour. That is, interest-bearing capital does extract surplus value
from production. To illustrate this point in detail and at the same time further demystify the
concept of interest-bearing capital, it is now necessary to consider the process in which
interest-bearing capitalist exploitation takes place. In fact, already demonstrated earlier has
been the indirect way (i.e. the general circuit of capital) that surplus value is first appropriated
by productive capitalists and later transferred to interest-bearing capitalists in the form of
interest revenue. However, our focus in this section is on the direct relationship between
interest-bearing capital and the working class, namely how the lending and borrowing
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activities between the two facilitate capitalist exploitation. Therefore, in what follows the
direct money dealing activities---lending and borrowing are examined respectively.

In the case of lending where private savings, investment, and pension funds of the working
class are placed into the hands of bankers and financial investors, it is argued that the interest
and other types of investment returns received by workers is an implicit form of wages for the
regeneration of the labour force. To appreciate this point, the following two aspects need to
be illuminated. First of all, personal savings and private investment in financial institutions
will not automatically render the working class “capitalists”. For, unlike the interest-bearing
and industrial capitalists with and in whom workers deposit savings and make investment,
workers do not possess any real “governing power over labour and its product” that
constitutes the essence of capital (Marx, 1974, p.35). Instead, it is always the productive
capitalists who directly appropriate surplus value from labour production, and the commercial
and interest-bearing capitalists who realise and share the unpaid labour afterwards. To put it
simply, the main difference here between the working class savers/ investors and the
capitalist investors (the interest-bearing capitalists in particular) rests upon the controlling
right over the private savings and personal investment from two different perspectives. On
the one hand, in relation to the capitalists involved, these savings and investment become
their capital with the purpose of producing more capital, even though “neither the lenders nor
users of this capital are its real owners or producers” (Marx, 1959, p.433). While maintaining
the legal ownership of their savings and investment, the real owners of the capital, that is, the
working class savers and investors, on the other hand, take no part in the actual process of
production but rather indirectly receive part of the capitalists’ profit in return.

75

Chapter 4 Theorising Financialisation in Iron Ore Market
Since these savings and investment are not capital from the working class point of view, nor
are they capitalists in this sense, then the question is to what extent the workers’ sharing of
capitalist profit should be accounted for. This brings us to the second aspect. Here again,
although Marx (1956, 1959) did not address this issue explicitly, our analysis based on his
methodology regarding the social formation of capitalism continues. Without the capitalist
incentive as producing surplus value, ordinary workers thus save and invest only for
subsistence purposes (e.g. housing, living expenses). This coincides with Marx’s (Marx &
Engels, 1974; Marx, 1974) opinion on wages of the working class as “providing for the
subsistence of the worker for the duration of his work and as much more as is necessary for
him to support a family and for the race of labourers not to die out” (Marx, 1974, p.21).
Viewed in this way, we can now assign a broader definition with the labour wage that not
only contains the nominal and explicit wage revenue paid directly by the capitalist employers,
but also the indirect and implicit revenue in the form of interest and other investment returns
paid by the interest-bearing capitalists. The conclusion that can be reached so far is that
workers’ savings and private investment in banks and financial institutions do not change
their class status within the social hierarchy of capitalism. Rather, their income received from
interest-bearing capitalists is part of the total wage that the capitalist class has to offer for the
regeneration of labour power.

In the case of borrowing where workers borrow money from banks and other financial firms,
Marx (1959) already pointed out that, under developed capitalism, workers separated from
the means and products of labour only borrow to “secure personal necessities” (p.425). He
went on and commented on this type of borrowing that
“the working class is… swindled in this form… also done by the retail dealer, who sells
means of subsistence to the worker. This is secondary exploitation, which runs parallel to
the primary exploitation taking place in the production process itself. The distinction
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between selling and loaning is quite immaterial in this case and merely formal, and…
cannot appear as essential to anyone” (p.435).

Here, Marx (1959) described the phenomenon as the “secondary exploitation” superimposed
collectively by interest-bearing and commercial capitalists upon the working class borrowers.
While this might sound a bit confusing and somewhat unexplained, our understanding can
still proceed from the appropriate logical reasoning of Marx. To this end, we must first agree
that interest-bearing capitalists, like their productive and commercial counterparts within the
same class, exist to extract surplus value for the self-expansion of capital. Thus, the interest
expense paid by workers is one form of surplus value. In particular, since surplus value
originates from labour production, then the interest-bearing capitalists who lend money to
workers will also interact with other types of capitalists. This is where Marx’s (1959)
mentioning of the “retail dealer” comes into play: insofar as the purchase of private
necessities on which workers request bank loans or mortgages is concerned, both the interestbearing and commercial capitalists involved will have the same interest (i.e. surplus value) in
realising and sharing the unpaid labour that derives from capitalist production. In other words,
interest-bearing capitalists appropriate surplus value through the alliance with its commercial
equivalents. Indeed, Marx (1959) noted that, like traditional usurers, interest-bearing
capitalists would absorb surplus labour to the extent that “the wage-slave (the working
class)… can become a creditor’s slave in his capacity as consumer” (p.425) (emphasis added).

Specifically, based on Marx’s (1959) interpretation here that “the distinction between selling
and loaning is quite immaterial… and… cannot appear as essential to anyone” (p.435), it is
then reasonable to conclude that, in this case, interest-bearing capitalists play the same role as
their commercial counterparts do. That is, the interest payment charged on the working class
borrower will be part of the total price of the commodity that she or he has purchased from
commercial capitalists, as it is only in this case can the lender become the seller. In other
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words, the real price / value of the commodity is equal to its original price charged by the
seller plus the interest payment to the lender: the quantitative division between the retailer’s
price and the interest expense on it does not even amount to the qualitative differentiation
between commercial and interest-bearing capitalists.

Summarising our discussion so far, there does exist the class conflict within the increasing
money-dealing activities between workers and interest-bearing capitalists through both
directions: as their commercial and productive counterparts, interest-bearing capitalists aims
at appropriating surplus value. The two direct interactions between the working and the
capitalist class in this case are examined respectively. On the one hand, workers’ investment
return, savings, private investment, and pension funds, however large it might be, does not
change their class status, but only amounts to an implicit form of wage revenue that they
receive to ensure the regeneration of labour force in capitalist societies. On the other hand,
interest charged on workers is part of the total price for the products and / or services for
which they have borrowed money, and hence part of the surplus value realised by interestbearing capitalists.

Turning to the contemporary globalised capitalist economy, the proliferation of money
dealing activities such as mortgages, pension funds, and some other financial instruments has
increased the social, economic, and political significance of the financial sector. This in turn
also reinforces the bargaining power of finance in its sharing of surplus value with productive
and commercial sectors. Ultimately, the interest-bearing capital, as the most developed form
of capitalist production, would “become the most potent means of driving capitalist
production beyond its own limits, and one of the most effective vehicles of crises and swindle”
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(Marx, 1959, p.433). Faced with the exploitation and even the potential crises posed by
interest-bearing capitalists, a solution is therefore needed.

4.3.5. Proposed solutions to financialisation
While much of extant literature on financialisation has demonstrated, albeit through different
approaches, the (potential) negative impact of financial sectors on the rest of the economy,
many, if not most, researches have interpreted the phenomenon without proposing solutions
(e.g. Orhangazi, 2008; Grady & Ackroyd, 2013). Even for those who have proposed
alternative changes, the suggestions merely scratch the surface of the issue and neglect the
structural conflict between the working and the capitalist classes. For instance, Stockhammer
(2004) calls for more regulation in financial markets. Demir (2007) recommends that national
savings must be compulsorily invested into the real productive activities rather than financial
markets. Perhaps less radical than Demir (2007), Crotty (2009) emphasises the need for a
balance, through government enforcement, between the financial and the real sectors, forging
financial markets a “more limited but more productive and less dangerous role” (p.577). He
also supports the use of public funds to alleviate the crises caused by financialisation.
Primarily via government regulatory mechanisms, most of these remedies only seek to
maintain the current hierarchical order of capitalist societies and leave the social conflict
unaddressed, or, in Tinker and Carter’s (2003) words, the solutions “hide as much as they
reveal” (p.578). These proposals reveal only the surface of the problem by attributing the past
and future economic crises to the apparent imbalance between financial and non-financial
sectors. By consequently putting forward a series of regulations to adjust that balance as if the
problem is simply confined to the capitalist class, they hide in the meantime the fundamental
contradiction between capital and labour. Since mortgages, lifesavings, and pension funds of
the ordinary workers have been increasingly involved with financial capitalists substantially
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as demonstrated earlier, the threat posed by the so called “unbalanced power of finance”
never was a new idea emerged in modern capitalism; it is rather the same structural crisis, the
contradiction between capitalists’ pursuit of surplus value and the wages of labour, in a
financial disguise.

On the other hand, as for Marx’s approach to financialisation, the “point, however, is to
change (the status quo)” (cited in Dillard, 1991, p.8). That is, the purpose of exploring the
rising power of finance, in Marx’s interest-bearing capital terms, is to change the status quo.
Following Marx’s logic, it is the contradiction deeply rooted in societies that initiates social
change and moves us forward (Bryer, 2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006). Therefore, rather than
being sidestepped via financial market regulations, the relationship, or rather the class
conflict, between financial sectors and ordinary workers, must be brought onto government
agenda as the point of departure for future critical investigations. For instance, questions can
then be asked as to whether public money should be used to bail out financial capitalists or to
serve the interest of the great majority working class; whether pension funds should be
nationalised and kept separate from the financial market for capitalists; whether regulations
are needed secure workers’ position in non-financial sectors, and so forth.

4.4. Concluding remarks and implications for accounting research
We have so far investigated two theoretical approaches to financialisation. While the (Post-)
Keynesian perspective provides the basis for much of the extant financialisation literature, it
nevertheless suffers from a number of limitations. That is, the power of finance and its
interaction with the rest of the economy has mostly been confined to the owner-manager
paradigm and the triumph of financial markets over non-financial sectors, without any
consideration to the social, political, and economic ramifications on ordinary workers. In
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other words, what the (Post-) Keynesian approach has offered us is simply a lens of the
bourgeois economics which takes individual as the subject of analysis, and neglects the
notion of capital as a social relation. What is needed therefore is a structural analysis that
concerns the entire capitalist and the working classes, as well as the changes (if any) in the
power relations, within the same economy in which financialisation operates.

The attention is therefore turned to a Marxist political economy approach which exhibits the
potential to satisfy our concerns. In particular, this exploration takes four steps which
gradually develop the concept of financialisation, or in Marx’s term, the interest-bearing
capital. I have: first, demystified the inner structure and the self-expanding pattern of finance
via its capital movement with production and commerce; second, deconstructed the sectorial
barrier set in between financial and non-financial sectors, thereby demonstrating the
interdependent and dialectical relationship between financial and non-financial activities;
third, examined the direct relationship between financial capitalists and the working class,
and; fourth, analysed the proposed remedies to threats posed by financialisation and then
offered the solution through the Marxist approach. Bearing in mind these discussions, a
Marxist definition of financialisation can be put forward: there never was a new concept as
financialisation; it is rather the capital movement on a global scale chasing after a higher
surplus value in the financial disguise.

Parallels of the theoretical investigation as such can be drawn with extant accounting
literature. Already many accounting researchers have studied financialisation in relation to
the aligned interests between shareholders and managers (Andersson et al., 2006; Andersson
et al., 2007), financialisation directing corporate strategy (Carter & Mueller, 2006; Andersson
et al., 2008; Andersson et al., 2010a, 2010b), financialisation and corporate collapse in a
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political economy context (Froud et al., 2004), the separation of non-financial and financial
activities (Newberry & Robb, 2008), financialisation and accounting standards harmonisation
(Dixon & Monk, 2009; Arnold, 2012; Zhang & Andrew, 2014), and financial literacy (Bay et
al., 2014). However, many, if not most, of the current accounting studies of financialisation
have to a large extent focused on either the owner-manager paradigm or the financial and
non-financial dichotomy or both, falling into the (Post-) Keynesian dilemma of limiting
themselves within bourgeois economics. Further, the present focus of the accounting studies
as such has been mostly on accounting regulations and fair value reporting in particular,
while leaving the everyday language of accounting untouched. It is at this point therefore that
a structural analysis of how accounting interacts with financialisation in different social
stratums is needed. More specifically, accounting discourse should be engaged into critical
investigations of financial activities “whose functioning is so often intertwined with
(accounting)” (Hopwood, 2009, p.550). Such refinements, it is argued, can shed light on the
social, political, historical, and environmental significance of financialisation, and how it may
differ in various contexts within contemporary global capitalist economies.

4.5. Defining financialisation in the context of the global iron ore market
Taking the concluding remarks here into consideration, specific relevance can be drawn to
the investigation on the global trading of iron ore in this thesis. In particular, the debate over
the financialised pricing mechanism of iron ore is the subject of this study, where the use of
accounting language by the Chinese iron and steel industries is examined and analysed.
Indeed, financialisation, the phenomenon which emerged in the past decade, exerts profound
influence on a wide variety of aspects from macro-economy to our everyday lives, much of
the extant literature studying the Chinese context however has only recently turned their
focus to the rising socio-political significance of finance and its impact on China’s economy.
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For instance, Tang (2007) analyses the pros and cons that financialisation has on China’s
economic structure. Cai and Liu (2008) examine China’s unbalanced level of development
between monetization and financialisation. Zhao (2012) delineates the necessity and the
future prospect of financialisation in the Chinese artistic market. Turning to the commodity
markets, Zhang and Wang (2009) examine the adverse impact of financialised commodity
price on the Chinese economy. They argue that, while overwhelming industrial demand,
financial demand has been the driving force behind international commodity price bubble
which has in turn slowed down the Chinese as well as the world economy. Particularly, Chen
(2011) and Su (2011) explore the potential threat posed by financial market speculations on
prices of oil and agricultural commodities respectively. Regarding the iron ore market in
particular, Yang and Chen (2011) point out the penetration of financial capitalists such as
HSBC, JP Morgan, and Citicorp into the dominant global suppliers of iron ore (i.e. BHP, Rio
Tinto, and Vale), and thus the disadvantaged positions of the Chinese iron and steel firms
therein.

Based on the extant literature above, financialisation in this research can then be narrowly
defined in two respects. First, as mentioned by Yang and Chen (2011), the major
international suppliers of iron ore have been increasingly financialised in that their largest
shareholders are now from the financial sectors. As at the end of 2012, specifically, the share
ownership of the three oligopoly mining firms is set out as follows.
BHP Billiton Limited9
1. HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited

% of issued capital
16.86

9

While both BHP Billiton Limited and BHP Billiton Plc are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the
former has a primary listing on the Australian Securities Exchange, and the latter has a premium listing on the
London Stock Exchange. The two corporations work together and are referred to as the BHP Billiton Group
(BHP Billiton 2012 Annual Report). This dual listed company structure (the DLC structure) puts shareholders
from both companies in substantially the same position as if they were from one single economic entity.
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2. J.P. Morgan Nominees Australia Limited
3. National Nominees Limited
4. Citicorp Nominees Pty Limited <BHP Billiton ADR Holders A/C>
5. Citicorp Nominees Pty Ltd
6. J.P. Morgan Nominees Australia Limited <Cash Income A/C>
7. BNP Paribas Noms Pty Limited <Master Cust DRP>
8. Citicorp Nominees Pty Limited <Colonial First State Inv A/C>
9. AMP Life Limited
10. UBS Wealth Management Australia Nominees Pty Ltd
11. BNP Paribas Noms Pty Ltd <SMP Accounts DRP>
12. HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited <NT-Comnwlth Super Corp A/C>
13. Australian Foundation Investment Company Limited
14. BNP Paribas Noms Pty Ltd <DRP>
15. ARGO Investments Limited
16. Perpetual Trustee Company Limited
17. Queensland Investment Corporation
18. Computershare Nominees Cl LTD <ASX Shareplus Control A/C>
19. Navigator Australia Ltd <MLC Investment Sett A/C>
20. HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited-GSCO ECA
total
Table 4.1 Twenty largest shareholders of BHP Billiton Limited as of December 2012
Source: BHP Billiton 2012 Annual Report
BHP Billiton Plc2
1. PLC Nominees (Proprietary) Limited
2. GEPF Equity
3. Chase Nominees Limited <LEND>
4. State Street Nominees Limited <OM02>
5. State Street Nominees Limited <OM04>
6. Chase Nominees Limited
7. National City Nominees Limited
8. The Bank of New York (Nominees) Limited
9. Nortrust Nominees Limited
10. HSBC Global Custody Nominee (UK) Limited <357206>
11. Vidacos Nominees Limited <CLRLUX2>
12. Lynchwood Nominees Limited <2006420>
13. BNY Mellon Nominees Limited <BSDTGUSD>
14. State Street Nominees Limited <OD64>
15. Nortrust Nominees Limited <SLEND>
16. Industrial Development Corporation
17. Nutraco Nominees Limited <781221>
18. Chase Nominees Limited <BGILIFEL>
19. BNY Mellon Nominees Limited <BSDTGABN>
20. State Street Nominees Limited <GB01>
total
84

12.17
9.66
6.56
3.38
1.92
1.59
1.26
0.88
0.47
0.45
0.44
0.44
0.25
0.25
0.24
0.20
0.20
0.17
0.15
57.54

% of issued capital
20.87
4.08
3.8
3.71
2.85
2.81
2.51
2.40
2.29
2.28
1.85
1.73
1.68
1.61
1.58
1.58
1.40
1.18
1.12
0.88
62.21
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Table 4.2 Twenty largest shareholders of BHP Billiton Plc as of December 2012
Source: BHP Billiton 2012 Annual Report
Rio Tinto Limited10
1. HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited
2. J.P.Morgan Nominees Australia Limited
3. National Nominees Limited
4. Citicorp Nominees Pty Limited
5. BNP Paribas Noms Pty Ltd (DRP)
6. Citicorp Nominees Pty Limited (Colonial First State Inv a/c)
7. J.P.Morgan Nominees Australia Limited (Cash Income a/c)
8. AMP Life Limited (BSP a/c)
9. UBS Wealth Management Australia Nominees Pty Ltd
10. Australian Foundation Investment Company Limited
11. Argo Investments Limited
12. HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited (NT-Comnwlth Super Corp a/c)
13. Perpetual Trustee Company Limited
14. BNP Paribas Nominees Pty Ltd (Agency Lending DRP a/c)
15. Navigator Australia Ltd (MLC Investment Sett a/c)
16. UBS Nominees Pty Ltd
17. Woodross Nominees Pty Ltd
18. Australian United Investment Company Limited
19. UBS Nominees Pty Ltd
20. QIC Limited
total
Table 4.3 Twenty largest shareholders of Rio Tinto Limited as of December 2012
Source: Rio Tinto 2012 Annual Report
Rio Tinto Plc3
1. Riversdale Mining Limited
2. Shining Prospect Pte Ltd
3. Blackrock, Inc. via its funds
4. Capital Group Companies, Inc., THE via its funds
5. Capital Research and Management Company
6. State Street Corporation
7. Legal & General Group Plc
8. Aberdeen Asset Management Plc
9. UBS AG
10. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
11. Standard Life Plc
10

% of issued capital
20.53
13.97
11.83
3.98
2.52
2.18
1.95
0.98
0.91
0.83
0.56
0.54
0.43
0.35
0.22
0.21
0.19
0.19
0.15
0.14
62.66

% of issued capital
43.14
12.7
10.82
5.53
4.95
2.07
<3%
1.83
1.69
1.48
1.47

Similar to the DLC structure in the case of BHP Billiton, the Rio Tinto Group consists of Rio Tinto Limited,
which is registered in Australia and is listed on the Australian Securities Exchange, and Rio Tinto Plc, which is
registered in England and Wales and is listed on the London Stock Exchange. The two companies operate
together as one economic entity in that the boards of directors of each firm are the same and the shareholders of
the two firms are placed in substantially the same position (Rio Tinto 2012 Annual Report).
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12. AXA
1.45
13. The Central People's Government of China
1.30
14. Credit Suisse Group AG
1.28
15. Deutsche Bank AG
1.19
16. Sun Life Financial Inc
1.09
17. Franklin Resources, Inc.
1.07
18. Prudential Plc
1.07
19. Aviva Plc
1.06
20. Bank of New York Mellon corporation
0.99
total
96.18
Table 4.4 Twenty largest shareholders of Rio Tinto Limited as of December 2012
Source: Osiris Database, accessed 09, October, 2013
Vale S.A.
1. Valepar S.A.
2. BNDES Participacoes S.A. BNDESPAR
3. Aberdeen Asset Management Plc
4. Blackrock, Inc.
5. Vanguard Group, Inc.
6. Baillie Gifford & Co Limited
7. Lazard Limited
8. Franklin Resources, Inc.
9. Government of Norway
10. Government of Brazil
11. Schroders Plc
12. JP Morgan Chase & Co.
13. ITAU Unibanco Holdings
14. FMR LLC
15. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
16. AXA
17. T. Rowe Price Group, Inc.
18. Fisher Investments, Inc.
19. Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP
20. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company
total
Table 4.5 Twenty largest shareholders of Vale S.A. as of December 2012
Source: Osiris Database, accessed 09, October, 2013
Valepar shareholders
Litel Participacoes S.A.
Bradespar S.A.
Mitsui
BNDESPAR
Electron S.A.
total
Table 4.6 Shareholders of Valepar as of December 2012
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% of issued capital
52.70
6.70
2.71
2.68
1.41
1.23
0.98
0.95
0.73
0.72
0.66
0.60
0.59
0.58
0.54
0.51
0.51
0.49
0.45
0.43
76.17

% of issued capital
49.00
21.21
18.24
11.51
0.03
100.00
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Source: Vale 2012 Annual Report

As shown in the tables above, almost all of the top twenty largest shareholders of BHP
Billiton and Rio Tinto come from financial sectors, accounting for more than 60% of the total
shares at each corporation. Of particular interest are the proportions of the shares held by
some leading multinational financial conglomerates. For instance, HSBC owns 17.45%
shares of BHP Billiton Limited, and 2.28% of BHP Billiton Plc, making itself overall the
largest shareholder at the BHP Billiton Group. It is also the largest shareholder of Rio Tinto
Limited, making up 21.07% of the shares. Following HSBC, J.P. Morgan is the second
largest shareholder in both BHP Billiton Limited and Rio Tinto Limited, accounting for 14.09%
and 15.92% of the shares respectively. Citicorp holds significant portions of shares in BHP
Limited and Rio Tinto Limited, with 11.20% and 6.16% respectively. Similarly, State Street
owns 9.05%, 2.07%, and 0.38% shares of BHP Plc, Rio Tinto Plc, and Vale respectively.

Also noteworthy is the shareholder structure of Vale. Unlike BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto that
are not controlled, by any means, by another corporation or any government or natural person
(BHP Billiton 2012 Annual Report; Rio Tinto 2012 Annual Report), Vale has a controlling
shareholder (i.e. Valepar). As a former state-owned enterprise in Brazil, Vale has undergone
a process of privatisation, resulting in the establishment of Valepar. Despite its sole purpose
of holding the controlling interest (52.7% as of December 31, 2012) in Vale, Valepar has also
been gradually penetrated by shareholders from financial sectors. That is, consistent with
table 4.6, the major shareholders at Valepar include two Brazilian holding companies (i.e.
Litel Participacoes S.A. and Bradespar S.A.), the investment branch of The Brazilian
Development Bank (i.e. BNDESPAR), and a Japanese corporate conglomerate (i.e. Mitsui).
In addition to the controlling shareholder Valepar, J.P. Morgan is the twelfth largest
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shareholder with 0.60% shares, whereas HSBC and Citicorp also appear on the list of the top
50 shareholders at Vale, holding 0.30% and 0.13% shares respectively.

On the other hand, while being the largest shareholders of the three mining oligopolies, some
financial institutions are also sponsors of the depositary receipts, a negotiable financial
instrument that enables shares from foreign stock exchanges to be traded in local financial
markets. For instance, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank has been the issuer of American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs) on behalf of Rio Tinto and Vale in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
and has also been the issuer of Hong Kong Depositary Receipts (HDRs) on behalf of Vale in
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE). Citibank, on the other hand, serves as the sponsor
of the ADR programme for BHP Billiton in NYSE. While the fact that the three mining
giants have been increasingly penetrated by financial instructions as stated above does not
simply mean that the latter possesses absolute control over the former, it is certain however
that the former must align its interest with that of the latter (i.e. financial capitalists) to a large
extent.

The second aspect of the financialisation, and perhaps more directly related to the current
trading pattern of the global iron ore market, refers to the quarterly indexed pricing system
that is also heavily linked to financial market investors. While international commodity prices
have long been considered as volatile and subject to financial market speculations (Tang &
Xiong, 2012), to date little attention has been given to the newly developed index mechanism
for iron ore pricing. Following the Rio Tinto scandal in 2009, a quarterly index pricing
mechanism was established and became effective in 2010, in place of the traditional annual
negotiation based pricing. Alongside the newly developed pricing system, three major indices
for iron ore have emerged—Metal Bulletin Iron Ore (MBIO) Index from Metal Bulletin, The
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Steel Index (TSI) from Steel Business Briefing Ltd, and Platts IODEX from McGraw Hill
Financial Inc. Of these, Platts IODEX is the most popular. Not only is this index adopted and
promoted by the Big Three (Yuan, 2013), but Platts, the provider of the index, also acquired
Steel Business Briefing Ltd, the publisher of TSI, in July 2011, further reinforcing the
dominant pricing power of IODEX in the global iron ore market.

Moreover, unlike the MBIO and the (former) TSI stemming from international publishers (i.e.
Metal Bulletin Ltd and Steel Business Briefing Ltd, respectively) specialised in estimating
and providing metal and steel prices, the IODEX comes from Platts, a leading global
organisation that offers price information of not only metals, but also energy, petrochemicals,
and agricultural products. Beyond its publishing capacities, Platts is in fact a subsidiary
division of McGraw Hill Financial which provides international capital and commodity
markets with credit ratings, analytics, consultancies, and benchmarks. In other words, the
effective controlling entity of the dominant publisher of iron ore price to date, McGraw Hill
Financial Inc., is also from financial sectors.

Exploring further the ownership structure of McGraw Hill Financial (see Table 4.7), of
particular interest are some of the same financial conglomerates who hold shares of both
McGraw Hill Financial as and the three mining firms at the same time. For instance, Capital
Group Companies, the number one shareholder of McGraw Hill Financial Inc. that holds
11.48% shares of the firm, also owns 10.48%11 shares of Rio Tinto Plc as the fourth largest
shareholder, and 0.15% shares of Vale. Similarly, while being the second largest shareholder
of BHP Billiton Plc and sixth largest shareholder of Rio Tinto Plc, State Street holds 4.85%

11

The is the combined amount of shares of Rio Tinto Plc held by Capital Group Companies Inc. (5.53%) and Capital
Research and Management Company (4.95%), as Capital Research and Management Company is the wholly-owned
subsidiary of Capital Group Companies Inc.
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shares at McGraw Hill Financial Inc., ranking as the fourth largest shareholder of the firm.
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, the fourth largest shareholder of BHP Billiton
Plc and one of the top 20 shareholders at Rio Tinto Plc owning 5.20% and 0.99% shares
respectively, is also among the top 20 shareholders at McGraw Hill Financial with 1.40%
shares. By the same token, other companies that hold shares among the three mining firms
and McGraw Hill Financial Inc. include Blackrock, Vanguard Group, T. Rowe Price Group,
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, AXA, Credit Suisse Group, and Deutsche
Bank AG.
McGraw Hill Financial, Inc.
% of issued capital
1. Capital Group Companies, Inc.
11.48
2. Blackrock, Inc.
6.63
3. Vanguard Group, Inc.
4.94
4. State Street Corporation
4.85
5. T. Rowe Price Group, Inc.
3.73
6. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company
3.37
7. Morgan Stanley
2.94
8. McGraw Harold III
2.74
9. Dodge & Cox
2.58
10. Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan
2.25
11. Independent Franchise Partners, LLP
2.24
12. Windy City Investments Holdings, L.L.C.
2.24
13. Northern Trust Corporation
1.48
14. Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC
1.42
15. Sun Life Financial Inc.
1.41
16. Bank of New York Mellon Corporation
1.40
17. Deutsche Bank AG
1.39
18. AXA
1.30
19. Credit Suisse Group
1.10
20. Government of Norway
1.00
total
60.49
Table 4.7 Twenty largest shareholders of McGraw Financial, Inc. as of December 2012
Source: Osiris Database, accessed 09, October, 2013

Equally worth mentioning out of these firms is Blackrock. While being the second largest
shareholder of McGraw Hill Financial, third largest shareholder of Rio Tinto Plc, and the
fourth largest shareholder of Vale, Blackrock seems to be less connected to the BHP Billiton
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Group (i.e. BHP Billiton Limited and BHP Billiton Plc) and Rio Tinto Limited whose top
three shareholders are, as discussed earlier, HSBC, J.P. Morgan, and Citigroup instead.
However, a closer examination on the ownership data of these three firms suggests otherwise.
That is, Blackrock is in fact the number one largest shareholder of HSBC, J.P. Morgan, and
Citigroup: it holds, in total, 25.34% shares of HSBC; 5.72% of J.P. Morgan; and 7.91% of
Citigroup.

To summarise the shareholder structure analyses so far, an inextricably entangled web
weaved by financial conglomerates in the iron ore market can be drawn as follows (see
Figure 4.2).

“

” indicating parent company control

“

” indicating top five shareholders

Figure 4.2 The network of financial capitalists in the global iron ore market
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As can be seen from the network above, the adoption of index pricing has further promoted
the penetration of financial investors in the global iron ore market, where the major
shareholders of the three dominant iron ore suppliers and of the price publishers are to a large
extent overlapping. The term “financialisation” is thus identified, contingent upon the context
of the thesis, as the rising forces of financial capital in the global iron ore market and, in
particular, in the iron ore pricing mechanisms.

To summarise the investigation of financialisation thus far, this chapter begins with a review
of the existing literature including the early studies by Crotty (1990), Stockhammer (2004),
Orhangazi (2008), and so forth, and then indicates the areas that have received insufficient
attention from extant research. In response to these, a Marxist approach is explored, primarily
drawing from Capital, as the theoretical framework of the thesis. Subsequently, with
particular reference to the shareholding structure of the three leading suppliers of iron ore (i.e.
BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Vale), and the newly established index pricing mechanism,
financialisation is considered as the increasing involvement and dominance of financial
institutions in the current global iron ore market. However, developing the Marxist informed
framework for the analysis of financialisation in contemporary capitalism is not enough, as
“what Marx bequeathed to us was not a definitive analysis of capitalism (and financialisation),
but some important methodological-political tools” (Tinker, 1999, p.655; see also Cooper &
Tinker, 1994) to change the status quo (Marx, 1969). Therefore, the exploration of Marx
continues in the next chapter which is directed towards a Marx-informed methodological
framework for this thesis.
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Chapter 5 Methodology: A Marx informed Discourse Analysis

This chapter is dedicated to continue the exploration of Marx, primarily from the
methodological perspective, in an attempt to establish a Marxist approach to the study of
PEA in general and in particular the analysis of the accounting discourse involved in the
financialisation of iron ore price. The philosophical underpinnings of the thesis are outlined
within the Marxist tradition, and a discourse analysis based on a Marx-informed PEA
framework is illuminated as the methodological approach of this study. In light of the Marxist
discourse analysis framework, subsequently, the specific method of analysis that the thesis
uses, and the data collection process, are explicated in detail.

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The first section, while reviewing the
extant Marxist accounting literature, delineates the theoretical underpinnings of Marxist
accounting, including Marx’s view point on ontology, epistemology, methodology, human
nature, and social orientations. The second section develops a Marxist PEA discourse
analysis as the research method. The third section explains the specific analysis method and
the data collection that the thesis uses corresponding to the Marxist framework
aforementioned.

5.1. Philosophical assumptions of Marxist accounting research
While there is much Marx-informed accounting research undertaken in the past few decades
with regard to methodological debates (Cooper & Tinker, 1994; Neimark, 1990, 1994;
Cooper, 1997; Bryer, 1994, 1999b; Macve, 1999; Tinker, 1999), historical studies (Tinker &
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Neimark, 1987; Tinker et al., 1991; Tinker & Gray, 2003; Bryer, 1991, 1993, 2000a, 2000b,
2005, 2006, 2012, 2013a, 2013b), accounting conceptual framework (Bryer, 1999a), and
capitalism crises (Tinker & Carter, 2003), insufficient attention has been given to explicitly
elucidate the theoretical underpinnings for a Marxist accounting approach. To both fill the
literature gap and put forward the methodological support of the thesis, this section is thus
dedicated to exploring the perspectives that Marxist accounting takes on with respect to the
basic components of knowledge which, according to Gaffikin (2008), refer to ontology,
epistemology, and methodology.

5.1.1. Marx’s ontological perspective
Ontology concerns the nature of reality and existence (Gaffikin, 2008). In this respect, the
general dichotomy that sets “critical” accounting aside from its mainstream (positivist)
counterpart has been that the former claims a non-realist ontology and thus conceives a
subjectively created society by and within which accounting is constructed and constructing
(e.g. Chua, 1986; Hines, 1988), the latter champions a realist/ positivist ontology and so
perceives an objective world whose solid existence is independent of human cognition (and
thus accounting). While the realist ontological belief of the latter has long been subject to
criticisms (e.g. Tinker et al. 1982; Mattessich, 1964; Hines, 1988; Hopwood, 1994), the nonrealist ontology held by the former is nevertheless not without limitations. If, say, our ideas
and cognition have been constantly shaping and shaped by the external environment that
surrounds us, then the question is which one came first, the ideas or the material world? Put
simply: it would be somewhat solipsistic if we were the only existence of the world and
everything else a fabrication of our mind; it would be also rather deterministic if the external
environment were the initial driving force that has constructed the contemporary world, and
humans a product of the environment.
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To solve the idealism / materialism binary, Hegel stated that neither human ideas nor the
external environment is the ultimate driver behind socio-historical development; instead,
there is a deeper and pre-structured reality / law which existed prior to and thus subsumes
human thinking. For Marx, however, this does not seem to be the case when Hegel developed
his dialectic “beginning as it does with logic, with pure speculative thought, and ending with
absolute knowledge—with the self-conscious, self-comprehending, philosophic or absolute
(i.e., superhuman) abstract mind” (Marx, 1974, p.128) (emphases in original). Therefore, in
Marx’s (1974) opinion, Hegel regarded mind as the essence of human, and as the premise, the
truth, and the absolute prius of the natural world, again falling into the solipsist category.

Marx (1974), in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, presented a “Critique of
the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole” (p.124) and argued that Hegel, in the
very beginning of his philosophy (i.e. Phanomenologie), solely and, in Marx’s opinion,
mistakenly, considered material entities only in their form as thoughts estranged from the
abstract philosophical thinking, which had unsurprisingly rendered his analysis ended with
absolute knowledge. Marx, on the other hand, leaned towards the material side:
(m)an is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on
the one hand endowed with natural powers, vital powers—he is an active natural being.
These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities—as instincts. On the other hand, as a
natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited
creature, like animals and plants (Marx, 1974, p.135) (emphases in original).

In other words, Marx agreed to some extent that we, as humans, have our own active and
natural instinct, but this self-autonomic power is at the same time limited by outside forces in
that
the objects of his (human) instincts exist outside him, as objects independent of him; yet
these objects are objects that he needs—essential objects, indispensable to the
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manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers (ibid, p.135) (emphases in
original).

However, Marx did not simply attribute the ultimate cause to the external environment, but
rather signified the coexistence between human and the outside world that
(a) being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural being, and plays no
part in the system of nature. A being which has not object outside itself is not an
objective being. A being which is not itself an object for some third being has no being
for its object (ibid, p.135) (emphases in original).

For instance, on the one hand, we as humans would no longer be the natural and / or objective
beings if the surrounding environment did not exist and / or, we did not have the needs for
any objects of the external world; the material world, on the other hand, is an object of
humans—an object existing outside us and yet indispensable to the integration and expression
of our natural existence—just as humans an object of the material world, being an expression
of the nurturing characteristics of the world. To state it simply, the existence of human
beings is predicated upon the existence of the outside world; and vice versa. As such the
aforementioned idealism / materialism binary seems to be somewhat redundant and
contradictory, as the dichotomy per se would postulate the independent existence of either
human ideas or external environment which Marx has already denied.

Nevertheless, having realised the co-existence between man and nature is not enough, as
Marx went on to comment that
…man is not merely a natural being: he is a human natural being… Therefore, human
objects are not natural objects as they immediately present themselves, and neither is
human sense as it immediately is – as it is objectively – human sensibility, human
objectivity. Neither nature objectively nor nature subjectively is directly given in a form
adequate to the human being… (ibid, p.136) (emphases in original).
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Then, the question becomes what sits in between human and nature, and thus unifies the two
together? For Marx, the answer is society, since
(t)he human aspect of nature exists only for social man; for only then does nature exist
for him as a bond with man—as his existence for the other and the other’s existence for
him—and as the life-element of human reality. Only then does nature exist as the
foundation of his own human existence. Only here has what is to him his natural
existence become his human existence, and nature become man for him (ibid, p.92)
(emphases in original).

In other words, the human / nature coexistence is juxtaposed with a third factor, society,
which plays an equally indispensable role: society produces and is also produced by human.
Not only does the social character of human beings exist in the direct interactions among
people, and between people and society, but it is predicated on the individual activities
performed by people. This is because the very existence of any individual him or herself is a
social activity: whatever he or she thinks or does belongs to the social being. Thus, despite
the physical distinction, human beings and the external environment in which we reside are at
the same time in unity with one another: the “antithetical character” (p.96) between the two is
lost within the framework of social relations. Here, unlike idealism and materialism, Marx
(1974) attempted to constitute the “unifying truth of both” (p.135) which he referred to as the
dialectic between humans and the environment, a constant changing process where
“circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances” (Marx & Engels, 1974,
p.59). Although it was Hegel who first conceptualised the method of dialectic, Marx (1887)
“openly avowed… (himself) the pupil of that mighty thinker (Hegel)” (p.14). Nevertheless
the difference between the two is, as discussed earlier, that while the Hegelian dialectic
begins with pure ideas, the Marxian counterpart starts from material activities.
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Having illustrated the ontological view held by Marx, that is, the dialectical relationship
between human beings and the external environment, questions still remain as to where
human ideas come from, how they are obtained, and what their main purpose is. These are to
be addressed in the following sections.

5.1.2. Marx’s Epistemological perspective
Epistemology refers to the theory of knowledge (Gaffikin, 2008); it determines what is to
count as valid knowledge (Chua, 1986). Following Marx’s logic, contrary to the Hegelian
philosophy which starts from and concludes with the abstract absolute knowledge (as
mentioned previously) and which has been, in so doing, detached from the material world,
knowledge itself cannot stand on its own but must come from and be proved by practice
(Marx & Engels, 1974). In fact, knowledge is “nothing else than the material world reflected
by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought” (Marx, 1887, p.14). Thus,
“(t)he production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language
of real life” (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.47).

Moreover, while obtaining and testing knowledge from material activities, Marx also
acknowledged the “one-sidedness” of knowledge in that
“every historical period has laws (i.e. knowledge) of its own… As soon as society has
outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to
another, it begins to be subject also to other laws (i.e. knowledge)” (Marx, 1887, p.14)
(emphases added).

This is because, for Marx, knowledge refers to not only the comprehension of the existing
state of the material world, but also the recognition of the negation of the state to change the
status quo; knowledge, in its essence, is therefore critical and revolutionary. In relation to
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extant accounting literature, this is also echoed by Tinker (1999) that “(f)or Marx, thought,
ideas, and ‘philosophies’, are simultaneously products of reality and a force for engendering
that reality” (p.646). Taking the material practice as the point of departure, Marx was
interested in investigating the natural law of social movement and its corresponding impact,
both positive and negative, on society at large. The way in which his investigation was
carried out leads us to methodology.

5.1.3. Marx’s Methodology
As elucidated earlier, for Marx, knowledge must be obtained from practice. Consequently, his
investigation begins with the real life and the real living individuals in their “empirically
perceptible process of development” under certain modes of production (Marx & Engels,
1974, p.48). In addition, while the living individual is a product of the ever-changing material
world, the latter has also been constantly shaped by the former. As a consequence, to explore
any particular phenomena requires us to study not only the people and the environment in
which they operate but also the corresponding social relations between the two (ibid, p.64). In
fact, Marx (1887) has explicitly illustrated the specific approach in his Afterword to the
Second German Edition of Capital as
“to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to
trace out their inner connexion. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be
adequately described. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is
ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori
construction” (ibid, p.14) (emphasis added).

Also in his The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx (1973) indicated that
“as a matter of principle in political economy, the figures of a single year must never be
taken as the basis for formulating general laws. One must always take… a period of time
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during which modern industry passes through the various phases of prosperity,
overproduction, stagnation, crisis, and completes its inevitable cycle” (p.214)

That is, to conduct any valid investigation, one must explore not only the contemporary but
also the historical environment, so as to trace out the inner connection behind different
periods of time and / or different stages of development in which the subject matter operates.
Having outlined Marx’s approach, the question now becomes how the word ‘different’ can be
defined in such a context, and / or, how Marx would account for the phases of prosperity,
overproduction, stagnation, and crisis. While this is not particularly addressed in the above
quotation, from his major works such as Capital and The German Ideology we know that
Marx was always interested in history, and thus it is his interpretation of history that may be
able to answer our question.

According to Marx, and consistent with his dialectics on the existence of social reality,
history does not stand on its own and must be interwoven with human beings. In fact,
“(t)he first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human
individuals…and men must be in a position to live in order to be able to ‘make history’”
(Marx and Engels, 1974, p.42-48).

And because
“…life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and
many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy
their needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a
fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily
and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life” (ibid, p.48)

Here, the production of material life refers to not only the satisfaction of the means of
subsistence but also the procreation of the next generation. With the initial need of living
being satisfied and the population increased comes the newer and greater need of
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production which then creates wider social relations in terms of family and production.
Following the expansion pattern as such, Marx argued that
“a certain mode of production… is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation
(i.e. social relation), or social stage, and this mode of co-operation is itself a ‘productive
force’… the multitude of productive forces accessible to men determines the nature of
society, hence, that the ‘history of humanity’ must always be studied and treated in
relation to the history of industry and exchange” (ibid, p.50) (emphasis added).

In other words, to study history we must turn our attention to the mode of production that
consists of the respective “productive force” and social relations. More importantly, it is to
Marx the materialistic connection between men as determined by the need and the mode of
production that creates a “‘history’ independently of the existence of any political or
religious nonsense which in addition may hold men together” (Marx and Engels, 1974,
p.50). The immaterial things such as consciousness, spirit, language and so forth, on the
other hand, are considered, from the very outset, merely the social products so long as
human beings exist. As such, “(r)eligion, family, state, law, morality, science, art, etc., are
only particular modes of production” (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.91) (emphasis in original).
Viewed in this way, the answer to our previous question becomes clear: the focus of
Marx’s investigation is the mode of production that underpins the socio-historical
landscape within which the subject matter is conceived and nurtured. More specifically, to
explore the mode of production we must delve into the particular force of production that
constitutes the former with certain social relations.

Unlike the classical political economists such as Smith (1980) and Ricardo (1952) who
simply defined productive force within the economic sphere, Marx re-interpreted the
notion on a philosophical level: it refers to not only the sizes of capital, divisions of labour,
and technical inventions but, as it evolves, becomes a form of social power which arises
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from the natural (albeit not voluntary) cooperation of individuals, “not as their own united
power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are
ignorant, which they thus cannot control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar
series of phases and stages independent of the will and the action of man, nay even being
the prime governor of these” (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.54). While being independent of
individual productions, the very same power in its entirety also determines and even
changes society as a whole in that
“… all collisions in history have their origin… in the contradiction between the
productive forces and the form of intercourse” (p.89).

And since
the forces of production, the state of society… can and must come into contradiction with
one another (p.52),

history will then move forward through replacing the older form of social intercourse that
has become a fetter upon the existing productive force with a new one (p.87), advancing
the relevant mode of production accordingly.

Subsequently, two points at this stage can be revealed here. First, individuals, and so are
their ideas, thoughts, consciousness, and other mental productions as such, are always
limited by productive forces as much as the latter supersedes the former. Second,
productive forces, coupled with the changing forms of social intercourse / relations,
determine the mode of production and thus the historical development of society. Bear in
mind the relationship from the material to the mental productions, a Marxist analytical
framework has now emerged, that investigates not only the subject-matter (whether
material or otherwise) per se but also the underlying productive forces and the forms of
social relations. This then can, in Marx’s own words, be concluded as
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“(e)mpirical observation must… bring out empirically, and without any mystification and
speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production” (ibid,
p.46).

Furthermore, Marx went on to comment on the social conditions under which his
investigation is undertaken that
“(t)he social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of
individuals… as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite
material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will” (ibid, p.46-47).

Of particular notice here, and also another distinguishing feature that has made Marx so
distinct from his contemporaries, is his assumption on social orientations. That is, society is
always moving toward change; any conflict can be traced back to the contradiction
between the existing productive forces and the corresponding social relations. Thus, not
only did Marx consider and explicate the subject-matter in a dynamic socio-historical
context, but he would also proactively take the analysis as the point of departure to change
the status quo (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.123).

5.1.4. Marx’s view on social change
Already illustrated in the previous section are how productive forces and social relations
move history forward, and, earlier than that, how thoughts, ideas, and concepts reflect the
material world, as discussed in the epistemology section. Attention is now turned to the
process in which, from a Marx’s perspective, our knowledge of the subject-matter leads to
social change. First of all, much as its origin derives from material practice, the
interpretation of knowledge is not to be contained at the linguistic or philosophic level
(p.41), but to be achieved “in the real world and by employing real means” (p.61), for
language per se is practical which arises from social relations. Then, in the real material
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world, knowledge recognises both the present state of things and also the negation of the
present, and therefore inevitably comes into contradiction with the exiting social conditions
which “can only occur because existing social relations have come into contradiction with
existing forces of production” (p.52). As such, society will then proceed forward through
the replacement of the old productive forces and relations with the newer ones. In short,
knowledge identifies conflicts in society, which can then be attributed to the deeper
contradiction between productive forces and social relations that ultimately changes the
status quo. Only now, after having considered the connections between knowledge,
productive forces and social change, can we indeed appreciate Marx’s point that
“all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism, by
resolution into “self-consciousness” … but only by the practical overthrow of the actual
social relations which gave rise to this idealistic humbug; that not criticism but revolution
is the driving force of history, also of religion, of philosophy and all other types of theory”
(pp.58-59).

Insofar as Marx’s methodological approach is concerned, the philosophical assumptions of
the thesis are outlined including ontology, epistemology, methodology, and social
orientations. Following these underpinnings, the next section is dedicated towards a Marxinformed Political Economy of Accounting framework in which the discourse analysis of
this study is undertaken.

5.2. A discourse analysis informed by Marx’s Political Economy of Accounting
As the credit goes to Tinker (1980) who initially conceptualised the Political Economy of
Accounting (PEA) as an alternative approach to accounting studies, PEA was first concerned
with exploring accounting by taking into consideration both the economic forces of
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production and the social relations of production. Cooper and Sherer (1984) further
elaborated on the concept that PEA “emphasizes the infrastructure, the fundamental relations
between class in society… (and) recognizes the institutional environment which supports the
existing system of corporate reporting and subjects to critical scrutiny those issues… that are
frequently taken for granted in current accounting research” (pp.208-9). Tinker and Neimark
(1987) later gave the definition that PEA investigates
“the ways various social protagonists use accounting information and corporate reporting
to mediate, suppress, mystify and transform social conflict. The approach places class
relations at the forefront of the analysis and is, accordingly, concerned with the effects of
accounting information and corporate reporting on the distribution of income, wealth,
and power” (pp.71-72).

Recently, Arnold (2009) also referred to this stream of studies as being able to understand
“the links between the micro world of accounting and the macro economy” (p.805), and thus
called for a renewed theoretical emphasis on PEA research. Despite the various
characteristics assigned with the concept itself, PEA, it is argued, may still seem to exhibit
little difference from other general critical accounting studies that examine accounting in its
social, historical, and political context. Thus, this approach has sometimes been labelled as
merely a “slogan” that falls short of any concrete methodological framework which would
otherwise justify its adoption (Woodward & Woodward, 2000; Toms, 2005). In particular,
relatively little attention has been given to the specific meaning or strand of the “political
economy” in extant PEA literature with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Tinker et al. 1982;
Bryer, 1991, 1993, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b, 2005; Toms, 2005). Responding to this
deficit and also consistent with Marx’s philosophical underpinnings discussed earlier, an
attempt is made in the following to first explore and evaluate the specific notions of
“discourse” and “analysis” from Marx’s perspective, which would then, in so doing, present a
Marx-oriented PEA framework for analysing accounting discourse.
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5.2.1. “Discourse” from a Marxist perspective
In general, discourse takes various forms of ‘communicative events’ including
“conversational interaction, written text, as well as associated gestures, face work,
typographical layout, images” (van Dijk, 2001, p.98) and so forth. Consistent with the notion
as such, Marx regarded the term as any language that “only arises from the need, the
necessity, of intercourse with other men” (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.51). For this reason, Marx
argued that discourse is in its nature “practical”, whose existence hinges upon not only its
users themselves but also others to whom the discourse is made. In other words, discourse is
considered a social product, produced by practical individuals who actively engage
themselves in a web of social relations.

Whilst Marx’s interpretation of discourse at this level may be no more different than many of
the contemporary notions of discourse in that discourse resonates with extant social
conditions, what does actually distinguish Marx from the general understanding lies in his
emphasis on the material activities on which discourse is based. That is, the production of
ideas, conceptions, and consciousness, originates from the production of the means of
subsistence as, in Marx’s (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.47) opinion, the first historical act. Since
discourse is the “immediate actuality of thought” (ibid, p.118), it is thus argued that the
production and the consumption of discourse are also conditioned by certain productive
forces and the corresponding social relations therein. Alongside the development of material
production and social relations, the content of human thoughts and the products of our
thoughts (i.e. discourse) will be changed accordingly.
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Bear in mind the focus on productive forces and social relations, the specific context, or in
Marx’s own words, the “form of intercourse”, from which discourse derives is civil society
(ibid, p.57). Emerging in the eighteenth century, the concept
“embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the
development of productive forces… and, insofar, transcends the State and the
nation…(and) in all ages forms the basis of the State and of the rest of the idealistic
(ideological) superstructure” (ibid, p.57).

Viewed in this way, unlike other linguistic studies that explicate discourse in national,
regional, ethnic, philosophical, ethical, and / or political contexts, Marx would rather come
back to civil society (and its underlying mode of production) as the starting point on which
any other ideological structure is based. Moreover, due to the transcendence of national
boundaries, the existence of civil society is predicated on the existence of a “world market
through competition” (ibid, p.56). For instance,
“if in England a machine is invented, which deprives countless workers of bread in India
and China, and overturns the whole form of existence of these empires, this invention
becomes a world-historical fact. Or again, take the case of sugar and coffee which have
proved their world-historical importance in the nineteenth century by the fact that the
lack of these products, occasioned by the Napoleonic Continental System, caused the
Germans to rise against Napoleon, and thus became the real basis of the glorious Wars of
liberation of 1813” (ibid, p.58).

In addition to the world-historical context in which Marx situates civil society as the specific
context that engenders discourse, he also pointed out the ruling class (i.e. the ruling material
force) as the main producer and distributor of discourse. This is because
“(t)he class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the
same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby… the ideas of those who
lack the means of mental production are subject to it” (p.64).
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The dominant material relationship here manifests itself in the production and distribution of
ruling discourse. More specifically, within the ruling class, it is those “active… (and)
conceptive ideologists who make (discourse) the perfecting of the illusion of the class about
itself” (p.65). Subsequently, in so doing, the ruling discourse gradually takes on the form of
universality, and the interest of the ruling class becomes the common interest of the society
correspondingly. Discourse, in this sense, serves to maintain and perpetuate the domination
of the extant ruling class.

Already explicated have been that discourse comes from civil society which embraces certain
productive forces and social relations, and that it is produced primarily by the ruling material
class. The question remaining to be answered is to what extent discourse shapes society, apart
from legitimising and reinforcing the status quo. Although Marx did not specifically address
this issue, he stated elsewhere that, without considering the real existing world, even the
“world-shattering” discourses would be merely the “staunchest conservatives… as they are
only fighting against… the phrases of this world” (p.41), for liberation could not be achieved
by simply liberating people from the domination of discourses (p.61). On the other hand, with
the consideration of the material world, Marx, on the contrary, did acknowledge the
possibility of social change via discourse, when “the existence of revolutionary ideas (and
thus discourse)… presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class” (p.65). In other words,
discourse alone may not be able to change the status quo; it may only change the status quo
to the extent that the underlying social class from which the discourse derives does so. Of
course this is not to say that discourse can never initiate social change; it is however to
emphasise the need for an appreciation of the dialectical interplay between discourse and the
oppressed class, the coincidence of which changes the status quo (see also Tinker, 1999,
p.646).
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To summarise the discussion so far, discourse has the power of legitimatising and thereby
sustaining the interest of the existing ruling class, yet pari passu, also retains the capacity to
change the status quo, provided that both scenarios have been shaped by and simultaneously
shaping the corresponding social classes: the former involves the ruling ones, and the latter
concerns the ruled. Having illustrated the relationship between discourse and its underlying
context (i.e. civil society) and the possibility of social change from a Marxist perspective, the
next section explores how specific discourse analyses can be carried out in order to reveal
these relations.

5.2.2. “Analysis” from a Marxist perspective
Following the above delineation of discourse, a Marxist approach to discourse analysis is
next investigated. This corresponds to Marx’s interest in production on which discourse is
based, civil society from which discourse arises, and class perspectives through which
discourse is perceived and interpreted, respectively.

5.2.2.1. Analysis of the underlying productive activities of discourse
First of all, unlike some of the conventional linguistic studies that take the discourse per se as
the point of departure, Marx’s analysis “set(s) out from real, active men, and on the basis of
their real life-process… demonstrate(s) the development of the ideological reflexes and
echoes of this life-process” (p.47). That is, Marx would pay specific attention to the producer
of the discourse and especially to his or her productive activities that constitute and condition
the basis of the discourse. Here, the productive activities refer to the producers’ “practical
position in life, their job and the division of labour” (p.68) in particular, and their respective
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productive forces and social relations in general. In the field of PEA, Tinker (1980) also notes
the theoretical significance of the productive forces and the relevant social relations which he
considers as the two dimensions of capital—the former refers to the economic forces of
production and the latter the social relations of production. As such, he argues that accounting
(and thus accounting discourse), as a “product of the socio-economic reality” (Tinker, 1980,
p.149), can be explored through investigating the distribution of power and the corresponding
institutional and social conditions. Drawing from the material focus on production, a Marxist
discourse analysis, at this level, concerns the producers of discourse, and particularly the
productive forces and social interactions in which they participate. Nonetheless, questions are
asked of the extent to which the productive forces are to be categorised and illuminated, and
the extent to which the social relations are to be defined and perceived.

5.2.2.2. Analysis of the underlying Civil Society of productive activities
Whilst Tinker (1980) emphasises both sides of capital (i.e. economic production and social
relations), Marx further situates them in the context of civil society, the form of social
relations that determines and is determined by productive forces, as the basis of his
historiography and of his critique of Political Economy. For Marx, civil society transcends
nations and states in that the concept itself directly arises from production and commerce
which then lay down the foundation of the “State and of the rest of the idealistic
superstructure” (p.57). Viewed in this way, our emphasis on production is not to be limited
within the confines of national contexts but to be conceived via different modes of production
such as production and / or commerce from a world perspective. This is not only because,
historically, the entire social structure of any nation hinges upon the “stage and development
reached by its production and its internal and external intercourse” (p.43), but also due to the
fact that, observing from without, the relations among different nations also depends on their
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development of productive forces and the social relations therein. Moreover, alongside the
division of labour and the resulting conflict of interest between separate individuals and
communities, comes the State which,
“takes an independent form… divorced from the real interests of individual and
community, and at the same time as an illusory communal life, always based, however,
on the real ties existing in every family and tribal conglomeration… and especially… on
the classes, already determined by the division of labour, which in every such mass of
men separate out, and of which one dominates all the others” (pp.53-54).

Here, the State deviates from the very purpose with which it was born as to mediate the
contradiction between individuals and communities. Instead, it provides and to some extent in
itself becomes the arena where distinctive classes compete with one another. As such, the
State is in no way helping unite the interests of different social groups, but only justifying and
universalising the particular interest of the ruling class as the common interest, the dominant
discourse, of the whole society. For instance, Marx noted that, in modern capitalist societies,
“the State… is nothing more than the form of organisation which the (capitalists)…
necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their
property and interests” (p.80). Regulation, in this sense, follows the will of the ruling class
(i.e. capitalists) in that “(w)henever, through the development of industry and commerce, new
forms of intercourse have been evolved e.g. assurance companies, etc., the law has always
been compelled to admit them among the modes of acquiring property” (p.81).

Having pointed out Marx’s greater emphasis on civil society in comparison to the “illusory
form of the State”, the structure of a Marxist discourse analysis is rendered clear. Rather than
concentrating on the national and / or political contexts, the focus is on the basic elements of
civil society that include industrial and commercial activities. However, as capitalism evolves
to date, financial capital, or in Marx’s term, interest-bearing capital has also become essential
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and integral to contemporary capitalist societies. Although Marx did not account for financial
activities in the notion of civil society, he did in fact extend his analysis to “interest-bearing
capital” in Volume III of Capital, and consider the capital as such the most advanced and the
most potent form of capitalist production (Marx, 1959, p.433). Therefore, given the relevance
and importance of financial capital, the Marxist discourse analysis, at this stage, explores the
corresponding modes of production such as industrial, commercial, and financial activities in
which the discourse is put forward in a global context.

Moreover, as civil society transcends the illusory form of the state to which Marx further
added that
“all struggles within the State, the struggle between democracy, aristocracy, and
monarchy, the struggle for the franchise, etc. etc. are merely the illusory forms in which
the real struggles of the different classes are fought out among one another” (p.54),

the crux of the issue here is to not only examine the industrial, commercial, and financial
capitalists within the same class alone, but also acknowledge and investigate the oppressed
working class to which the discourse as a social product can be extended. In the following
section, therefore, it is to the class perspective that we now turn.

5.2.2.3. Analysis of the underlying classes of Civil Society
As the aim of Marx’s investigation is to change the status quo (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.123),
and the root from which social change derives is embedded in class conflicts, the analysis at
this level involves the impact of discourse on both the ruling and the ruled classes, explores
the struggles between the two, and examines the relationship between the discourse in
question and the potential social change. This is also consistent with Marx’s view of
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discourse that while dominant discourse put forward by the ruling class serves to legitimise
and perpetuate the status quo, the dialectical interplay between discourse and the ruled class
does exhibit the possibility of social change. In particular, Marx pointed out the premises for
the oppressed class, coupled with the relevant discourse, capable of initiating such changes
that
“when productive forces and means of intercourse are brought into being, which, under
the existing relationships, only cause mischief, and are no longer productive but
destructive forces… and connected with this a class is called forth, which has to bear all
the burdens of society without enjoying its advantages, which, ousted from society, is
forced into the most decided antagonism to all other classes” (Marx and Engels, 1974,
p.94).

View in this way, the discourse analysis at this stage now begs the questions that to what
extent the discourse concerns the conflicts between the ruling class and the ruled, and that to
what extent such conflicts are solved by or sustained through the discourse in question and
why.

Admittedly, as capitalism develops to date, some researchers (and the post-modernist
scholars in particular) argue that the concept of class struggle is obsolete and no longer
relevant as modern capitalist societies have entered into the post-industrialised and / or
postmodern era. Nevertheless, the aftermath of the economic crisis in the 1980s and the
globalisation of capital have witnessed the transition from the Fordist Welfare State based on
a compromise between capital and labour to a new era of capital accumulation and
restructuring on a global scale (Harvey, 1989; Hanlon, 1996). As productions are being
shifted from advanced capitalist countries to newly emerged developing economies to
achieve greater flexibility and lower cost, the interest of the working class has been gradually
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and naturally marginalised through casualization and outsourcing (Cooper, 1997; Arnold &
Cooper, 1999). Class conflict at this stage should not be sidestepped as it would appear so on
the surface but be brought to the very forefront of critical examination. It is thus in this
context that the class perspective is as relevant today as in the period in which Marx had
observed and analysed.

Another concern which might lead us to refute the idea of class is that modern capitalism has
rendered the class identity rather obscured and conflicting in that many people are both
workers and capitalists at the same time. In response to this, Tinker et al. (1991) pointed out
that “class conflict is not a conflict between ‘individuals’ but between social role aggregates
in which individuals participate in several, often conflicting, roles” (p.30). In this sense, it
may be possible that “by engaging the same dispute through conflicting roles, an individual
may ultimately contribute to her/his own exploitation” (p.30). However, the focus of the
question here is not on the individuals but on the class “in which they participated not as
individuals but as members of a class” (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.85), since firstly the
“subsuming of individuals under definite classes cannot be abolished (until the
accomplishment of the communist revolution)” (p.83), and more importantly the power of a
class is not simply the united power of all individuals within that class as a whole but an alien
force existing outside the individuals which they cannot control and which conversely may
even be able to control them (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.54). Consequently, it is argued here
that, despite the identity of individuals on the surface, however conflicting and obscure it
might be, it is the interests of and the conflict between different classes that underlying the
purpose of the analysis at the third level.
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5.3. Research method and data collection
Having developed the Marxist-informed framework for discourse analysis, this section
applies the framework to set out the specific analysis method that the thesis uses, the
corresponding data collection process, and the reliability and validity of the data collected.

5.3.1. Three levels of analyses of the accounting discourse on financialisation
As the research question of the thesis considers the role of accounting discourse, in particular
on the part of the Chinese iron and steel industry, in the process of the financialised pricing
mechanism in the global iron ore market, three levels of analyses are put forward following
Marx’s focus on material production, civil society, and class perspective.

In the first layer, the discourse around the iron ore pricing controversy from both the Chinese
iron and steel industry and the international iron ore suppliers (i.e. the three oligopolies: Rio
Tinto, BHP Billiton, and Vale) are collected and analysed with the attempt to explore the
practical meaning of the discourse as informed by the corresponding underlying modes of
production. At this level, questions are asked of whether the controversy between the two
parties over the price of iron ore can be traced back to the discrepancies between different
modes of productions. Relevant social relations and productive forces corresponding to the
different modes of production are explored. In the second layer, the underlying productive
activities discussed and identified from the first layer are brought further to the context of
civil society in which different modes of production coordinate and / or conflict with one
another. More specifically, the producers of the discourse, i.e. the Chinese industry and the
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global oligopolies, are considered as different fractions in the same capitalist class in a global
arena.

While the two preceding analyses examine the interactions among corporations, the third
layer extends the scope of the investigation and lends a perspective on classes other than
capitalists themselves. In the context of the Chinese iron and steel industry as one heavily
state-controlled sector, the analysis at this level takes into consideration the interest of the
working class and the issue of accountability insofar as the state-owned enterprises are
concerned. In so doing, it attempts to answer the question of whether the Chinese communist
government has achieved a real market economy with socialist characteristics as informed by
Marx’s theory and particularly The Communist Manifesto, or if it is in fact another form of
capitalism that evolves on its own.

5.3.2. Data collection
Since this thesis is concerned with the practical meaning of accounting discourse in the
process of financialisation, the data that the research uses largely consists of primary sources
from publicly available materials. This refers to the use of the accounting information by the
Chinese steel industry found in news articles, government announcements, corporate media
releases, and other forms of media reports during the iron ore price negotiations. As
accounting is generally regarded as the process of identifying, measuring, categorizing, and
reporting corporate activities (primarily economic transactions) to the users of the
information to make informed decisions, thus, it is argued that almost no better data could be
obtained to represent and reveal the meaning of accounting than the accounting discourse put
forward by the end users of accounting information in real practice. In so doing, the study can
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also avoid using the statistical data alone, the validity and reality of which, in the Chinese
context, would otherwise be questioned (Xiao et al., 2004; Tang, 2000).

In general, the data of this thesis can be divided into four categories. The first category refers
to the media coverage of the iron ore price negotiation in China, contributing to the major
part of the data used in the current research. Specifically, the data is collected from Sina
Finance, a website that contains and updates a wide variety of financial news in China and
across the globe. As one of the most popular and commonly used websites in Mainland
China, Sina has been acknowledged and referred to by those who investigate accounting
topics in the Chinese context (e.g. Ding & Graham, 2007; Zhang et al., 2012). In relation to
annual iron ore price negotiations, the Sina Finance launched the special website to each
year’s

negotiation

from

2006

to

2011

http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/lntksztp/index.shtml;

(the

2006

the

http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/2007tkstp/index.shtml;

the

http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/iron2008/;

2009

the

http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/iron2009/index.shtml;
http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/iron_2010/;

the

2007

the
2011

2008

annual

negotiation:

annual

negotiation

annual

negotiation

annual
2010

annual
annual

negotiation
negotiation
negotiation

http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/iron_2011/).

The period of data collection ranges from 2008 October to 2010 May because: (1) the idea of
adopting the index pricing mechanism was initially raised in the 2008 iron ore annual price
negotiation and partially adopted in 2009 by BHP Billiton; (2) it was then formally discussed
in the 2009 annual negotiation and also recommended by the publisher of the index—Platts at
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the time, and; (3) this pricing mechanism became generally accepted in the global iron ore
market during the 2010 negotiation.

The specific collection method is as follows. First, all the news articles and media releases
available from Sina Finance’s special webpages for the 2009 and 2010 annual negotiations
(i.e.

2009

negotiation

http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/iron2009/index.shtml;

2010

negotiation http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/iron_2010/) are downloaded. Each article is
input in a single Microsoft Word document in its original language (i.e. Chinese) with the
corresponding web address in the end of each document. Second, in addition to the articles
and commentaries directly post on the special pages for two annual negotiations, there are
also links of other relevant articles which are not presented on the special pages straightaway
but available from those directly post articles. These articles are also downloaded together
with the first round downloaded articles and input in Microsoft Word in the same manner.

Third, when the download is completed, all the articles referred to in the first and second
stages are filtered through two relevant criteria: (1) the topics of the article shall be related to
the iron ore price negotiations; (2) the producers of the discourse shall be one of the
participants of the iron ore market which include (1) the major buyers of iron ore from the
Chinese iron and steel industry and their political stakeholders (i.e. large Chinese Stateowned steel enterprises, the Chinese Iron and Steel Association or the CISA, China Chamber
of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters or the CCCMC, the
Ministry of Industry and Information or the MII, the Ministry of Commerce or the MOC, and
the State Council); (2) other buyers from the Chinese iron and steel industry (i.e. China’s
small and medium steel firms, China’s iron ore trading firms and ports); (3) the iron ore
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buyers from Japan, Korea, and Europe which were on the same buyers’ side with China in the
negotiation; and (4) the global iron ore suppliers (i.e. BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Companhia
Vale do Rio Doce or Vale, Fortescue Metals Group or FMG, etc.) and the iron ore price index
publishers (i.e. Platts).

Fourth, after leaving out the articles and commentaries purely written by journalists or market
analysts or other professional researchers in the third stage, the existing available data are
organised in a chronological order dating from 2008 August to 2010 October via Microsoft
Excel. All relevant discourse are translated by the author of the thesis and input into the Excel
sheets, categorised by (1) the producer of the discourse from the four groups considered in
stage three, and (2) the date, author, name, and web address of the article in which discourse
is reported. In particular, for simplicity purposes, members of the four groups are outlined
with different colours corresponding to different groups. That is, the first group (i.e. major
Chinese steel SOEs and government agencies) is indicated by dark red; the second group (i.e.
other iron ore buyers from the Chinese market) by orange; the third group (i.e. iron ore
buyers from other countries) by light green; the fourth group (i.e. iron ore suppliers and index
publishers) by dark blue. In the case of more than one article is reported on the same day,
sub-headings (e.g. (1), (2), (3), etc.) are used to indicate the specific articles for that period. In
the case that, despite the filtering process in stage three, no specific discourse is found, the
date, author, name and web address of the article are still input in Excel.

Fifth, an initial assessment of the raw data is undertaken to combine the similar discourse
produced by the same person and reported on the same day or period (i.e. a week), in order to
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refine the data. Overall, more than 600 news articles from Sina Finance have been collected
and analysed in accordance with the method illustrated above.

The second category of data is the set of official announcements and regulations regarding
the iron ore pricing mechanism in particular and the Chinese steel and iron industry at large
by the CISA and the Chinese government. The third category consists of the annual reports of
the major players on the supply and demand chain including China’s top four state-owned
steel plants (i.e. Baosteel, Shougang, Anshan Iron and Steel, and Wuhan Iron and Steel) as
well as the Big Three. The fourth category contains other types of publicly available
information regarding the price of iron ore such as the index price assessment methodology
stated by Platts. For those materials that are only available online, the author has downloaded
the content in Microsoft Word and also added the corresponding web address to the
document.

5.3.3. Reliability and validity of the data
Since most of the news articles, reports, and other types of documents introduced above are
originally written in Chinese, there is a need to outline the reliability and validity of the data,
which are accomplished through three steps. First, as a native speaker of Chinese, the author
of the thesis has single-handedly translated the Chinese texts into English which are
subsequently input into the respective Microsoft Excel and Word documents. Second, these
documents are assessed by the supervisors of the author (two of whom12 are native English
speakers) in term of both grammar and content. They consult with the author and help revise

12

Dr. Kathy Rudkin and Dr. Corinne Cortese.
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the wording of the English texts (where necessary) while maintaining the original meanings
intact. Third, this consult-revise procedure is carried forward to the writing up of the thesis.
For each reference made in the thesis, the author has reached the agreement with the
supervisors to strengthen the empirical validity and the theoretical relevance of the data.

5.4. Conclusion
In this chapter, the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis are outlined following the Marxist
tradition; the discourse analysis based on a Marxist methodological approach is discussed and
developed. The specific analysis method and the data collection process are also explicated in
detail. In the next chapter, the Marxist discourse analysis will be applied to the controversy
over the fair price of iron ore between the Chinese iron and steel industry and the three
oligopolistic global iron ore suppliers (i.e. BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Vale), with an
attempt to investigate the underlying mode of productions for both parties on the supply and
demand chain of the international iron ore market.
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Chapter 6 Different Interpretations of Iron Ore Price—
Identifying Modes of Production

In the preceding chapters, the theoretical framework and the methodological approach of the
thesis are discussed and developed. A Marxist theorised framework for financialisation is
presented and the term financialisation is defined with particular reference to this thesis as the
rising significance of financial capital in the global iron ore market in general and the iron ore
pricing mechanism in particular. Consistent with the Marxist-informed PEA framework,
subsequently, a discourse analysis informed by Marx’s theoretical framework as the
methodology of the study is explored. The specific data collection and classification
procedures are explicated at the end of chapter five. In this chapter, the accounting discourse
around iron ore pricing between the Chinese iron and steel industry and the global iron ore
suppliers (i.e. the Big Three) is analysed, in order to unveil the underlying modes of
production which, in Marx’s opinion, constitute and condition the basis of discourse.

The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The first section (6.1.) introduces the
producers of the discourse concerning the heated argument over the iron ore price within the
period from October 2008 to April 2010. The second section (6.2.) delineates a timeline of
significant events with regard to the annual iron ore price negotiations that occurred during
the designated time frame aforementioned. In section three (6.3.), the controversial arguments
around the fair price of iron ore are located and identified corresponding to different
producers of the discourse. This is then explored in section four (6.4.), where the discourse of
fair price is further analysed with specific reference to relevant market components. Based on
the analysis in section four and Marx’s interpretation of different types of capital, the
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respective modes of production are identified and assigned to the producers of discourse in
section five (6.5.). The final section (6.6.) provides some concluding remarks.

6.1. Producers of discourse in iron ore price negotiations
As illustrated in chapter five, analyses following a Marxist framework “set out from real,
active men, and on the basis of their real life-process” (Marx and Engels, 1974, p.47).
Therefore, the first and foremost step of the analysis in this thesis begins with an
investigation of the producers of discourse and particularly of their “practical position in life,
their job and the division of labour” (ibid, p.68). In the context of the annual iron ore price
negotiations for the financial years of 2009 and 2010, and consistent with the groups
identified in the data collection process as described in chapter five, the producers of
discourse here are classified into the following four groups: (1) the major iron ore buyers
from the Chinese iron and steel industry and their relevant political stakeholders such as
government departments and semi-government organisations; (2) other buyers from the
Chinese iron and steel industry including small and medium steel enterprises and iron ore
trading companies; (3) other major iron ore buyers from Japan, Korea, and Europe which
were on the same buyer’s side with the Chinese firms in the negotiations, and; (4) the three
oligopolistic global iron ore suppliers and the iron ore index promoters and publishers. In line
with these classifications, the following sections introduce each group in greater detail.

6.1.1. The major Chinese buyers and relevant political stakeholders
As explicated in chapter two, the Chinese iron and steel sector has always been tainted with a
sense of political correctness and government control, since the birth of the People’s Republic
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of China (PRC) in 1949 (see e.g. Rawski, 1976; Peng, 1987). To date, the majority of the
largest steel plants in China are still either state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or subsidiaries of
even larger SOEs. For instance, data from the China Iron and Steel Association (CISA)
shows that, in 200913, while seven14 out of the ten largest steel plants in China were directly
state-owned, two enterprises15 were the subsidiaries of their state-owned parent entities, and
only one firm16 was privately owned. Among the top 50 steel plants in 2009, there were only
nine privately owned firms; the other 41 were either state-owned enterprises (SOE) or
subsidiaries of SOEs. Furthermore, despite the fact that many of these large SOEs are listed
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange or Hong Kong Stock Exchange, or both, less than 50% of
their shares are allowed to trade in the financial market, while the government maintains the
control of the SOEs by holding the majority of shares (Movshuk, 2004).

Having pointed out the dominance of SOEs in China’s iron and steel industry, also worth
noting is, inter alia, the CISA which is of significant political importance to the function of
the industry in general and the country’s participation in the iron ore annual price negotiation
in particular. Chinas has become the world’s largest producer of iron and steel since 1996
(Trench, 2004) and the largest iron ore importer since 2004 (Zhu, 2012). The Chinese iron
and steel industry began its participation in annual iron ore negotiations since 2003, and

13

The reason why the year 2009 is selected to illustrate the dominance of state ownership in China’s iron and steel industry
is that the period of time in which the accounting discourse is collected and examined in this study is from August 2008 to
April 2010. Thus, the industry data in 2009 is considered relevant to the research.
14

These include Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation, Shougang Company Limited (Group), Anshan Iron and Steel Group
Corporation, Wuhan Iron and Steel (Group) Corporation, Taiyuan Iron and Steel (Group) Company Limited, Jinan Iron and
Steel Group Corporation, Handan Iron and Steel Group.
15

These include Laiwu Steel Group Corporation (a subsidiary of Shangdong Iron and Steel Group Co Ltd which is
controlled by the provincial government of Shandong) and Maanshan Iron & Steel Company Limited (a subsidiary of
Magang (Group) Holding Col., Ltd which is controlled by the provincial government of Anhui).
16

This is Jiangsu Shangang Group Company Limited.
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Baosteel Group was subsequently chosen by the Ministry of Industry and Information as
China’s representative on the negotiation table. Baosteel held this role until the 2009 annual
iron ore negotiation, when CISA, under the permission of the State Council, took over the
responsibility and represented the Chinese industry as a whole in the negotiations (Xu,
2009c). While from the 2010 iron ore negotiation onwards Baosteel seemed to be the
representative of the Chinese side again, it was the CISA that actually had the final say on the
Baosteel’s decisions (DFdaily, 17 June 2009; Zhang XD, 2009e; Cao, 2009c). The following
subsections are dedicated to a detailed introduction of the major steel firms which are the
producers of the discourse collected and their overlaps with the CISA.

CISA
Prior to its formal establishment and the change of names in January 1999, the CISA was
then called the Chinese Metallurgy Enterprise Management Association (CMEMA), being
founded in January 1989. On March 10 1998, the former Ministry of Metallurgical Industry
(MMI) was officially revoked at the first meeting of the Ninth National People’s Congress
through Decisions on the Institutional Reform of the State Council (i.e. Decisions). The
purpose of the Decisions was to ‘remove the organisational structure which led to the
integration of government administration with enterprise’. As a result of these decisions, ten
ministries were abolished, on the ground that these departments were the offspring of the era
of China’s centrally planned economy, the existence of which would be unfavourable to the
market optimisation of resources as well as the active role that enterprises should take in a
market economy (Luo, 1998). Consequently, many of the staff members at the former MMI
joined to the CMEMA which carried on part of the ministry’s regulatory role. In less than one
year, the organisation was renamed as China Iron and Steel Association, i.e. the CISA. The
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first chairman of the association was Wu Xichun, one of the deputy ministers of the former
MMI; and the first deputy chairman Wu Jianchang was also the deputy minister at the
ministry. At the same time, the remaining function of the former MMI was taken over by the
State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC).

Also alongside the enactment of the Decisions, in addition to the revocation of the MMI, was
the organisational restructuring and the name change of the State Planning Commission
(SPC) which was then the direct regulator of the CMEMA. That is, as the CMEA turned into
CISA, the State Planning Commission also became the State Development Planning
Commission (SDPC), which still regulated the CISA. It was not until 2003 when the then
Chinese premier Wen Jiabao further promoted government reforms that the SDPC and the
SETC merged into one organisation, the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC hereafter). Since then, the regulator of the CISA became the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC hereafter), and the term ‘planning’
was completed removed from the departments concerned, at least on the surface. Moreover,
the employee salaries of the CISA are also covered through the funds of the SASAC. The
historical development of the CISA and its close relationship with the Chinese government
are illustrated in Figure 6.1 below.
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To investigate the producers of discourse at this stage in the case of the CISA, senior staff
members of the organisation and, if relevant, their professional and political backgrounds are
identified, in order to “explain… from their practical position in life, their job, and the
division of labour” (Marx and Engels, 1974, p.68). In 2009 and 201017, the detailed list of
staff members at the CISA is presented as follows.
Table 6.1 The third session leading members of China Iron & Steel Association in 2009
Title

Name

Chairman

Deng Qilin

Honorary Chairman

Wu Xichun

Party Secretary & Legal Representative & Vice Liu Zhenjiang
Chairman

17

Consistent with the designated period of time from which the data of this study is collected, the period from 2009 to 2010
is chosen to set the background of the Chinese Iron and Steel industry, which of course involves the CISA.
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Executive Vice Chairman

Luo Bingsheng

Vice Chairman

Zhu Jimin; Li Xiaowei; Zou Zhongchen; Wang
Yifang; Cui Chen; Shen Wenrong; Xu Lejiang;
Gu Jianguo; Yu Tianchen; Wang Ziliang; Zhang
Xiaogang; Li Xiaobo; Fan Zhengwei; Zhang
Changfu

Secretary-general

Shan Shanghua

Deputy Secretary-general

Qi Xiangdong; Li Shijun; Chen Xiaofu; Yang
Zunqing; Li Kemin; Chi Jingdong; Jiang Qihua;
Wu Xinchun

Advisors

Wu Jianchang; Pu Haiqing

(CISA, 2012a, 2012b)
While holding their positions at the CISA, most of these staff also work at the major SOEs in
the Chinese iron and steel sector and some are even government officials. For instance, the
chairman of the CISA, Deng Qilin, was also the general manager and the deputy secretary of
the Communist Party of China (CPC) Committee at Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation (the
fourth largest steel enterprise in China).

Among the vice chairman of the CISA, Zhu Jimin, was also the member of the Beijing
municipal party committee as well as the CPC committee secretary and the chairman of
Shougang Group (the second largest steel enterprise). Li Xiaowei was the member of the
Hunan provincial party committee, and the chairman of Hunan Valin Steel Tube & Wire Co.,
Ltd. (the parent entity of three top 100 steel enterprises18). Zou Zhongchen was the deputy
secretary of the CPC committee and the chairman of Shandong Steel Group (the parent entity
of two top 10 steel makers19). Wang Yifang was the chairman, general manager, and the
deputy secretary of the CPC committee of Hebei Iron & Steel Group (the parent entity of
18

These include LY steel, Xiangtan Iron & Steel, and Hengyan Steel Tube, which were ranked number 28, 36, and 82 of the
top 100 steel companies respectively in China in 2009 (CISA, 2009e).
19

These include Laiwu Steel Group (the 6th largest steel maker) and Jinan iron and Steel Group (the 8th largest steel maker).
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three top 50 steel plants 20 ). Cui Chen was the chairman and the secretary of the CPC
committee of Baogang Group (the 17th largest steel maker). Xu Lejiang was the chairman,
and the member of the CPC standing committee of Shanghai Baosteel Group (the largest steel
maker). Gu Jianguo was the chairman of Anshan Iron and Steel Corporation (the third largest
steel maker). Yu Tianchen was the member of the city part committee of Benxi, as well as the
chairman and the secretary of the CPC committee at Benxi Iron and Steel Group (the 13th
largest steel maker). Wang Ziliang was the chairman, general manager, and the deputy
secretary of the CPC committee at Anyang Iron and Steel Group (the 21st largest steel
maker). Zhang Xiaogang was the chairman, general manager, and the CPC committee
secretary at Anshan Iron and Steel Group (the 3rd largest steel maker). Li Xiaobo was the
chairman, general manager, and the member of the CPC committee at Taiyuan Iron and Steel
Group (the 7th largest steel maker). Fan Zhengwei was the chairman and the secretary of the
CPC committee at Panzhihua Iron and Steel Group (the 11th largest steel maker).

In addition to the aforementioned vice chairmen who were also the senior management of the
country’s major state-owned steel plants at the same time, other vice chairmen and chairman
at the CISA either previously held government positions or worked at major SOEs in the iron
and steel sector or both. For instance, the honorary chairman, Wu Xichun, was the deputy
minister and the member of the CPC committee at the former MMI, and the CPC committee
secretary at Anshan Iron and Steel Group. Luo Bingsheng was the chairman and the CPC
committee secretary at Shougang Group (the 2nd largest steel maker) prior to his
appointment as the executive vice chairman of the CISA. Liu Zhengjiang, the CPC
committee secretary, legal representative, and the vice chairman of the CISA, was previously

20

These include Handan Iron & Steel Group, Tangshan Iron & Steel, and Chengde Iron & Steel, which were ranked number
10, 12, and 41 of the top 50 steel plants respectively in 2009 (CISA, 2009e).
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the head of the personnel department at the former MMI before joining the CISA. Zhang
Changfu was the CPC committee secretary and the head of the service and administration
bureau at the SASAC and the member of the CPC committee of the SASAC. Perhaps the
only exceptional case among the vice chairmen is Shen Wenrong, who was the founder and
the chairman of Shagang Group (the 5th largest steel maker and privately owned), but whom
also worked as the deputy secretary of the Zhangjiagang municipal party committee in mid1990s.

While most of the secretary-generals did not serve at the same time as senior management at
major SOEs or government officials as did the chairmen and vice chairmen, they did however
have the working experience at government departments and agencies in the past and even at
present. The secretary-general, Shan Shanghua, was also the president and the CPC
committee secretary at China Metallurgical Industry Planning and Research Institute from
February 1996 to October 2009, as well as the independent director at Shougang Group. The
deputy secretary-generals, Qi Xiangdong and Li Shijun, both worked at the former MMI
prior to their appointment at the CISA. Chen Xiaofu was the deputy head of the discipline
inspection division at State Bureau of Metallurgical Industry. Yang Zunqing was the
executive vice president of the Metallurgical Council at the China Council for the Promotion
of International Trade (CCPIT). The three other deputy secretary-generals, Chi Jingdong, Wu
Xinchun and Jiang Qihua, also worked at either major SOEs (Sinosteel Group in the case of
Chi Jingdong and Wuhan Iron and Steel Group in the case of Wu Xinchun) or semigovernment agencies (China Metallurgical News in the case of Jiang Qihua) concurrently.
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Summarising from the investigation above of the corresponding political and professional
background of the leading members at CISA which were not shown on the association’s
website, the findings are presented in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 Political and professional backgrounds of the leading members of the CISA in
2009
Position(s) at CISA

Name

(Previous) position(s)
at major SOEs in steel
sector

(Previous) position(s) at
government
department(s)

Chairman

Deng Qilin

President
&
CPC
secretary (Wuhan Iron
and Steel)

Honorary chairman

Wu Xichun

Independent
director Deputy minister & CPC
(Anshan Iron and Steel) committee
member
(former MMI)

Vice chairman & secretary Liu Zhenjiang
of the CPC committee &
legal representative

Head of the personnel
department (former MMI)

Executive vice chairman

Luo Bingsheng

(former) Chairman &
CPC
committee
secretary
(Shougang
Group)

Vice chairman

Zhu Jimin

CPC
secretary
& Member of the Beijing
chairman (Shougang)
municipal
party
committee

Vice chairman

Li Xiaowei

Chairman (Hunan Valin Member of the Hunan
Steel)
provincial
party
committee

Vice chairman

Zou Zhongchen

Deputy CPC secretary
&chairman (Shandong
Steel)

Vice chairman

Wang Yifang

Chairman, president, &
CPC secretary (Hebei
Iron & Steel)

Vice chairman

Cui Chen

Chairman
&
CPC
secretary (Baogang)

Vice chairman

Shen Wenrong

Chairman
&
CPC Deputy secretary of the
secretary (Shagang)
Zhangjiagang municipal
party committee
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Vice chairman

Xu Lejiang

Chairman
committee
(Baosteel)

&

CPC
member

Vice chairman

Gu Jianguo

Chairman
(Maanshan
Iron and Steel)

Vice chairman

Yu Tianchen

Chairman
&
CPC Member of the Benxi
secretary (Benxi Iron municipal
party
and Steel)
committee

Vice chairman

Wang Ziliang

Chairman,
president,
deputy CPC secretary
(Anyang Iron and Steel)

Vice chairman

Zhang Xiaogang

Chairman
&president
(Anshan Iron and Steel)

Vice chairman

Li Xiaobo

Chairman,
president,
CPC committee member
(Taiyuan Iron and Steel)

Vice chairman

Fan Zhengwei

Chairman
&
CPC
secretary
(Panzhihua
Iron and Steel)

Vice chairman

Zhang Changfu

Secretary-general

Shan Shanghua

Independent
(Shougang)

Deputy secretary-general

Qi Xiangdong

Independent
director Head of the economic
(Xinxing Ductile Iron adjustment
department
Pipes Co., Ltd)
(former MMI)

Deputy secretary-general

Li Shijun

Independent
director Deputy head of the
(Angang Steel Co., Ltd.) technology
department
& Independent director (former MMI)
(Sansteel
MinGuang
Co., Ltd)

Deputy secretary-general

Chen Xiaofu

Deputy head of the
Disciplinary Inspection
department
at
State
Bureau of Metallurgical
Industry

Deputy secretary-general

Yang Zunqing

Executive vice president
of Metallurgical Council
of CCPIT

CPC secretary & head of
the
service
and
administration
bureau
(SASAC)
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Deputy secretary-general

Li Kemin

unknown

unknown

Deputy secretary-general

Chi Jingdong

Consultant
(Sinosteel
Jinxin Consultation)

Deputy secretary-general

Jiang Qihua

President
&
CPC
secretary
(China
Metallurgical News)

Deputy secretary-general

Wu Xinchun

Head of the technical
innovation department
(Wuhan Iron and Steel)

Advisors

Wu Jianchang

Independent
director Deputy minister (former
(Taiyuan Iron & Steel)
MMI)

Advisors

Pu Haiqing

Executive vice governor
& deputy provincial party
committee of Sichuan;
mayor & deputy city part
committee secretary of
Chongqing & Managing
director of State Bureau
of Metallurgical Industry

As shown in Table 6.2, while the managers and directors from many of the largest SOEs 21 in
the Chinese iron and steel sector as well as some current and previous government officials at
the same time dominated the composition of senior management at the CISA, their
counterparts at small and medium size and / or privately owned steel enterprises were not
present in the same management team of the association.

Considering the aforementioned professional and political backgrounds of the senior
management at the CISA, it is indeed very hard to perceive the CISA as an “industrial
organisation” which the association itself claims to be on its website (CISA, 2013a).
Therefore, rather than conceiving the functioning role of CISA as “a bridge between the

21

In fact, all of the top 10 steel enterprises had their chairmen and / or directors holding senior positions at the CISA
concurrently. On the whole, there were 17 out of the top 30 steel makers which the senior members of the CISA came from.
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government and enterprises” (CISA, 2013a), it seems more convincing to regard its raison
d’etre as yet another government organisation serving the interests of large state-owned steel
plants, leaving the small and medium size privately owned steel companies unrepresented
(Huang & Mei, 2010). Indeed, a closer examination of the association’s own introduction
also adds a sense of political correctness in that the CISA is “(g)uided by the Party’s lines,
rules and policies, (and) follows scientific development view and provides services to the
enterprises, the industry, the government and the society” (CISA, 2013a) (emphases added).
Here, while the ‘party’ purports to the CPC, the ‘scientific development view22’ refers to, at
that time, the latest ideological slogan of the CPC put forward by the then President Hu Jintao
(Mulvenon, 2009).

Aside from the political component, another factor that has rendered the CISA close its door
to most small and medium enterprises is one of the criteria to join the association that, in
order to join the association, steel plants must reach at least an annual steel production of 1
million tons or above (CISA, 2011a). As a result, the vast majority of the CISA member
firms were large size (and mostly state-owned) steel enterprises. In fact, the significant
overlap as such between the CISA and major SOEs in the same sector is also reflected
throughout the discourse from the Chinese iron and steel industry in the 2009 and 2010 iron
ore price annual negotiations. Thus, in addition to the CISA, there is also a need to introduce
other producers of discourse from the major SOEs in the Chinese iron and steel industry
including Baosteel, Shougang, Ansteel, and Wuhan Iron and Steel. The following sections are
directed towards this end.

22

The concept of ‘scientific development’ was first introduced by then the Chinese president Hu Jintao in 2003 and officially
included in the CPC’s revised constitution at the 17th party congress in October 2007 alongside the CPC’s existing pantheon
of Chairman Mao’s thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, and Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represents’. (Holbig, 2009).
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Baosteel Group Corporation
Establish in December 1978 and headquartered in Shanghai, Baosteel Group Corporation
(Baosteel) is regarded as a typical product of China’s opening reform in the late 1970s.
Despite its relatively short history compared to other major SOEs in the same industry,
Baosteel has grown into China’s largest iron and steel enterprise with the highest level of
modernisation, and the second largest steel producer in the world (after ArcelorMittal).
Primarily interested in the iron and steel sector, Baosteel manufactures premium iron and
steel products with three major product lines including carbon steel, stainless steel, and
special steel which are not only sold to China’s domestic market but also exported to more
than 40 countries worldwide. In 2014, Baosteel has been listed among the Fortune Global
500 for the 11th consecutive year and ranked 211th (Baosteel Group Corporation, 2014). It
has also been awarded the highest credit ranking by the world’s leading credit rating agencies
including Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings (Baosteel Group Corporation,
2014). For the financial year ended December 31 2009, Baosteel reported the net profit
(before tax) of RMB 7,294 million23 and had total assets of RMB 201,143 million24 (Baoshan
Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. 2009).

Despite having its subsidiary, Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., listed on the Shanghai Stock
exchange in 2000, a significant portion (more than 70%)25 of the firm’s share are held by the
23

The net profit of RMB 7,294,555,395.87 is equivalent to AUD $1,215,759,232.65 (i.e. AUD 1,216 million), assuming the
exchange rate between Chinese RMB and Australian dollar is 6:1.
24

The total assets of RMB 201,142,782,516.38 is equivalent to AUD $33,523,797,086.06 (i.e. AUD 33,524 million),
assuming the exchange rate between Chinese RMB and Australian dollar is 6:1.
25

For the financial year ended December 31 2000, Baosteel Group held 85% of the shares of Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.
(Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., 2000). The figure remained so until 2005 when the firm issued new shares to the public and
Baosteel Group held still 77.89% shares (Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., 2005). For the financial year of 2009, the
proportion of shares held by Baosteel Group was 73.97% (Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., 2009). According to the
subsidiary’s latest annual report (for the financial year 2013), the parent entity still holds 79.71% shares of the subsidiary
(Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., 2013).
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parent entity, Baosteel Group which is directly under the control of the Chinese central
government through the SASAC, and thus remain non-tradable in private financial markets
ever since. As indicated in its 2013 annual report, the actual controller of Baosteel is the
SASAC (Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. 2013) and the relationship between the listed entity,
i.e. Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., and the actual controller is illustrated in Figure 6.226.

As shown in Figure 6.2, similar to the case of the CISA, Baosteel Group is also under the
control and management of the SASAC. The SASAC, in turn, not only supervises and
manages the state-owned assets under the supervision of the central government of CPC, but
also makes personnel decisions on the top management of its supervised SOEs (SASAC,
2014). It is thus not surprising that the directors and executives at Baosteel are also members
of the CPC and subject to government supervision. As found in the data collected, many of

26

The relationship for the year ended December 31 2009 was similar, except that, as mentioned in the previous footnote,
Baosteel Group owned 79.71% shares of Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.
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the producers of discourse came from Baosteel, it is thus necessary to clarify their relevant
professional and political titles. In 2009, the profile of the Baosteel Group Corporation’s 27
senior management28, combined the group’s overlap with the CISA (as indicated in 6.2), is
presented in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 Profile of senior management at Baosteel Group Corporation in 2009
Position(s) at Baosteel
Group

Political identity29

Name

Chairman of board of
directors

Xu Lejiang

Secretary of CPC
committee

Managing director &
President

He Wenbo

Member of CPC
committee

Vice president

Fu Zhongzhe

Member of CPC
committee

Vice president

Dai Zhihao

Member of CPC
committee

Vice president

Zhao Xia

Member of CPC
committee

Vice president

Zhou Zhuping

Member of CPC

Vice president

Zhao Zhouli

Member of CPC

Vice president

Cui Jian

Member of CPC

Secretary to the board of
directors

Chen Ying

Member of CPC

Titles held at CISA
Vice chairman

27

As the parent entity of Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. under the control of the SASAC, Baosteel Group Corporation’s
image and influence are more widely recognised and accepted than those of its listed subsidiary, in both practical and
political terms. Therefore, the profile of the group is considered and presented. For the same reason, this also applies to other
major SOEs described and analysed in this chapter.
28

The table is of course not to be considered exhaustive, for (1) Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. is under the control of
Baosteel Group Corporation which thus merits more attention; (2) the major difference between the management teams of
Baosteel Group and Baoshan Iron & Steel is the existence of the independent directors, all of whom are outsiders to the
parent entity and thus whom are not included in the above table; and (3) the complete profile of Baosteel Group’s
management team for the year 2009 is not available.
29

While collecting and examining the profile of senior management at both Baosteel Group Corporation and Bashan Iron &
Steel Co., Ltd, the findings show that the political identity of directors and executives are unanimously hidden from the
corresponding annual reports (in both Chinese and English versions), and it is only through the group’s Chinese website can
those political status be traced. However, this is not uncommon in the case of China’s major SOEs whose subsidiaries are
listed in public stock exchanges (see e.g. Gong, 2011).
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Outsider director

Wu Yaowen

Member of CPC

Secretary of CPC committee
for Disciplinary Inspection

Liu Zhanying

Member of CPC
committee

Deputy secretary of CPC
committee for Disciplinary
Inspection and director of the
supervision department

Zhou Guiquan

Member of CPC
committee

General manager of the
department of operating
finance

Zhu Kebing

Member of CPC
committee

(Adapted from Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. Annual Report 2009 and the website of Baosteel
Group at http://www.baosteel.com/group/index.htm accessed 24 March 2014)

Shougang Company Limited (Group)
Following Baosteel, Shougang Company Limited Group (Shougang Group) was ranked 2nd
in China’s top 100 steel enterprises in 2009 according to the CISA (2009e) data and was also
among the Fortune Global 500 since 2011. Compared to the relatively short history of
Baosteel, the establishment of Shougang Group can be traced back to 1919, even before the
founding of the PRC. Headquartered in Beijing, the group has five subsidiaries listed on stock
exchanges. That is, in addition to Beijing Shougang Company Limited which is the group’s
first major subsidiary and listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the other four subsidiaries
including Shougang Concord International, Shougang Concord Century, Shougang Concord
Grand, and Shougang Concord Technology are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
With its primary focus on the steel industry, the group is also interested in mining, machinery,
electronics, construction, real estate, and services sectors (Shougang Group, 2014). Aiming to
be the world’s leading steel enterprise, Shougang Company Limited achieved the net profit
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(before tax) of RMB 450 million30 and recorded the total assets of RMB 18,507 million31 for
the financial year 2009 (Shougang Co., Ltd. 2009).

Similar to the shareholding structure of Baoshan Iron & Steel, a significant portion (above
60%) of the shares of the listed subsidiary, Shougang Company Limited, is held by the parent
entity, Shougang Group, and remains non-tradable in private markets. However, unlike
Baosteel Group which is directly controlled by the SASAC at the level of the central
government, Shougang Group is, through Beijing State-owned Capital Operation and
Management Center, under the supervision of the SASAC of People’s Government of Beijing
City at the municipal level. According to the group’s annual report for the financial year
2013 32 , the controlling relationship between the subsidiary and its actual controller is
presented in Figure 6.3.

30

The net profit (before tax) of RMB 450,805,775.96 is equivalent to AUD 75,134,296 (i.e. AUD 75 million), assuming the
exchange rate between the Chinese RMB and the Australian dollar is 6:1, which was nearly the average exchange rate during
the period concerned.
31

The total asset of RMB 18,507,644,802.61 is equivalent to AUD 3,084,607,467.1 (i.e. AUD 3,084 million), assuming the
exchange rate between the Chinese RMB and the Australian dollar is 6:1.
32

This relationship back to 2009 is same as its 2013 counterpart.
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Here, the SASAC of Beijing Municipality plays a similar role as the SASAC which
supervises Shougang Group as well as appoints and removes senior executives of the entity.
To explore the political background of the directors and executives at Shougang and their
relationship, if any, with the CISA, the profile of the group’s senior management is illustrated
in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4 Profile of senior management at Shougang Group in 2009
Position(s) at Shougang
Group
Chairman of board of
directors

Political identity33

Name
Zhu Jimin

Vice chairman of board of Wang Qinghai
directors & President

Secretary of CPC committee
of Shougang Group
&Member of the Beijing
municipal party committee

Titles held at CISA
Vice chairman

Deputy secretary of CPC
committee
of
Shougang

33

Same as Baosteel Group and other major Chinese SOEs, the political identity of directors and executives are unanimously
hidden from the corresponding annual reports (in both Chinese and English versions), and it is only through the group’s
Chinese website can those political status be traced.
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Group
Director

Huo Guanglai

Deputy secretary of CPC
committee
of
Shougang
Group &Secretary of CPC
committee for Disciplinary
Inspection

Director & Executive vice Xu Ning
president

Member of CPC committee

Director & Vice president

Wang Yi

Member of CPC committee

Director& Chief accountant

Fang Jianyi

Assistant general manager

Qiankai

Independent
director
Shougang Co., Ltd.

of Shan Shanghua

Member of CPC committee
Member of CPC

Secretary-general

(Adapted from Shougang Company Limited Annual Report 2009 and the website of Shougang Group
at http://www.shougang.com.cn/shougang_cn_web/ accessed 24 March 2014)

Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation
Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation (Ansteel Group) is China’s second largest steel
manufacturer after merging with Panzhihua Iron and Steel Group34 in 2010. In 2009, It was
ranking 3rd among China’s top 100 steel enterprises (CISA, 2009e) and 462nd among the
Fortune Global 500 in 2011 (Ansteel Iron and Steel Group Corporation, 2014). Similar to
Shougang Group, it has a long history that can be traced back to the second decade of the
20th century. Today, the group has “three major production bases located in Anshan,
Bayuquan, and Chaoyang, with an annual integrated capacity of 25 million tons of pig iron,
raw steel and rolled steel” (Ansteel Iron and Steel Group Corporation, 2014), manufacturing
high-end steel products such as “the auto sheet, electric household appliance sheet, container
plate, ship plate, heavy rail, oil tubing, pipeline plate, vessel plate, cold-rolled silicon steel,
etc.” (Ansteel Iron and Steel Group Corporation, 2014). The group’s major subsidiary,
34

Panzhihua Iron and Steel Group was ranked 11th among the top 100 Chinese steel manufacturers in 2009 (CISA, 2009e).
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Angang Steel Company Limited, is dual listed on both the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange since 1997. For the financial year 2009, Angang Steel Company
Limited reported the net profit (before tax) of RMB 843 million35 and the total assets of RMB
100,987 million 36 (Angang Steel Company Limited, 2009). Same as the case of Baosteel
Group, Ansteel Group is under the direct supervision of the SASAC, and, according to its
2013 annual report37, the specific relationship is illustrated in Figure 6.4.

The professional and political profile of the senior management at Ansteel Group, and their
overlap with the CISA (if any), are presented in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5 Profile of senior management at Ansteel Group in 2009

35

The net profit (before tax) of RMB 843 million is equivalent to AUD 140.5 million, assuming the exchange rate between
the Chinese RMB and the Australian dollar is 6:1.
36

The total asset of RMB 100,987 million is equivalent to AUD 16,832 million, assuming the exchange rate between the
Chinese RMB and the Australian dollar is 6:1.
37

The shareholding structure in 2009 is very similar to its 2013 equivalent, except that Ansteel Group held 67.29%, instead
of 67.80% (as in 2013), shares of the listed subsidiary (Angang Steel Company limited, 2009).
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Position(s) at Ansteel Group

Name

President of Ansteel Group
&Chairman of board of
directors of Angang Steel Co.,
Ltd.

Zhang Xiaogang

Political identity38

Titles held at CISA

Secretary of CPC committee Vice chairman
of Ansteel Group

Chairman of the supervisory Wen Baoman
board of Angang Steel Co.,
Ltd.

Deputy secretary of CPC
committee of Ansteel Group&
President of CPC School of
Ansteel Group & Member of
the Anshan municipal party
committee

President & Vice chairman of Tang Fuping
board of directors of Angang
Steel Co., Ltd.

Member of CPC committee of
Ansteel Group

Vice president & Chief Yu Wanyuan
accountant of Ansteel Group
Vice president
Group

of

Ansteel Yao Lin

Vice chairman of Angang
Steel Co., Ltd.

Yang Hua

Independent
non-executive Li Shijun
director of Angang Steel Co.,
Ltd

Member of CPC committee of
Ansteel Group
Member of CPC committee of
Ansteel Group &Secretary of
CPC committee of Angang
steel Co., Ltd.
Member of CPC & (former) Deputy
Deputy head of the technology general
department of (former) MMI

secretary-

(Adapted from Angang Steel Company Limited Annual Report 2009 and the website of Ansteel
Group at http://www.ansteelgroup.com/a/index.php accessed 24 March 2014)

Wuhan Iron and Steel Group Corporation
Wuhan Iron and Steel Group Corporation (Wuhan Iron and Steel Group hereafter) was
founded in 1958 in Wuhan, Hubei province, and regarded as the “first super-large stateowned iron and steel complex established after the foundation of P. R. China” (Wuhan Iron
and Steel Group Corporation, 2014). To date, as one of the most important iron and steel
38

Same as other major Chinese SOEs, the political identity of the senior management is usually hidden from annual reports
(see footnote 17 for a detailed explanation).
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production base in the country with advanced manufacturing processes and production
equipments, Wuhan Steel is engaged in the production of a wide variety of iron and steel
products including “hot-rolled coil, hot-rolled section steel, hot-rolled heavy rail, plate of
moderate thickness, cold-rolled coil, galvanized plate, cold-rolled oriented and non-oriented
silicon steel sheet, color coated plate, and high-speed wire rod, etc.” (Wuhan Iron and Steel
Group Corporation, 2014). Moreover, the group is also interested in high-tech industries and
international trade. In 2013, the group was ranked 328th among the Fortune Global 500 and
the 4th largest iron and steel enterprise in the world (Wuhan Iron and Steel Group
Corporation, 2014). The main subsidiary of the group, Wuhan Iron and Steel Company
Limited, is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange since 1999. For the financial year ended
31 December 2009, the company realised the net profit (before tax) of RMB 1,957 million39
and the total assets of RMB 73,324 million 40 (Wuhan Iron and Steel Company Limited,
2009). As shown in the subsidiary’s annual report41, similar to other major Chinese SOEs
aforementioned, the governing structure of Wuhan Steel Group is illustrated in Figure 6.5.

39

The net profit (before tax) of RMB 1,956,678,485.59 is equivalent to AUD 326,113,080.93 (i.e. AUD 326 million),
assuming the exchange rate between the Chinese RMB and the Australian dollar is 6:1.
40

The total asset of RMB 73,324,006,864.66 is equivalent to AUD 12,220,667,810.78 (i.e. AUD 12,221 million), assuming
the exchange rate between the Chinese RMB and the Australian dollar is 6:1.
41

The controlling relationship in 2009 is similar to its 2013 equivalent, except that the group held 64.71% shares of the
subsidiary (Wuhan Iron and Steel Company Limited, 2009).
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The professional and political backgrounds of the senior management at the group, and their
overlap with the CISA (if any), are presented in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6 Profile of senior management at Wuhan Iron and Steel Group in 2009
Position(s) at Wuhan Iron
and Steel Group
President of Wuhan Iron &
Steel Group; Chairman of
board of directors of Wuhan
Iron & Steel Co., Ltd

Political identity42

Name
Deng Qilin

Titles held at CISA

Deputy secretary of CPC Chairman
committee of Wuhan Iron &
Steel Group

Vice president of Wuhan Iron Wang Zhenyou
& Steel Group; Vice chairman
of board of directors of Wuhan
Iron & Steel Co., Ltd

Secretary of CPC committee of
Wuhan Iron & Steel Group and
Wuhan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd;
(former) Mayor of Huangshi
city; (former) Mayor & Deputy
secretary of the Yichang
municipal party committee

Vice president of Wuhan Iron Hu Wangming
& Steel Group; director of
Wuhan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd

Member of CPC committee of
Wuhan Iron & Steel Group

42

Same as other major Chinese SOEs, the political identity of the senior management is usually hidden from annual reports
(see footnote 17 for a detailed explanation).
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President and director of Wang Ling
Wuhan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd

Member of CPC committee of
Wuhan Iron & Steel Group

Director and chairman of trade
union of Wuhan Iron & Steel
Co., Ltd

Member of CPC committee of
Wuhan Iron & Steel Group

Ma Qilong

Vice president & Chief Peng Chen
accountant of Wuhan Iron &
Steel Group; director of
Wuhan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd
Chairman of supervisory board Zhang Tiexun
of Wuhan Iron & Steel Co.,
Ltd

Member of CPC committee
&Secretary of Disciplinary
Inspection Commission of
Wuhan Iron & Steel Group;
(former) Deputy secretary of
Disciplinary
Inspection
Commission
&
(former)
director of Supervision Bureau
of Haicheng City (Liaoning
province)

Assistant general manager of Liu Qiang
Wuhan Iron & Steel Group

Deputy secretary of CPC
committee of Wuhan Iron &
Steel Co., Ltd

(Adapted from Wuhan Iron and Steel Company Limited Annual Report 2009)

As shown from the above analyses of the four largest SOEs, not only do the vast majority of
their directors and executives hold political titles and some even previously served as senior
government officials, but the entities themselves are also under the control of the SASAC that
appoints and removes the management team of SOEs. Furthermore, equally intimate is the
relationship between these SOEs and the CISA, considering the significant overlap between
the two groups. That is, senior members of these top four SOEs in steel sector also hold
important positions at the CISA such as the chairman, honorary chairman, executive vice
chairman, and three other vice chairmen, secretary-general, and deputy secretary-general.
Figure 6.6 below summarises the close relationship among these major SOEs, the CISA, and
the Chinese government.
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In fact, the affinity depicted above is also evidenced in the data collected that it is these senior
members of the CISA or major SOEs or both who were the primary producers of discourse
from the Chinese iron and steel industry in the media coverage. It is thus considered
appropriate to classify the CISA and the major SOEs aforementioned into the same group in
the discourse of iron ore price negotiations for the designated frame of period (2008-2010).
While the main producers of discourse on behalf of China’s iron and steel sector are
introduced and discussed above, the subsequent section then concerns the opposite group in
the iron ore price debate on the sellers’ side, namely the three leading iron ore suppliers in the
world including BHP Billiton, Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, and Rio Tinto.
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6.1.2. The Big Three and other major iron ore suppliers
As mentioned in chapter two, the international trade of iron ore has historically been a sellerdominated market stemming from the high level of monopolisation on the parts of the iron
ore suppliers (Hou & Yang, 2009). Thus, despite the annual price negotiation between the
iron ore buyers and sellers since the early 1970s (Sukagawa, 2010), it has been generally
acknowledged that the three largest iron ore manufacturers on the suppliers’ side—BHP
Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce are the real drivers of the negotiations
and the resulting price of iron ore thereafter (Wilson, 2012), hence the name the Big Three. A
brief introduction to the three corporations (the Big Three hereafter) is presented in the
following.

BHP Billiton
BHP Billiton is one of the “world’s largest producers of major commodities, including iron
ore, metallurgical and energy coal, conventional and unconventional oil and gas, copper,
aluminium, manganese, uranium, nickel and silver” (BHP Billiton, 2013, p.2). As a
consequence of the merger of the Australia-based Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited
and the UK-based Billiton Plc in 2001, BHP Billiton is now headquartered in Melbourne and
dual listed on both the Australian Securities Exchange and the London Stock Exchange. With
its reported market capitalisation of approximately US$ 147,100 million43 and net profits of
US$ 10,900 million44 for the financial year ended 30 June 2013 (BHP Billiton, 2013), the
organisation is considered the largest mining company in the world.

43

This is equivalent to AUD 163,281 million, assuming the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Australian dollar is
0.9:1.
44

This is equivalent to AUD 12,099 million, assuming the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Australian dollar is
0.9:1.
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Companhia Vale do Rio Doce
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (Vale hereafter) is a multinational mining corporation
headquartered in Brazil and with operations in more than 30 countries spanning across five
continents. Founded in June 1942, Vale was initially a public company under the control of
the Brazilian Federal Government until the firm’s privatisation in 1997. To date, Vale is
listed on the stock exchanges of Sao Paulo Hong Kong, New York, Madrid and Paris. It has
grown into the world’s third largest mining company, as well as the world’s largest producer
and exporter of iron ore and iron ore pellets. The company also produces “manganese ore,
ferroalloys, coal, copper, platinum group metals (‘PGMs’), gold, silver, cobalt and potash,
phosphates and other fertilizer nutrients” (Vale, 2013). For the financial year ended 31
December 2013, Vale reported the total assets of US$ 124,597 million45 and realised the net
profits (before tax) of US$ 7,241 million46 (Vale, 2013).

Rio Tinto Group
Founded in 1873, Rio Tinto was originally based in Spain, and has to date grown into a
“leading global mining group that focuses on finding, mining and processing the Earth’s
mineral resources” (Rio Tinto, 2013, p.1). Currently, the group is headquartered in London
and Melbourne, and dual listed on the London Stock Exchange and the Australian Securities
Exchange. The group now has more than 66,000 employees working at five product groups
including aluminium, copper, diamonds & minerals, energy, and iron ore. Moreover, its iron
ore group is the world’s second largest iron ore producer after Vale (Rio Tinto, 2013). For the

45

This is equivalent to AUD 138,303 million, assuming the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Australian dollar is
0.9:1.
46

This is equivalent to AUD 8,037.5 million, assuming the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Australian dollar is
0.9:1.
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financial year ended 31 December 2013, the group reported the total assets of US$ 111,025
million47 and the net profits (before tax) of US$ 3,505 million48 (Rio Tinto, 2013).

6.1.3. Other buyers (private small and medium enterprise) from the Chinese market
In addition to the above major players on both the supply and demand sides in the annual iron
ore price negotiations, there also exists another group of iron ore buyers from the Chinese
iron and steel sector, most of whom are privately-owned small and medium size enterprises.
More specifically, this group contains both private steel manufacturers and private iron ore
trading companies. There were about 1200 steel plants operating in the Chinese iron and steel
sector in 2009, and nearly 70 of which were large size companies (Wang J, 2009b). In other
words, there were about more than 1000 small and medium steel plants in the sector.
Although these small and medium firms did not participate in the iron ore negotiations in
person, they did have their own voice heard, albeit in much smaller proportions relative to the
discourse of the major players, in the media coverage.

Compared to their compatriots in the Chinese iron and steel industry, the vast majority of
which are SOEs, these firms are not the members of CISA, given the CISA entry criteria as
mentioned earlier that steel plants must at least reach the annual production level of one
million tons (CISA, 2011a). Furthermore, the professional and political profile of the senior
management team of the CISA illustrated earlier also reveals the absence of any

47

This is equivalent to AUD 122,128 million, assuming the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Australian dollar is
0.9:1.
48

This is equivalent to AUD 3,855.5 million, assuming the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Australian dollar is
0.9:1.
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representatives from the small and medium firms in China’s iron and steel sector, which
arguably renders these entities unrepresented at the CISA (Huang & Mei, 2010).

Nor have they received much support from the central government as have their state-owned
counterparts. In fact, contrary to the SOEs, the small and medium companies in the same
sector have become in recent years the target of the industrial restructuring under the central
government’s broader macro-economic adjustment schemes. That is, in an attempt to limit
the country’s staggeringly rapid economic growth, which might otherwise lead to inflation, to
a sustainable level, the Chinese government has introduced many new regulations and
national policies to the domestic markets where the iron and steel industry is at the very
forefront (Sukagawa, 2010). For instance, in order to control the overall industrial output, the
State Council issued the Iron & Steel Industry Adjustment and Revitalisation Plan49 (Plan
hereafter) in March 2009 that encourages the curtailment of obsolete steel production
capacity (among small and medium size steel plants) and promotes mergers and acquisitions
among major SOEs such as Baosteel, Anshan Iron and Steel, and Wuhan Iron and Steel
(State Council, 2009). Based on the spirit of the Plan, the CISA subsequently introduced the
Steel Industry Self-discipline Agreement on Standardising the Order of Domestic Steel
Market 50 to maintain the market stability by primarily tackling issues in steel pricing and
marketing.

49

The original Chinese name is 钢铁产业调整和振兴规划. The translation is done by the author of the thesis.

50

The original Chinese name is 钢铁行业规范国内钢材市场秩序自律公约. The translation is done by the author of the
thesis.
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With particular reference to the country’s iron ore import, the CISA together with China
Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exports (CCCMC
hereafter) issued the Suggestions On the Promotion of the Iron Ore Import Agency System51
(Suggestions hereafter) in 2006 that attempts to impose a threshold on iron ore importing and
trading companies in accordance with the appropriate national and industrial standards. In
2009, to further implement the Plan and the Suggestions, the CISA also published the Steel
Industry Self-discipline Agreement on Standardising the Trade Order of Imported Iron Ore52
which requires small and medium enterprises to stop importing iron ore by themselves but
adopt the agency system and purchase from the major SOEs instead.

Bear in mind the regulations and principles above, it is reasonable to conclude that, even
though the group of small and medium steel plants and iron ore trading firms was not closely
related to the CISA (that is, the main producer of the discourse in question), the interaction
between the two does exhibit a certain level of reflection to the extent of how the social
relations of production of the latter have affected and been affected by that of the former. In
other words, consistent with the Marxist notion of discourse (discussed in chapter five) as a
social product comprised of productive forces and social relations, it is considered relevant
and useful to investigate how the discourse of small and medium enterprises is supported and
/ or suppressed, both directly and otherwise, by their state-owned counterparts.

51

The original Chinese name is 关于推进铁矿石进口代理制的意见. The translation is done by the author of the thesis.

52

The original Chinese name is 钢铁行业规范进口铁矿石贸易秩序行业自律公约. The translation is done by the author of
the thesis.
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6.1.4. Other buyers from other countries
As the traditional annual iron ore pricing mechanism invites major players from both the
supply and demand sides to join the negotiation, there are meanwhile other iron ore buyers
than the Chinese group sitting at the same table, namely ArcelorMittal and ThyssenKrupp
(representing the European market), Nippon Steel (representing the Japanese market), and
Posco Steel (representing the Korean market) (Chen SS, 2009a). By the same token as group
three, although these foreign steel companies are not directly related to the focus of the thesis
as to the role of accounting discourse from the Chinese iron and steel sector in the process of
the financialised pricing mechanism of iron ore, they do form part of the wide wed of social
relations that constitutes the discourse in question.

While the above sections provide the introduction to the four groups of the producers of
discourse, the “practical position… job and the division of labour” (Marx and Engels, 1974,
p.68) of the first group are discussed in detail as the point of departure for the discourse
analysis based on the Marxist theoretical framework discussed in chapter five. Before
analysing the actual discourse put forward by the above four groups, it is necessary to present
the storyline over the period concerned. The following section therefore is directed to this
end.

6.2. Timeline of Financialisation---the annual iron ore negotiations for the financial
years 2009 and 2010
As stated in chapter five, the period over which the data is collected in this thesis contains the
annual iron ore price negotiation in two consecutive years that ranges from 2008 October to
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2010 May. This is because: first of all the concept of using the index pricing model was
originally raised in 2008 and partially adopted in the end of the 2009 annual negotiation by
BHP Billiton, and; secondly the index pricing was then discussed and became generally
accepted in the global iron ore market in the end of the 2010 annual negotiation. The timeline
for each year’s annual negotiation (from 2009 and 2010), therefore, is presented in Table 6.7
and Table 6.8 respectively.
Table 6.7 Timeline of the 2009 annual iron ore price negotiation
Date

Group(s) concerned

Event

2008 Nov

All groups

The negotiation began

2008 Dec

CISA

proposed a 82% price drop

2009 Jan

CISA & Nippon Steel

proposed a 40% price drop

2009 Feb

CISA

issued the two Agreement that forbade China’s domestic firms
re-selling any iron ore initially purchased from long term
contracts

Vale

gave up the priority of setting the initial annual price for 2009

Rio Tinto

offered a temporary 20% price drop for Asian buyers

Vale

offered a temporary 20% price drop

Big Three

withdrew from the negotiation, which was unfinished on the
part of Chinese firms

Rio Tinto

refuse the proposed 40% price drop

Rio Tinto & Nippon Steel

agreed on the new annual price that was 33% lower than the
2008 annual price (on May 26)

Posco Steel

followed the initial price reached by Nippon Steel and Rio
Tinto (on May 28)

CISA

did not follow the new price and claimed that the Chinese
buyers would not compromise

China Aluminium & Rio Tinto

failed in the attempted US$ 19.2 billion investment in Rio
Tinto

BHP Billiton & JFE Steel

followed the initial price reached by Rio Tinto and Nippon
Steel (on June 11)

Vale & Nippon Steel & Posco Steel

agreed on a new annual price that was 28.2% lower than the
2008 annual price (on June 10)

2009 Apr

2009 May

2009 Jun
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2009 Jul

ArcelorMittal

accepted the above price, i.e. 28.2% price drop (on June 19)

CISA & Big Three

did not reach any agreements in the negotiation by the
traditional due date (i.e. June 30)

CISA

proposed to establish a new negotiation method and a new
pricing mechanism exclusive to the Chinese market

CISA

claimed that it would accept a price drop between 33% to 40%

Big Three

offered a new temporary price that contains 33% reduction
(i.e. same as the newly agreed annual price by Rio Tinto and
Nippon Steel)

Rio Tinto & Chinese government

Rio Tinto’s chief representative in the negotiation with three
other employees at the firm’s Shanghai Office were arrested
by Chinese National Security Bureau under the charges of
commercial bribery and stealing China’s national secrecy

CISA

acquiesced that large steel firms accepted the temporary 33%
discount off price (i.e. the newly agreed annual price) from
the Big Three

Vale & ThyssenKrupp

agreed on the 33% off discount price

Vale

announced that half of its iron ore export to China were using
the newly agreed annual price;
show its interest in adopting the index pricing mechanism

2009 Aug

BHP Billiton

on July 29 announced that 23% of its iron ore would be sold at
the newly agreed annual price; the other 30% would be priced
based on quarterly average, spot and indexed pricing models;
price of the remaining 47% of its iron ore was still under
negotiation

CISA

turn to negotiate with small and medium size iron ore
suppliers from Australia, India, Africa, Vietnam and UAE

CISA

proposed to establish a unified iron ore price that applies to all
types of iron ore in the Chinese market

CISA & FMG

CISA on August 17 announced the result of its negotiation
with FMG that the latter would sell iron ore to Chinese buyers
at the price that was 35.02% lower than the 2008 annual price,
from July to December 2009

Rio Tinto

did not recognise the price by CISA and FMG, and claimed
that this price had nothing to do with Rio Tinto’s iron ore
price

CISA

claimed that its negotiation with the Big Three was still in
process

Vale & BHP Billiton

did not adjust their price according to the agreement reached
by CISA and FMG
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2009 Sept

2009 Oct

Vale

denied any negotiation with the CISA for the 2009 annual
price and continued to use the temporary price

Rio Tinto

denied any negotiation with the CISA for the 2009 annual
price and continued to use the temporary price

Baosteel

said that the negotiation is still undergoing and not yet
finished

BHP Billiton

said it was still in the negotiation with some Chinese steel
plants and would begin the negotiation for the 2010 price
negotiation in October; proposed to shift the annual pricing
mechanism to index pricing

Shandong Steel Group

said that CISA was preparing for the 2010 price negotiation

CISA

claimed that it was still in the negotiation with BHP Billiton
and Vale for the 2009 price

CISA

claimed that the negotiation with the Big Three was still in
process, and would discuss both the 2009 and the 2010 annual
price at the same time

Table 6.8 Timeline of the 2010 annual iron ore price negotiation
Date

Group(s) concerned

Event

2009 Sept

CISA

claimed to strictly implement the “Chinese price” exclusive to
the Chinese market

BHP Billiton

said the 2010 price negotiation will begin in October

Rio Tinto

suggested mixed pricing based on spot market contracts

CISA

continued to propose the “Chinese price” model;

2009 Oct

claimed that the new annual price should start at Jan 1 to Dec
31, which accords with the Chinese financial year;
supports the long term pricing mechanism
Big Three

made no comment on the “Chinese price”;
proposed a 30%-35% price increase

CISA

regarded the proposed price rise as “unreasonable” and would
not accept it;
invited FMG to join the 2010 price negotiation

2009 Nov

FMG & CISA

were still negotiating the iron ore price for the 4th quarter in
2009

Rio Tinto

pointed out the possibility of adopting a new pricing
mechanism for the Chinese iron ore import market;
warned that the ‘Chinese price’ proposed by CISA may place
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the negotiation in a difficult situation

2009 Dec

2010 Jan

2010 Feb

Nanjing Iron and Steel

expected the 2010 annual price to be increased by 5%-10%

Vale

was not prepared for the 2010 negotiation and decided to
follow the outcome reached by Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton

FMG

declared that, as China did not fulfil the financing agreement
by September, the previously reached contract price was no
longer effective; the Japanese price was then adopted

CISA

found little room for the Big Three to increase the iron ore
price

FMG

reversed its previous statement regarding changing its own
2009 price to the Japanese price

Vale

claimed that the 2010 annual price would increase by 10%-20%

Macquarie Bank

predicted the 2010 iron ore price to be increased by 30%

Morgan Stanley

predicted the iron ore price to be increased by 20% in 2010
and 30% in 2011

Big Three

turned to the Japanese steel plants in the negotiation which
took place in Singapore

Deutsche Bank

predicted the 2010 iron ore price to be increased by 35%

Merril Lynch

predicted the 2010 iron ore price to be increased by 50%

Goldman Sachs

predicted the 2010 iron ore price to be increased by 35%

Union Bank of Switzerland

predicted the 2010 iron ore price to be increased by 40%-50%

Vale

was not in a hurry to join the negotiation

Baosteel & Wuhan Iron and Steel

went to Singapore to join the negotiation

Shagang Group

expected the 2010 iron ore price to be significantly increased

Shougang Group

supported the long term pricing mechanism

CISA

reiterated its goal to establish a unified price exclusive to the
Chinese iron ore import market;
agreed that the iron ore price would increase

BHP Billiton

suggested that the iron ore price would increase;
reiterated that a more flexible pricing mechanism should be
adopted to reflect future market changes

Rio Tinto

argued that the current long term pricing mechanism needs to
be changed

BHP Billiton & Japanese steel plants

adopted the quarterly pricing model for coking coals
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2010 Mar

BHP Billiton

unilaterally issued the temporary iron ore price containing a
40% price increase;
further promoted the index pricing

Morgan Stanley

predicted the 2010 iron ore price to be increased by 60%

CISA & Baosteel & Hebei Steel claimed that China could not accept index pricing;
Group & Ministry of Industry and
Insisted on the long term pricing model based on the “Chinese
Information
financial year”
CISA

claimed that China would not accept and could not afford the
proposed 90% plus price increase

Major Chinese state-owned steel collectively wrote and sent a petition letter to the Chinese
plants
Premier asking for government intervention in iron ore import
market
Australian Trade Minister

claimed that the Australian government would not intervene
the iron ore price negotiation

Chinese Ministry of Commerce & officially advocated the long term pricing mechanism
Ministry of Industry and Information
Vale

informed major Chinese steel plants to raise iron ore price by
90%-100%;
would adopt more flexible pricing and marketing policies (on
March 17)

Rio Tinto

will adopt short term market based pricing mechanism

Big Three & Japanese steel plants

reached the agreement to adopt the short term pricing
mechanism based on spot market (on March 22);
the proposed price contained a 90%-100% increase

Vale & Nippon Steel

reached the initial price agreement for the 2nd quarter of 2010
(on March 30);
the price contained a 90% increase

BHP Billiton

2010 April

claimed to have persuaded many of its Asian clients to adopt
the short term pricing mechanism based on CIF price (on
March 30)

Chinese Ministry of Industry and strongly opposed the short term pricing mechanism of iron ore
Information
&
Ministry
of
Commerce & Baosteel
Vale

announced that it reached the quarterly price agreement with
97% of its clients (on April 1)

Posco Steel & Vale

accepted the quarterly price agreement with Vale for the 2nd
quarter in 2010, showing a price increase of 83%-86% (on
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April 2)
BHP Billiton

reached the price agreement with its Asian clients for the 2nd
quarter in 2010, containing a price increase of 99.7% (on
April 7)

Rio Tinto

announced on its website that it was in the negotiation
regarding the quarterly pricing mechanism (on April 9)

CISA

asked all domestic steel plants and trading firms to stop
importing iron ore from the Big Three for the next two months

Chinese Ministry of Commerce

was planning an anti-monopoly investigation on the quarterly
pricing model proposed by the Big Three

Chinese Ministry of Industry and was considering a new regulatory mechanism for China’s iron
Information
ore import market
FMG

announced to adopt the “market based pricing mechanism”
(on April 22)

CISA

acquiesced that domestic steel plants could, under the
guidance of CISA, use the temporary price earlier reached by
Japan and Korea to import iron ore from the Big Three;
i.e. the CISA indirectly accepted the quarterly pricing
mechanism

2010 May

Baosteel

accepted the temporary price to import iron ore;
still advocated the long term pricing mechanism

Vale

announced that it reached the quarterly price agreement with
100% of the firm’s clients

From the tables above, a story can be perceived of how the iron ore pricing mechanism has
been shifted from the traditional annual benchmark pricing to the indexed quarterly pricing,
particularly from the perspective of the Chinese iron and steel industry. In the aftermath of
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the 2009 annual iron ore price negotiation kicked off in
November 2008. On the sellers’ side, it was always the Big Three that represented the global
iron ore suppliers. On the buyers’ side, however, the CISA for the first time came to the
forefront on behalf of the Chinese iron ore buyers to take part in the negotiation. At the time,
due to the wide repercussion of the GFC, the global steel market was seriously affected which
lowered down the global demand of iron ore. Thus, while the Big Three unanimously reduced
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their iron ore production (Wang YJ, 2008), the Chinese buyers were in general optimistic
about and confident in the forthcoming iron ore price. For instance, in December 2008, the
CISA called for a new annual price that contained an 82% reduction compared to the 2008
annual price, on the ground that China’s domestic steel price went below its 1994 level, and
so should the iron ore price (Xiao, 2008). In February 2009, while offering no comments on
the CISA’s proposed price, the CEO of Vale, Jose Carlos Martins announced that Vale
withdrew from the current iron ore price negotiation and would wait for the result reached by
BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto.

As there was not any price agreement reached from the negotiation on April 1, the traditional
starting date to which the new annual price would apply, Rio Tinto offered a temporary 20%
off discount based on the 2008 annual price to its Asian clients (Xing, 2009). Subsequently,
Vale also began to offer the same discount price (Deng, 2009a). The temporary discount price
offered by the Big Three was not however appreciated by the CISA, as the latter considered it
as the former’s unilaterally determined annual price in a disguised form, and insisted on at
least a 40%-50% price drop (Xu, 2009a). Rio Tinto responded to the CISA’s request in the
following month and claimed that the proposed 40% price drop was not acceptable (Wang J,
2009a).

On May 26, Nippon Steel, the representative of the Japanese steel sector in the negotiation,
reached the price agreement with Rio Tinto that the 2009 iron ore annual price would be
decreased by 32.95%53 compared to its equivalent last year (Chen SS, 2009a). Subsequently,
53

More specifically, the price of fine ore was reduced by 32.95% and the price of lump ore reduced by 44.46%, in
comparison to their equivalents in 2008. However, as the major type of iron ore that was at the centre of the price negotiation
was fine ore (Yu X, 2009), the iron ore price discussed in both the data collected and in general the thesis refers to that of
fine ore.
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on Posco Steel, the Korean representative in the negotiation, adopted this initial price, as it
was the tradition that once an initial price has been reached by any two parties from the buyer
and the sellers’ group respectively, and then all other firms on the supply and demand chain
will simply follow this price afterwards (Sukagawa, 2010). Similarly, the Taiwanese steel
enterprises including China Steel and Dragon Steel also followed the initial price in the
subsequent week. On June 11, BHP Billiton and JFE Steel (the second largest Japanese steel
corporation) also followed the initial price reached.

Once the initial price was settled by the two Australian mining giants, Vale, as promised in its
earlier statement, also reached the agreement on June 10 with Nippon Steel and Posco Steel
for the 2009 annual price that contained a 28.2% 54 decrease compared to the 2008 price.
Subsequently, ArcelorMittal, the largest steel maker in Europe, followed this price on June
19. ThyssenKrupp, the largest German steel maker, also accepted the price on July 21.

While other major mining companies and steel firms around the world accepted the initial
price set by either the Australian or the Brazilian suppliers, CISA on the other hand chose not
to adopt any of these initial prices in that the newly agreed price failed to objectively and
faithfully reflect the changes in the international iron ore market for the past year (Jiao,
2009a). Instead, the Chinese association still insisted on its previously proposed 40% to 44%
price drop. Even after June 30, the traditional due date for iron ore negotiation, CISA’s stance
remained unchanged and further claimed that the association would rather establish a new
negotiation method and correspondingly a new pricing mechanism exclusive to the Chinese

54

For the same reason stated in the previous footnote, only the price change of fine ore is mentioned here. The price of lump
ore was reduced by 44.47% as per Vale’s agreement in the above case.
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buyers (Zhang C, 2009a). At this time the Big Three, on the other hand, did not respond to
any of the CISA’s claims but offered further a temporary 33% off discount to their Chinese
clients. That is, the Big Three began to adopt the initial price (which contained a 33%
decrease compared to the 2008 price) reached by the Japanese and Korean firms for their iron
ore export to China in the form of ‘temporary price’. Some Chinese steel plants then had no
option but to accept the price on the condition that iron ore suppliers would refund for the
overpayment or charge for any shortage once the Chinese side has agreed an official price
with the Big Three. Subsequently, the CISA, after a one and half-month resistance to the
initial price, acquiesced that the Chinese buyers could use the 33% discount as the temporary
price to purchase iron ore from the Big Three till the end of the negotiation (Chen SS,
2009b).

Two events also noteworthy from June to July 2009 both came from Rio Tinto. Firstly in
June, Rio Tinto unilaterally terminated its financing agreement with China Aluminium who
promised to offer a US$ 19.5 billion equity investment to help the former overcome the
financial difficulties caused by the GFC. Eventually, instead of taking the Chinese
investment, Rio Tinto turned to its market competitor BHP Billiton. The event was said to
pose another serious challenge to the iron ore negotiation as the two mining giants (i.e. Rio
Tinto and BHP Billiton) were forming an even greater alliance. Secondly, in the following
month (i.e. July), four employees at Rio Tinto’s Shanghai office including its chief Chinese
representative Stern Hu (who was also the firm’s representative in the negotiation) were
arrested in Shanghai by the Chinese State Security Bureau. They were charged with bribing
the internal staff of China’s steel manufacturing companies, stealing China’s national
secrecy, and thereby resulting in serious and substantial damages to China’s economic safety
and national interests (Sun, 2009a). While being treated as an individual case independent of
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the iron ore negotiation in particular and the Sino-Australia diplomatic and economic
relationship in general (Miao et al., 2009; Sun, 2009a; Zhang HY, 2009a; Zhang Yi, 2009a),
the industrial espionage case including the arrest of Rio Tinto’s representative for the
negotiation did lead both parties on the seller and buyers’ sides to a stalemate (Jin, 2009).
Consequently, the negotiation on the part of the CISA did not reach any result by the end of
July.

While the CISA claimed that the negotiation was still in process, and kept reiterating the idea
of establishing a unified iron ore price exclusive to the Chinese market, its counterparts on
the other side of the negotiation table seemed satisfied with the initial price reached by the
Japanese and Korean firms. For instance, Vale on July 29 announced that 50% of its iron ore
sold to China were already priced at the new annual price earlier agreed by other major steel
firms around the world. Rio Tinto also expressed its support for the initial price. Moreover,
not only was the ‘Chinese price’ unheeded, but the indexed pricing mechanism was officially
brought forward for the first time. That is, BHP Billiton at the same time told the press that
while the price of 47% of the firm’s iron ore were still under negotiation, the 23% of the iron
ore would be using the newly agreed annual price, and the remaining 30% would be priced
based on a mixed pricing mechanism including the quarterly average, the spot market, and
the indexed prices (Han, 2009a). In this regard, the CISA opposed the spot index pricing
which would attract market speculations (Wang ZK, 2009).

In the beginning of August, while not being able to reach any agreement with the Big Three,
the CISA turned its focus to the medium and small size mining companies from India, South
Africa, and Vietnam in the hope that these relatively small size suppliers could serve as the
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complement to the three global mining giants (Deng, 2009b). Subsequently, on August 17,
the CISA for the first time in history reached the price agreement with a non-Big-Three
supplier, namely FMG. According to the arrangement, the newly agreed price contained a
35.02%55 price cut compared to its 2008 equivalent. Furthermore, as the traditional starting
date for the new yearly price (April 1) already past, the period for which this new price would
remain effective began from July to December 2009 (CISA, 2009a). Despite being
acknowledged by the Chinese government and the CISA as a huge breakthrough for China’s
iron and steel sector, this price was not accepted by the Big Three (Zhang Yi, 2009b; Yue et
al., 2009). In addition, given that the promised amount of iron ore supplied by FMG was only
20 million tons which accounted for even less than 4% of China’s estimated annual iron ore
import for 2009 (i.e. 500 million tons), the FMG price was applied more in a symbolic sense
than in the actual practice, and thus limited to a few large size state-owned steel plants (Yue
et al., 2009; Zhang Yi, 2009c). For this reason, in October 2009 when six months had passed
since the traditional beginning date for the new price (i.e. April 1), the CISA claimed that its
negotiation with the Big Three was still undergoing, and would discuss the 2009 and the 2010
annual price at the same time.

While the idea of establishing a unified price exclusive to the Chinese iron ore market was
raised in the beginning of the 2009 iron ore negotiation and reiterated in the end, it was given
greater emphasis and formal recognition in the beginning of the 2010 negotiation (i.e.
October 2009) by both the CISA and the Chinese government (Gold Bull Information, 24
September 2009; Xu, 2009b). In particular, the so called ‘Chinese price’ did not differ in
nature from the traditional long term pricing mechanism which the international iron ore
market had been using since the 1970s. In other words, unlike the indexed pricing promoted
55

To be more precise, the price of fine ore was reduced by 35.02%, and the price of lump ore reduced by 50.42%.
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by BHP Billiton involving the overthrow of the long run pricing practice, the ‘Chinese price’
refers to the annual price that only applies to China’s iron ore market, replacing both the
traditional long run price and the spot market price. In addition, according to the CISA,
attached to this unified price was another claim that, as it is exclusive to the Chinese market,
the price shall follow the Chinese accounting report period beginning from 1 January to 31
December (Gold Bull Information, 29 September 2009).

At this time, the Big Three held the similar view as per last year. On the one hand, both Rio
Tinto and BHP Billiton did not show much interest in the ‘Chinese price’ but continued to
promote the indexed pricing model. With the particular reference to the ‘Chines price’, Rio
Tinto considered it as an “unfair benchmark price” which would place the negotiation in a
very difficult position (Han, 2009b). Vale, on the other hand, adopted the same strategy as it
did in last year’s negotiation. That is, it announced in the beginning of the negotiation that,
before making any specific decisions, the firm would wait for the outcome reached by Rio
Tinto and BHP Billiton (Gold Bull Information, 29 September 2009).

In mid-October, while the Financial Times reported that the Big Three proposed to increase
the 2010 annual price by 30%-35%, the CISA replied that, under the market condition where
supply was over demand, there was no room for price increase (Du, 2009). At the same time
when the CISA kept emphasising that iron ore market supply would be over the demand in
the foreseeable future (Zhang C, 2009b; Cao, 2009b; Yu L, 2009a), the Big Three on the
contrary held the completely opposite view that the present iron ore supply was not enough
(Yang Y, 2009b). Thus, they unanimously expressed their optimism about the rising iron ore
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demand and increased their iron ore production level accordingly (Zhou & Zhang, 2009;
Yang Y, 2009a; Yu L, 2009b).

On December 14, Vale told the press that the new annual iron ore price was expected to
increase by 10%-20% (Yang LM, 2009). Subsequently, some financial institutions including
Macquarie Bank and Morgan Stanley predicted that the new iron ore price be increased by
20%-30% (Chen SS, 2009c). In the subsequent month (i.e. January 2010), their prediction
even went up to 35%-50% (DFdaily, 14 January 2010; Sina Finance, 14 January 2010; Jiao,
2010a). Baosteel, China’s largest steelmaker, commented however that there would be
limited room for the iron ore price to increase (Li R, 2009). Shagang Group, the 5th largest
steel maker and the largest private owned steel plant in China, held the different view that the
iron ore price would be increased by more than 10% (Yuan, 2009a).

It was not until February 2010 that the CISA finally admitted that the iron ore price this year
might increase (Han, 2010a). However, the association still reiterated its goal in the
negotiation to establish a unified price, based on the traditional long term pricing mechanism,
exclusive to the Chinese market (Sina Finance, 9 February 2010). The Big Three on the other
hand kept promoting the indexed pricing mechanism. For instance, the half year report of
BHP Billiton published in the same month showed that 46% of the firm’s iron ore sales for
the first half of the 2009-2010 financial year were sold based on the short term pricing model
that contained spot market price, indexed price, and quarterly average price (DFdaily, 11
February 2010). Rio Tinto also argued that the old annual pricing mechanism needed to be
changed for its own survival (Chen SS, 2010a). In addition, the Big Three were so confident
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in the rising iron ore demand from China that even with the full production capacity they
could not meet the demand of the Chinese market (Chen SS, 2010a).

In March, the idea of the ‘Chinese price’ continued to appear on the agenda of the CISA and
other major steel plants in China. Particularly when BHP Billiton unilaterally raised the
temporary price of its long run iron ore contract with Chinese clients by 40% (Huang, 2010),
Hebei Steel Group, the parent entity of two top 20 steel makers56 in China, suggested that the
Ministry of Industry and Information take the initiative and establish a ‘national mineral
resources joint stock company’ unifying all of China’s iron ore import and domestic
transactions (Yu L, 2010a). Furthermore, while BHP Billiton pointed out that the indexed
pricing mechanism would be able to better reflect the constantly-changing market conditions
and follow economic principles, both Hebei Steel Group and the CISA replied that China still
insisted on the long term benchmark system, as the corresponding price, once the indexed
mechanism could be applied, would be ‘unreasonable’, ‘unfair’, and ‘immoral’ (Guan, 2010).

Faced with the impending application of the indexed pricing mechanism, senior executives of
China’s major steel plants, while attending the two annual political sessions 57 in Beijing,
collectively sent a petition letter to the Chinese premier seeking government intervention in
the iron ore import market at the national level (Yu L, 2010b). In response to this, the
Australian Trade Minister Simon Crean commented that the Australian government would
not intervene the negotiation, and that nor should the Chinese government. He further pointed
56

These include Handan Iron & Steel Group and Tangshan Iron & Steel Group.

57

The two sessions are National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
(CPPCC), which are held annually year (usually in every March) in Beijing. According to the Chinese Constitution (The
Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2004), the purpose of the two sessions is to enable the
general public to collect, organise, and communicate public opinions and information to the central government of the CPC.
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out that while Australia recognised China’s market economy, China should then adhere to,
rather than interfere in, the principles and laws of the market (Ma, 2010a). Subsequently, both
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Industry and Information declared to
provide necessary support to the CISA while keeping the negotiation within the boundaries of
corporations (Xue, 2010a, 2010b). Thus, when the Big Three claimed to shift the pricing
mechanism and reached the short term (i.e. quarterly) price agreement containing a 90% price
hike with the Korean and Japanese steel plants in the end of March (Lin, 2010; Sina Finance,
30 March 2010), CISA chose not to accept (China Business Network, 30 March 2010b).

In the beginning of April, in an attempt to resist the quarterly indexed price, CISA suggested
that all domestic steel plants and trading firms stop importing iron ore from the Big Three for
the next two months (Yuan, 2010a). The boycott, albeit being called for in the name of
securing China’s national economic development and the Chinese iron and steel sector in
particular, was not very well executed. In addition to the major steel makers such as Wuhan
Iron and Steel (4th largest steel plant) which promised to follow CISA’s call, other
participants in the domestic market including other steel plants and trading companies treated
it as the Dutch courage that was against market (Zhu, 2010a; Yu L, 2010d). The attempted
boycott of the Big Three was not simply limited to China’s domestic market but echoed at the
political level. The Ministry of Commerce claimed that its Anti-Monopoly Bureau was
planning on an anti-monopoly investigation of the quarterly pricing mechanism promoted by
the Big Three (Xue, 2010c). The Ministry of Industry and Information announced that it was
considering a new regulatory mechanism for China’s iron ore import market (Deng Y,
2010c).
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Despite the attempted boycott from the Chinese market, the new quarterly price was set
subsequently for the second quarter of 2010. Vale and Posco Steel reached the 83%-86%
price increase agreement on April 2 and BHP Billiton announced on April 7 that it reached
the agreement with its Asian clients containing a 99.7% price hike (Sina Finance, 2 April
2010; The Beijing News, 8 April 2010). On April 22, even FMG, the only mining company
that successfully reached the agreement with the CISA in 2009, also announced that it would
follow the industrial shift to adopt the ‘market based pricing mechanism’ (Zhu & Ruan,
2010). At the political level, the Australian Trade Minister responded to the boycott that that
government should not intervene with the market but let the market decide the price
(DFdaily, 6 April 2010).

After the one-month long failed boycott of the Big Three, the CISA finally accepted the
quarterly price reached by Japan and Korea in the same month and acquiesced that domestic
steel plants were permitted to use the price temporarily to purchase and import iron ore till
the Chinese negotiation team and the Big Three reached an agreement (Yu L, 2010e). At the
same time the association also reiterated the social, economic, and political significance of
the iron ore price to China’s national interest and the country’s economy. Subsequently,
Baosteel, China’s largest steel enterprise, admitted at the firm’s quarterly results
announcement conference in May that it already began to use the quarterly index price earlier
proposed by the Big Three, as the new pricing mechanism became an ‘irresistible trend’
(Zhu, 2010b).
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6.3. Competing connotations of the fair iron ore price
Although the end of the story shows that Chinese iron ore buyers had to adopt the short term
index pricing eventually, it is not to say that the CISA accepted the new mechanism without
any confrontation. In fact, since the focus of this study is on the particular process of the iron
ore pricing mechanism shift, in order to explore the reason why the CISA, as the industry
representative of the world’s largest iron ore importing country, failed in its attempt at
resisting the financialised price, a closer examination of the arguments made by both parties
at the negotiation table regarding the change of iron ore pricing is needed.

While the short-term based index pricing was not applied to the global market until the first
quarter of 2010, the concept was formally proposed and discussed during the 2009
negotiation. In May 2009 when the Big Three and the CISA already past the traditional finish
date of the negotiation (i.e. April 1) and reached a stalemate, BHP Billiton continued to
promote the index pricing. In particular, the mining company argued that the new method
would be able to reflect changes in market conditions in time. Also, as index pricing has long
been applied in the oil and coal sectors, BHP Billiton argued that replacing the conventional
long term pricing with the short-term based pricing that enables the market supply and
demand to decide will also be in line with economic principles (Liu, 2009). For the same
reason that market changes shall be reflected, the CISA on the other hand rejected the 2009
‘initial price’ reached by Nippon Steel and Rio Tinto as the price failed to objectively and
genuinely reflect the iron ore market supply and demand (Jiao, 2009a). Ironically, while the
CISA seemed be to in agreement with BHP Billiton that the 2009 annual price could not
represent the market, the former also opposed the index price promoted by the latter for the
very same reason. As China is the largest iron ore importing country in the global seaborn
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iron ore market, Mr. Li Xiaowei, the vice chairman of the CISA, argued that the leading
market status of the Chinese buyers should be reflected by, neither the newly agreed annual
price from Japan nor the index price promoted by BHP Billiton, but the ‘Chinese price’
exclusive to the Chinese market (Han, 2009a).

By the end of the 2009 negotiation, BHP Billiton was not convinced of the counterargument
put forward by the CISA, and adopted the index pricing for 30% of its global clients instead
(Yue & Zhou, 2009). Marius Kloppers, the firm’s CEO, advocated that the new method
would better reflect market movements (Lin, 2009). Yet again based on the same argument,
CISA concluded the price negotiation with FMG, and commented that the final price agreed
by both parties “objectively reflects the current supply and demand condition of the iron ore
market” (Bao, 2009).

The different connotations of ‘the reflection of market’ continued in the 2010 price
negotiation, with Rio Tinto and Vale expressing their interest in index pricing (Wang, J
2010a; Sina Finance, 24 March 2010a; Zhang Yi, 2010b). For instance, while attending a
mining industry conference in Singapore, Sam Walsh, the executive director of Rio Tinto,
commented that Rio Tinto would support any pricing mechanism that was capable of
reflecting the basic market conditions, and at the moment the company began to turn its
attention to spot market pricing as well as index pricing, and preferred the latter (Sina
Finance, 24 March 2010a). In June 2010, already having adopted the short term based pricing
mechanism, Roger Agnelli, Vale’s global CEO, told the press that the new price formula (i.e.
short term based pricing) was determined by the market, not the company (21st Century
Business Herald, 1 June 2010).
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However, in the meantime the Chinese negotiation team defended its opposition against
index pricing on the same ground that market conditions shall be reflected, Jia Yinsong, the
former inspector at the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information, advocated the long
term negotiation pricing at the 2010 China Iron Ore Conference for the reason that index
pricing failed to represent market supply and demand relationships (Li Y, 2010a). More
specifically, the Chinese side maintained that as the calculation mechanism of the new iron
ore pricing was not transparent in the first place, it would not of course be able to reflect the
market afterwards (Li RX, 2010a).

In fact, similar to the argument for market representation, transparency was another concept
that caused competing connotations by both sides. On the one hand, BHP Billiton claimed
that, compared to the traditional long run pricing, index pricing exhibited a higher level of
transparency as it would be able to replace the secret closed door negotiation between the
buyers and sellers every year, and avoid industrial espionage events such as the Rio Tinto
case from happening (Deng, 2009c; China Business Network, 30 March 2010a). Similarly,
after Vale adopted the short term based index price, Roger Agnelli, the firm’s CEO,
applauded the transparency brought by the new pricing mechanism “which enables everyone
to perceive the future price and (thus) helps steel plants control costs and management
inventory” (Wan, 2010a). Pedro Gutemberg, Vale’s head of the magnetite and ferroalloy
division, also pointed out that the new pricing mechanism would be more transparent as it
was based on publicly available information (Chen SS, 2010b).

While the Big Three promoted the transparency of index pricing, the Chinese side on the
other hand pointed out the potential information asymmetry as a result of the new price. That
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is, although the pricing information from iron ore buyers would be in general transparent, the
counterpart offered by the sellers would always be a mixture of truth and falsehood that
would lead the buyers to an unfair position and the sellers an advantageous one (Lang &
Zhang, 2010). Furthermore, even suppose that buyers and sellers both provide necessary
market information, the calculation of iron ore index was still not transparent as it was not
based on the actual transactions of iron ore in a physical market (Li RX, 2010a).

Coupled with the notions of market reflection and of transparency was the fair price of iron
ore. During the 2009 negotiation when the Big Three agreed on the ‘initial price’ with the
major Japanese, Korean, and European steel plants, and CISA reached the so called ‘Chinese
price’ with FMG, both groups claimed their price as the fair price. For instance, while Tom
Albanese, the CEO of Rio Tinto, announced that “we believe that the negotiated result
already agreed (By Rio Tinto and other steel firms) is a fair price that reflects market
conditions” (Yue & Zhou, 2009), Li Yizhong, the minister of the Chinese Ministry of
Industry and Information, supported the Chinese price as it was reached based on the
principle of fairness (Zhou RX, 2009a). Yaojian, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of
Commerce, also acknowledged and welcomed then the newly agreed Chinese price that it
would be able to help establish the fair trade order in the international iron ore market (Gong
& He, 2009). With the controversy over the fair price unresolved by the end of the 2009
negotiation, so was the discrepancy between the ‘initial price’ by the Big Three and the
Chinese price.

Moving into the 2010 negotiation, the debate concerning the fairness of iron ore price
continued and intensified. In the beginning of the negotiation, Sam Walsh, the chief executive
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of Rio Tinto’s Iron Ore group, warned in the firm’s shareholder newsletter that any attempt
by the Chinese steel plants to establish unfair benchmark prices would lead the negotiation to
a predicament (Han, 2009b). To defend the Chinese price, Wu Xichun, the honorary
chairman of the CISA, pointed out at the CISA industry conference that it was unfair to
China that as the largest iron ore importing country in the world China could not take
advantage of the stable long run price but to accept the fluctuated spot market price (Yu L,
2010f). Instead, what would be fair then was that China could have its own long run iron ore
price exclusive to the Chinese market (Yu L, 2010f). Consequently, when the Big Three
claimed to shift the pricing mechanism and reached the short term (i.e. quarterly) price
agreement containing a 90% price hike with the Korean and Japanese steel plants in the end
of March (Lin, 2010; Sina Finance, 30 March 2010), the CISA chose not to accept (China
Business Network, 30 March 2010b).

The proposed price increase by the Big Three, once the short-term pricing mechanism could
be applied, at this point amounted to 90%-100% (Yu L, 2010c; Yang LM, 2010a). This had
gone far beyond CISA’s bottom line at 50%, which was already considered by the CISA as
‘not fair’ (Guan, 2010). Rather, from the Chinese side, what would be “fair” was a price that
enabled both the Chinese steel plants and the mining companies to keep a reasonable level of
profitability (China News Service, 22 July 2009). On the one hand, the ‘unfairness’ of the
short term pricing model was already argued by the Chinese association that accepting the
indexed price means that while promising suppliers the long term procurement amount of
iron ore, steel plants would also lose the bargaining power towards the Big Three (Caijing, 27
April 2009). On the other hand, however, what was unfair from Rio Tinto’s perspective was
the conventional long term mechanism which no longer fairly represented the price of iron
ore (Zhou XY, 2010).
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It has thus far been depicted the controversy regarding the price of iron ore based on concepts
including the reflection of market, transparency, and fair price. While using the same set of
accounting discourse, CISA and the mining companies (i.e. Big Three) nonetheless put
forward the nearly opposite arguments. In CISA’s point of view, a fair iron ore price should
be a unique long term price exclusive to the Chinese market reflective of the leading status of
Chinese buyers in the iron ore supply and demand relationship where market information
would be transparent from both the buyers’ and the sellers’ sides and where both the buyers
and sellers could maintain a reasonable level of profitability. From the perspective of the Big
Three, however, a fair price refers to an index-based short term price based on transparent
market information that fairly and constantly reflects changes in market supply and demand.
With the completion connotations above, the question is rendered as to why the same
concepts and reasons have led both parties to arrive at differing conclusions. Since
accounting needs to be understood in the specific socio-political circumstances, and the
meaning of accounting discourse is a contested terrain that shifts over time and different
parties (Tinker, et al., 1991), it is necessary for the study to explore the discourse of iron ore
pricing at a deeper level.

Already presented has been that both CISA and the Big Three were able to use similar
notions to defend their own ‘fair price’ of iron ore, a good point of departure is then to
investigate how the components of the ‘fair price’ were interpreted by both parties. The most
conspicuous elements with which both parties were concerned are (1) market and (2) the
supply and demand relationship. Holding differing opinions on these two may be attributed to
(3) the different views of iron ore as the commodity traded within the market, (4) the
corporate ownership of market participants, and / or (5) the influence of government. Bear in
mind these factors, the analysis is also in line with, as illuminated in chapter five, Marx’s
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methodological framework with the material focus on production That is, the investigation at
this level then concerns the particular mode of production and social relations in which the
producers of discourse (as explored in 6.1) participate.

6.4. Accounting discourse as a contested terrain that shifts over different groups
This section is aimed to unveil the underlying modes of production on parts of both the
Chinese buyers and the mining firms that constitute the basis of discourse. To this end, the
following five components are considered: market, supply and demand, value of iron ore,
corporate ownership, and role of government.

6.4.1. Discourse of market
As discussed earlier, while both the CISA and the Big Three advocate that the iron ore price
is decided by the market mechanism, they then reached considerably different conclusions
regarding what the fair price of iron ore should be. This section therefore further investigates
the specific context in which the discourse of market is put forward by the groups involved
including (1) the CISA, (2) the Big Three, and (3) other market participants.

6.4.1.1. The market interpreted by CISA
As China is the largest iron ore importing and steel producing country in the world, the CISA
always emphasised the strong interconnectedness between iron ore price and China’s
domestic steel market in the negotiation as well as the uniqueness of the Chinese market, and
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thus urged the Big Three to offer a unique price exclusive to the China’s domestic steel
manufacturers.

For instance, in the beginning of the 2009 negotiation, CISA’s secretary general, Shang
Shanghua, asked the Big Three to lower down the forthcoming iron ore price to its 1994 level
(i.e. a 82% price cut), on the ground that China’s steel price had also gone back to the 1994
level (Sina Finance, 9 December 2008). This was because, Shan argued, the increase and
decrease in the iron ore price should keep the same pace with those of the steel price, given
that iron ore is the raw material for steel production (Xinkuaibao, 10 December 2008).
Alongside the 82% price decrease, Shan also proposed that the traditional period to which the
annual iron ore price applied that began from 1 April and ended on 31 March also be changed
to accord with the Chinese financial reporting period from 1 January to 31 December, as it
would be more suitable to the business operation as well as financial reporting of China’s
steel manufacturers (Xinkuaibao, 10 December 2008).

In March 2009 when the negotiation reached a stalemate and CISA changed the proposed
82% price cut to 45%, Qi Xiangdong, the deputy secretary general at the CISA, still
maintained that
“we are neither talking about the exact percentage that the long run iron ore price should
drop nor concerned with how much this year’s steel price would reduce compared to its
last year equivalent, the biggest focus (for the CISA) is to achieve a reasonable
relationship between the prices of steel and of other commodities including coal and iron
ore on the same industrial chain. (We) must ensure the reasonability of the profit
allocation on the industrial chain” (Zhang Yi, 2009d).

Qi continued to explain that
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“while the iron ore suppliers were profiteering last year, (China’s) steel plants suffered
huge losses. This situation was not reasonable and could not last long. Therefore, (we)
should on the one hand lower down the raw material cost of iron ore and on the other
hand increase the steel price to a proper level” (Zhang Yi, 2009d).

At about the same time, Wu Xichun, the honorary chairman of CISA, also pointed out that
major iron ore suppliers should take the interests of steel enterprises into full consideration
while negotiating with the Chinese buyers. According to CISA’s data, the loss-suffering
status of (China’s) domestic steel plants would even exacerbate for the next two months.
“Under such circumstance, if iron ore suppliers still do not consider an appropriate price cut,
they will leave no room for steel plants to survive. Nor will they themselves have any space
for profits either… after all, our (i.e. mining companies and steel plants) fundamental
interests are the same”, said Wu (Securities Times, 20 March 2009). Luo Bingsheng, CISA’s
vice chairman, also elaborated on such an interest-sharing relation that as the global iron ore
price gone up by 412% for the past five years (i.e. from 2003 to 2008), the international
mining companies, by gradually increasing iron ore price every year, had made huge profits
at the expense of steel plants which was not normal. Steel enterprises and mining companies
should have a win-win relationship that looks after the interests of both parties (Ruan, 2009a).

On the same basis that the relationship between iron ore suppliers and steel plants shall be
interest-sharing and reciprocal, CISA rejected the new annual price that contained a 32.95%
price cut reached by Nippon Steel and Rio Tinto (China Galaxy Securities, 5 June 2009; Xu
YL, 2009d). The secretary general Shan Shanghua emphasised that “mining companies and
steel manufacturers should be interdependent as close as lips and teeth. (Therefore,) while the
(Chinese) steel industry in general suffers from losses, the iron ore suppliers on the upper
stream have no reason to continue to profiteer” (Wan, 2009a). The spokesperson of the
Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information, Zhu Hongren, also held the same opinion. He
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hoped that, through communication, coordination, and negotiation, both the iron ore suppliers
and steel manufacturers could soon agree on a relatively fair and reasonable price so that both
parties would be able to retain a normal level of profitability (China News Service, 22 July
2009).

As China did not accept the 2009 initial price, the idea of index pricing was raised, where the
Chinese side also maintained the close connection between iron ore and steel prices. When
responding to the promotion of the quarterly pricing model based on Platts index, Yang
Siming, the chairman and CEO of Nanjing Iron and Steel United Co., Ltd. (i.e. a subsidiary
of Nanjing Iron and Steel Group owned by the Chinese government, top 20 steel plant in
China), suggested the CISA to link the quarterly price of steel with that of iron ore (Caijing,
27 April 2009).

In the belief that the Chinese domestic steel sector was the most influential factor for the
forthcoming iron ore price, another CISA official even admitted that, in order to reach a
better price with the Big Three, the association attempted to coordinate the production
schedule of (China’s) domestic steel manufacturers. One typical example was that Shan
Shanghua, the secretary general, went to Baosteel in person in the end of May discussing the
company’s possible increase in steel price. “The association (i.e. CISA) wants to see that
each major steel plant hold on for a while and do not raise steel price at this particular
moment. (Because) once the steel price is increased, there will be obviously less space for the
(iron ore) negotiation. However, on June 10 (2009), Baosteel increased its steel price for July
by the amount which was even RMB 200 / ton higher than anticipated. This made secretary
general Shan very upset” (Deng, 2009d).
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In addition to the strong connection between iron ore price and China’s domestic steel
market, CISA also emphasised the uniqueness of the Chinese iron ore market. In particular,
the Chinese market, in the view of CISA, was so influential as though it would be the only
determinant factor that the Big Three should take into consideration. For instance, in the
beginning of the 2009 iron ore negotiation, CISA’s secretary general Shan Shanghua pointed
out that the year of 2009 would be witness a buyer’s market (Li JL, 2009a). After Japan and
Korea reached the initial price agreement with Rio Tinto, Shan told the press that China
would not accept the price as “we (i.e. the Chinese market) are currently the largest iron ore
importing country around the globe, and thus should have a cheaper price” (Gold Bull
Information, 15 May 2009). For the same reason, he further indicated that Japan’s iron ore
import accounted for less than one sixth of its Chinese counterpart, and so could not represent
Asia to set up the price. Instead, “as the number one iron ore importing market the world
over, China should establish a new pricing mechanism based on our actual iron ore demand
for steel production” (Gold Bull Information, 12 June 2009; Zhang C, 2009a). Luo
Bingsheng, the vice chairman, also added that, regardless of the Japanese and Korean
enterprises accepting the new annual price from Rio Tinto, the Chinese steel plants are the
number one client for Rio Tinto. In 2008, there were about 55% of Rio Tinto’s iron ore that
were sold to China (Zhang Yi, 2009e).

When CISA finally reached the price agreement with FMG (i.e. Australia’s third largest iron
ore supplier) in August, Liu Zhenjiang, CISA’s vice chairman and the secretary of the CPC
committee, commented that
“this year (i.e. 2009) China will import nearly 500 million tons of iron ore, accounting
for more than 50% of the trading amount of global seaborn iron ore… With the massive
commodity import like this, as far as the major suppliers are concerned, they should
consider China’s market share. This is certainly not a simple matter of the buyer’s
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interests. When others import 10 to 20 million tons of iron ore, they will then determine
the price for China’s 500 million tons of iron ore, which makes it very hard to be fair to
China. The unfairness has to be stopped. Based on the concept of fair market, we must
begin to build the Chinese model” (Xinhuanet, 17 August 2009).

Summarising from the discourse above, a picture of the iron ore market from CISA’s
perspective emerges, that is, a market largely affected by China’s domestic steel sector and
dominated by the Chinese plants for steel production only. However, questions are asked as
to whether or not the Chinese steel sector really is the most influencing factor and whether or
not China’s iron ore buyers are capable of establishing the Chinese price for the global
market. Before answering these questions, it is thus to the market discourse of the Big Three
which we now turn.

6.4.1.2. The market interpreted by Big Three
Compared to CISA, the Big Three depicts a larger market comprised of global buyers and
influenced by macro-economic policies when discussing the iron ore price. In the beginning
of the 2009 iron ore price negotiation, Tom Albanese, the then CEO of Rio Tinto, indicated
that China’s weak iron ore demand was only temporary as a consequence of the tightened
monetary policy by the Chinese government; considering the pace of China’s economy
development (at 8%-9% annual GDP growth rate) and the implementation of new
government policies, the iron ore demand would go up next year (i.e. 2009) (Chen, 2008a). In
2009 March, Guy Elliott, Rio Tinto’s chief financial officer (CFO hereafter), said at the Asia
Mining Conference that the company was not in a hurry to conclude the iron ore negotiation,
as it expected that the economic stimulus package in US, China, and other countries would
help the steel and metal markets recover (Caijing, 27 April 2009).
181

Chapter 6 Different Interpretations of Iron Ore Price—Identifying Modes of Production

For the Big Three, China was not the only market to which they could sell iron ore. After
CISA and FMG reached the so called ‘Chinese price’ in August 2009, Tom Albanese, the
CEO of Rio Tinto, told the press that at the moment the company was primarily selling iron
ore with the temporary benchmark price (reached by Nippon steel and Rio Tinto before the
Chinese price) to steel manufacturers in Japan and other regions, and would continue to do so
until market condition changes. He expressed that using the temporary benchmark price was
appropriate, despite the Chinese price which was just agreed by CISA and FMG (Gold Bull
Information, 21 August 2009). In fact, Amanda Buckley, Rio Tinto’s press officer at the
Australian Headquarter, commented that “the price agreed by Chinese steel enterprises and
FMG has nothing to do with our 2009 annual iron ore price. Rio Tinto will continue to
negotiate with its own clients around the globe” (Shanghai Morning Post, 18 August 2009).
Vale also dismissed the applicability of Chinese price but emphasised the global price. “If
you already have a widely recognised price agreement, and everyone uses that price to buy
and sell iron ore, then why would you go into another negotiation?”, said Roger Agnelli,
Vale’s CEO (Xu, 2009e).

Aside from the concern with iron ore consumers around the globe, the Big Three also pointed
out factors affecting the iron ore price other than the Chinese domestic steel market. For
instance, BHP Billiton revealed that its cooperation with Nippon Steel was not limited to iron
ore trade, but also involved the long term shipping agreement which on its own would help
Nippon Steel save a huge amount of cost (Suo, 2009a). Zhu Kai, the president of Vale China,
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also mentioned the relevance of shipping cost (primarily based on the Baltic Dry Index 58, i.e.
BDI index hereafter) that “the fluctuation in shipping costs is huge, ranging from 8 USD / ton
to 108 USD / ton, and (thus) resulting in substantial influence on clients’ cost control… (in
the past,) due to the small number of long term charter agreements signed by the Chinese
steel enterprises with shipping companies, the Chinese (iron ore) buyers had paid more costs”
(Deng, 2009e). Therefore, to enlarge Vale’s market share in China, Zhu Kai expressed the
firm’s aim in 2009 as to stabilise the iron ore delivery cost by establishing its own shipping
fleet (Deng, 2009e; Zhang C, 2009c).

6.4.1.3. The market interpreted by Chinese small and medium enterprises
The different interpretations of market not only exist between the CISA and major iron ore
suppliers, but also derive from the small and medium enterprises within the Chinese iron and
steel sector, a third group worthy of further investigation. As illustrated earlier (in 6.1.3.), this
group mostly consists of privately-owned steel plants and trading companies which did not
directly participate in the iron ore price negotiation. However, they were still the stakeholders
in this case and their voices were presented in the media coverage during the period. It is thus
argued that their discourse reflect, both directly and otherwise, to what extent they would
agree with CISA, the association which claimed to be their representative in iron ore price
negotiation.

With regard to the concept of market, this group perceived a different market than what the
CISA conceived of. That is, unlike the CISA which simply linked the level of steel output
58

The Baltic Dry Index (BDI index) measures the price of shipping raw materials by sea. It is issued on a daily basis by the
London-based Baltic Exchange (The Baltic Exchange, 2015a). In this thesis, the terms shipping cost and BDI index are used
interchangeably.
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with the iron ore price and attempted to unify the price in China’s domestic market, the small
and medium enterprises pointed out a market where iron ore was not only traded between
mining companies and steel plants as the raw material for steel production, but also resold
among trading firms and steel plants as the retail inventory.

The manager at a medium size steel plant based in the city of Tangshan (Hebei province)
pointed out that
“the majority of steel manufacturers in Hebei province established since 2002 have
neither the long term iron ore contracts (with the Big Three) nor any other channels to
import iron ore… (Thus,) the ‘import license’ has in fact given a ‘privilege’ to most large
steel enterprises—they have monopolised the ‘long term based iron ore’ purchased from
the international iron ore suppliers at a cheaper price. Apart from those consumed for
their own steel production, the rest of the iron ore are sold to the ‘unlicensed’ small and
medium steel enterprises at higher prices. The difference between ‘long term based price’
and ‘spot price’ has thus given rise to a new market with huge space for ‘arbitrage’”
(Wang J, 2009b).

He further added that
“(o)f course, having the import license does not mean having the long run iron ore supply
straightaway. After 2005, although there were 118 qualified enterprises with ‘iron ore
import license’, only a few number of them could actually purchase the long term based
iron ore… This is because the major foreign mining firms are quite picky and only
choose those large size steel plants with great potential as the ‘long term partners’. It is
very rare that any small and medium or privately owned steel enterprises could have the
opportunity to order the long term contract based iron ore” (Wang J, 2009b).

Even for those firms that have been granted with the import license, the sufficient and stable
long term supply of iron ore is not guaranteed either. Zhao Qiang, the general manager of a
steel enterprise based in Hebei province, revealed that while his company had signed up long
run iron ore contracts with Vale and FMG, the total ordered amount was less than 2 million
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tons, which was far below the firm’s actual demand. Thus, his company also faced the same
expensive iron ore price as did those small and medium enterprises.
“We would also like to sign up bigger contracts. However, as our total iron ore demand
is still too small (compared to the bigger players with larger quantity of demand), the
major suppliers are not willing to talk with us at all. (Thus,) We have to purchase from
Baosteel and Sino Steel at higher prices. Sometimes, the price can be 500 RMB / ton
more expensive than its long term contract counterpart” (Zhang XD, 2009a).

It is not that the CISA did not consider this secondary market for iron ore trade, as the
association introduced the Suggestions On the Promotion of the Iron Ore Import Agency
System in 2006 and the Details on the Implementation of Iron Ore Import Agency System in
2010. However, these policies were not very well implemented as they were issued by the
association instead of government and thus were not legally enforceable (Guan, 2011).

Xu Tao, the vice president of a small steel enterprise (i.e. Tangshan Jianlong Co., Ltd) based
in the city of Tangshan, told the journalist that
“While our nation’s iron ore import agency system states that, when re-selling the
imported iron ore to those unlicensed steel firms, licensed iron ore importing companies
can only charge a 3%-5% agency fee and cannot profiteer from the reselling, this policy
has, in reality, become a dead letter… In this aspect, I think the key thing is that many
licensed iron ore importing firms or those who are able to receive long term priced iron
ore elsewhere simply sell us at the spot market price that subsequently creates many
problems… in July 2008 when the long term price was 700-800 RMB / ton, Tangshan
Jianlong could not use this price. Instead, the company bought iron ore from trading
companies at the price of 1400 RMB / ton, which nearly doubled its long term
counterpart… While these licensed firms made a fortune (from re-selling iron ore), the
unlicensed ones had to suffer from the prohibitive price of iron ore” (Economy 30
Minutes, 2009).

The market as such even existed for some licensed companies. As explained by Liu Zenglin,
the general manager at Baoye Group which is another private steel enterprise also based in
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the city of Tangshan, even though the company did have the long term iron ore contract every
year for 3 million tons, its annual demand for iron ore nevertheless amounted to 15 million
tons. In other words, the other 12 million ton iron ore had to be purchased from trading
companies in the spot market. He added that
“While in theory the users of iron ore are eventually steel manufacturers, this is not so in
the case of those trading companies which do not purchase iron ore for production
purposes. Rather, they are simply concerned with the gap between the long term based
price and its spot market counterpart, the higher the better. They do not actually consider
whether or not the steel plants in the lower stream could accept the raw material cost. As
long as you need (iron ore), the bigger the price gap the better. As steel plants make
purchases from them, these trading firms will be even bolder to import more from
overseas with a higher import price (and thus an even higher selling price to China’s
domestic steel plants). This is a vicious circle” (Economy 30 Minutes, 2009).

As such, this difference between the long term contract-based price and the spot market price
posed more challenges to the small and medium enterprises. As a buyer of second hand iron
ore from China’s domestic market, a privately owned medium size steel plant based in Hebei
province told the journalist that
“without the import license, (the company) must find a licensed firm as the agent when
(the company) needs to import iron ore, and because of this, (the company) needs to pay
a significant amount of money as commission… the agency fee is about 1-3 USD / ton,
which means that the company would have to pay 100-200 million RMB as the agency
fee every year since the firm’s annual iron ore import is 10 million tons. Instead of
calling it as the agency fee, it is rather something from reselling. When iron ore was in a
high demand, the price that those licensed firms sold us with was 1.5-2 times more
expensive than the original price” (Deng, 2009c).

Consequently, these small and medium enterprises even suggested the government to abolish
the iron ore import agency system as it “on the one hand has caused unfair competition in the
(iron ore import) market, and on the other hand only exists in name” (Deng, 2009c).
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Moreover, not only did CISA fail in its attempt to suppress the secondary iron ore transaction
market, but the association also exacerbated such a market. When the CISA went into a
stalemate with the Big Three in the negotiation and called for the ban on iron ore
‘speculations’ in the secondary market, “large trading firms such as Laibao and Jiaji soon
adopted a new strategy which, instead of selling 100,000 tons of iron ore per day like they
normally did in the past, now only offers 10,000 tons in the spot market everyday… (this is
because) now it is another good opportunity to stockpile iron ore. While the CISA will keep
containing the iron ore import amount till the end of the negotiation, the decreasing amount
of iron ore supply means the corresponding increasing price. The iron ore price will thus be
higher in future”, said Shang Yong, an iron ore trader (Suo, 2009b).

In the similar way as CISA failed to extend its control over the market for small and medium
steel enterprises, much of the association’s success in the 2009 negotiation (i.e. 35.02% price
cut reached by CISA and FMG) remained within CISA and its member firms. The market in
which privately owned small and medium steel plants operated, on the other hand, remained,
if not worse, the same. As the spokesperson of Puyang Iron and Steel (a private steel plant
based in Hebei province) explained that “this price cut (agreed by CISA and FMG) only
applies to FMG’s clients, whereas we cannot share the benefit”, since the company at the
moment did not have any iron ore contracts with FMG. He further pointed out that the iron
ore supply from FMG was limited, and so was its subsequent influence on the Chinese steel
enterprises (Yue et al., 2009). Moreover, regardless of whichever mining firms that the CISA
reached an agreement with, it was already not feasible for the major SEOS and small and
medium enterprises to stay in the same team. “Long term price negotiation is a matter which
concerns CISA and large steel enterprises. It has nothing to do with us. Compared to the long
term price negotiation, we are more willing to focus on the spot market” (Zhang C, 2009a),
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said the director of an unlicensed steel plant in Hebei. In response to CISA’s call for a nationwide iron ore boycott against the Big Three who might then offer a better price to the Chinese
market, the director of a medium size steel plant explained that
“to unite us (i.e. small and medium enterprises with major SOEs) against the foreign
suppliers, we must align our interest together! With those large size licensed firms that
held the discourse power on behalf of the Chinese market, we do not in the first place
share the same interest, and nor do we face the same ‘enemy’. How can we follow
CISA’s proposal? ... In the past these enterprises (i.e. licensed SOEs) had benefited from
the long term contract based iron ore. But now the market has changed, then they say
they could not afford the (iron ore) price, and ask us to cooperate” (Zhang Yi, 2009f).

In addition to the secondary market that significantly differs from the one idealised by the
CISA, this group also indicates other influencing factors of iron ore price than the Chinese
steel market. Similar to the Big Three, an iron ore trading company based in Rizhao port
(Shandong province) pointed out the influence that shipping costs (i.e. BDI index) might
have on the price of iron ore. For instance, BHP Billiton had the control over 60% of the dry
bulk shipping capacity in the Chinese-Australian seaborne market, which gave the mining
giant the ability of artificially raising the shipping cost and so the spot price of iron ore at
(China’s) domestic ports (Xu, 2009f). The manager of China National Chartering Co., Ltd.
also expressed the same concern that while in the beginning of 2009 the cost of shipping iron
ore from Brazil to Chian was 10 USD / ton, the price at the moment was increased to 30 USD
/ ton. Due to the lack of the time charter agreement (i.e. long term charter agreement), he
illuminated, that
“the shipping right is in the hands of the consignors (i.e. iron ore suppliers in this case)
who charter ships at any prices they prefer, and so the Chinese steel plants have to accept
the price however expensive it may be… This is the most important problem that the
Chinese side should solve, rather than simply focusing on a few US dollars that the iron
ore price could be reduced by” (Suo, 2009a).
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To summarise the discourse of market interpreted by the small and medium companies in the
Chinese iron and steel sector, a market that is more complex than the one pictured by CISA
emerges. First, similar to the Big Three that consider other influencing factors of iron ore
price than steel production demand, the small and medium enterprises also take into account
the international shipping cost for iron ore transactions. Second, and more importantly, they
operate in a market which the CISA would not recognise and which the Big Three were not
directly involved with. In other words, they have created to some extent a secondary market
by themselves, that is, a market largely within China where iron ore transactions occur not
primarily between the Big Three and the Chinese iron ore importers but in fact among
China’s ‘licensed’ importing companies and those unlicensed ones where iron ore may have
been sold a few times to reach its end users with the final price much higher than its original
selling price.

6.4.1.4. Conclusion and discussion for the discourse of market
To conclude the analysis of the different interpretations of market by (1) the CISA, (2) the
Big Three, and (3) the small and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry,
three types of market emerge. The first is, as depicted by the CISA, an iron ore market purely
based on the development of China’s domestic steel sector, and primarily influenced and
dominated by the Chinese iron ore consumers. The second one, as viewed by the Big Three,
is a world market influenced by both the macro-economic and political environment around
the globe and the specific market conditions such as the global shipping cost (i.e. BDI index).
Thirdly, the small and medium enterprises operating in the Chinese iron and steel industry
perceived another market based on factors from both global and domestic markets. On the
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one hand, this group, similar to the Big Three, also considers the international price of iron
ore as well as the global shipping cost (i.e. BDI Index) as the determinants of iron ore price.
On the other hand, however, unlike the mining giants or the CISA, the global iron ore price is
regarded as the cost of goods (i.e. iron ore) sold on the part of the Chinese licensed iron ore
importers who subsequently resell the previously imported iron ore to, and consequently
profiteer from those unlicensed privately owned small and medium companies. With CISA’s
failed attempt in suppressing and perhaps the unintended facilitation of such a market, it
becomes an area beyond the reach of the Chinese association, in both regulatory and
beneficial terms.

6.4.2. Discourse of supply and demand
Having identified the three categories of market from the perspectives of the three groups, the
next concern is the discourse of supply demand which gives rise to competing point of views
regarding the price of iron ore. For instance, when negotiating the 2009 annual price, CISA
contended that iron ore supply was over demand whereas the Big Three emphasised the
opposite scenario (Yu L, 2009a; Yang Y., 2009b). Also, in the debate over iron ore index
pricing, whilst the Big Three claimed that the new pricing mechanism could be determined
and reflected by market supply and demand (Liu, 2009), the CISA argued that the supply and
demand represented by the indexed price was problematic (Li Y, 2010a) and only the
‘Chinese price’ was able to “objectively reflects the… supply and demand” (Bao, 2009).

Based on the different interpretations of market explored earlier, it is thus no longer difficult
to explore the respective opinions on supply and demand under theses market conditions,
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which have been extensively used to substantiate their own argument by both parties at the
negotiation table.

6.4.2.1. The supply and demand interpreted by CISA
Since the CISA considers the Chinese steel market as the primary determinant of iron ore
price, the association has thus paid sufficient attention to the supply and demand level shown
in the Chinese domestic steel sector, leaving the global market supply and demand relatively
undiscussed. In the beginning of the 2009 price negotiation, Luo Bingsheng, the executive
vice chairman of CISA, equated iron ore demand with steel production demand in that
“while the continuous increase in iron ore price for the past few years has stimulated the
investment in (China’s) domestic mining resources and resulted in the gradual increase in
domestic iron ore production… (Thus,) the increase in domestically produced iron ore
can totally meet the demand for domestic steel production” (Yao, 2008).

For him, the only motive that Chinese companies purchase iron ore was to manufacture steel,
as Luo further argued that with the current iron ore inventory stock, China’s domestic steel
plants could maintain their normal production for three to four months without importing any
iron ore (Chen, 2008a). Moreover, he predicted that, as China’s steel production would
reduce in 2009, the excessive demand of iron ore would no longer be the case (Li JL, 2009b).
Shan Shanghua, the secretary general of CISA, also expressed the similar view that the
existing iron ore inventory at China’s ports in the beginning of November was already above
90 million tons, and so was able to meet China’s steel production demand till the end of the
first quarter in 2009 (DFdaily, 7 November 2008).
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While claiming that iron ore demand solely depended on the steel demand, the CISA also
found that the country’s iron ore import kept increasing when the steel production was
significantly reduced (Xia, 2009). However, rather than recognising the rising demand of iron
ore, Shan Shanghua criticised that the increased amount of iron ore supply in the Chinese
market only created the illusory demand (Su, 2009), on the ground that the nation’s iron ore
import in the first quarter of 2009 was much higher than its demand of steel production (Gold
Bull Information, 15 May 2009; Zhang Yi, 2009f). Luo Bingsheng, CISA’s vice chairman,
commented that the excessive import of iron ore distorted the supply and demand relationship
in (China’s) domestic iron ore market, and substantially disturbed the iron ore price
negotiation (Ruan, 2009b). In the meantime, the association discredited those small and
medium enterprises which at the time reached the iron ore procurement arrangement with
foreign iron ore suppliers. The official at the CISA told the journalist that
“do those so called arrangements really count? There are some small and medium size —
which of course are not considered small by overseas standards—steel plants which do
not know anything but simply sign up contracts (with iron ore suppliers). However, they
forgot that they themselves do not have such right to sign the contract… It is not that we
do not know about the excessive iron ore import by trading firms in the first half of the
year. Now (we) are looking for those which imported the most and then conduct
investigations on them, Once you break the national standards, you must be punished”
(Wang J, 2009c).

As for the Big Three who privately sold iron ore to those unlicensed Chinese firms, on the
other hand, the CISA also dismissed their supply with the remark that the main reason behind
Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton’s recent shipment to China was to create the illusory increase in
market demand (Su, 2009). In general, Luo Bingsheng, the vice chairman of CISA,
commented that
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from 2009 January to July, iron ore trade via spot market accounts for 82.74% of the
nation’s entire iron ore import. The excessive import of iron ore, purchased through
trading companies, distorts the supply and demand relationship in the Chinese market,
and greatly disturbs the iron ore price negotiation (Ruan, 2009b).

In other words, rather than acknowledging the increase in supply and demand, the association
simply regarded it as the unnecessary excess which contributed nothing but caused distortion
and disturbance in the market. Similarly, the deputy minister of the Ministry of Commerce,
Fu Ziying, also commented on the rising demand for iron ore as irrational (Han, 2009c).

With the privately-owned iron ore trading firms and steel plants being discredited, steel
production was another concept that received specific attention from the CISA. In an attempt
to establish a nationwide unified iron ore price exclusive to China, Shan Shanghua also
pointed out that the new pricing mechanism must be based on the actual iron ore demand for
steel production (Gold Bull Information, 12 June 2009). Having linked the iron ore demand
with the demand for steel production was not enough; the term actual demand was also
defined, or perhaps confined, by the industry association. Faced with the fact that while most
of the CISA member firms had reduced their daily steel output from 1.14 to 1.11 million tons,
the rest of the industry (mostly non-CISA member firms) increased the production level from
0.29 to 0.34 million tons per day (Xu, 2009f), Shan Shanghua labelled the increased steel
production at non-CISA member steel plants as the overproduction which made the iron ore
negotiation exceptionally difficult and exacerbated the illusory demand for iron ore for the
Chinese market (Yue & Zhou, 2009). Apparently, the actual demand for steel production did
not mean the actual steel production on the part of the non-CISA member firms.
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Nonetheless, this is not to say that steel production at major SOEs would have no problem at
all; operations of SOEs were also subject to the will (or command) of the industry
association. Given the production overcapacity claimed by the CISA, Li Yizhong, the
Minister of the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information, at the State Council press
conference suggested that domestic steel plants shall not launch any new projects within the
next three years (Yangcheng Evening News, 14 August 2009).

While disavowing the activities, including iron ore importing and steel manufacturing, of the
non-CISA member firms (most of which were privately-owned small and medium
enterprises), the industry association also, either consciously or otherwise, disregarded the
interests of these firms. When claiming to have achieved the price agreement with FMG in
the 2009 negotiation, Liu Zhenjiang, the vice chairman and the secretary of the CPC
committee at the CISA, emphasised that the negotiation result was accepted by parties from
the supply and demand chain (Xinhuanet, 17 August 2009). However, the promised amount
of iron ore supply by FMG was only 20 million tons that did not even take up 4% of the
nation’s entire demand for 2009 (Dong, 2009a). Consequently, similar to the way in which
the market described by CISA was separated from the one considered by small and medium
enterprises, most, in not all, of FMG’s iron ore supply went to the hands of those CISA
member firms (Yue et al., 2009).

To summarise CISA’s discourse of supply and demand, the interpretation largely remained
within the confines of China’s domestic market in two particular ways. On the one hand, the
concept of iron ore demand was equated to the actual demand for steel production, which was
conditional upon CISA’s approval and thus effectively excluded the so called overproduction
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operated by the non-CISA member plants. On the other hand, the term iron ore supply was
limited to CISA’s own authorised channel in terms of both qualification and quantity. This
primarily referred to transactions between iron ore suppliers and the licensed Chinese
companies, most of which were the industry’s leading SOEs. With regard to qualification,
CISA discredited both the iron ore supplier and the unlicensed receiver at the same time. As
for quantity, non-CISA member firms were naturally omitted due to the limited amount of
authorised supply. Viewed in this way, it is thus not surprising for CISA to conclude that (its
regulated) supply was over demand in the iron ore market.

6.4.2.2. The supply and demand interpreted by Big Three
As the Big Three views the iron ore market as affected by the international macro-economic
and political environment, they also consider the corresponding global influence when it
comes to supply and demand. Contrary to CISA which delineated a general picture where
iron ore supply was over demand, the Big Three held the opposite opinion. For instance, even
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, Vale expected that China’s iron ore demand
would bounce back in mid-2009, as by then the country would run out of iron ore inventory
stock and also because other mining firms might not be able to meet China’s demand (Chen,
2008a). Tom Albanese, the CEO of Rio Tinto, also held the similar view that China’s weak
iron ore demand was only temporary as a result of the nation’s tightened monetary policy.
However, as the Chinese economy kept increasing at the annual growth rate of 8%-9%, and
alongside the implementation of new government policies, the demand would soon recover in
2009 (Chen, 2008a). Lu Jiucheng, the president of Rio Tinto Asia and China, explained that
the economic stimulus package by the Chinese government would continue to increase
(China’s) domestic steel demand, and thus the need for iron ore (Gold Bull Information, 20
May 2009).
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While being optimistic about the rising demand of iron ore (Deng, 2009a), the Big Three also
increased their iron ore supply accordingly by signing up the export agreement with China’s
small and medium enterprises. In other words, the supply of iron ore was no longer restricted
to the long term based contract only available to large size SOEs. For the first quarter of
2009, when Vale’s export to China hit a record high of 32 million tons, the firm’s senior
management explained that in the past Vale only sold iron ore to large size steel plants, these
days however the company began to sign contracts with medium and small plants. This was
because “as long as there is someone willing to buy, we are ready to sell” (Caijing, 27 April
2009). Furthermore, it was not just the long term based contract that was used by mining
firms to extend their supply. The short term based index price was also accepted by both
parties to the meet the rising demand for iron ore. In June 2009 when the annual price
negotiation was nowhere near its conclusion, BHP Billiton started to sign up iron ore
contracts with the Chinese private steel firms (Wan, 2009a). Rio Tinto also began to sell iron
ore to China’s spot market (Chen SS, 2009d). Vale as well expressed the same intention
(Wan, 2009a; Yu L, 2009b). Unsurprisingly, the Big Three continued to supply iron ore at
either the long term price earlier reached by Japanese and Korean firms or the short term
based spot price when the mining giants did not reach any result with CISA in the 2009
negotiation after July 1, the traditional start date for the new annual price (Jiao, 2009b; Li Q,
2009). Therefore, unlike the CISA which attempted to limit the supply and demand via
regulatory means, the Big Three seemed to open their door of supply to meet all types of
demand including SOEs and private buyers from different markets.

Underlying such distinction between the two is their attitude on the market supply and
demand equilibrium. That is, contrary to the statement of CISA which only acknowledged the
supply and demand figures approved by the association, and discredited all other
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unrecognised private arrangements, the Big Three, at least on surface, claimed to let the
market return to its supply and demand equilibrium. When no outcome was achieved by both
parties in the 2009 negotiation, the president of Rio Tinto Asia and China, Lu Jiucheng,
indicated that the company would wait till the market recovered to its normal state and then
began the rational conversation (with the CISA) (Caijing, 27 April 2009). In response to
CISA’s proposed 40% price cut, Zhu Kai, the president of Vale China, commented that “the
40% price cut is simply the expectation of the Chinese side, anyone can make expectations,
but in the end it is still up to the market to decide…the Chinese market has already shown
some signals of recovery, I believe its iron ore demand and thus import will continue to
increase in April and May” (Deng, 2009a). In rationalising the adoption of index pricing
during the 2010 price negotiation, BHP Billiton expressed its belief in the market in that the
new pricing mechanism meant handing over the price setting power to the market (DFdaily, 8
March 2010).

To summarise the Big Three’s discourse of supply and demand, they considered the term
from a macro-economic and political perspective which suggested that China’s economy and
government policies would boost steel demand and thus iron ore demand. With the optimism
for the rising demand, the Big Three lowered down the previous threshold for long term iron
ore contract and opened the door for short term based supply as well, which further
corresponds to their belief in the equilibrium where market itself would be able to adjust
supply and demand.
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6.4.2.3. The supply and demand interpreted by Chinese small and medium enterprises
As the small and medium enterprises primarily operate in a secondary market within China
where iron ore may have been sold a few times before reaching its end users who would
actually consume the product for steel production, their interpretation of supply and demand
is largely confined within that market.

On the one hand, in terms of supply, as the CISA and Big Three reached the stalemate in the
2009 negotiation, the iron ore supply for small and medium enterprises was no longer limited
to those re-sold by the major licensed SOEs, but also directly came from the Big Three via
either signing long term contracts or bidding in the spot market. In 2009 June when no result
was achieved in the negotiation by both parties, the Big Three began to sign up long term iron
ore contracts to those small and medium steel plants which, despite CISA’s condemnation,
took the opportunity to enter long run iron ore contract market (Zhang Yi, 2009f). At about
the same time, an increasing amount of iron ore also became available in China’s spot market
(Wang J, 2009c). Since 2009 April, as pointed out by a domestic iron ore trader, “the Big
Three took the initiative to charter ships sending iron ore to China. They even began the
shipment without firstly locating any buyer… in the past many small companies could not
order iron ore in large quantity due to limited capital. At present mining firms have loosened
the requirement so that they would deliver iron ore first, and collect payment later” (Su,
2009).

On the other hand, alongside the opened door to the long term as well as short term iron ore
supply from the Big Three came higher demand by the small and medium firms in three
aspects. First, the iron ore demand from small and medium plants kept increasing at all costs.
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When the Big Three first offered long term based contract to small players from the Chinese
industry, the cheap price stimulated the small players to import more than their actual
demand for steel production. “In fact, (we) do not need that many iron ore”, admitted by Liu
Wei, the general manager assistant of Tianzhu Iron and Steel Group (based in the city of
Tangshan), “the company is now operating at the full production capacity and using only the
imported iron ore. Its cheap price is the main reason” (Zhu, 2009). Another private steel plant
director also confirmed that “according to normal business logic, as long as I have the money,
why cannot I purchase as much as I can for the rest of the year when the price is low?”
(Wang J, 2009c).

The second factor that too pushed up the iron ore demand on the part of small and medium
plants was the small and medium size iron ore trading companies.
“While according to Big Three’s past principle long run iron ore contracts were not to be
made available to trading companies which did not engage in steel production activities,
now the Big Three just turn a blind eye to this issue. As long as the trading company
could sign up an agreement with even small size steel plants, then they would be able to,
in effect, enjoy the benefit of long term priced iron ore from Vale… (that is,) small steel
plants simply use their own name to import iron ore on the surface, with the actual
purchaser being the trading company underneath” (Zhang Yi, 2009f).

Subsequently, the trading company which purchased iron ore via these small and medium
steel plants resold the import to other small and medium firms in spot market (Zhang C,
2009a).

199

Chapter 6 Different Interpretations of Iron Ore Price—Identifying Modes of Production

Thirdly, even the licensed SOEs also began to privately import iron ore through the small
players when the CISA called for the iron ore boycott towards the Big Three (Zhu, 2009).
“many steel plants rather sold their products at a loss to maintain the cashflow and at the
same time borrowed funds from banks to increase the level of steel output, instead of
reducing it… their demand for iron ore is not low either. However, due to their sensitive
identity (as major SOEs and CISA member firms), many of them choose to delegate
import tasks to the trading companies and small firms” (Wang J, 2009c).

As opposed to CISA’s call, even these licensed firms justified their behaviour through market
supply and demand.
“Before the negotiation can be finished, CISA does not allow the Chinese steel plants to
purchase iron ore from the Big Three. However, that is not the solution, as the Chinese
factory could not survive without producing steel (which needs iron ore as the necessary
raw material). In addition, the entire second quarter gives the Chinese iron and steel
industry the best time and opportunity to recover production and profit. (Thus,) in from
of market interests, no single firm would like to stop everything as planned by the
CISA… I think there is only one simple principle for China’s iron ore negotiation. That
is, whatever belongs to market shall be determined by market. In front of the market,
enterprises will even reject the price cut if it renders them suffer losses, and may accept
the price increase if it results in profits” (Zhang XD, 2009a).

In fact, the overall rising, contrary to CISA’s attempted control over, supply and demand
within the gradually unleashed market environment in which small and medium enterprises
operated are rationalised by the belief in market mechanism. In other words, rather than
CISA’s claim that the supply and demand shall give way to iron ore negotiations, “it is
actually the market supply and demand that has determined the progress of the negotiation”
(Tao, 2009), said Xu Bin, the analyst of Anbound Group (a private consulting company).
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To summarise the supply and demand interpreted by the small and medium enterprises in the
Chinese iron and steel industry, the concept is affected by a multitude of factors. First, the
supply of iron ore primarily came from (1) long term contracts with the Big Three and (2)
purchases in China’s spot market. Responding to the increased availability of iron ore supply
in multiple channels, the demand was also dramatically increased. More specifically, three
groups’ demand manifested: (1) small and medium size steel plants which privately signed up
long run contracts with Big Three and / or purchased from spot market, (2) small and medium
iron ore trading companies which first imported from Big Three unofficially and then resold
the iron ore in spot market, and (3) licensed (large size) steel companies which secretively
purchased from small and medium enterprises.

6.4.2.4. Conclusion and discussion for the discourse of supply and demand
To conclude the above analysis of the supply and demand discourse, a clear distinction can be
drawn between the view held by CISA and those advocated by Big Three and the small and
medium enterprises. In the case of CISA, both supply and demand are contingent upon the
association’s approval where supply is limited to licensed firms (most of which are leading
SOEs in the industry) and demand confined to the level of steel production authorised by the
association. The cases of Big Three and the small and medium firms by contrast exhibit a
relatively less regulated concept of supply and demand in a more opened market
environment. That is, not only through the official import channel promoted by the CISA,
iron ore supply has also been made available in the short term based spot market as well as
via the long term based contract with those unlicensed small and medium enterprise in the
Chinese industry. Accordingly, the amount of demand is calculated based on the iron ore
purchase by all types of companies in the industry including major SOEs as well as small and
medium steel plants and trading companies. Such a belief in the market mechanism is thus
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one of the main reasons why the supply and demand interpreted by CISA differs significantly
from those understood by the other two groups (i.e. Big Three and small and medium
firms)—CISA champions a heavily regulated market whereas the other two groups believe in
a self-adjusting one. Viewed in this way, supply and demand seem to be mutually reinforcing
in that the increased supply attracts more demand which in turn further stimulates supply.

Having illuminated the commonality shared by the Big Three and the small and medium
firms, nonetheless, there does exist some differences between their understandings of supply
and demand. Firstly, the Big Three view from a macro-economic and political perspective to
justify the (potential) rising demand in the first place and then begin to proactively supply
iron ore in multiple channels in the second place, whereas the Chinese small and medium
enterprises, in a relatively passive manner, welcomed the increased supply on the one hand
and emphasised the increasing demand on the other. This may be further explained by the
second difference between the two groups. That is, the supply and demand chain in the case
of Big Three is relatively simpler in that iron ore is simply transferred from the seller (i.e. Big
Three) to the buyer (i.e. all types of firms in the Chinese iron and steel industry). In the case
of small and medium enterprises, on the other hand, iron ore supply must first be imported
from the Big Three in the upper stream and then can be traded for a few times among major
SOEs and the small players. The distinction here in the trading pattern can be attributed to
how the value of iron ore is perceived by Big Three and small and medium firms. In fact, the
CISA may also have its own interpretation of iron ore, given that the association simply
equates iron ore demand to steel production demand. Therefore, it is now to the discourse of
the value of iron ore that this analysis proceeds.
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6.4.3. Discourse of the value of iron ore
With the different interpretations of market and supply and demand from the three groups, it
is not difficult to deduce how each group would consider the value of iron ore. For instance,
as CISA emphasises the strong link between iron ore market with steel market, and between
iron ore demand with steel production demand, how the association views the value of iron
ore will also be closely related to steel products. Those small and medium enterprises which
engage in secondary transactions of iron ore, on the other hand, think of it as a common
commodity irrelevant to the steel market. The Big Three that take into account the global
macro-economic and socio-political atmosphere may also consider something otherwise. The
following sections are then dedicated to explore the discourse of the value of iron ore from
the three groups.

6.4.3.1. The value of iron ore interpreted by CISA
From the very beginning of the 2009 negotiation, the secretary general, Shang Shanghua,
indicated that there were more than 90 million tons of iron ore stock waiting to be unloaded
at China’s ports that were enough for (domestic) steel plants to consume till the end of the
first quarter in 2009. Thus, any proposed increase in iron ore price became meaningless
(DFdaily, 7 October 2008). Viewed in this way, it appears as if the only purpose of iron ore
is, as one of the major raw materials, to manufacture steels. CISA maintained this concept of
iron ore in the following two years. When the 2009 negotiation reached a stalemate, the
association used this argument to threaten the Big Three that the Chinese steel manufacturers
would be able to maintain their normal production level without importing iron ore for two
months, whereas the Big Three could not afford that (Gold Bull Information, 20 May 2009).
Even faced with the fact that for the first quarter of 2009 the nation imported in total 187
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million tons of iron ore, Shan Shanghua did not acknowledge the rising amount of import but
simply regarded it as an illusion on the ground that the actual iron ore consumption for the
steel sector was only 30 million tons for the period (Zhang Yi, 2009f). In other words, the
import which went beyond the actual consumption level contributed nothing but created a
non-existent market.

The association’s recognition of iron ore as the raw material for steel manufacturing and at
the same time the repudiation of it as a tradable commodity may perhaps be best exemplified
by the Rizhao event. Established in 2009 May, Rizhao International Iron Ore Trading Centre
(Rizhao Centre hereafter) was aimed at providing the third party intermediary services
including iron ore transactions and financing and would also launch the Chinese iron ore
price index—Rizhao Index. Two weeks later the CISA released an official announcement
which condemned the Rizhao Centre.
“Chinese market does not allow any speculation of the imported iron ore. Iron & Steel
Industry Adjustment and Revitalisation Plan (Plan hereafter) clearly states that iron ore
import must adopt the agency system and unify the price. However, there are now the
quoted price and the online transaction price that emerged in the (Chinese) iron ore
import market, and some particular regions established the iron ore trading centre (i.e.
Rizhao Centre), which already breached the policies required by Plan. Their activities
are clearly speculative in nature which would distort the market, and (thus) must be
stopped at once. The association called for an immediate disqualification from relevant
government departments” (China Business Times, 16 June 2009).

As a consequence, the CISA, together with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, and the
CCCMC, conducted an investigation on Rizhao Centre which indicated that the Centre’s
attempt to build an internationally advanced electronic trading platform as a world-class iron
ore e-market and establish the Rizhao Index as the bellwether of iron ore price the world over
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was beyond the Centre’s operation scope and resulted in significantly negative impact on
society. In the investigation report, CISA asked that
“the Trading Centre must publicly announce not to engage in any trade or transactions
involving iron ore import, not to publish the iron ore price or the price index; the Trading
Centre must undertake internal re-organisation, must be renamed… not to initiate any
‘speculative activities’ irrelevant to its business activities” (Zhou B, 2009).

In response, Rizhao Centre accepted all requirements set out by the CISA, and promised not
to engage in any iron ore transactions by any means (Xu YL, 2009g). Obviously, if the iron
ore transactions within China’s domestic market were considered irrelevant and speculative
as per CISA’s investigation, the purpose of iron ore really was limited to steel production.
This was then, with the insistence of the CISA, enforced through a series of semi-compulsory
regulations and standards including Suggestions on the Promotion of the Iron Ore Import
Agency System, Steel Industry Self-discipline Agreement on Standardising the Trade Order of
Iron Ore Import, and Iron Ore Importing Enterprise Assessment Criteria and Application
Procedure, most of which disavowed iron ore trade between trading companies and small and
medium steel plants.

To further eliminate the secondary market of iron ore as such, Luo Bingsheng, the executive
vice chairman of CISA, even suggested to the Ministry of Industry and Information at the
steel enterprise symposium in July that government abolish iron ore spot market transactions
in the nation. At the same time, the chairman of the association and the president of Wuhan
Iron and Steel (the fourth largest steel plant) proposed to restrain the number of iron ore
import licenses and also trace the distribution of the imported iron ore in the Chinese market
(Xu, 2009h). While the Ministry of Industry and Information did not give a straightforward
response to CISA’s request, the association’s call did confirm that the use and distribution of
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iron ore were simply confined to steel manufacturers. The next question that begs an answer
becomes what kind of iron ore price that CISA would consider as valid and fair.

As the association equated the demand for and the use of iron ore with steel production, it is
thus foreseeable / understandable that the price of iron ore was also closely related to that of
steels. Indeed, throughout the two year negotiations, CISA always emphasised the strong
correlation between iron ore price and steel price. From the beginning of the 2009
negotiation, Shan Shanghua, the secretary general, claimed that iron ore price must drop to its
1994 level which would then accord with the price level of steel in the Chinese market (Sina
Finance, 9 December 2008). Not surprisingly, underneath the concern with steel price was the
recognition of iron ore as the raw material of steel and thus as the cost of the steel inventory.
This is reflected in one of the three principles which the CISA insisted during the negotiation
was to maintain the balance between the production cost of the Big Three and that of Chinese
enterprises (Zhou Y, 2009a).

Also due to the fact that CISA viewed iron ore only as part of the raw material for steel
production, the price of iron ore must thus be long term based in much the same way as how
steel production budget should be prepared. In the debate of the long term contract based
price versus the short term index based price that followed the 2009 negotiation and climaxed
during the 2010 negotiation, CISA advocated the long term pricing mechanism which served
as an indispensable tool for cost control on the part of steel manufacturers. In opposing the
index price, Shan Shanghua pointed out that the short term based price was not favourable for
steel plants to organise their production schedule (Caijing, 27 April 2009) and cost control
(Yue & Zhou, 2009). That is, the use of long term price implies the identity of iron ore as the
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raw material for steel products on the one hand and the long term basis of its price on the
other. Similarly, this emphasis on the long term basis continued later in the association’s call
for the ‘Chinese price’ (Yue & Zhou, 2009) where Shan Shanghua claimed to establish a new
pricing mechanism based on China’s “own steel production demand” (Gold Bull Information,
12 June 2009).

To summarise the discourse of the value of iron ore, the CISA has literally confined the use
of iron ore as the raw material for steel manufacturing, which corresponds to the association’s
equation of iron ore demand with steel demand. Accordingly, the price of iron ore is
intimately linked with that of steel products. Furthermore, the long term price is preferred,
compared to the short term based one, and justified by the CISA in that long term based iron
ore contracts serve as an important tool for production schedule and cost control on the part
of steel plants.

6.4.3.2. The value of iron ore interpreted by Big Three
While the CISA, from the perspective of steel plants, considers iron ore simply as the raw
material for steel manufacturing, the Big Three on the other hand view their product as a
tradable commodity for sale which is subject to not only changes in steel demand but also the
immediate market movements and the macro-economic conditions worldwide.

As the producer and seller of iron ore, first of all, the Big Three by their nature regard iron
ore as a commodity which is not necessarily limited to long term sales agreements with steel
plants. For instance, the Big Three showed their intention to sell iron ore in China’s spot
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market when the CISA rejected the long term based price for 2009 initially agreed by Nippon
Steel. In 2009 June Vale for the first time publicly expressed its interest in selling iron ore in
the spot market (Xu YL, 2009i) and began to do so in the following month (i.e. July) (Cao,
2009a). Rio Tinto pointed out that for the 2009 financial year, already nearly half of the iron
ores that the company manufactured were sold in spot markets (Yu X, 2009).

Not only was iron ore traded in the spot market, it also became available for small and
medium size steel plants and trading companies, regardless of its use afterwards. For the first
quarter of 2009, Vale attributed its record high quarterly sales of 32 million tons in China to
the fact that the firm began to sell iron ore to small and medium size steel plants as well as
trading companies. “Usually, as long as someone is willing to buy, we are ready to sell” said
the senior manager at Vale China (Caijing, 27 April 2009). Viewed in this way, iron ore in
fact becomes a commodity, the value of which extends from simply the raw material for steel
production to a world recognised goods ready for sale to any willing parties. Indeed, in
promoting index pricing, BHP Billiton reiterated that the pricing mechanism had long been
adopted and applied in petroleum and coal industries worldwide (Liu, 2009), which thus
equated the attribute of iron ore to those of the other two global commodities. Jose Carlos
Martins, CEO of Vale, also rationalised the firm’s adoption of index pricing after its 2010
price negotiation with the CISA came to a dead end, that
“under the new pricing mechanism (i.e. index pricing)… iron ore will become a
commodity same as oil, copper, alumina, and soybean… there will be no blame and no
disagreement. It will be either buy or not buy; (iron ore) transactions will be made with
freedom” (21st Century Business Herald, 1 June 2010).
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If iron ore is considered as a tradable commodity, then it is not surprising that the Big Three
tend to price the commodity as per market conditions in the cases of both long term and short
term pricing mechanisms. During the 2009 price negotiation when the long term pricing
mechanism was at the verge of replacement, both Rio Tinto and Vale accepted the newly
agreed annual price (reached by Nippon Steel) on the ground that it was able to fairly reflect
market conditions (Yue & Zhou, 2009; Xu, 2009e). The argument for basing iron ore price on
market movements became even more frequently raised and advocated by the Big Three later
in the case of the short term based index pricing. First proposed by BHP Billiton during the
2009 negotiation, the mining giant claimed that the conventional annual pricing mechanism
which had last for the past 40 years was outdated (Lin, 2009), whereas the index pricing
mechanism was more reasonable as it would be able to constantly reflect market changes in
time (Liu, 2009). During the 2010 negotiation, Vale also justified its adoption of index
pricing in that the traditional long term price based on the annual bilateral negotiation
between buyers and sellers can no longer fit in the every-changing market conditions (China
Business Network, 6 May 2010), and the new pricing mechanism on the other hand was
totally suitable for the firm’s various clients across different markets and regions (Caijing, 24
March 2010). Specifically, Roger Agnelli, Vale’s global CEO, pointed out that index pricing
could enable market participants to perceive the future price of iron ore (21st Century
Business Herald, 1 June 2010). Sam Walsh, the executive director of Rio Tinto, also
indicated the firm’s interest in adopting index pricing so long as the new price would reflect
the basic conditions of market (Sina Finance, 24 March 2010a).

Of particular notice here is that the market condition on which iron ore price shall be based is
different from the interpretation of market by the CISA. While the Chinese industry
association equated iron ore market with the country’s domestic steel market on the ground
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that (1) iron ore was considered only as the raw material for steel production and (2) the
China was the largest iron ore purchasing market the world over, the Big Three on the other
hand took the global market into account where iron ore price was influenced by not only the
steel sector but also the micro as well as macro-economic and political conditions ranging
from international shipping index (Suo, 2009a; Deng, 2009e; Zhang C, 2009c) to government
economic stimulus package (Chen, 2008a; Gold Bull Information, 20 May 2009).

To summarise how the Big Three have considered the value of iron ore, the mineral product
is perceived as a tradable commodity, the purpose of which is not only limited to the
production use for steel manufacturing, but also in itself sets up a class of internationally
recognised goods in the similar nature to oil, copper, soybean, and other global commodities.
In other words, the exchange value of iron ore is preferred before its conventional use value.
Consequently, iron ore price is determined by market exchanges, in both long term and short
term bases, among the Big Three, major steel plants, and small and medium size steel plants
and trading companies, in the broad context of the global micro- and macro-economic
environment and socio-political milieu.

6.4.3.3. The value of iron ore interpreted by Chinese small and medium enterprises
Following their interpretations of iron ore market and the correspondingly supply and
demand relationship, the small and medium enterprise from the Chinese iron and steel sector
consider iron ore as a commodity whose function also extends beyond the production use for
steel manufacturing to commercial transactions between willing parties operating, in most
cases, secondary market. More specifically, largely due to the regulatory environment in the
Chinese industry as well as the nature of their business, the majority of the small and medium
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players had been unable to directly purchase iron ore from the Big Three for the immediate
use for steel production. As a consequence, iron ore was in the first place sold to these
companies through the ‘licensed’ firms at varying premium prices which, both directly and
otherwise, gave rise to the secondary market where the mineral product could be (re)sold for
a few times not as the raw material for steel but in the form of a common commodity.

It was not that relevant regulation did not exist to maintain the consistent interpretation of
iron ore’s value within the entire Chinese industry. As explained by Xu Tao, the vice
president of Tangshan Jianlong Co., Ltd (a small steel plant based in the city of Tangshan),
there was the iron ore import agency system introduced by the Chinese government which
prohibited the profiteering activities of those licensed importing companies that might
otherwise sell iron ore at higher prices to the small players (Economy 30 Minutes, 2009).
However, this regulation became a ‘dead letter’ that only existed in words not in practice.
Faced with the limited availability as well as the exorbitant price of iron ore from those
licensed importing companies, small and medium enterprises, rather than immediately
consuming iron ore for production, were also provoked to resell iron ore in order to either
transfer the huge cost burden to the next buyer or make extra profits or both. Geng Bingxi,
the deputy secretary general at China Chamber of Industry and Commerce for Metallurgical
Enterprises, pointed out that
“while satisfying their own production demand, some large steel enterprises usually sell
the extra iron ore import to make profits; subsequently, the medium and small companies
on the other hand resell the secondary imported iron ore in the domestic market, many of
which have been resold for more than one time” (Zhang C, 2009a).

In the second place, even the small and medium steel plants which bought iron ore from
major SOEs (i.e. licensed iron ore importer) or elsewhere did not put all of their purchase into
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steel manufacturing but rather stocked some, if not many, in warehouses waiting for the price
increase in the foreseeable future (Zhai, 2009). Gradually,
“the profits derived from reselling iron ore may become even higher than that made from
selling steel products. Relevant data shows that while the accumulated iron ore import in
our nation from January to May (in 2009) amounted to 242 million tons exhibiting a 26%
increase compared with the same period in 2008, steel sales for the entire industry for the
first quarter of 2009 however was only RMB 449.99 billion containing a 22% decrease
compared with the same period in 2008. Also, while the first quarter of 2009 experienced
a RMB 3.31 billion loss, the same period in 2008 witnessed a huge profit of RMB 44.16
billion. That is, in the context of the general depression of (China’s) domestic iron and
steel industry and the non-existence of the actual iron ore demand for steel production,
iron ore import keeps increasing. This can only mean that everyone, from steel plants to
trading companies, has been playing games over the raw material (i.e. iron ore). It must
be a lucrative business here, otherwise they would not be so into it”,

Said Jiang Qian, the chief researcher at the energy sector of China Investment Consulting
(Zhang C, 2009a). Such commodity attribute of iron ore became even more obvious in the
case of trading firms. Liu Zenglin, the president at Baoye group based in the city of
Tangshan, commented that
“while in theory the end user of iron ore should be steel enterprises, in practice this is not
quite so in the case of the trading companies who do not purchase iron ore for
production. Instead, they just consider the gap between the long term price and the spot
market counterpart, the higher the better. They do not actually consider whether or not
steel manufacturers in the lower stream could accept the raw material cost. So long as
you need iron ore, the bigger the price gap the better” (Economy 30 Minutes, 2009).

As such, reselling iron ore within China’s domestic spot market, which was supposed to be a
simple redistribution of iron ore import from licensed to unlicensed firms in the eyes of the
CISA, became a profitable business itself. Viewed in this way, similar to how the Big Three
perceived the value of iron ore, the small and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and
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steel sector also preferred the exchange value of the mining product compared to its use value
for steel production.

However, what distinguishes the small and medium firms from the Big Three in this regard is
the price of iron ore. Of course it is true that, as discussed earlier, both groups indicated their
belief in an efficient market which helps determine a fair and reasonable price for iron ore.
Nonetheless, the distinction here involves how the two groups interpret the concepts of
market and supply and demand. Recall from the previous discussion (in section 6.4.1.4.),
while the Big Three considered the world market as a whole and justified their action with
particular reference to the socio-economic factors both within and outside China, the small
and medium enterprises passively accepted the global trend on the one hand and engaged in
their own unique market within China on the other hand.

Given the above distinction, it is argued that while aligning the price of iron ore with those of
other global commodities such as oil and copper and acknowledging the influence of BDI
index, the Big Three actively promoted the latest index pricing mechanism the world over. In
contrast, the Chinese small and medium enterprises acted more in a relatively passive
manner, accepting whichever type of price available in the market. For instance, when the
Big Three could not reach the price agreement with the CISA in 2009 and began to lower
down the threshold for long term based contracts, China’s small and medium firms welcomed
the change and accepted the long run price subsequently (Caijing, 27 April 2009; Deng,
2009e; Zhang Yan, 2009). As iron ore was made increasingly available in spot market (Su,
2009), the small and medium players were even more willing to purchase. A private steel
manufacturer explained that
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“in the past because we did not have the license to buy the long term contract based iron
ore, and had to purchase from the spot market with higher prices; at present the spot
market price is lower than the long term price… according to normal business logic, as
long as I have money, why is it not allowed to purchase all the iron ore that we need for
the whole year at the low price?” (Wang J, 2009c).

While the index pricing mechanism was being promoted by the Big Three, these small and
medium companies viewed the proposed forthcoming change as the good news for two main
reasons. In the first place, as they had been unable to share the long term contract based price
with their SOE counterparts in the past but had to accept the exorbitant price of the secondary
iron ore charged by those SOEs, whether or not the annual price negotiation would result in a
favourable price to China remained almost irrelevant (Economy 30 Minutes, 2009).
Subsequently, they were more concerned with spot market price instead, which was
nonetheless significantly higher, in most of the time, than the long run based price that only
their SOE counterparts were able to use. However, as the idea of index pricing was
increasingly raised and discussed by the Big Three, the indifference on the long term price
became a zeal for the index one. This was because, in the second place, the small and
medium firms believed that by adopting the index price they would be able to compete with
their SOE counterparts in a fair manner. Overall, their apathy on the long term price, passive
acceptance of the spot market price, and enthusiasm towards the index price were explained
by a small steel plant in Tangshan,
“as long as the (long term price) negotiation outcome is confirmed, whether or not the
resulting price is substantially increased has no meaning for us… basically we can only
purchase iron ore from spot market. Therefore, even though the spot price rises to 150
USD / ton, we will still accept the price, so long as our clients can take the price increase.
This is the case for many small and medium size firms in Tangshan. When they cannot
compete with large steel makers in terms of raw material costs, it is then only a matter of
cost control and management effectiveness for each firm to improve their profitability.
However, if the index pricing, which is more flexible, is realised, small and medium steel
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plants will be able to adopt the new pricing mechanism much quicker and sooner than
large size companies” (Sina Finance, 22 March 2010).

Shen Wenrong, the chairman of Shagang group (the largest private steel plant) also
commented on the index price that “as it is a product of market economy, it is thus neither
good nor bad. We can only learn how to embrace it…we cannot just ignore it simply because
it is unfavourable to us. Instead, we should further study and investigate index pricing and
how it will affect us” (Li RX, 2010b).

It is also of particular interest to note that the small and medium enterprises did not always
passively accept whatever price offered by the three major international suppliers. The
Rizhao International Iron Ore Trading Centre, for instance, was founded in mid-2009 with
the aim to not only providing the intermediary service for iron ore transactions but also
launching the Chinese iron ore price index—Rizhao Index. However, the Centre was shut
down two weeks after its establishment, due to what the CISA considered as the speculative
nature of the business (China Business Times, 16 June 2009). Thereafter, the small and
medium enterprises could only accept the pricing mechanism from the global market and,
following CISA’s failure in resisting index pricing, adopted the quarterly index price.

To summarise the value of iron ore interpreted by the small and medium players in the
Chinese iron and steel sector, this group regarded the mineral product not only as the raw
material for steel production but also a commodity available for sale and resell. Thus, in
relation to the value of iron ore, both the value in use and the value in exchange are
considered, with the latter taking precedence over the former. While trading iron ore as
commodities within China, the pricing mechanism that small and medium enterprises have
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adopted follows whatever is offered to them by the Big Three in the market, under the
administrative constraint imposed by the CISA.

6.4.3.4. Conclusion and discussion for the discourse of the iron ore value
To conclude the above analysis of how the value of iron ore is perceived by the three groups,
the purpose and price of the mineral product are revealed and explored corresponding to each
group. For the CISA, in line with the association’s emphasis on steel market, iron ore is
considered only as the raw material for steel production, the price of which depends on the
value in use and thus is determined by the demand for steel production. On the other hand,
both the Big Three and the small and medium size firms in the Chinese iron and steel
industry consider the mineral product more in the nature of a commodity rather than that of
the raw material for steel manufacturing. This is because: on the part of the Big Three and the
Chinese trading companies, it is the nature of their business that treats iron ore as a tradable
commodity for sales; on the part of the small and medium steel plants, the unique context of
the Chinese iron and steel sector has led them to engage in the reselling of the iron ore which
were supposed to be consumed for steel production. Nonetheless, the distinction between the
Big Three and the small and medium firms rests on their perceptions of the iron ore price.
While both believing a market-based price, the former aligns the identity of iron ore with
other international commodities and therefore takes the lead to promote the index price, and
the latter plays a relative passive role in accepting prices offered in the market.

Having put forward the discourse of market, supply and demand, and the value of iron ore on
the parts of (1) the CISA, (2) the Big Three, and (3) the Chinese small and medium
enterprises, attention should now be turned to the respective mode of production on which the
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discourse of the three groups is based. After all, it is the underlying mode of production
which constitutes and conditions the corresponding discourse (Marx & Engels, 1974).

6.5. Respective modes of production to each group
As illustrated in chapter four, the modes of production considered in this thesis include
production, commerce, and finance. In particular, their respective capital movements are
explored, with the first two (i.e. productive and commercial capital) comprising the circuit of
industrial capital. For instance, the movement of productive capital begins with the purchase
of human labour and the means of production and ends with the finished goods ready for sale.
Commercial capital involves the ex ante purchase and the ex post sale of commodities.
Financial capital lends money to industrial capitalists at first and receives the principal plus
interest income afterwards. Granted, it is naïve and unrealistic to narrowly define any of the
enterprises represented by the three groups analysed above as productive, commercial, or
financial capitalists, given the increasing involvement between financial and non-financial
sectors in modern corporations (see e.g. Orhangazi, 2008). The major Chinese SOEs
represented by the CISA, for example, may also engage in some financing activities in
addition to the primary focus on steel manufacturing. Therefore, it is necessary to pointed out
that the following analysis simply concerns the mode of production which the three groups
adopted, both consciously and otherwise, to constitute their discourse regarding the price of
iron ore.
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6.5.1. Mode of production by CISA
Following CISA’s interpretation of market, supply and demand, and the value of iron ore, a
relatively closed circuit of productive capital can be perceived in Figure 6.7 below.

Starting from the purpose of iron ore, the CISA assigned the mineral product (C) simply as
the means of production (MP), that is, the raw material for steel (C’) manufacturing. The
price of iron ore is thus intimately linked with that of steel products. This also justifies the
Chinese association’s confinement of iron ore supply and demand to the level of (domestic)
steel output (C’). As such, iron ore, once has been imported from the Big Three at the price of
M, must be converted immediately from commodity (C) into the means of production (MP).
Coupled with the input of human labour (L), the production means (MP) is then turned into
steel products (C’) available for sale at the price of M’, when the production process (P) is
completed. Given such a direct transformation of iron ore (C) into steel product (C’) and that
China is the largest importer of iron ore in the world, the Chinese steel market naturally
becomes the major determinant for the global iron ore market. The whole process /
movement is facilitated and enforced through relevant administrative procedure and
regulatory requirement introduced by both the CISA and other government departments.

While these regulations are set out to, in theory, prohibits any reselling of iron ore in the
country (except those authorised by the iron ore import agency system), they are nevertheless
not well implemented in practice which has led to the emergence of an unofficial market
where iron ore becomes a tradable commodity among the small and medium enterprises in
the Chinese iron and steel sector. Thereafter, the next question becomes which mode of
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production that these firms use to construct, rationalise, and reinforce their discourse over the
price of iron ore, and in particular the transaction of secondary iron ore in the domestic
market. The following section is thus directed towards this end.

6.5.2. Mode of production by Chinese small and medium enterprises
Unlike the CISA, the small and medium size trading firms and steel plants in the Chinese iron
and steel sector not only consume iron ore for steel production but also sell the mineral
product to make profits. More importantly, considering the unique market where these small
and medium players resell iron ore for profits, it is the commodity attribute of iron ore
underneath their discourse regarding the mineral product’s price. In other words, iron ore is
treated as a commodity (C), purchased first by the small and medium enterprises from either
domestic or overseas suppliers at the price of M, and sold later to other market participants at
the price of M’. The movement of capital can be illustrated in Figure 6.8 as follows.

Admittedly, not all of the iron ores bought by the small and medium steel plants was
subsequently sold to other companies for profits. However, the fact that at least some of these
iron ore were put into steel production in the first place does not render the small and medium
players into the category of productive capitalists, as Marx indicated
“(s)hould merchant’s capital (i.e. commercial capital) yield a higher percentage of
average profit than industrial capital, then a portion of the latter would transform itself
into merchant’s capital. Should it yield a lower average profit, then the converse would
result…No species of capital changes its purpose, or function, with greater ease than
merchant’s capital (i.e. commercial capital)” (Marx, 1959, p.190).
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Therefore, it is argued that, in relation to the sale and resale of iron ore, the small and
medium enterprises are considered as commercial capitalists. Moreover, also shown from the
above quote is that these firms choose to operate in the circuit of commercial, rather than
productive, capital because of higher profit they could achieve by selling iron ore than they
would have otherwise realised from consuming the mineral product in steel production.
However, what is still not certain here is whether or not there exists any limit on the selling
price of iron ore (M’) which encourages or discourages the productive and / or commercial
activities in question. Recall from the discussion in section 6.4.3.3. regarding the price of iron
ore, it has been illustrated that the Chinese small and medium firms follow whatever price
offered by the Big Three, including the long term benchmark price at first, the spot market
price latter, and the index price at last. Now the concern becomes to what extent the Big
Three influence the commercial capitalists on the selling price of iron ore (M’).

6.5.3. Mode of production by Big Three
First of all, it is relatively easy to discern that, as the world’s major manufacturer and supplier
of iron ore, the Big Three play the role of industrial capitalists comprising both productive
and commercial activities, which is depicted in Figure 6.9 below.

While seemingly combing the circuit of capital from the production and commerce
demonstrated above (in Figures 6.7 and 6.8), it is noteworthy that, unlike the CISA (in Figure
6.7) which treats iron ore as the means of production, the Big Three here being the industrial
capitalist (as in Figure 6.9) regard iron ore as the finish goods manufactured and available for
sale. That is, the three major iron ore suppliers spend the initial capital (M) to purchase
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commodity (C) including human labour (L) and the relevant production means (MP) for the
production (P) of iron ore (C’), which will then be sold at the price of M’. Having described
the circuit of industrial capital on the part of the Big Three, however, attention should now
return to the different types of capital movement between the Big Three and the Chinese
small and medium enterprises. This is because while, by simply judging from Figures 6.8 and
6.9, both groups do act the same role of the commercial capitalist who makes profit by selling
iron ore, there does exist, as discussed earlier, the distinction in the pricing mechanism of
iron ore.

Recall from the broader circulation of productive, commercial, and financial capital outlined
in chapter four, it is argued that the participation of financial capitals will affect, and thus to
some extent limit, the way in which the surplus value (i.e. unpaid labour) is distributed. Then
the question becomes whether or not the pricing mechanism promoted by the Big Three falls
into the category of the financial capital that confines the profitability of the commercial
capital. To this end, there is a need to revisit the concept of index pricing initially proposed
by the Big Three.

While there were three types of iron ore index including Metal Bulletin Iron Ore Index
(MBIO index), The Steel Index (TSI index), and Platts IODEX (Platts index) when BHP
Billiton raised the idea of index pricing in 2009, it is the Platts index that has been adopted by
the Big Three as a result of the 2010 negotiation. According to Platts, the index serves as a
“benchmark assessment of the spot price of physical iron ore” (Platts, 2015a). In particular,
acquired through instant messaging software, telephone, email, and fax, the data assessment
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of Platts index involves a wide range of real time market information on a daily basis
including
“confirmed trades, firms bids that are open to the marketplace as a whole… firm offers
that are open to the market place as a whole… expression of interest to trade with
published bids and offers… indicative values… reported transactional activity heard
across the market… (and) other data that may be relevant to Platts assessments, such as
supply/demand fundamentals and other factors affecting the price of a particular
commodity” (Platts, 2015b, p.3).

Noticeable here is Platts’ inclusion of bids, offers and expression of interest to trade which
are by no means the actual transactions in the physical iron ore market, but exhibit
considerable resemblance to those of the financial market. Furthermore, rather than giving
priority to the physical market transactions over the bids and offers in the calculation of the
index, Platts in fact adopts the opposite treatment. That is,
“(f)irm bids and offers that are available to the entire market take precedence over trades
that have been concluded earlier in the assessment process when establishing the value of
the market… firms bids and offers that are available to the entire market take precedence
over transactional activity reported to Platts after the fact” (Platts, 2015b, p.5).

This is where the distinction in the so called market based pricing between the Chinese small
and medium enterprises and the Big Three manifests itself: while the former operate in a
commercial market where iron ore price is determined via spot transactions (as in Figure 6.8),
the latter in reality price the steelmaking ingredient largely in accordance with the virtual
transactions through bids and offers. Therefore, unlike the Chinese commercial capitalists
who first use money (M) to purchase iron ore (C) in order to sell it later at a higher price
(M’), the index price promoted by the Big Three acts more in the nature of a financial
capitalist who does not necessary engage in the actual trade of iron ore but simply invests a
certain amount of money (M) with the expectation of higher returns (M”) afterwards.
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The identity of financial capital as such is further confirmed through an array of financial
derivatives which derive their value from the Platts index as the underlying instrument. These
include the forward contracts traded by investment banks, equity funds, trading companies,
and private investors (Chen SS, 2009d), as well as the paper swaps offered by Platts itself.
Assessed and published on monthly, quarterly and annual bases, the iron ore swaps are
defined by Platts as “risk management tools which allow users to lock in values by
transforming floating price risk to fixed or fixed to floating… trade(d) freely in an over the
counter market … at any time” (Platts, 2015b, p.11). Moreover, Platts also points out the
distinction between physically-settled transactions and the financially-settled (through swaps)
ones: “in the first case the buyer would take delivery of a cargo of the product, while in the
second case the buyer would pay (or be paid) the difference between the swap price and the
average of Platts’ iron ore cargo assessments in (the period concerned)” (Platts, 2015b, p.11).
This corresponds to the different capital movement between commerce and finance
illuminated in the previous paragraph. While the circuit of commercial capital is illustrated in
Figure 6.8, the financial capital counterpart is presented in Figure 6.10 below.

Thus, the financial capitalists begin with bids, offers, contracts, swaps, or other financial
derivatives at the price of M, as “risk management…(or) speculative tools” (Platts, 2015b,
p.11), and sell the instruments later for M”, “hedged using positions in the financial
derivative market” (Platts, 2015a).

Having assigned the role of financial capital to the index pricing of iron ore promoted by the
Big Three, the mining giants themselves in fact also exhibit substantial and close relationship
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with the global financial capitalists. As illustrated in chapter four (see Tables 4.1-4.6), most
of the top 20 shareholders at the Big Three come from financial markets. More specifically,
more than 60% shares of BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto are in the hands of financial capitalists,
some of whom hold the shares at both firms at the same time. These include HSBC as the
largest shareholder of BHP Billiton as well as Rio Tinto, J.P. Morgan the second largest, and
other financial institutions such as Citicorp, Sate Street, Capital Group Companies, and The
Bank of New York Mellon Corporation which also hold significant amount of shares at the
three mining companies.

Taking the shareholding connection between the Big Three and the financial sector into
consideration, the broad movement of financial capital emerges in Figure 6.11.
Figure 6.11 Broad movement of financial capital reflected by Big Three

In phase one, M – M, shareholders from the financial sector invest M in the Big Three which
then in phase two utilise the money (M) as the productive capitalist to purchase labour force
(L) and means of production (MP). When the manufacturing process (P) in phase three is
completed and iron ore is subsequently sold in the fourth phase at the price of M’ realising
the profit of ∆M, the profit is then either allocated as dividends (M”) that flow back to the
financial capital or retained as the reinvestment (iM) in the mining corporations in phase six.
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In addition, the entangled web does not stop within the Big Three but expand to the field of
iron ore pricing. In fact, some of the major shareholders of the Big Three including the Union
Bank of Switzerland and the Deutsche Bank were among the first to launch financial
derivatives based on the price of iron ore back in 2008 (China Economic Times, 13
November 2008). More importantly, there also exists close relationship between the financial
sector and the publisher of the iron ore index price, Platts (see Figure 4.1). First, the parent
entity of Platts, McGraw Hill Financial Inc., comes from the financial sector. And,
surprisingly still, McGraw Hill also shares the same group of financial conglomerates with
the Big Three, including Capital Group Companies, State Street, The Bank of New York, and
so forth. Of particular interest to note is Black Rock. Not only is the company the second
largest shareholder of McGraw Hill, the third largest shareholder of Rio Tinto Plc, and the
fourth largest shareholder of Vale, but it is also the largest shareholder of HSBC, J.P.
Morgan, and Citigroup which are as well the top three shareholders at BHP Billiton and Rio
Tinto.

To summarise the two aspects of financial capital movement illustrated above, the financial
sector has to a large extent penetrated the global iron ore market in relation to (1) the index
pricing mechanism from which relevant financial derivatives derive; (2) the publisher of the
index (i.e. Platts); and (3) even the Big Three themselves. It is therefore the role of financial
capital which the Big Three have played, and in particular adopted as mode of production
underlying their discourse, in negotiation the index price of iron ore with the CISA.

With the modes of production identified respectively on the parts of (1) the CISA, (2) the
small and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry, and (3) the Big Three,
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the concern becomes how the three modes of production interact with one another, in order to
answer the research question as to why the CISA, as represented by the productive capital,
failed in its attempt to resist the expansion of financial capital in the Chinese iron and steel
sector. Specifically, considering such a high level of penetration of financial capital into the
Big Three in particular and the global iron ore market at large in which the traditional
productive and commercial capitalists operate, another issue remains unanswered is whether
the financial sector will be the “driving force in its (capitalist) development to its highest and
ultimate form” (Marx, 1959, p.433) or the “most potent means of driving capitalist
production beyond its own limits, and one of the most effective vehicles of crises and
swindle”

(ibid).

These

shall

be
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In chapter six, the accounting discourse as to the pricing mechanism of iron ore between the
Chinese iron and steel industry and the Big Three are analysed. The corresponding modes of
production underneath the discourse are identified with particular reference to respective
groups. That is, in relation to how the iron ore price should be, the CISA defended the long
term contract based price from the perspective of a productive capitalist; the small and
medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry accepted whichever type of price
offered in the spot market in which they operate as commercial capitalists; and the Big Three,
with their intricate connection with the financial market and in particular with the publisher
of the iron ore index, promoted the index price from the financial capitalist’s point of view.

In this chapter, the investigation explores the inter-relationship between these three modes of
production informed by Marx’s theoretical framework outlined in chapter four. In particular,
the way in which the interaction among the three groups is analysed consistent with the
second level of the analytical method illustrated in chapter five. In other words, if, say,
chapter six has identified the corresponding modes of production for the CISA, the small and
medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry, and the Big Three based on the
respective discourse during the negotiations, the current chapter then examines the interaction
among the three by situating them in the context of civil society where the movement of
productive, commercial, and financial capital transcends the nations and states. From the
perspective of the capitalist mode of production, the emergence of first the commercial and
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later the financial capitalists in the Chinese iron ore market is explored through the
interaction of the three groups, bear in mind the research question of the thesis as to why the
Chinese iron and steel sector failed in resisting the wave of financialisation.

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The first section (7.1.) revisits Marx’s
explanation of the interaction among production, commerce, and finance in the context of the
global iron ore market. In particular, the inner connection among the productive, commercial,
and financial capital is presented, and the question raised in the end of chapter six as to
whether finance contributes or compromises production and commerce is addressed. At the
same time, the contributing factor of the shifts in iron ore pricing from the long run contract
based price, to the spot market price and ultimately the financialised quarterly price is
discussed, consistent with Marx’s view that the change in mode of production originates from
the conflict between productive forces and social relations. The second section (7.2.)
compares CISA’s interpretation on financialisation with that of Marx, in order to appreciate
why the Chinese association failed to resist the financialised pricing mechanism of iron ore.
Specifically, CISA’s view on the proposed solution to financialisation in the Chinese iron and
steel industry are explored, alongside the corresponding discussion of Marx’s opinion on the
subject. A conclusion is drawn in the final section (7.3.).

7.1. Interaction of production, commerce, and finance in the Chinese iron ore market
As illustrated in chapter four, the capital movements of production, commerce, and finance
are in fact interrelated where the financial capital flows first to the hands of the commercial
capital, through to the productive capital which transforms labour and production means into
commodity ready for sale, and finally returns back to finance from the profit realised by the
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commercial capital when the sale is made. In terms of the actual practice of such circuit of
capital, the case of Big Three illuminated in chapter six accords with the capital movement
here. Also mentioned in chapter four is the seemingly paradoxical relationship between the
financial and the productive and commercial capitalists in that the higher the profit is
extracted by one party, the less will be left with other parties. While this might be the case
where a traditional industrial capitalist borrows money from a financial capitalist and pays
interest expenses, as the reduction from total income, to the latter, however this is not quite
the case with the Big Three. This is because the financial capital, which in such case refers to
the international financial conglomerates including HSBC, J.P. Morgan, Citicorp, State
Street, etc., have in fact become the major shareholders of the Big Three who are regarded as
productive and commercial capitalists. Therefore, at the manifest level the reallocation of
profits among them is no longer a result of the antagonistic relation among the industrial and
the financial capitalists, but the natural outflow of dividends from the former to the latter.

In other words, it is not even the conflict between different fractions within the capitalist
class, considering the legitimised distribution of dividends to company shareholders.
Moreover, the participation of financial capital in the index publishing organisation (i.e.
Platts) (see Table 4.7) further aligns the interest of the global mining giants with that of the
financial sector. Such an alliance between financial and non-financial capitalists effectively
expands beyond the boundaries of any nation which is considered by Marx as the subordinate
of capitalist mode of production (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.79). Thus, taking the global
economy as a whole which the Big Three have always emphasised throughout their discourse
of the iron ore price (see for example Xu YL, 2009e) and which the Platts index is claimed to
be not origin specific (Platts, 2015a), capital, as Marx (1959, p.172) argued, will naturally
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flow to whichever sector that extracts the highest surplus value, which in this study points to
the Chinese iron and steel industry. Indeed, as exemplified in chapter six, in supporting the
price increase and promoting the index of iron ore, the Big Three kept referring to the strong
potential of the Chinese steel market and the nation’s economy as a whole (see for example
Chen, 2008a; Caijing, 27 April 2009; Gold Bull Information, 20 May 2009; Yan, 2009;
Zhang C, 2009b; Miao, 2010; Ming, 2010; Sina Finance, 24 March 2010b, 8 May 2010).

In fact, not only the Big Three, some of the financial capitalists including the major
shareholders of the Big Three also expressed their optimism in the thriving iron ore market
primarily boosted by the Chinese demand. For instance, in the beginning of the 2010
negotiation (i.e. 2009 December), when the CISA found little room for mining companies to
increase the iron ore price, Morgan Stanely, the top 10 shareholder of McGraw Hill Financial
Inc. (i.e. the parent entity of Platts), already expected the price to go up by 20% in the
forthcoming year and stay on the upward trend for the subsequent two years by 30% and 10%
respectively (Chen SS, 2009c). In the early March of 2010 when the CISA refused to accept
the potential 50% price increase proposed by the Big Three, Morgan Stanley report even
adjusted its previously expected price increase to 60% (Jiao, 2010b). At about the same time,
J.P. Morgan, the top 5 shareholder of BHP Billiton Limited and Rio Tinto Limited, and the
top 20 shareholder of Vale S.A., estimated that the raw material cost of steel would be
increased by more than 200% (Global Times, 9 March 2010).

Similarly, the Union Bank of Switzerland, the top 10 shareholder at BHP Billiton Ltd, Rio
Tinto Ltd and Rio Tinto Plc, also estimated a 20% price increase in early 2010 (Sina Finance,
14 January 2010) and then raised the rate to 40%-50% a week later (Wang J, 2010b).
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Deutsche Bank, in the meantime, the top 20 shareholder of Rio Tinto Plc and McGraw Hill
Financial, anticipated the price of iron ore to raise by 35%, on the basis that the global iron
ore supply in 2010 would be less than the demand (DFdaily, 14 January 2010). Following
other investment banks’ prediction, Goldman Sachs, the top 20 shareholder of Vale S.A., also
adjusted the expected price rise to 35% in 2010 January (Wang J, 2010b).

So far have been discussed the legitimised redistribution of profit from the productive and
commercial to the financial capitalists, and the incentive of capital movement from the
financial market to the conventional industrial sector. While these may be explained by
Marx’s view on regulation that “the law has always been compelled to admit (the new forms
of capitalist production) among the modes of acquiring property” (Marx & Engels, 1974,
p.81), and his interpretation of the sole purpose of capital, what remains uncertain here is
whether financialisation of the international iron ore market contributes or compromises the
traditional iron and steel industry. That is, in chapter four, it is only illuminated in theory
where Marx (1959) points out that finance could be either a driving force in (capitalistic)
development” or “one of the most effective vehicles of crises and swindle” (p.433). The
following section thus carries on the unfinished discussion in chapter four, coupled with the
practicality of the global iron ore market, in order to flesh out the investigation in both theory
and practice.

7.1.1. Productive vs. Commercial Capital in the case of the Chinese iron ore market
First of all, to illustrate how financial capital may assist and in itself become the capitalist
mode of production, there is a need to revisit, in the context of the international iron ore
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market, the broad capital movement of production, commerce, and finance outlined in
chapter 6 (see Figure 6.11).

To begin with, commercial capitalists purchase iron ore (C’) as the finished goods from the
productive capitalists, most of whom are in this case the Big Three. Admittedly, it has been
recognised in both the extant literature (e.g. Stockhammer, 2004; Orhangazi, 2008) and
previous chapters (four and six) that contemporary industrial capitalists such as the Big Three
have been increasingly involved in not only productive but also commercial and financial
activities. However, the discussion here concerns the interaction among different fractions of
capital, rather than the relation between individual capitalists which has been in fact
extensively explored in chapter four and six. Thus, it is decided to leave the multiple
identities of the Big Three (as productive, commercial, and financial capitalists at the same
time) out of consideration. To continue the discussion, as the iron ore is passed from
productive to commercial capitalists, so is the duty of selling it. In this regard, the productive
capitalist, as argued by Marx (1959), will function more efficiently in that the process of
converting iron ore into cash can be shortened through the commercial capitalist serving as
the intermediary selling the mineral product on the former’s behalf. As such, the producers of
iron ore will be able to “constantly employ a larger portion of… capital in the actual process
of production, and a smaller portion as money reserve (to purchase labour and the means of
production)” (ibid, p.186).

Moreover, when assisting one group of productive capital in becoming more efficient, the
same commercial capital is also able to help other groups of manufacturers on the same
industry chain in such a way as to “expedite the opposite phases of the metamorphosis of
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commodity-capital” (p.203). In the case of the global iron ore market, for instance, the iron
ore trading companies best exemplified such a role. More specifically, the relationship among
one commercial capitalist and two productive capitalists within the related industrial branch
is depicted in Figure 7.1 below. On the one hand, these iron ore traders first purchase iron ore
from the Big Three who are then enabled to realise their profit, that is, to complete the final
phase of the movement of industrial capital C’ – M’ (as outlined in the phase 1). On the other
hand, when the iron ore traders sell the steel making ingredients to the steel manufacturers,
the former also promotes the latter to convert monetary capital into the means of production
via M – C (MP) (as outlined in phase 2).

While the relationship between production and commerce illuminated thus far indicates that
the latter promotes the former in theory, in the actual practice of the Chinese iron ore market
the attitude towards the commercial transactions of iron ore does vary among the Big Three,
the small and medium enterprises, and the CISA.
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7.1.1.1. Big Three’s lean towards commercial capitalists
First of all, consistent with their role as the financial capitalist identified in the end of chapter
six, the Big Three took the initiative to trade with the commercial capitalist, which, in this
case, purports to the small and medium size Chinese steel plants and trading companies. This
was initiated by the conflict in the social relations between the Big Three and their Chinese
customers. In the beginning of 2009, Vale withdrew from the iron ore price negotiation, on
the ground that whilst it was the first of the Big Three to reach the annual price (which
contained a 65%-71% price increase) during the 2008 negotiation, the ‘initial price’ was not
followed by Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton which subsequently came with an even higher price
(which contained a 85% price increase) (Wang J, 2009d; Cao, 2009c). Two days after Vale’s
announcement, Rio Tinto also told the press that the firm would stop the negotiation until
market conditions recovered (Cao, 2009c). This was partly because the plunged iron ore
demand as a result of the GFC (He, 2008), and partly due to the fact that the 2008 long term
price based contract was not implemented very well on the parts of the Chinese buyers who
did not honour the contract but turned to the spot market at a lower price than the contract
one instead (Caijing, 27 April 2009).

Thus, in the absence of the agreement with the CISA on the new annual price, the traditional
form of the social intercourse between the Big Three and their Chinese clients (i.e. the
licensed steel plants and trading companies) was not implemented. Sam Walsh, the chief of
Rio Tinto’s Iron Ore division, even indicated that, if the firm could not reach the annual price
agreement with the CISA, the firm would, according to relevant terms and conditions,
terminate the contract with its Chinese clients (Wang J, 2009a).Compared to Vale and Rio
Tinto, BHP Billiton showed the least interest in the annual price negotiation, as the company
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kept promoting the index pricing since the beginning of the year (Liu, 2009). In the Chinese
iron and steel industry, on the other hand, it was not only the major SOEs that needed to
purchase iron ore, but also the small and medium steel plants which resumed and increased
their level of production since the end of 2008 due to the Chinese government’s economic
stimulus package (Chen, 2008b; Cao, 2009c; Li JL, 2009b).

As such, from Marx’s perspective (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.87), there existed a contradiction
between the traditional annual pricing mechanism (as the old form of social relation that was
not working) and the increased iron ore demand from China’s steel plants (as then the current
productive force). The conflict remained so until April when the Big Three began to use a
temporary price (which contained a 20% discount) to satisfy the demand of the Chinese
market. In May, Vale turned to the small and medium firms in the Chinese market in order to
maintain and increase its level of production (Deng, 2009e). In June, the firm had already
signed up sales contracts with 38 small and medium size firms for nearly 50 million tons of
iron ore, which accounted for more than half of Vale’s annual sales in 2008 (i.e. 85 million
tons) (Zhang Yi, 2009f). At about the same time, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto also began to
sign up contracts in private with the small players (Zhang Yi, 2009f; Chen SS, 2009e). As the
2009 price negotiation reached a stalemate and did not finish by its traditional due date (i.e.
30 June), the Big Three further opened their door to all Chinese buyers via the spot market
since 2009 July (Cao, 2009a). That is, the mining giants all took the initiative to charter ships
delivering iron ore to China, even before locating any specific buyers (Su, 2009). As such,
iron ore was in effect no longer simply the raw material (MP) for steel manufacturing but
became a commodity (C) also available for commercial transactions.
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Moreover, in addition to the traditional merchandise of iron ore, BHP Billiton also promoted
the index pricing to the private steel plants in China (Wan, 2009a). Compared to the
conventional annual pricing mechanism as the old form of social relations between the Big
Three and their global clients, the index pricing was considered by the mining giant as the
next solution, since it would be more transparent and thus deliver a smoother channel of
communication to clients (Deng, 2009c; Tang, 2009). By the end of July, while Rio Tinto and
Vale claimed to use either the newly settled annual price by the Japanese and Korean steel
plants or the spot price in dealing with the Chinese market (Han, 2009a; Yue & Zhou, 2009;
Li Q, 2009), BHP Billiton announced that 30% of the group’s total iron ore sales for the 2009
financial year would be based on a mixed pricing model that combined quarterly, spot, and
indexed prices (China News Service, 29 July 2009). The partial adoption of the index price, it
is argued, heralded the era of the financialised pricing mechanism in the global iron ore
market. Before proceeding to the discussion of the financial capital concerned in this case, it
is necessary to also explore the attitude of China’s small and medium size enterprises on the
interaction between production and commerce.

7.1.1.2. Chinese small and medium enterprises’ shift to commercial capitalists
In response to the opened door of the Big Three, the second group, that is, the small and
medium firms, welcomed the offer. Specifically, they considered it as the opportunity to
fairly compete with the SOEs which resold the imported iron ore to them at exhibitive prices
in the domestic market and which were thus considered as ‘an exclusive club joined by the
rich and wealthy’ in the Chinese iron and steel industry (Li RX, 2010a).
“in the past, the long term contract price is always lower than the spot price, the large
firms made huge profits from it (selling iron ore to small and medium enterprises),
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whereas the small firms did not share anything from that. This was particularly so last
year (i.e. 2008) when the iron ore spot price increased to RMB 1590 / ton that was RMB
400-500 / ton higher than the long term contract price. At that time those large size firms
with long run contracts did not share any iron ore with us to support our development,
and even sold their cheaply imported iron ore to us at higher prices… Now the market
has changed, (small and medium size firms) wanted to grab this opportunity to join the
‘long run price mechanism’” (Zhang Yi, 2009f).

In other words, the emergence of the commercial transaction of iron ore in China’s spot
market served as the solution to the conflict between: (1) the traditional form of social
relation between the small and medium enterprises and their state-owned counterparts (where
the latter, through political advantages, imposed higher raw material costs on the former); and
(2) the potential productive force of the former. To state it simply, on the one hand, the
licensed iron ore importing steel plants and trading companies (most of which were SOEs)
had long been taking advantage of the exclusive access to the seaborn iron ore market by
profiteering from reselling their import to the small and medium size players in China’s
domestic market. On the other hand, under the pressure of being merged with their stateowned counterparts, these small and medium enterprises needed to purchase an increasing
number of iron ore so as to maintain their level of steel output and thus avoid the industry
wide M&A (Wang J, 2009c). Thus, participating in the commercial trade of iron ore not only
enabled these firms to purchase iron ore at cheaper prices but also gave them, fundamentally,
an equal access to the market of seaborn iron ore. In Marx’s term (Marx & Engels, 1974,
p.87), the mode of production in China’s iron ore market was thus advanced from traditional
productive arrangement to commercial transactions.
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Gradually, even after Japan and Korea had settled the new annual price with the Big Three
and the CISA had not, an increasing number of small and medium firms in the Chinese
market adopted in private the newly agreed offer from the Big Three (Li XH, 2009). In the
first place, for those small and medium size firms which did not have the contract based
supply from the Big Three at the time, they would rather purchase from their peers (i.e. the
small and medium companies which had bought iron ore from Big Three in private) at lower
prices than from the licensed SOEs (Zhang C, 2009a). In the second place, not only the small
and medium firms that bought iron ore from their peers, even some of the licensed SOEs,
which could not meet the production demand by their own contracted amount, engaged in the
trade of the secondary iron ore with the small players (Zhu, 2009; Zhang XD, 2009a).

While this type of iron ore transactions among the small and medium enterprises was not
officially approved by the CISA, the steel plants involved claimed that their production level
was increased thanks to these iron ore trades. That is, consistent with Figure 7.1 which
depicts the improved efficiency of the productive capitalists at both ends of the industrial
chain facilitated by the involvement of commercial capital, the small and medium enterprises
in the Chinese iron and steel sector for the first time served as commercial capitalists, thanks
to the opened door of the Big Three, and thus contributed to the efficient operations of both
iron ore suppliers on the upper stream and steel plants on the lower steam. In 2009 July, Vale
announced a 59 billion USD investment in iron ore mining programmes for the next five
years (from 2010 to 2014), increasing the firm’s iron ore production capacity from 296
million tons in 2007 to 422 million tons in 2012. While Brazil’s national iron ore output level
was estimated to rise to 475 million tons by 2012, its Australian equivalent was expected to
grow to 460 million tons (Dong, 2009c). At the same time, the Big Three also indicated that
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their iron ore production was at the full capacity (Xu YL, 2009e). At the other end of the
industrial chain, the growth in the output level was also, if not more, evident. That is, China’s
small and medium size steel plants were at full production capacity to take advantage of the
newly available iron ore in the domestic market (Zhu, 2009) and to fundamentally maintain
and even expand their market shares (Wang J, 2009c; Zhang HY, 2009b). According to the
report published by China’s General Administration of Custom, for the first half of 2009 the
small and medium steel plants and trading companies were able to import iron ore directly
from the Big Three thanks to the lowered threshold of minimum purchase, and thus operated
much better than those large size steel plants (Zhang Yan, 2009).

As the number of companies entering into the commercial transactions of the secondary iron
ore kept increasing, the establishment of Rizhao International Iron Ore Trading Centre
symbolised perhaps the climax of the iron ore trade among the privately-owned small and
medium companies in China’s domestic market. The centre was jointly founded in 2009 May
by the five privately owned companies59 based in the city of Rizhao (China National Radio,
26 June 2009), the largest iron ore importing city in China. It was aimed at providing third
party intermediary services for iron ore transactions, financing, and so forth (China Business
Times, 16 June 2009). More importantly, the centre would also launch the Chinese version of
the iron ore price index, namely the Rizhao Index. However, within less than a month the
centre was shut down and asked to undertake significant restructuring and to rename the
organisation by the CISA. Thus, the attempt to shift to the financialised pricing mechanism
by the country’s very own organisation, the Rizhao Centre, was stifled in its cradle. Before
59

These include Shandong Wanbao Group, Shandong Huaxin Group, and Rizhao Zhongrui Group, each of which holding
30% of the centre’s shares, and two other companies each holding 5% shares of the centre (China National Radio, 26 June
2009).
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discussing the rationale behind CISA’s suppression on the centre’s potential involvement
with the financial sector, attention should now be given to the association’s attitude towards
the emergence of iron ore commercial transactions.

7.1.1.3. CISA’s repudiation of commercial capitalists
While the Big Three turned towards the small and medium size companies which transferred
the traditional role of iron ore from the raw material for steel production to a tradable
commodity for resale, the CISA as the third group analysed from chapter six took a
completely different point of view. That is, the industry organisation always opposed the idea
of the secondary transaction of iron ore in China’s domestic market, and thus prohibited the
unlicensed iron ore trading firms (most of which are small and medium enterprises) from
importing and trading iron ore. For instance, in response to the private iron ore trade that first
emerged in the beginning of 2009 between the Big Three and the small and medium firms,
Shan Shanghua, the secretary general of CISA, formally declared that “these firms have
neither the authority nor the qualification to sign the long term iron ore contract, even they
had signed up the so called ‘contract’, it would not be able to go through custom, (and so)
would be nothing but a piece of wastepaper” (Gold Bull Information, 12 June 2009).

To stop the ‘unqualified’ trade as such, the CISA not only formed investigation team with the
corresponding government departments such as the Ministry of Commerce to supervise the
nation’s domestic market, but also introduced and attempted to impose relevant standards and
regulations onto the Chinese iron and steel industry, in order to officially obliterate any
commercial transactions of iron ore in China’s domestic market. Subsequently, the only
channel in which the small and medium size firms could purchase iron ore was through a
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limited number of licensed importers, most of which were major SOEs, at the pre-designated
agency fee of 3-5%.

While dismissing the commercial transaction of iron ore in the domestic market, the CISA
also disavowed the improved capacity of steel production, resulting from the iron ore trade as
such, in the Chinese iron and steel sector. In 2009 July, the CISA revealed that China’s
domestic steel production hit a record high in the first half of the year, which was nonetheless
based on the overcapacity mostly at the small and medium steel plants nationwide (Xu YL,
2009f). Thus, the increase in the level of steel output was considered as the obstacle to close
down the obsolete production capacity as well as the contributing factor to the illusionary
iron ore demand from the Chinese iron and steel industry (Xu YL, 2009c). Consistent with
the CISA, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce also lambasted this type of production
overcapacity (Han, 2009c) and asked that China’s steel enterprises not to launch any new
projects within the next three years (from 2010 to 2012) (Yangcheng Evening News, 14
August 2009). Similarly, the Ministry of Industry and Information also regarded the
production capacity increase as one serious issue significantly impeding the healthy
development of the Chinese steel sector (Zhou RX, 2009b).

Having pointed out CISA’s refutation of both the newly emerged commercial market for iron
ore and the resulting increased level of steel output, one wonders then why the CISA, in the
mentality of a productive capitalist (i.e. manufacturing steel) as identified in chapter six,
failed to adapt to the emergence of commercial capital whereas the Big Three, as another
group of productive capitalist (i.e. manufacturing iron ore) on the same industrial chain,
succeeded? Moreover, to lift up the regulatory veil of the CISA and take a closer look at the
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productive capitalists (i.e. the state-owned steel manufacturers) which were supposedly
represented by the industry association, another question poses: given the sole purpose of
capital, according to Marx (1959), as to extracting the highest profit wherever possible, what
had made these steel plants stay within the purview of the productive capital? Before
answering these questions, there is a need to first finish the discussion here on the interaction
among production, commerce, and finance. Since the current section only concerns the
relationship between the productive and the commercial capital in the context of the Chinese
iron and steel sector, the following section is thus dedicated to explore the connection
between the commercial and the financial capital.

7.1.2. Commercial vs. Financial Capital in the case of the Chinese iron ore market
While facilitating the sphere of productive capital, movement of the commercial capital per
se can also be accelerated through the participation of financial capital. That is, the
commercial capitalist does not have to first spend the actual money (M) to purchase iron ore
(C) and sell it later at the price of M’ as per the conventional movement of commercial
capital outlined in Figure 6.8. Instead, the traditional merchant can perform both activities
simultaneously: she or he buys and sells the commodity at the same time. The capital
movement then shifts or evolves from M – C – M’ (see Figure 6.8) to M – M’ (see Figure
6.1060).

60

In the original formula, M” is used in Figure 6.10, rather than M’, in order to differentiate the income (M”) distributed to
financial commercial to the one (M’) realised by commercial capital. However, to illustrate the shift from commercial to
financial capital, the same M’ is used to represent the income obtained by the commercial capital which in effect evolves to
financial capital.
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In the case of the financialised pricing mechanism of iron ore, the transition from commercial
to financial capital is reflected in the assessment of the Platts index. That is, based on the
“daily transaction value of seaborne iron ore sold in the spot market imported into China”
(Platts, 2015c, p.1) which involves the actual trade of iron ore (i.e. the traditional M – C –
M’), Platts also takes into account “bids that are open to the marketplace as a whole… offers
that are open to the marketplace as a whole, (and) expressions of interest to trade” (Platts,
2015b, p.3) which do not necessarily require the physical trade immediately but simply
enables the nearly simultaneous purchase and sale of iron ore. That is, in the latter scenario, if
the same party first takes the bid and then, before receiving the actual iron ore, sells the offer
to other parties, the capital movement becomes M – M’.

In the practice of the iron ore market, an evolved form of the M – M’ movement arises from
the application of financial derivatives. For instance, iron ore swap contracts are developed
and used by investment banks (Chen SS, 2009d; China Economic Times, 13 November 2008)
and even Platts itself, which allows the counterparties to exchange a series of cash flows (M)
at a certain point in time. Thus, the ex ante purchase and the ex post sale of the iron ore do
not necessarily have to occur on the same day to complete the movement of financial capital
(i.e. M – M’); the use of financial derivatives provides capital investors with longer time to
receive their return (M’). As such, iron ore is viewed beyond a simple commodity but
becomes an underlying item, equipped with the same self-expanding capacity of money, or
rather, capital (M), from which M’ derives effortlessly. More importantly, since the iron ore
is now characterised as money, and because the use value of money refers to its selfexpanding capacity (Marx, 1959, p.255; see also section 4.3.1.), the use value of iron ore can
also be shifted from manufacturing steel to creating more money straightaway independently
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of the actual steel production. This is what Marx (1959) considered as the “meaningless form
of capital, the perversion and objectification of production relations in their highest degree…
(and) a mystification of capital in its most flagrant form” (ibid, p.256).

Furthermore, to enable the continual purchase and sale of iron ore requires the sufficient
amounts of market participants as well as the corresponding start-up capital, which might not
have been possible, according to Marx (1959), were it not for the introduction of the credit
system. That is, the fairy tale goes on and becomes better via the use of credit, even in the
absence of the immediate commodity transactions, to the extent that, so long as the
commodity is sold within the designated credit term, even the initial capital M is no longer
needed. Functioning in such a way, the commercial capital will then be able to better perform
its own duty as to “promote the productivity of industrial capital, and its accumulation”
(Marx, 1959, p.189). Also, the shift from commercial to financial capital, in particular, has
relieved the former from its reliance on the actual monetary amount with the help of the
credit system that enables the latter to operate with the increasingly less portion of capital. In
Marx’s (1959) own words, “(t)he more rapid the process of reproduction, and the more
developed the function of money as a means of payment, i.e., the more developed the credit
system, the smaller that portion is in relation to the total capital” (p.189). Consequently,
regardless of how much the traditional industrial capital (i.e. production and commerce)
accounts for within the total circuit of capital, financial capital may still operate and gradually
take the precedence over the former.
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Having illustrated the evolved form of capital movement from the conventional commercial
transaction to financial derivatives in the case of the iron ore pricing mechanism, what
follows is how the three groups concerned in the case responded to such a shift.

7.1.2.1. Big Three’s promotion and adoption of financialised price
As discussed chapter six, BHP Billiton was the first among the Big Three to propose the idea
of index pricing back to 2008 (Xu YL, 2008), which was said to provide the basis of the shift
from long term contract pricing to flexible pricing and thus save time for both parties at the
negotiation table (Chen SS, 2009d). Also mentioned in the previous section is that BHP
Billiton achieved the partial application of index price (i.e. 30% of its iron ore sales) as at the
end of the 2009 price negotiation. In the beginning of 2010 the firm announced that, as a
result of the unsettled iron ore negotiation between the Big Three and the CISA in 2009
(Dong, 2009b), nearly half of the firm’s clients had turned to the short term based index price
(Zhang Yi, 2010a).

However, despite the partial adoption of index price as well as the emergence of the spot
market for iron ore, the fundamental contradiction remained between Big Three’s social
relation with the Chinese market and the corresponding productive force since the breakdown
of the 2009 negotiation between the Big Three and the CISA. That is, in relation to the social
relation between the mining giants and their Chinese buyers, on the one hand, there existed
two types of market for mining companies to export iron ore—the long term contract based
and the spot market, both of which encountered problems.
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First, in addition to the significant price difference between the two markets where the price
of the former was much lower than that of the latter (Economic Information Daily, 10
November 2009; Ma, 2010b; DFdaily, 11 February 2010), the Big Three had generally lost
the interest in continuing the long term price based contract. Rio Tinto claimed that “for the
past three to four years, the long term contract based price had already deviated from its spot
market counterpart” (Zhou XY, 2010). Vale even argued that the traditional long term pricing
mechanism had “completely failed” (Chen SS, 2010b). This was (1) partly because that their
Chinese clients did not honour the long term price based contract in 2008 when the spot
market was much cheaper than the long term one as a result of the GFC, and so those buyers
would rather incur penalties for the breach of contract and traded in the spot market (Caijing,
27 April 2009; Economic Information Daily, 29 December 2009; Yang LM, 2010b); and (2)
partly because they did not even reach any annual price agreement with CISA for 2009,
which prevented them, at least on the surface, from trading with China’s major SOEs. In
particular, Rio Tinto may perhaps be the one out of the Big Three that was least likely to
reach the annual price agreement with China, due to the industrial espionage event. That is, in
2009 July, Stern Hu, Rio Tinto’s chief representative at the annual price negotiation, with
three other employees at the firm’s Shanghai office, were under the arrest of the Chinese
State Security Bureau, charged with bribing the internal staff of China’s steel plants, stealing
China’s national secrecy, and thereby resulting in serious and substantial damages to China’s
economic safety and national interests (Sun, 2009a). Consequently, the firm’s meeting with
China’s major SOEs had to be cancelled and the general negotiation went into a stalemate
(Zhang HY, 2009a). It was not until 2010 February that Rio Tinto appointed Ian Bauert as the
new CEO at the firm’s China office, to replace the vacant positon of Stern Hu (Yuan, 2010b).
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Secondly, China’s spot market too was not without its issues. The CISA stepped in the spot
market and announced to punish and disqualify those Chinese enterprises which privately
signed up sales contract with the Big Three based on either the long term price or the spot
price (Economic News, 30 June 2009; Xu YL, 2009i). While the association attempted to
deter the Chinese buyers from trading in the spot market, it also to a certain extent contained
the sales volume at the Big Three. Thirdly, in addition to the long run contract based as well
as the spot markets, there was potentially another market which the CISA strongly promoted
within China so as to regulate the ‘chaotic’ order in the Chinese iron and steel industry. This
was called the ‘unified price’ exclusive to China’s domestic market, which was another form
of the long term contract based price only attached with more stringent criteria to the Chinese
buyers. In particular, the CISA specified that all Chinese firms, both state-owned and private,
both large and small, and both steel plants and trading companies, must obey the Iron & Steel
Industry Adjustment and Revitalisation Plan issued by the State Council and follow the
unified price nationwide (Zhang Yi, 2009g; Yue & Zhou, 2009). However, considering the
considerable difference between the long term price and the spot market one, as well as Big
Three’s explicit apathy (Zhang C, 2009b, 2009d), the so called unified price was highly
unlikely to be realised, not to mention the amount of time and effort involved in settling
down first the conventional long run price.

On the other hand, in relation to Big Three’s productive force, their level of iron ore
production exhibited significant growth compared to last year, in the belief that China’s iron
ore demand would increase substantially, and the rest of the world economy could recover
gradually (Yang Y, 2009a; Beijing Business Today, 21 January 2010). For instance, Rio
Tinto indicated that its iron ore production for the third quarter of 2009 hit a record high of
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47.5 million tons (Zhou & Zhang, 2009). At about the same time, BHP Billiton too showed in
its quarterly first report that the firm’s iron ore output also hit the record high of 30.1 million
tons for the third quarter of the year (Yang Y, 2009a), which was replaced by its own fourth
quarter equivalent at 32.45 million tons (Lu, 2010). Vale pointed out in 2010 March that its
iron ore sales volume in 2009 reached a record high of 140 million tons and the firm’s
existing level of iron ore production could not meet the market demand (Wang J, 2010a). In
fact, all of the Big Three held the view that the demand of iron ore from the Chinese market
in particular would keep increasing at a fast pace, which was the main reason behind the
increase in their level of iron ore output (Wan, 2010b; Chen SS, 2010a). However, standing
in the violent contrast with the rising iron ore demand and the increased level of iron ore
output was the time consuming long term price negotiation which had not been settled since
2009. Thus, the Big Three argued that the present pricing mechanism which lacked of both
transparency and flexibility needed to be changed to survive (Chen SS, 2010a; Yu L, 2010g;
Global Times, 9 March 2010).

Taking Big Three’s social intercourse with the Chinese market and their rising productive
forces into account, the financialised quarterly index price came into existence as the solution
to the conflict between the two, that is, the shift in the mode of production from commercial
to financial activities. For one thing, in relation to the social intercourse between the buyers
and sellers, the index pricing, according to the Big Three, would be more transparent and
smoother so as to avoid the direct conflict and hostility between the buyer and the seller at the
traditional closed door meeting every year such as Rio Tinto’s industrial espionage event
(Deng, 2009c; Tang, 2009). This was pointed out by Clinton Dines, the former CEO at BHP
Billiton China office, that
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“one thing which has always been ignored in iron ore price negotiation is that the intense
argument and hostility between buyers and sellers do not exist in negotiations for other
commodities. (This is because) the pricing mechanism for other commodities is more
mature and transparent. While commodity prices have ups and downs of course, overall
each party shows their trust and recognition in the global pricing mechanism. In the iron
ore market, however, there is no any single party or organisation that totally trusts the
benchmark pricing mechanism (i.e. long term contract based pricing). (Because) this
mechanism lacks of both transparency and flexibility, and it is only treated as the tool to
get a head start in the negotiation. Every year both the buyers and the sellers spend a lot
of time and energy on negotiating iron ore price. As a result of the negotiation, both
parties become upset and even angry, and correspondingly the international relations are
negatively affected” (Yu L, 2010g).

Jose Martins, the CEO of Vale, shared the similar view that
“under the new pricing mechanism, the conflict between suppliers and purchasers could
finally be avoided… There is no one criticising the price, (and) there is no disagreement
either. It will be either buy or not buy, that is, transactions are made with freedom” (21st
Century Business Herald, 1 June 2010).

As such, the index pricing came as the remedy for the conflict, since it would be, as claimed
by BHP Billiton, determined by the market, which is also consistent with natural laws of
economics (Liu, 2009). Further, the use of index price leaves no room for both parties to
break the contract which some Chinese buyers did in 2008 when the spot market was much
lower than the long term contract based price (Deng, 2009c; Yang LM, 2010b). In fact, as
argued by Vale, such type of distinction between the spot price and the long term contract
price could be flexibly dealt with by the new pricing mechanism (Wang J, 2010a) in which
the price changes according to the market change (Ye & Qin, 2010).

For another, in terms of the change in productive forces, the index price, according to Rio
Tinto, would serve as the determining factor for the firm’s future production scheme (Zhou
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XY, 2010). Rio Tinto further pointed out that, aside from iron ore suppliers, the buyers would
also benefit from the predictability of the new pricing mechanism (Chen SS, 2010b). In a
similar vein, Roger Agnelli, the global CEO of Vale, indicated that the quarterly index
pricing model could provide both parties on the supply and demand chain with a certain level
of transparency enabling everyone to perceive the future price movement. For steel plants in
particular, the new mechanism would help cost control and inventory management (21st
Century Business Herald, 1 June 2010). Looking at the productive force of the society in
general, Vale argued that the quarterly index price was capable of providing continuous and
important information to market participants including both mining companies and steel
plants, facilitating the market equilibrium and contributing to the greater wellbeing of the
global economy and social prosperity (China Business Network, 6 May 2010).

It is against this background which the shift from traditional annual contract based price to
the quarterly indexed one took place, with the emergence of spot market price playing a
transitional role that dissolved the former. Prior to the 2010 annual price negotiation, in
addition to BHP Billiton which announced to partially apply the index pricing, Vale also
indicated that it was willing to shift to the spot index price in the following year (Xu YL,
2009i; Yue, 2009). In a similar vein, Rio Tinto also expressed its interest in the short term
based index price in the hope that the new price would become the real benchmark in the
market if the entire industry were to adopt it (Sina Finance, 24 March 2010a). Subsequently,
in the beginning of May 2010, the Platts IODEX was officially adopted by the Big Three and
steel plants as the benchmark index for the third quarter of 2010 (Zhu, 2010c).
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Viewed from the perspective of capital movements as interpreted by Marx (1959), this can
then be explained by (1) the Big Three’s opened door, in the first place, towards nearly all
types of buyers, whether state-owned or privately invested, and whether large or medium and
small, in the Chinese market, which shifted the previously productive capitalist to the
commercial capitalists, and (2) in the second place the gradual adoption of index pricing that
transformed the movement of commercial capital to that of financial capital.

Further, while it is demonstrated earlier in Figure 7.1 that the movement of commercial
capital facilitates the movements of different branches of productive capital on the same
industrial chain, the involvement of financial capital, which shortens the M – C – M’ process
to M – M’, seems to render its productive counterparts even more efficient. Thus, the
interaction depicted in Figure 7.1 between the two productive capitalists via the same
commercial capitalist (i.e. M – C – M’) can then be simplified as the one between the
productive capitalists via their own financial activities (i.e. M – M’). This is presented in
Figure 7.2 as follows.
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Unlike the movement of commercial capital depicted in Figure 7.1 which requires two phases
to firstly purchase the commodity (C) from one productive capitalist as the finished goods
(C’) and secondly sell to the other as the means of production (MP), the transfer of the
commodity in Figure 7.2 facilitated by the involvement of financial capital only takes one
step. That is, once the two productive capitalists reached the price agreement via the
intermediary channel of the financial capital (i.e. M – M’), the commodity (C’) is soon
shifted to the other end of the industrial chain as the raw material (MP). As such, the time
consuming process that previously the commercial capitalist had to undertake is replaced by
the immediate transfer of commodity among productive capitalists themselves. In the case of
the new pricing mechanism of iron ore, this is rendered possible through the constantly
updated index price which takes into account the bids and offers in real time (Chen SS,
2009d).

Similarly, the Big Three, in promoting and justifying the use of index price, reiterated, in line
with the index publishers (Caijing, 27 April 2009), that the new price would be able to bring
common interests to both mining firms themselves and steel plants (Zhang Yi, 2010a; China
Business Network, 6 May 2010) in relation to continued investment and improved efficiency
(Wan, 2010a). In particular, this would be achieved through the smoother communication
(Tang, 2009) between buyers and sellers offered by the new pricing mechanism delivering
bids, offers, and expression of interest to trade in real time. Moreover, as market data are
constantly updated via the index price (China Business Network, 6 May 2010), the Big Three
claimed that, compared to the traditional annual closed door price negotiation, the index
pricing mechanism could reflect market changes in real time (Liu, 2009; Sina Finance, 24
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March 2010a) and is thus more transparent (Deng, 2009c; Gold Bull Information, 29
September 2009; 21st Century Business Herald, 1 June 2010).

So far it has been illuminated how the Big Three responded to the shift in iron ore
transactions facilitated by the previous commercial to then the financial capital.
Correspondingly, the mining conglomerates’ interpretation of market, supply and demand,
and the identity of iron ore has also been added with the attribute of finance. This is because,
since the movement of commercial capital (i.e. M – C – M’) is replaced by that of the
financial capital (i.e. M – M’), while the latter does help shorten the process of the iron ore
purchase and sale, and thus improve efficiencies at both end of the transaction, it also at the
same time poses potential challenges which may disturb and distort the normal operation of
productive capital. For instance, as the financial transactions increasingly take precedence
over the actual transaction between productive capitalists in the financial market, the price of
iron ore will no longer be based on the physical supply of and the production demand for iron
ore, but highly likely be overstated by the supply and demand of financial capital. That is, in
the absence of the actual transfer of commodity on the part of the financial capitalist, the
purchase and sale of iron ore increasingly takes on an independent role which focuses on the
seemingly self-expanding capacity of capital: the demand for iron ore depends less on the
level of steel production from productive capitalists, but more on how much investment
return it immediately generates and / or how much risk it mediates when it is sold to financial
investors; accordingly the supply accounts for not only the physical inventory but also the
offers and contracts available in financial market.
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Furthermore, the introduction of financial derivatives based on the index price of iron ore, as
well as the lowered threshold to enter the market via the credit system would then attract
more investors to the game of finance, divorced from the industrial chain of the iron and steel
sector, exhibiting the mystified self-creating magic of capital (i.e. M – M’ which has been
demystified in both chapter four based on the theoretical framework of Marx and chapters six
and seven referring to the case of the index pricing mechanism of iron ore). Viewed in this
way, the previously illustrated capital movement (in Figure 7.2) in which productive
capitalists complete the immediate purchase and sale of commodity through the channel of
financial capital would then be directed to the other way around where financial capital
becomes the subject and productive capital the object. This is depicted in Figure 7.3 below.

Unlike Figure 7.2 that presents the idealised scenario where the movement of financial capital
(i.e. M – M’) serves as the intermediary in the interest of productive capital by enabling the
continual purchase and sale of iron ore, Figure 7.3 delineates a different picture. After placing
the purchase order to the iron ore suppliers in phase 1 at the price of M, the financial
capitalist does not have to find any productive capitalists. Instead, he or she may simply
transfer the right of receiving the commodity to other investors in the financial market at the
price M’. Subsequently, the second investor may also sell the right to the next buyer with a
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higher price M”. The process of reselling goes on so long as someone in the financial market
is willing to buy. Eventually, in phase n, steel manufacturers as the productive capitalist on
the lower stream accept the final price (Mn) of the iron ore which has been traded among
financial capitalists for n times and the actual iron ore is then shipped to the physical
manufacturing entity correspondingly. If the above scenario really is the case, the CISA’s
resistance against financialisation is not without sound theoretical support. As iron ore would
then be traded for the purpose of directly receiving greater capital afterwards, which Marx
(1959) labelled as the “perversion and objectification of production relations in their highest
degree” (p.256) independently of steel manufacturing.

However, before discussing whether the shift to index price in the 2010 negotiation will
contribute or compromise the global iron and steel industry, it is necessary to first fulfil the
purpose of the current section (7.1.2.) as to explore the transition from commercial to
financial capital in the case of the Chines iron ore market. Having illustrated how the Big
Three justified their adoption of the index price, the following is thus concerned with the
response to the new pricing mechanism on the parts of the small and medium enterprises in
the Chinese iron and steel industry.

7.1.2.2. Chinese small and medium enterprises’ acceptance of financialised price
As a result of the unsettled annual price negotiation between the CISA and the Big Three in
2009, the small and medium companies in the Chinese iron and steel industry began to sign
up iron ore contracts in private with the Big Three using either the long term fixed price or
the spot price. Once the iron ore were imported, the small and medium firms were able to sell
their purchase to other parties in China’s domestic market, exhibiting the feature of a
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commercial capitalist. The movement of commercial capital on the parts of the small and
medium firms climaxed near the end of the 2009 negotiation, attempting to merge itself with
the financial market by establishing the Rizhao Centre and introducing the Rizhao iron ore
index. While the centre was quickly shut down by the CISA with the assistance of the
Ministry of Commerce and the CCCMC, the seed of financialisation nevertheless sprouted
from the other end, serving as, in Marx’s terms (Marx & Engels, 1974), the solution to the
conflict between the social relations and the corresponding productive force.

On the one hand, regarding the form of social relations where the small and medium firms
interacted with other market participants and the CISA in particular, despite that many
Chinese companies began to enter in the commercial transactions of iron ore since 2009, the
question of fairness remained in two aspects. The first refers to CISA’s attempt to eliminate
spot transactions in China’s domestic market, which was not realised as planned by the
association but turned towards the opposite end. That is, the fact that the regulatory control
imposed by the CISA only suppressed both the iron ore trade and the index price on the
surface has in reality provoked more participants to engage in the reselling of iron ore. This is
because, as explained by the manager at one private trading company,
“the result of the ‘tight regulation’ (in the domestic iron ore market) is that the import
license is becoming increasingly valuable, and thus brings more profits deriving from
rent-seeking… (companies) without the import license have to find a licensed importing
firm as an agent when they need to import iron ore, and need to pay a significant amount
of money as commissions. Normally, when the number of licensed firms is reduced (due
to CISA’s tighter control), the amount of commission that the unlicensed firms have to
pay is increased correspondingly… instead of calling it as the agency fee or commission
expense, it is rather something from reselling. (This is because) when the iron ore was in
a high demand, the price that they (i.e. licensed firms) sold us with was 1.5-2 times more
expensive than the original price” (Deng, 2009c).
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Gradually, the increased number of iron ore trade in China’s domestic market, partly
motivated by CISA’s proposed tighter regulation, became an obstacle to fair market
competition in that while some firms were able to import and sell iron ore to make profits,
others were not (Deng, 2009c). Therefore, the small or medium firms, and particularly those
with no direct access to Big Three’s iron ore, felt unfair and called for the abolishment of the
agency system.

The second aspect of unfairness resided within other small and medium firms which did
have, in private, the access to import iron ore from the Big Three. While being capable of
selling the steel making ingredient in the spot market, they too faced with the issue of
fairness. That is, as both the number of traders and the amount of iron ore kept increasing in
China’s spot market, large size corporations, most of which were SOEs in the Chinese
context, gradually dominated the commercial transactions. This later became conspicuous in
the beginning of 2010 when iron ore price skyrocketed in China’s spot market. Sun Qijun, a
private iron ore trader based in Qingdao revealed that “the biggest promoters behind the sharp
increase of spot price are Sinosteel and China National Building Materials Group. These two
SOEs imported tens of million tons on the one hand and then stockpiled the import on the
other” (Deng Y, 2010a). Based on its stable source of iron ore supply and the close relation
with other major steel plants in China, Sinosteel rationalised its import of iron ore in large
quantity as to follow the overall market trend with the aim to achieve the cost leadership
advantage. However, the private trader indicated that, as the bid price offered by Sinosteel
and China National Building Materials was beyond the range that the small and medium
enterprises could afford, a significant amount of iron ore were ‘being accumulated’ by the
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two SOEs which then pushed up the spot market price accordingly (Deng Y, 2010a). As a
consequence of the increased spot price, the newly opened door of the commercial market,
insofar as the small and medium enterprises were concerned, seemed to gradually turned
towards the SOEs which took advantage of their sufficient amount of capital to monopolise
the purchase channel therein (Zhou XF, 2010a). As such, in addition to the unequal access to
the contract based iron ore, what was also unfair was the potential monopoly of SOEs in the
spot market, an area which the small and medium size firms frequently complained about.

On the other hand, despite that these enterprises found it increasingly difficult to purchase
iron ore from even the spot market, the corresponding productive forces were expected to
increase. That is, for the small and medium size trading companies, even faced with the
soaring spot price, the need for importing iron ore still kept increasing. Shang Wenyong, the
manager at a private iron ore and steel trading firm, told the press that
“from now onwards till the end of the negotiation, iron ore price will be even higher…
now it is only a matter of by how much. Now it is another good opportunity to purchase
and stockpile (iron ore), before the negotiation is concluded… (Because) the price hike
in the future will be surprising” (Suo, 2010).

In fact, unlike the CISA which considered the ‘excessive import of iron ore’ as the
contributing factor that distorted the supply and demand relationship in the domestic market
and distracted China’s negotiation with the Big Three, trading companies held that the less
the number of iron ore trade took place, the higher the price would be (Suo, 2010; Wang &
Xu, 2010). Therefore, these traders tried to purchase as many iron ore as they could, with the
belief that its price would in any case keep increasing in the foreseeable future. For the steel
plants in small and medium size, apart from those with the same intention (as their
counterparts in the trading business) of keeping purchasing iron ore in the spot market, others
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expressed, at the most, the indifference towards the price movement of iron ore (Sina
Finance, 22 March 2010). Thus, the focus for these plants was on improving the efficiency of
steel production (Sina Finance, 22 March 2010); so long as the raw material purchase channel
existed, they would keep manufacturing the end product accordingly. In other words, what
worried them was the potential production shutdown due to the shortage of iron ore supply in
spot market (Wang J, 2009e).

Faced with the unfair competition in the country’s spot market where iron ore supply was
limited by CISA’s attempted regulation and the potential monopoly of major SOEs, and the
rising demand of iron ore for both trading and production purposes, the financialised index
price promoted by the Big Three came into effect and solved the issue. That is, through
accepting the index price, both compulsorily and otherwise, the small and medium companies
were able to realise their intention of purchasing and reselling iron ore as well as the claim
for fair competition, as the new pricing mechanism would grant everyone in the market the
same access (i.e. the same index price) to seaborn iron ore. A small size steel plant in
Tangshan indicated that while most of the small and medium steel plants in the city could
only purchase iron ore from the spot market at higher prices and thus
cannot compete with those large steel makers in terms of raw material costs. Therefore,
the small and medium firms could only increase their profitability by improving cost
control and management effectiveness. However, if the index price, which is more
flexible, can be realised, these steel plants will be able to adapt to the new pricing
mechanism much more quickly and efficiently than their large size counterparts (Sina
Finance, 22 March 2010) (emphasis added).

Since 2010 April, the small and medium enterprises began to take offers from BHP Billiton
based on the average Platts index price from the first quarter of the year (Li RX, 2010c).
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Shagang, the largest private steel plant in China, also indicated that the group had begun to
study the Platts index. “Since it is a product of market economy, we could not judge whether
it is good or bad but only learn how to accept it”, said Shen Wenrong, the chairman of
Shagang group (Li RX, 2010b). In the following month, some private steel plants and trading
companies already engaged in the iron ore swap transactions at Singapore Exchange, whereas
their state-owned counterparts did not (Yang Y, 2010).

Consistent with the broad movement of capital as illustrated in Figures 7.1 and 7.2, the
participation of commercial and financial capital, insofar as the small and medium size
enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry were concerned, did contribute to their
improved business performance. Liu Haimin, the vice president of China Steel Development
& Research Institute, revealed that while the average profit margin of the industry was only
2.5% for 2009, and 3% for the first two months in 2010, most of the firms showing negative
ratios were SOEs which lowered down the industry average ratio (Li Y, 2010b). For the first
quarter of 2010, even the CISA showed that there were 10 enterprises among the
association’s 77 member firms (all of which were large size companies) suffering from
losses. Overall, the profit margin of large size enterprises for the period was only 3.25%
which was below the average ratio of the Chinese industry (CISA, 2010). In other words, the
corresponding ratio which the small and medium enterprises exhibited must be higher than its
SOE counterpart, and most likely to be above the industry average. This is because,
according to Liu Haimin (Li Y, 2010b), while the SOEs lost their cost leadership advantage
in terms of iron ore price, their disadvantage nonetheless remained; while the average
management cost at SOEs was 5.1% for the past year, the equivalent figure of private
enterprises was only 1.2%.
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While the small and medium firms welcomed and enjoyed the advent of the index pricing
mechanism, what remains a moot point is whether the index price will also be subject to, in a
similar fashion as the spot price experienced in China’s domestic market, the potential
monopolies by larger size capitalists. In particular, as illustrated in Figure 7.3, investors from
the financial market might overwhelm those operating in the industrial economy, namely the
productive and commercial capitalists. Consequently, there might exist the danger that
physical transactions of iron ore could be increasingly replaced and overshadowed by virtual
trades of financial derivatives which would then increase, both intentionally and otherwise,
the final price of iron ore. However, before proceeding to this potential threat, attention
should now be turned to how the CISA responded to the shift to the index pricing
mechanism.

7.1.2.3. CISA’s resistance to financialised price
In the similar way as, and perhaps to a greater extent than, it disavowed the iron ore trade in
China’s domestic market by commercial capital, the CISA rejected the idea of index pricing
since 2008. In the beginning of the 2009 annual price negotiation, Shan Shanghua, the
secretary general of the association, indicated the ‘zero tolerance’ approach to the index price
of iron ore initially proposed by BHP Billiton (Chen, 2008b). Therefore, any Chinese
company that used the index price to purchase from iron ore suppliers shall be disqualified
from importing (Xu YL, 2008; Li JL, 2009a). Also, Shan planned to introduce new standards
and regulations that legally prohibit the iron ore transactions in the domestic market (Chen,
2008b). While this may not seem to be surprising, as the CISA adopted the mentality of the
productive capitalist throughout the two annual negotiations (from 2009 to 2010), what does
set the Chinese association apart from the conventional role of capitalists is that the former
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refused to adapt to commercial and financial markets whereas the latter would have. This is
because, from CISA’s perspective, production, commerce, and finance were independent of
one another. Thus, the Chinese iron and steel industry, as represented by the productive
capital in CISA’s point of view, should never be involved with commerce and finance. This
is also reflected in the association’s argument that steel plants should stay away from the
index price based on financial market.

For instance, in 2009 April when the annual negotiation between the CISA and the Big Three
went into a stalemate, Shan Shanghua reiterated that China would definitely not accept index
pricing, as it would mean that while steel plants promised a fixed procurement amount in the
long term, they could not have a settled price on that amount. Instead, the steel plants would
have to bear all risks of the market index (Liu, 2009). Here, the assumption underlying
CISA’s statement is that steel plants should always, as traditional productive capitalists,
concentrate on manufacturing, since they could not benefit from the financial market. While
this was the view held by the CISA, many, if not most, steel plants and trading companies
and especially the small and medium size firms believed otherwise. Already discussed were
the iron ore trade, in private, in China’s domestic market by not only the small and medium
firms but even some major SOEs which ignored the CISA’s principles. Nonetheless, in
extreme scenarios, the association were able to use political means and administrative
procedures to regulate the industry of which the case of Rizhao Centre may best serve as the
example. In particular, with less than a month after the trading centre was established in mid2009 with the aim of providing intermediary services for iron ore transactions and launching
the Chinese iron ore price index, the CISA, together with the Ministry of Commerce and the
CCCMC, called for an immediate disqualification of the centre (Xu YL, 2009g).
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Moreover, the CISA’s attitude towards finance was also clear in its announcement regarding
the closure of Rizhao Centre:
“(the city of Rizhao) established the iron ore trading centre, which already breach the
policies of the Iron & Steel Industry Adjustment and Revitalisation Plan, as they are
clearly speculative in nature which will bring market disorder, and (thus) must be
stopped at once” (China Business Times, 16 June 2009).

Consistent with the association’s historical view on finance, any type of financial activities,
carried out by either foreign or Chinese institutions, were deemed speculative and toxic to the
traditional operation of productive capital in the iron and steel sector. This was also the point
shared by the Ministry of Industry and Information that specified
“(the ministry) does not support (China’s) enterprises to participate in the transaction of
iron ore financial derivatives…(because) the so called iron ore index is in fact the
financial derivative, and the global financial crisis (i.e. the subprime mortgage crisis
originated from the US housing market) was exactly caused by financial derivatives” (Li
RX, 2010d).

Obviously, the Chinese government too considered the index price as harmful to the
conventional iron and steel sector.

Furthermore, it was not only the CISA and relevant government departments which opposed
the index price; the major SOEs which were the association’s key members also rejected the
new pricing mechanism. However, in addition to the CISA’s argument which simply
reiterated the potential threat deriving from the financialised index price, the SOEs also
emphasised that they would be disadvantaged in competing with other market participants in
terms of the raw material cost. For instance, in 2010 March, one month before the quarterly
index price was officially adopted, one large state-owned steel plant pointed out that “once
the traditional annual benchmark pricing mechanism is cancelled and replaced by the
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quarterly index pricing model, large size steel plants will have no cost leadership advantage.
By then, the larger the production scale, the more difficult it is to control the operation and
profitability. Then steel enterprises could only transfer the cost pressure, through increasing
(steel product) prices, onto the automobile, home appliance, machinery, and real estate
sectors in the lower stream” (Sina Finance, 22 March 2010) (emphasis added). Standing in
violent contrast here is the view of the small and medium enterprises which, as mentioned
earlier, welcomed the change to the index price. However, the SOEs believed that adopting
index price would certainly be unfavourable to the development of the nation’s entire iron
and steel industry and so the Chinese steel plants could not accept this result (Zhang GD,
2010).

To resist the impending adoption of index price, the CISA initiated the boycott of Big Three
in the beginning of April at the Iron Ore Market Regulation Conference in Beijing, asking all
steel plants and trading companies in China to stop importing iron ore from the Big Three for
the following two months (i.e. April and May). The rationale behind the proposed campaign
against the financialised price of iron ore was still confined to the mentality of productive
capital to which the CISA’s perspective was assigned in chapter six. That is, the secretary
general Shan Shanghua explained three reasons behind the boycott as
“(firstly,) the current iron ore inventory held by our nation’s steel plants is sufficient to
maintain their normal productions for the next two months. (Secondly,) there is still 75
million tons of iron ore stock at our nation’s ports. (Thirdly,) at the same time, affected
by the increasing price of iron ore, the output level of the iron ore made in our nation
exhibits an 18% increase compared to the same period last year.” (China Business
Network, 2 April 2010).
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Here, while both the Big Three and the Chinese small and medium companies considered
iron ore as a globally tradable commodity, the CISA still thought of it as the raw material for
steel manufacturing, which the domestically made iron ore could easily replace the
counterpart from the Big Three. As such, iron ore market was only related to China’s
domestic steel sector. In fact, it was not that the CISA had not realised the changed nature of
iron ore, but rather that the association wanted to maintain the traditional role of the mineral
product. When the Big Three ceased the negotiation and simply offered the quarterly index
price to the Chinese buyers, Luo Bingsheng, CISA’s executive vice chairman, chastised such
an ‘ultimatum’ way of communication on the ground that, since iron ore as a commodity had
a very specific purpose (i.e. as the raw material for steel manufacturing), both parties on the
supply and demand chain should work together in the long term (Zhou Y, 2010). More
specifically, he explained that
“the specific characteristic of iron ore means that it can only be sold to steel plants…
(Thus,) the relationship between mining companies and steel plants should be an
interdependent and reciprocal one. However, as the Big Three are now under the control
of the financial capital… iron ore has now been equipped with the nature of capital;
mining companies do not consider the long term interests of corporate growth, and have
abandoned the basic win-win principle for both parties on the supply and demand chain”
(Chen YM, 2010) (emphases added).

Obviously, while the CISA at this point began to realise the participation of the financial
capital from the rest of the world in the global iron ore market where iron ore had been
‘equipped with the nature of capital’, the association still wanted to maintain the status of the
traditional productive capital. To this end, it turned to regulatory and administrative
measures.
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To assist the proposed industry wide boycott against the quarterly index price, the CISA also
introduced relevant industry polices and legal principles to resist the new pricing mechanism.
Within the industry, the association, together with the CCCMC, jointly issued three selfdiscipline policies including The 2010 Iron Ore Importing Enterprise Assessment Criteria
and Application Procedure, Details on the Implementation of Iron Ore Import Agency
System, and The Record Tracking Standards on Iron Ore Import Contract61. As suggested by
their name, the three policies were aimed at (1) imposing the minimum import threshold onto
steel plants and trading companies, (2) ensuring that only large size companies redistribute
iron ore in the domestic market, and (3) establishing the audit system to supervise the
allocation of the iron ore import within the country, respectively.

Furthermore, the issue of iron ore price was brought to the national level. Luo Bingsheng,
CISA’s executive vice chairman, suggested that the Chinese government consider iron ore as
a strategic issue and bring it up to the national level for further investigation, in order to
ensure the strategic safety of China’s national economy (Yu L, 2010e). To this end, the
association, on the one hand, advised the Ministry of Finance, the NDRC, and other relevant
departments to reduce the tax rate of the domestic iron ore manufacturers which were then
expected to be able to compete with the Big Three (Zhang XD, 2010a). On the other hand, in
mid-April, CISA also worked with the Ministry of Commerce on the anti-monopoly
investigation of the quarterly pricing mechanism proposed by the Big Three, drawing
relevant legal standards from China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (Xue, 2010c; Zhang XD, 2010b).
The Ministry of Industry and Information also announced that it would introduce a new
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A detailed discussion of CISA’s industry policies is provided later in the chapter.
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management mechanism for iron ore import which would be favourable to the regulatory
adjustment of China’s iron ore market (Deng, 2010a).

Responding to the boycott proposed by the CISA, however, only a few major SOEs
expressed their willingness to cooperate. At the International Iron Ore market Symposium on
April 9, Wuhan Iron and Steel (the fourth largest steel plant in China) told the press that
“although the Big Three have officially sent us the request of adopting the quarterly
index based price, we have not accepted it. As a central-government controlled
enterprise, (we) must consider the broad picture and firmly resist the prohibitive price
asked by the Big Three… Wuhan Iron and Steel will utilise its own iron ore inventory
which would help the steel plant maintain its normal production for three months” (Zhu,
2010a).

Hunan Valin Steel (the parent entity of three top 100 steel plants62 in China) also did not
accept the quarterly index price by the Big Three (Li RX, 2010c). Angang Steel (the third
largest steel plant in China) indicated at the press conference that (China’s) domestic steel
enterprises should unite together to boycott the soaring price of iron ore from the Big Three
(Wang F, 2010).

Except these top steel conglomerates in the country, other SOEs at the same time confessed
that they had already accepted the quarterly price to maintain their operations. For instance,
one top 10 steel plant explained that
“the amount of raw material inventory varied at different domestic factories. Thus, many
plants do not have the same level of iron ore stock as those conglomerates. Because of
this, the boycott against the Big Three may have been some Dutch courage. Instead, what
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These include LY steel, Xiangtan Iron & Steel, and Hengyan Steel Tube, which were ranked number 28, 36, and 82 of the
top 100 steel companies respectively in China in 2009 (CISA, 2009e).
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would be waiting for us may be the soaring spot price of iron ore and the withdrawal of
the long term price based contract (by the Big Three)” (Sina Finance, 11 April 2010).

In a similar vein, Nanjing Iron and Steel (the 14th largest steel plant) admitted that it too had
adopted the quarterly price for the second quarter of 2010 (Li RX, 2010c). In fact, a medium
size state-owned steel plant even admitted that it had already followed Big Three’s price
since 2009. Regarding CISA’s boycott, the manager commented that “if I stop declaring the
iron ore import at the custom today, the price will soon be increased to RMB 300 / ton”
(Wang & Xu, 2010). In mid-May, even Baosteel (the largest steel plant in China) and
Shagang (the fifth largest steel plant) admitted at the Sixth China International Steel
Conference that all Chinese steel plants had signed up the ‘temporary price agreement’ with
the Big Three (Wang & Zhang, 2010).

With the SOEs giving in to the Big Three, it was hardly surprising on the other hand that the
small and medium enterprises did not follow CISA’s call but accepted the quarterly index
price. Trading companies commented on the proposed boycott that while there still existed
iron ore demand in the domestic market, stopping iron ore import to resist the mining firms
was against the market. They further argued that “even suppose (the CISA) would be able to
really cease the iron ore import for two months, it could not reverse the negotiation outcome,
but rather result in chaos in (China’s) domestic iron ore market” (Zhu, 2010a). For this
reason, the small and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel sector, as mentioned
earlier, began to adopt the index price since 2010 April. Eventually, as more and more steel
plants accepted the new price, even the CISA had to acquiesce in the end of April that
Chinese firms could use the price temporarily (Yu L, 2010e). Shan Shanghua, the secretary
general, justified this decision that “we had to import iron ore during the past two months (i.e.
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April and May), and thus needed a temporary price to issue the letter of credit” (Zhou XF,
2010b). Ironically, the association’s own confession that Chinese buyers kept purchasing iron
ore for the same period (i.e. 2010 April and May) on which it previously initiated the boycott
demonstrates that the campaign against the financialised index price had in effect come to an
end.

Here, CISA’s failed boycott and the corresponding response from both SOEs and the small
and medium enterprises exhibit a certain level of relevance to Marx’s antithesis between the
industrial economy (that consists of productive and commercial capital) and the financial
capital. That is, when the CISA and some SOEs realised that iron ore had been equipped
with the nature of capital (Chen YM, 2010), and the pricing right of iron ore were being
shifted towards financial capital (Li RX, 2010e), the association still attempted to insulate the
Chinese iron and steel industry from the financial capital operating in the rest of the world.
However, as demonstrated earlier, the participation of commercial capital and later the
financial capital, consistent with Marx (1959), did help promote the productivity of the Big
Three as well as the Chinese steel plants, leading to the outcome that “(t)he more rapid the
process of reproduction, and the more developed the function of money as a means of
payment, i.e., the more developed the credit system, the smaller that portion is in relation to
the total capital” (Marx, 1959, p.189). In other words, despite China’s temporary boycott,
which in the above scenario purports to the absence of the industrial capital, against Big
Three’s iron ore, financial capital may operate as usual and take the lead in the virtual
transaction of iron ore and also the associated derivatives, thereby pushing up the index price.
This is echoed by the response of SOEs and small and medium firms behind their
compromise. For instance, many argued that, even suppose the boycott could succeed
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temporarily, the resulting price afterwards would have been skyrocketed (Sina Finance, 11
April 2010; Wang & Xu, 2010). In other words, even though the CISA could unite everyone
in the industry and cease the import of iron ore, the commodity would have still been traded
in the financial market.

It may also explain, at least in part, the reason behind CISA’s failure to resist the
financialised price of iron ore in general, on the ground that, however large the scale of
China’s industrial capital might be, the operation of financial capital continues, running
independently of the physical consumption of iron ore for steel manufacturing. As such, it
becomes understandable that why the CISA used the same strategy of ceasing China’s iron
ore import in the 2009 and 2010 price negotiations and failed both times. From 2009 May to
June, as the traditional due date (i.e. 30 June) of the negotiation was approaching, Shan
Shanghua, the secretary general, indicated that “at the moment our country’s port there are 70
million tons of iron ore inventory, accounting for twice the normal monthly level of iron ore
consumption. (Thus,) we can stop importing iron ore for two months, but they (the Big
Three) cannot stop producing or exporting (for the same period of time)” (Miao, 2009; Gold
Bull Information, 12 June 2009). The rationale behind Shan’s discourse here comes from
CISA’s mentality as the productive capitalist (as discussed in chapter six) that treated iron ore
only as the raw material for steel manufacturing, and the iron ore market as a market solely
related to the steel market where only the physical transaction of iron ore took place. Thus,
once China, as the world’s largest iron ore purchaser (an argument that the CISA always
emphasised) had stopped the purchase and import, it would have been reasonable to believe
that the Big Three would compromise and give in.
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The reality, however, was that the Big Three did not follow CISA’s will and so their price did
not drop by 40% as per the association’s request but rather skyrocketed by 99.7% in next
April. This is because the Big Three and particular BHP Billiton at that time (in 2009) were
in the mentality of the financial capital (as discussed in chapter six), referring to iron ore as a
global commodity tradable in both physical as well as financial markets globally. Therefore,
from the perspective of the Big Three which conceives of iron ore in “the meaningless form
of capital, the perversion and objectification of production relations in their highest degree”
(Marx, 1959, p.256), the limit upon the accumulation of capital, which in this case refers to
CISA’s boycott, becomes “merely quantitative and defies all fantasy” (ibid, p.261).
Potentially, the financial market, as argued by Marx (1959), will grow even faster than its
physical counterpart, “driving capitalist production beyond its own limits” (p.433).

7.1.3. Conclusion and discussion of the emergence of commerce and finance in the
Chinese iron ore market

So far it has been illustrated in this section (7.1) that the emergence of commercial capital
and later the financial capital in the iron ore market with particular reference to the Chinese
iron and steel industry. In 2009, alongside the breakdown of the 2009 annual price
negotiation between the Big Three and the CISA, the mining companies began to, for the first
time in the history of long run price based iron ore transactions, offer iron ore in China’s spot
market. This attracted the participation of commercial capital, which in this scenario referred
to the commercial activities from both the Big Three and the small and medium enterprises in
the Chinese iron and steel sector. Consequently, the productive efficiency at both parties
exhibited a certain level of improvement which was consistent with Marx’s demonstration of
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the interaction between productive and commercial capital (as shown in Figure 7.1). On the
other hand, the CISA, however, chastised and disavowed in the first place the ‘private’ iron
ore trade between the first two parties, and subsequently the resulting improved efficiency of
the small and medium enterprises concerned. Rather, the association, together with relevant
departments, formed the investigation team in an attempt to obliterate iron ore transactions in
the domestic spot market. While the team’s attempt failed and the trade of iron ore continued
between the Big Three and the small and medium firms as well as among companies within
the Chinese market, it did shut down the Rizhao Centre which was aimed at launching
China’s own iron ore index price.

Nevertheless, even though the attempt to financialise the price of iron ore was suppressed
within the country, the new pricing mechanism became realised from the other hand in the
following year. That is, in 2010, the Big Three gradually adopted the index price which the
Chinese small and medium enterprises accepted straightaway, heralding the era of the
financialised iron ore price facilitated by not only the movement of the commercial but also
the financial capital. This is illustrated in Figure 7.2 where the commercial transaction of iron
ore was being increasingly replaced by the corresponding financial activities. While the small
and medium firms welcomed the new pricing mechanism, the CISA strongly opposed it and
attempted to resist such a trend of financialisation. To this end, not only did the association
initiate the nationwide boycott of the quarterly index price required by the Big Three, but it
also issued self-disciplinary industry policies, and brought the issue to the national level by
seeking political and legal assistance from the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of
Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Information, and other government departments.
However, despite CISA’s administrative and political effort, the association failed in its
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attempt to resist the financialised index price of iron ore by eventually permitting the
‘temporary’ adoption of the price. The reason behind the failure of CISA’s boycott is
discussed with reference to Marx’s view of financial capital. In particular, the quantitative
limit that the productive capital, as represented by the CISA, imposed on the financial capital
comprised of the Big Three did not render the former defeat the latter. On the contrary, it was
the qualitative distinction between the two that lent the advantage to the financial capital
running independently of the actual steel production. Iron ore is equipped with the same selfexpanding capacity as capital, becoming a “meaningless form of capital, the perversion and
objectification of production relations in their highest degree” (Marx, 1959, p.256). Thus,
without the Chinese iron and steel industry purchasing and importing iron ore, the commodity
could still be actively traded in the financial market which would subsequently push up the
price. This explains, at least in part, why the CISA failed in its attempt to resist
financialisation. However, a more comprehensive analysis is needed to examine the general
context in which the CISA was forced to undertake the index price.

To address this issue, questions raised earlier in the current chapter alongside the story of
financialisation need to be answered first, including (1) the association’s view on the nature
of financialisation: whether the shift to index price will contribute or compromise the iron
and steel sector both globally and within China; (2) its own role in the Chinese iron and steel
industry: why the CISA, in the mentality of a productive capitalist, failed to adapt to the
emergence of commercial and financial capital in the Chinese iron ore market; and (3) the
approaches it adopted in resisting the financialised price of iron ore: why relevant regulations
imposed by the CISA upon the Chinese iron and steel sector failed. The next section is
directed towards these issues.
273

Chapter 7 Shift to Financialisation of Iron Ore Price—Interaction among Modes of
Production
7.2. CISA’s failed attempt to resist financialisation
To explore CISA’s failure, this section examines, as outlined in the paragraph above, firstly
the reason behind the association’s attempt, secondly the identity of the association, and
thirdly its attempted solutions to financialisation which eventually turned out to be
ineffective. Alongside the investigation, equally important is that Marx’s interpretation of
finance (as discussed in chapter four) as well as the power of discourse underpinned by the
corresponding mode of production (as discussed in chapter five) is used not only as the
theoretical framework in which the analysis is carried out, but also as the benchmark against
which the CISA’s thoughts and activities are compared. In other words, both the
financialisation framework and the discourse analysis informed by Marx’s work are not
simply used as the theoretical and methodological tools in this thesis, but in themselves serve
as part of Chinese context in which the investigation is accomplished, since the Chinese
communist government per se is initially inspired by Marxism (Deng, 1993; Jiang, 2006b,
2006c).

7.2.1. CISA’s view on financialisation
As illustrated earlier, while the Big Three and the small and medium firms in the Chinese
iron and steel industry engaged in the commercial trade of iron ore in 2009 and began to rely
on the financialised index price in 2010, the CISA always opposed the change and wanted to
maintain the traditional status of the industry where only the productive capitalists operate.
Therefore, what is certain at this stage is that the CISA did not accept the financialised price
of iron ore. The next question then becomes if the association understood finance and then
disapproved the emergence of financialisation in iron ore market or if it was simply against
anything related to finance and wanted to separate the Chinese iron and steel industry from
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financial market. A closer look at CISA’s discourse suggests a combination of both, based on
the following four aspects.

7.2.1.1. Immediate closure of Rizhao Centre
First and foremost, the case of Rizhao centre demonstrates that the CISA did not allow any
type of financial activities, even those undertaken by the Chinese institutions, in the domestic
iron ore market. If, say, CISA’s opposition to the index price initially promoted by BHP
Billiton and published by Platts in 2008 was based on the fact that the index publishers were
foreign institutions such as Metal Bulletin, Steel Business Briefing, and McGraw Hill
Financial, it would then be hardly convincing that the association shut down the Rizhao iron
ore index for the same reason. In fact, in its announcement regarding the centre, the CISA
commented that the establishment of Rizhao Centre “already breached the policies of the Iron
& Steel Industry Adjustment and Revitalisation Plan, as they (i.e. business activities of the
centre) are clearly speculative in nature which will artificially push up the iron ore price and
result in market disorder” (China Business Times, 16 June 2009). Viewed in this way, it is
argued that the CISA opposed any form of index price regardless of the publishers. Such an
attitude toward finance was carried forward to the 2010 iron ore price negotiation, as the
association and the major SOEs reiterated that the financialised index price was always
speculative and could be easily manipulated (Deng, 2009c; Chen SS, 2009f; Li RX, 2010d,
2010e). Thus, it is highly likely that the association simply considered the finance as
something harmful and toxic to the Chinese iron and steel industry.

However, as illustrated earlier (in section 7.1.2.1.), the participation of financial capital does
help facilitate the traditional circuit of productive capital (as shown in Figure 7.2), by
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enabling the immediate and continual purchase and sale of iron ore between mining
companies and steel plants. The improved financial performance of the small and medium
enterprises, vis-à-vis their state-own counterparts, in the Chinese iron and steel industry is
also demonstrated in section 7.1.2.2. While turning a blind eye to such an improved
profitability, the CISA chastised the increased efficiency at the small and medium enterprises
which allegedly gave rise to the chaotic steel market (Xu YL, 2009f). In other words, the
association chose to downplay the advantages of the financialised index price, at least from
the perspective of small and medium firms, on the one hand, and emphasised its potential
disadvantages on the other.

7.2.1.2. Reluctance to accept and study index price
Nonetheless, it is still not certain if the CISA really understood the inner mechanism of the
expanded capital movement as outlined in Figure 7.2 and then concluded with the potential
threat of financialisation as outlined in Figure 7.3, or the association simply rejected any form
of finance. Stepping outside the case of Rizhao centre, the analysis of CISA’s discourse
suggested the latter. For instance, after the index price was officially adopted by the Big
Three and most small and medium enterprises in 2010 April, the association and its key
members, namely the major SOEs, showed their reluctance to learn about the new pricing
mechanism (He, 2010a). Zou Jinhong, the managing director of the marketing department at
Minmetal Co., Ltd, China’s largest state-owned steel trading company, indicated that his firm
would not take part in transactions based on the index price, as he did not understand the so
called iron ore index price (Li RX, 2010d). In the subsequent month, while some private steel
plants began to engage in iron ore swap transactions at Singapore Exchange, their stateowned counterparts did not, on the ground that entering into the iron ore swaps for the
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purpose of risk avoidance was in itself a huge risk. Even suppose that SOEs were to “try” the
swaps, it would have to be audited and approved by various government departments at
different levels, which in short would be very difficult (Yang Y, 2010).

7.2.1.3. Omission of other financial derivatives on the industrial chain
In fact, it was not only the financialised index price which the CISA chose to ignore; the
association also did not to recognise other financial products and derivatives on the same
industrial chain. Steel futures, for instance, began to be traded in Shanghai Futures Exchange
since 2009 March (Economic News, 27 March 2009). While locating at the lower stream of
the iron ore market, the demand and price of steel were intimately related to those of iron ore
which even the CISA admitted and emphasised throughout the 2009 and 2010 negotiations
(as demonstrated in the end of chapter six). Moreover, the point at which steel futures became
tradable was within the period of the 2009 iron ore negotiation. Despite the close relevance
mentioned above, however, the association made no mention of steel futures, to say nothing
about the possible iron ore derivatives.

Another type of financial derivative which was also closely related to the price of iron ore
was the Forward Freight Agreements (FFA hereafter), a forward contract which provides a
“means of hedging exposure to freight market risk through the trading of specified time
charter and voyage rates for forward positions” (The Baltic Exchange, 2015b). Facing the
fluctuations of the BDI index in the international shipping market, FFA has been applied
since 2002, serving as a tool for price discovery, risk management, and speculations
(Kavussanos et al., 2004; Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2004; Yu & Zhu, 2009). In terms of the
Big Three, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto already actively engaged in the FFA transactions even
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before the 2009 negotiation (China Business Journal, 20 January 2008; Xu YL, 2009f),
whereas Vale, during the 2009 negotiation, attempted to stabilise the shipping cost between
China and Brazil by establishing its own fleet, in order to expand its client base in the
Chinese market (Deng, 2009e; Zhou Y, 2009b). In the beginning of the 2010 negotiation, the
Brazilian company even proposed to establish the iron ore distribution centres in a few
regions across Asia to avoid fluctuations in shipping costs (Zhang C, 2009c).

On the other hand, in relation to the Chinese iron ore market, although both academics
(Zhang & Yang, 2006; Yang, 2007; Li & Lu, 2008) and market participants (Li LX, 2009;
Chen YM, 2010) paid sufficient amount of attention to this tool and suggested the Chinese
ship owners and charters to take advantage of it, the CISA seemed to be only concerned with
the long term based fixed price of iron ore. As most Chinese iron ore buyers 63 had neither the
long term charter agreement nor the FFA in the futures market, the only option for shipping
costs they had was the spot price. Under this scenario, China National Chartering Co., Ltd
commented that
“the shipping right is in the hands of the consignors (i.e. iron ore suppliers in this case)
who charter ships at any prices they prefer, and so the Chinese steel plants have to accept
the price however expensive it may be… This is the most important problem that the
Chinese side should solve, rather than simply focusing on a few US dollars that the iron
ore price could be reduced by” (Suo, 2009a).

Wu Minghua, the director at the Shanghai branch of China Ocean Shipping Company,
indicated that
from January to November this year (i.e. 2009), iron ore shipping costs from Brazil to
China and from Australia to China have increased by more than 40 USD / ton and 10

63

The top 10 steel plants in China such as Baosteel, Shougang, Angang Steel, Shagang, and Hebei iron & steel did have the
long term contracts with the Chinese and foreign shipping companies (Zhou Y, 2009b).
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USD / ton respectively. The changes in shipping costs have already exceeded the
changes in iron ore prices…some argued that instead of struggling to lower down the
iron ore price in the negotiation, it is more practical to try to lower down the shipping
cost” (Zhou Y, 2009b).

The CISA, however, did not consider the shipping cost as yet another form of financial
derivative which in its own constituted a futures market, but simply took it as something that
passively reacted to changes in the physical demand of iron ore shipping (Yu L, 2009a). This
is not surprising, given that, as illustrated in chapter six, the association did not take the BDI
index into account throughout its discourse regarding the price of iron ore during the
negotiations. Rather, in a similar vein as how the association attempted to link the iron ore
market with the steel market, the vice chairman of the CISA and the chairman of Baosteel
(China’s largest steel plant), Xu Lejiang, indicated at the Shanghai International Shipping
Forum that steel plants, iron ore suppliers, and shipping companies should establish a stable
and long lasting cooperative relationship contributing to the prosperity and stability of the
industrial chain (Chen SS, 2010c). Viewed in this way, similar to its discourse of iron ore
market discussed in chapter six, the concept of shipping market was also confined to the
traditional industrial economy which, according to Marx (1959), concerns productive and
commercial capital. In other words, the influence of financial market on both the shipping
cost in general and the FFA in particular, which in itself is one form of financial derivative,
was omitted by the CISA.

In the beginning of May 2010 when the Platts index was officially acknowledged as the
benchmark assessment of the newly adopted quarterly index price of iron ore, shipping costs
also became part of the price as the index was measured on a CIF basis in the spot market of
Qingdao (North China), instead of the traditional reference to FOB (Zhu, 2010c). In its
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response to the quarterly pricing mechanism, the CISA did not address the shift from FOB to
CIF, but simply rejected the price on the ground that the iron ore supply was higher than the
demand (Zhou XF, 2010b). As such, from CISA’s discourse both before and after the initial
adoption of the quarterly index price, neither the BDI index nor the FFA was taken into
consideration. It thus poses a subsequent question as to whether the association really
believed that, as discussed in chapter four and shown in Figure 4.1, finance in general has
become increasingly intertwined with the industrial economy in modern society.

7.2.1.4. Separation of financial from productive and commercial capital in China’s iron and
steel sector
The outcome of the 2009 iron ore price negotiation between the CISA and FMG answers this
question. That is, when the association released the Result Announcement of China’s 2009
Iron Ore Price Negotiation on 2009 August 17, only the price of iron ore and the period to
which it applied were revealed by the Chinese side (CISA, 2009a). On the same day,
however, Andrew Forrest, the CEO of FMG, announced at the global video press conference
that the agreement ensured the firm’s cashflow in the short to medium term, partly due to
CISA’s promise that Chinese financial institutions would provide 5.5 to 6 billion USD debt
financing to FMG, under the terms and conditions acceptable to the latter, before 2009
September 30 (Dong, 2009a; Zhang XD, 2009b). In particular, the interest rate on the
proposed financing would be 1.5% to 2% lower than the market rate, which alone was
estimated to help FMG save about 80 to 120 million USD interest expense (Suo, 2009a). On
the other hand, when asked about the additional condition regarding financing FMG, Shan
Shanghua, the secretary general of CISA, replied that “financing is something carried out by
financial institutions. The CISA simply promotes the proposal (i.e. 5.5-6 billion USD debt
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financing), with the purpose of increasing FMG’s iron ore production capacity” (Xiao, 2009).
Again, the association separated finance from operations of the conventional iron and steel
industry.

The separation of the financial and the industrial (i.e. production and commerce) capital was
also evident in the association’s response to the tightened credit environment in the Chinese
iron and steel sector. Wu Xichun, CISA’s honorary chairman and the former deputy minister
of the former Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, commented that the influence of credit
crunch on large size steel manufacturers was limited, as the “iron and steel industry is not
short of money” (Deng Y, 2010b). This was also echoed by Nanjing Iron and Steel (top 20
steel plant in China), Baogang (top 20 steel plant in China), and the vice chairman of the
CISA (Deng Y, 2010b). If, say, CISA’s opinion that the major SOEs would remain relatively
unaffected by the tightened credit environment demonstrates the divide between China’s iron
and steel sector and finance, then its view on the small and medium enterprises further
confirms such separation. That is, rather than concerning the potential shortage of capital on
the parts of the small and medium enterprises, the CISA welcomed and encouraged the credit
crunch which would then create a better environment for the industry wide M&A proposed
by the State Council (Tan, 2010).

In fact, the proposal for M&A in the industry has long been on the agenda of the CISA and
relevant government departments (Deng & Gao, 2008). This was rationalised based on the
argument of the CISA, major SOEs, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Industry
and Information that the level of concentration in the Chinese iron and steel sector was not
significant enough and thus possessed less discourse power compared with the Big Three
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(Zhai, 2009; Mei, 2009; Shanghai Securities News, 11 March 2010; Xu KX, 2010; Zhang
GD, 2010). Furthermore, this view was based on the experience of the Japanese steel sector
where the industry concentration level was high and so able to unite all enterprises within the
country to negotiate with iron ore suppliers.

However, there did exist fundamental distinction between the ‘Japanese model’ and the
M&A plan proposed by the CISA and the Chinese government, indicating the third area
which the CISA ignored the significance of financial capital. In relation to the way in which
the Japanese steel plants unite together, a triangle among steel plants, sogo shosha (i.e.
general trading companies64), and banks is formed, in which steel plants on the one hand use
bank loans to invest in mining companies overseas and on the other hand delegate the
responsibility of iron ore price negotiation to sogo shosha (Wang & Qin, 2009). As a special
form of corporation unique to Japan, sogo shosha trades a wide variety of commodities across
different markets around the globe. While serving as the intermediaries for commercial
transactions, they also offer financial services including debt and equity financing in various
sectors (Dziubla, 1982). In the case of the global iron ore market, Mitsui, one of the largest
sogo shosha in Japan, also owns 18.24% shares of Valepar (the largest shareholder of Vale),
indirectly holding 9.6% shares of Vale as the third largest shareholder. Under such scenario,
sogo shosha is able to not only provide capital to the Japanese iron and steel industry in
general, but also compensate the steel plants in the case of rising iron ore prices by obtaining
its share of profit from the Big Three, as well as be compensated by the steel plants for the
reduction in the share of profits from mining companies in the case of decreasing iron ore
prices. As such, the broad movement of capital among production, commerce, and finance
64

Sogo shosha is the Japanese word for general trading companies.
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could be established: steel plants play the role of productive capital, banks and other financial
institutions the role of financial capital, and sogo shosha the role of both commercial and
financial capital.

Standing in sharp contrast to the ‘Japanese model’ described above is the M&A proposal in
the Chinese iron and steel industry. That is, instead of building the alliance among steel
plants, trading companies, and financial institutions, the Chinese side foresaw a production
oriented M&A in which large size state owned steel plants take over their small and medium
size counterparts. For instance, the State Council (2009) published the Iron & Steel Industry
Adjustments and Revitalisation Plan65 on 2009 March 20, suggesting that major SOEs take
the lead to reorganise and integrate the domestic industry66 to establish by 2011 extra-large
steel conglomerates including Baosteel group (i.e. the no.1 largest steel plant), Anben group
(i.e. Anshan Iron & Steel as no.3, and Benxi Iron & Steel as no.13), and Wuhan Iron & Steel
group (no.4). Here, commerce is not needed as the CISA had long been promoting the iron
ore import agency system asking the licensed firms to resell their import to those unlicensed
ones at 3%-5% premiums (Economy 30 Minutes, 23 June 2009). As for other commercial
transactions of iron ore that small and medium enterprises entered into, the association
strongly opposed and promised to investigate and punish the participants involved. In
addition to commerce, finance too was not the essential part of the M&A process in the
Chinese iron and steel sector. As mentioned earlier, the association almost omitted the
65

The original name of this document in Chinese is 钢铁产业调整和振兴规划. The translation is done by the author of the
thesis.
66

The proposed M&As include those between Baosteel (China’s no.1 largest steel plant), Baogang (no.17), and Ningbosteel;
between Anshan Iron & Steel (no.3), Benxi iron & Steel (no.13), Baogang (no.17), and Panzhihua Iron & Steel (no.11);
between Tiantie (no.18), Tianjin Pipe (no.23), and Tgsteel (no.32), and; between Taiyuan Iron & Steel (no.7) and other steel
plants within Taiyuan province (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2009).
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influence of the tightened credit environment on the industry, since “our iron and steel
industry is not short of money”, said Wu Xichun, the honorary chairman of the CISA (Deng
Y, 2010b). Moreover, on the parts of the small and medium firms, finance was even
something that the CISA would rather take away from them (Tan, 2010). This was justified
on the ground that, without financial support, small and medium enterprises would soon be
acquired by large size SOEs, facilitating the industry wide M&A process. Viewed in this
way, neither commerce nor finance was needed to increase the industry’s concentration level
and correspondingly improve its discourse power.

7.2.1.5. Conclusion of CISA’s view and comparison with Marx
Summarising the discussion so far, the analysis in the present section (7.2.1.) firstly begins
with the specific case of Rizhao Centre which indicates CISA’s ex ante resistance to the
indexed iron ore price published by Chinese institutions; secondly illustrates the association’s
ex post reluctance, after the Platts IODEX was officially adopted globally, to study the index
and the corresponding financial derivatives such as iron ore swaps; thirdly, stepping outside
the price of iron ore, explores other financial products alongside the same industrial chain
including steel futures and FFA contracts which further confirm CISA’s omission of the
financial products participating in the iron ore market, and; fourthly, examining the industrial
structure in general, demonstrates CISA’s separation of finance from the Chinese iron and
steel industry. If, say, the Rizhao case leaves the question whether it was because the CISA
understood the mechanism of the broad capital movement among production, commerce, and
finance (as illustrated in Figure 4.1) and thus foresaw the potential crisis deriving from
financial market, or it was due to the fact that the association was simply against anything
related to finance, then its ignorance regarding the iron ore index and the omission of steel
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futures and FFA point the answer to the latter. The M&A proposed by the CISA and relevant
government departments further confirms this point at the industrial level. That is, the
association did not recognise the fact that finance has become in general increasingly
intertwined with the conventional industrial economy in the contemporary business world; in
other words, the CISA failed to understand the broad movement of productive, commercial
and financial capital which has been illustrated in theory in chapter four and in the case of the
iron ore market in the first part (section 7.1) of the current chapter.

Thus, it can be concluded, at this stage, that although the association emphasised the potential
threat posed by the participation of financial capital in the iron ore market which to some
extent corresponds to Marx’s interpretation (outlined in Figure 7.3), it did not acknowledge
his view of the interconnectedness of production, commerce, and finance. As mentioned
earlier in this section, while analysing CISA’s failure to resist the financialised price of iron
ore, Marx’s investigation of finance and capitalism in general are also discussed and
compared with the Chinese iron and steel industry. The next section is directed towards this
end.

7.2.2. Comparing Marx’s view with that of CISA
Thus far it has been illuminated that the potential threat, alongside the expanded movement
of financial capital, may arise from the deviation of the financial market from the traditional
industry chain, where transactions of financial products take precedence over the physical
transactions of iron ore (as shown in Figure 7.3). This is to a certain degree consistent with
the discourse of the CISA and the major SOEs in an attempt to resist the index price. For
instance, Sheng Zhicheng, the deputy secretary general of China Federation of Logistics &
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Purchasing (CFLP hereafter)’s Iron and Steel Committee at, pointed out that the price
difference in the physical transaction of iron ore as the data collection process on which the
index was based would work in favour of mining firms. This is because,
“since those buyers who are able to reach a lower price are certainly not going to take the
initiative to publicise their purchase price, (and nor will the seller)… (as such,) while the
information from the seller’s will always be a mixture of truth and falsehood, the
information provided by the buyers are in general transparent. This makes it easier for
the seller to gather the specific production capacity of most steel plants, and (then) apply
corresponding tactics to different buyers, placing the former in a more active and
advantageous position (compared to the latter)” (Lang & Zhang, 2010).

Even suppose information regarding the physical market could be transparent on both sides,
the involvement of financial market adds another type of instability to the formation of index.
Zou Jinhong, director at Minmetal Co., Ltd (China’s largest state-owned steel trading firm),
claimed that “as the iron ore index is not based on the actual transaction between buyers and
sellers in the real world, how can this index reflect the spot market and discover the proper
price?” (Li RX, 2010a). In other words, as financial capital enters into transactions of iron ore
and also the associated financial derivatives in particular, the resulting index, many SOEs
argued, could be easily pushed up by market speculations (Chen SS, 2009f; Li RX, 2010d,
2010e). In relation to Figure 7.3, this view corresponds to the capital movement from phase 1
to phase n where the right (M) of purchasing iron ore and its associated derivatives (m) are
traded for n times in financial market before the actual iron ore (C’) can be shipped over at
the price of Mn to steel plant (i.e. productive capitalists) as the raw material (MP) for steel
manufacturing on the lower stream of the industrial chain. In Marx’s own words, iron ore has
become a “meaningless form of capital, the perversion and objectification of production
relations in their highest degrees” (Marx, 1959, p.433).
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However, it is yet to conclude that, in terms of the potential drawback of the index price
formation, the CISA was literally in an agreement with Marx (1959). For one thing, as
demonstrated earlier, the former did not understand the interconnectedness among
production, commerce, and finance. From CISA’s perspective, index price simply rose from
the Big Three turning towards financial market; the commercial transaction of iron ore
among mining companies, small and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel sector,
and even the SOEs was disavowed and thus not acknowledged. Marx (1959), in contrast,
developed the broad capital movement among production, commerce, and finance evolving
from the interaction between the first and second (see Figure 7.1), and subsequently the
participation of the third (see Figures 7.2 and 7.3). For another, confining the comparison to
the financial market threat alone, the inconsistency remains as to the stage in which the
financialisation of iron ore price had progressed. While the CISA straightaway jumped to the
conclusion that financialisation would attract fluctuations and speculations, increasing the
level of instability in the iron and steel industry, Marx (1887) examined different stages of
development for the subject matter. He emphasised that
“(a)s a matter of principle in political economy… (o)ne must always take… a period of
time during which modern industry passes through the various phases of prosperity,
overproduction, stagnation, crisis, and completes its inevitable cycle” (Marx, 1973,
p.214).

Viewed in this way, what the CISA had argued was primarily the potential stagnation
resulting from the soaring index price of iron ore, leaving the prosperity (i.e. the improved
efficiency and productive force at the Big Three and the Chinese small and medium
enterprises) unrecognised, and overproduction and crisis undiscussed. In earlier sections (i.e.
7.1.1.2., 7.1.2.1, and 7.1.2.2.) of the current chapter, the improved efficiency resulting from
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the emergence of commercial and financial capital in China’s iron ore market are
demonstrated with the associated discourse from the Big Three and the small and medium
size companies, and illustrated in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. The overproduction and crisis, as a
consequence of financialisation and of capitalism in general, are illuminated next alongside
the case of the Chinese iron ore market, drawing from Marx’s Capital.

7.2.2.1. Overproduction
First, to illustrate overproduction, there is a need to revisit the broad capital movement among
production, commerce, and finance. As shown in Figure 7.1, the initial participation of iron
ore traders as the commercial capital in between the two groups of productive capital
(including the iron ore suppliers on the upper stream and the steel manufacturers on the lower
stream) serves as the intermediary to promote the productive efficiency at both ends. This is
because each group of capital is now assigned with their own individual task: the productive
capital focuses on production and the commercial concentrates on sales. However, while they
are given individual missions respectively, the turnover of commercial capital is limited by
that of productive capital:
“(commercial capital) has no direct influence on the time of production… This is the first
barrier for the turnover of commercial capital. Secondly, aside from the barrier formed
by reproductive consumption, the turnover of (commercial capital) is ultimately limited
by the velocity and volume of the total individual consumption” (Marx, 1959, p.203).

To state it simply in the case of the Chinese iron ore market, the first limit is that the sale of
iron ore must keep the same pace with Big Three’s production level on the upper stream and
the output level at China’s steel plants. The second is that, even suppose the production
process could coincide with the corresponding commercial transaction, the sale of iron ore
must reach its end user, whether it be the Chinese steel plants for the purpose of reproductive
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consumption, or the ordinary people in China for their own individual consumption of the
resulting steel products such as automobiles, home appliances, office blocks, private
residences, and so forth.

Failure in meeting the above criteria, according to Marx (1959), leads to overproduction.
First, once the turnover of commercial capital exceeds that of the productive capital, the
former can “repeat its purchases even before it has definitely sold what has previously been
purchased” (p.203). As a result, the commercial capitalist will place more orders on the
productive capitalist, without delivering its previous purchase to the end user. This then
creates a form of fictitious demand that is based on, not the overall level of individual
consumption, but the purpose of the commercial capital as to maximising profits. Thus,
despite that the actual reproduction process (including production and consumption) can be
slower than the commercial capital movement, the externally independent form of the latter
(i.e. M – C – M’) enables “it (to) move, within certain limits, independently of the bounds of
the reproduction process and thereby even drives the (productive capital) beyond its bounds”
(Marx, 1959, p.203). In other words, the level of production may potentially go beyond the
actual demand, leaning towards overproduction.

At this point, one might argue that, even if the first limit no longer exists, the second
criterion, the “velocity and volume of the total individual consumption”, still remains, so long
as the commercial capitalist needs to purchase iron ore from steel plants, and to sell them to
willing buyers, whether it be iron ore traders as other intermediate commercial capital
between the Big Three and steel plants, or directly the steel plants themselves. That is, on the
one hand, even with the problem of overproduction, the productive capital would have a
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physical maximum limit on which the commercial capital could purchase. On the other hand,
suppose the productive capital on the upper stream could manufacture as many as demanded
by its commercial counterpart, it would still be unrealistic that the actual consumption of
commodity on the lower stream could match with what the commercial capitalist offers in the
market. This is where financial capital comes into existence, which renders commercial
capital reach beyond the second limit. For one thing, owing to the participation of financial
capital and in particular the emergence of relevant financial products, the commercial capital
will then be able to purchase not only the actual iron ore, but, more significantly, the
associated derivatives such as swaps and futures which do not require the immediate delivery
of the commodity. As the actual delivery of finished goods is not necessary, the term
‘overproduction’ becomes, so to speak, the infinite production. For another, alongside the
involvement of financial capital, the demand for iron ore also contains two components: first
the physical demand of iron ore on the parts of steel plants, and; second the non-physical
demand on the parts of financial market investors. As such, similar to the shift in the meaning
of ‘overproduction’, the term ‘consumption’ on the lower stream also turns into an endless
circle where both the supply and the consumption are based on financial derivatives, driving
productive as well as commercial capital further beyond their limits.

The introduction of the credit system exacerbates this scenario in terms of enabling the
production, purchase, and sale of commodities without paying the actual cash before they fall
due. In other words, aside from the limitless supply and demand, the physical cash payment
also becomes virtual and nearly infinite, as “it places all the available and even potential
capital of society that is not already actively employed at the disposal of the industrial and
commercial capitalists so that neither the lenders nor users of this capital are its real owners
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or producers” (Marx, 1959, p.433). In this sense, the credit and banking system, or generally
speaking, the financial capital, is thus an “immanent form of the capitalist mode of
production, and… a driving force in its development to its highest and ultimate form” (ibid,
p.433).

Perhaps too far that financial capital would “become the most potent means of driving
capitalist production beyond its own limits, and one of the most effective vehicles of crises
and swindle” (ibid, p.433). This is due to the imbalance between the internal dependence and
the external independence among production, commerce, and finance. On the one hand, the
internal dependence refers to the principle that: the movement of commercial capital is, as
mentioned above, limited by the process of production and the velocity and volume of overall
individual consumption, and; financial capital is also subordinated to the capitalist mode of
production (Marx, 1959, p.428). The inter-dependent relationship is illustrated in Figure 4.1,
where the surplus value (i.e. profit) is first extracted from the production process, realised by
the commercial capitalist at the point of sale, and shared by the financial capitalist in the form
of interest income. On the other hand, the external independence purports to the outward
individual movement of the three types of capital: the productive capital as C (L, MP) … P
… C’; the commercial capital M – C – M’, and; the financial capital M – M’. The
overproduction stimulated by the commercial as well as the financial capital (Marx, 1959,
p.306) will push the external independence to the extreme while leaving the internal
dependence far behind, until the point at which “the internal connection is violently restored
through a crisis” (Marx, 1959, p.203).
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Turning to the case of the Chinese iron ore market, the next concern is whether the Chinese
market went beyond the two types of limit mentioned above and reached the stage of
overproduction. The distinction in the discourse of market interpreted by the Big Three vis-àvis the CISA (discussed in chapter six) may perhaps be related to this question. That is, the
Big Three rationalised their decisions by referring to the macro-economic environment and
government policies (see Chen, 2008a; Caijing, 27 April 2009; Wang J, 2009a), as well as
some other particular factors than the Chinese steel market such as shipping costs (see Suo,
2009a). These can then be understood as the overall level of consumption, on which the
production and sale of iron ore are based. The CISA, on the contrary, mainly confined its
argument within China’s domestic steel market (see Sina Finance, 9 December 2008; Zhang
Yi, 2009d; Deng, 2009d), which, in Marx’s terms, purports to the reproductive consumption
of iron ore itself. Therefore, even though the association claimed that the supply of iron ore
was more than its demand, which might be considered as overproduction, the fact that the
small and medium enterprises as well as SOEs in the Chinese industry kept purchasing iron
ore even during CISA’s industry wide boycott against the Big Three demonstrates that iron
ore supply was, at a minimum, equal to (if not less than) its demand. The other factor which
might cause the overproduction of iron ore is, as discussed above, that the commercial
capitalist sells iron ore to, not the steel plant as the end user of the commodity, but another
commercial capitalist, contributing to the fictitious prosperity in the market (Marx, 1959,
p.203). This is yet another area of controversy. From CISA’s perspective, China’s iron ore
import was excessive and not based on the actual demand for steel production (Li JL, 2009b;
Ruan, 2009b). The CCCMC, on the contrary, presented the counterargument that “the
excessive import of iron ore does not exist… (and) iron ore stockpiling does not exist… the
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reason behind the sharp increase in iron ore demand was the expansion of our country’s crude
steel production capacity in 2009” (Wang J, 2010c).

In fact, the level of steel output was indeed another area of overproduction claimed by the
CISA. However, arguments too were presented on both sides. For instance, in mid-2009,
while the Ministry of Industry and Information predicted that the level of overproduction in
the Chinese steel market for the year (i.e. 2009) would reach 20%-30% (Zhou Y, 2009c), the
Shanxi province iron and steel association at the same time told the press that,
“despite the potential overcapacity shown in statistics, steel plants did not feel the
corresponding slowed sales in the actual market. Although the (steel) price might have
been lowered down (due to the increase in steel output), everyone can still sell their
products. As such, the small and medium steel plants would keep purchasing the raw
material (i.e. iron ore) for production” (Zhai, 2009).

Fu Ziying, the deputy minister of the Ministry of Commerce, emphasised the overcapacity in
China’s steel output as one of the contributing factors behind the excessive import of iron ore
(Han, 2009c). Li Yizhong, the minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information even
claimed that, given the serious overcapacity in China’s domestic market, steel plants should
not launch any new projects in the following three years (i.e. 2010-2012) (Yangcheng
Evening News, 14 August 2009). The main reason for the overcapacity, Li Yizhong pointed
out at the World Steel Conference in 2009 October, was that while large steel plants generally
reduced the output level, some small size factories by contrast dramatically increased their
production (Zhou R.X., 2009b). This was also echoed by CISA’s data that while all of the
association’s 72 member firms had been reducing the steel output level since 2009 March,
other steel plants kept increasing the production (Xu YL, 2009f).
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On the other hand, Li Zhao, the vice president of the information management division at
Lange Steel (a leading portal in China’s iron and steel sector), commented that “China’s iron
ore demand is still far from the peak. Despite that China (the Chinese government) keeps
emphasising the overcapacity in the (domestic) steel industry, the actual usage of steel
products however reaches 96%” (Sun, 2009b). Furthermore, in the view of the small and
medium enterprises, the concept of overproduction was even regarded as the excuse to fulfil
the government’s real purpose as “the state advances, and the private retreats” (Deng Y,
2010d). In fact, some small and medium steel plants rationalised their increased output level
on the basis that they needed to generate the certain amount of cashflow to maintain the
extant market share and thus to avoid the potential M&A threat from the major SOEs (Wang
J, 2009c; Xu YL, 2009f).

Faced with the competing discourse put forward by the CISA and relevant government
departments versus the privately owned small and medium size enterprises in the industry, a
closer examination of the underlying mode of production from which the discourse derives is,
consistent with Marx’s methodology (in chapter five), needed. It has been demonstrated in
the end of chapter six that, throughout their respective discourse of market, supply and
demand, and the role of iron ore, the CISA argued from the perspective of a productive
capitalist, whereas the small and medium enterprises in the same industry interpreted were in
the mentality of a commercial capitalist. As such, the so called ‘excessive import of iron ore’
and the overproduction of steel in China’s domestic market can be explained as the improved
productive force resulting from the shift in the mode of production. That is, prior to 2009,
only the licensed firms (most of which were SOEs) had the right to import iron ore from
overseas and subsequently resold part of their purchase, at higher prices, to those unlicensed
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enterprises primarily comprised of the small and medium size privately owned steel plants
and trading companies (see Deng, 2009c; Zhang Yi, 2009f). The redistribution of iron ore
within the Chinese market was carried out through a mixture of planned economy (as
reflected by the industry policies and regulations67 promoted by the CISA) and monopolised
transactions (as reflected by the SOEs reselling iron ore to private firms). In other words, the
older form of social relations in which iron ore was redistributed became a fetter upon then
the existing productive force at the small and medium size steel plants in the Chinese market.
However, since the Big Three had opened their door to the small and medium size companies
in 2009 (see Cao, 2009a; Chen SS, 2009e) via the spot market in China, iron ore import was
no longer the privilege exclusive to the SOEs, and thereafter small and medium size firms
were able to purchase the steel making ingredient at nearly the same price as their stateowned counterparts; the conflict between the older social relations and the productive forces
was solved by the advent of the commercial capitalists engaged in iron ore spot market
transactions. However, the spot market transaction too was not without its problems. After
all, there were still some small and medium firms that were unable to purchase iron ore
(Deng, 2009c). The situation deteriorated in the beginning of 2010 when the major SOEs
such as Sinosteel and China National Building Materials Group also engaged in the
commercial trade of iron ore and thereafter significantly pushed up the spot price (Deng Y,
2010a).

If, say, the emergence of China’s iron ore spot market in 2009 enabled some small and
medium enterprises to directly purchase iron ore at spot price from the Big Three when their
67

These include the Steel Industry Self-discipline Agreement on Standardising the Trade Order of Iron Ore Import,
Suggestions On the Promotion of the Iron Ore Import Agency System, Details on the Implementation of Iron Ore Import
Agency System, and The Record Tracking Standards on Iron Ore Import Contract. A detailed discussion regarding these
standards and policies is provided in chapter eight.
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state owned counterparts either continued to use the long term contract based price or began
to monopolise the spot market, then the adoption of the quarterly index based price since
2010 April simply gave everyone in the market the same access (i.e. same index price) to the
seaborn iron ore. In Marx’s view (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.87), the introduction of financial
capital disintegrated the traditional long term pricing mechanism which had long been
applied to the international iron ore market since the late 1960s, resulting in the further
increase in the productive forces of the market. For instance, owing to their flexibility and
management effectiveness, the small and medium enterprises were able to adapt to the new
pricing mechanism more quickly and efficiently than the SOEs (Sina Finance, 22 March
2010; He, 2010a; Yang Y, 2010). Thereafter, with the fairer price of iron ore and the efficient
operation (see Zhang Yan, 2009), small and medium enterprises increased their production
capacity accordingly (Zhu, 2009) and achieved better performance (Li Y, 2010b). The SOEs,
however, lost their cost leadership advantage over the price of iron ore on the one hand and
still bore the relatively high management cost on the other, thereby exhibiting lower level of
profitability compared to the private plants (CISA, 2010; Li Y, 2010b).

Viewed in this way, the overproduction claimed by the CISA can be interpreted as the
increase in the productive forces (mainly at the small and medium steel plants), owing to the
evolved modes of production from first a mixture of planned economy and SOE monopolies,
then the emergence of commercial activities, and finally the adoption of the financialised
index price. On the other hand, Marx’s notion of overproduction, which derives from the
imbalance between the internal dependence and the external independence among
production, commerce, and finance, is yet to manifest during the period (2009-2010)
concerned in this study, given that the Chinese market had only been forced to adopt the
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financialised price in 2010. Moreover, stepping outside the iron and steel sector, the CISA
made no mention of other categories of consumption in China’s overall economy, which cast
further doubts on the association’s claim of overproduction.

7.2.2.2. Crisis projected by Marx
As discussed earlier, when the overproduction is pushed by speculations of both commercial
and financial capital to an extreme, the external independence among production, commerce,
and finance continually goes beyond the limit of capitalist production and thus the internal
dependence needs to be violently restored through a crisis. For Marx (1959), because
financial capital is one factor which operates “as the main lever of over-production and overspeculation” (p.306), the crisis first originates from the financial market.
“Hence the phenomenon that crises do not come to the surface, do not break out, in the
retail business first, which deals with direct consumption, but in the spheres of wholesale
trade, and of banking, which places the money-capital of society at the disposal of the
former” (p.203).

Specifically, the crisis will become society wide as what the financial capital is able to deploy
is the capital of society, “neither the lenders nor users of this capital are its real owners or
producers” (p.433). However, also because of the use of social property, financial capital
“accelerates the material development of the productive forces and the establishment of the
world-market… (as) the historical mission of the capitalist system of production… (and at the
same time) accelerates… the disintegration of the old mode of production” (p.306). Two
points can be drawn from the above quotation. First, while financial capital ultimately
contributes to the crisis of capitalism, it does so to dissolve and replace the old mode of
production with a new one. As mentioned in chapter five, it is this type of contradiction
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which moves society forward (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.87). Second, as capitalism and the
capitalist mode of production are “merely historical (and) transitory” (Marx, 1959, p.166), the
participation of financial capital may be benevolent to the extent that, in the first place,
capitalism will be able to constantly break the temporary limit upon the existing mode of
production and, subsequently, the class struggle will rise to such prominence that changes the
status quo. Thus, based on the two points, financialisation is necessary, as we
“can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered
by the successive phases (i.e. financialisation) of its (i.e. capitalism) normal
development” (Marx, 1887, p.7).

Instead, what can be accomplished is to “shorten and lessen the birth-pangs” (ibid, p.7).

In the case of the shift in the pricing mechanism of iron ore, the Chinese iron ore market has
yet to reach the stage of crisis during the period with which this thesis is concerned (i.e.
2008-2010). On the one hand, from the perspective of the small and medium enterprises in
the industry and the mode of production underlying their discourse, the advent of the
financialised quarterly index price has replaced the old form of social intercourse between
these firms and their state-owned counterparts with a new one. That is, they no longer need to
purchase the second hand iron ore at exhibitive prices from the major SOEs that held the iron
ore import license; everyone in the Chinese iron and steel industry has the same access to the
global iron ore market. As a consequence, the productive force at these firms has been
improved (see Li Y, 2010b).

On the other hand, it can also be explained from Big Three’s point of view that the conflict
between their social intercourse with the Chinese clients and the rising productive forces was
solved too by first the emergence of iron ore spot market transactions (as the commercial
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activity) and later the adoption of financialised quarterly index price. That is, in 2009 when
the Big Three for the first time in the 40 year long history of annual iron ore price negotiation
did not reach any price agreement with China, the emergence of spot market transactions
helped the Big Three sell iron ore to meet China’s iron ore demand. In 2010 when the long
term contract price and the spot price both exhibited a certain level of uncertainties due to the
unsettled annual negotiation and CISA’s attempted regulation, the increased amount of iron
ore output at the Big Three may also be influenced accordingly. Thus, the adoption of the
financialised quarterly index price came as the remedy to replace the time consuming and
sometimes hostile annual price negotiation and thus improve the market efficiency in terms
of both facilitating iron ore transactions and determining future production schedules.

Thus, at the stage where the financialised price was just accepted and adopted by both parties
on the supply and demand chain in the global market in 2010, it was primarily the benevolent
side of financialisation which manifested from the perspectives of the Big Three and the
Chinese small and medium firms. The quantitative constraint on the productive capital (i.e.
the steel plants and iron ore suppliers) including CISA’s attempted boycott and relevant
regulations and industry policies failed, as a result of the introduction and participation of
commercial and financial capital that extended CISA’s concepts of market and supply and
demand to the financial sector.

While recognising the benevolent side of financialisation in its early stage, its malevolent
consequence should not be ignored. It has been demonstrated from the discussion above that
the shift in the mode of production from productive capital to financial capital increased
productive forces of mining companies, trading firms, and steel plants, by freeing them from
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the limit of the political obstacles set up by the CISA and other government departments. To
state it simply, financialisation facilitated the freedom of transaction in the Chinese iron ore
market. Marx also acknowledged that “(f)ree trade increases productive forces” (Marx, 1973,
p.215). However, when it has reached the stage of overproduction where “the more
production precedes consumption, the more supply tries to force demand… consequently
crises increase in frequency and in intensity” (ibid, p.216). In chapter 18 of Capital Volume
III, Marx (1959) described the entire story which fits in the case studied here where the
manufacturers are the mining companies and steel plants, and the exporters and importers are
trading firms.
“The manufacturer may actually sell to the exporter, and the exporter, in his turn, to his
foreign customer; the importer may sell his raw materials to the manufacturer, and the
latter may sell his products to the wholesale merchant, etc. But at some particular
imperceptible point the goods lie unsold, or else, again, all producers and middlemen
may gradually become overstocked… The crisis occurs when the returns of merchants
who sell in distant markets (or whose supplies have also accumulated on the home
market) become so slow and meagre that the banks press for payment, or promissory
notes for purchased commodities become due before the latter have been resold. Then
forced sales take place, sales in order to meet payments. Then comes the crash, which
brings the illusory prosperity to an abrupt end” (ibid, p.203).

Applying the above example to the Chinese iron ore market, it can be interpreted that the
crisis will come at the point where the actual consumption of iron ore by China’s steel plants
cannot keep the same pace with the production level of the Big Three, then the iron ore
trading companies will soon be in an urgent need of money and, as their repayments fall due,
be forced to liquidate by banks, finally resulting in the crash of the market.

Although Marx, in his original work—including Capital and ‘On the Question of Free Trade’
in The Poverty of Philosophy— discussed primarily how crises originated from the industrial
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economy comprised of productive and commercial capital and led to stagnation in the
physical market, he too pointed out elsewhere how finance might trigger the structural crisis
of capitalism (e.g. Chapter 27 in Capital Volume III). That is, as crisis repeats in both
frequency and intensity in the traditional industrialist economy, it also “hastens the
centralisation of capital” (Marx, 1973, p.216) where “competition has been replaced by
monopoly… and the road has been paved, most gratifyingly, for future expropriation by the
whole of society” (Marx, 1959, p.304) (emphasis added). Alongside the shift from
competition to monopoly, also was born
“a new financial aristocracy, a new variety of parasites in the shape of promoters,
speculators and simply nominal directors; a whole system of swindling and cheating by
means of corporation promotion, stock issuance, and stock speculation… (based on the)
private production without the control of private property” (ibid, p.304).

To put it simply, as overproduction and stagnation occur more often in productive and
commercial sectors, finance, as a new form of the capitalist mode of production, comes to
suspend the crisis of capitalism. Through the access to the social capital where the actual
users and speculators of capital are no longer its legal owners (i.e. the general public) but the
financial capitalists, finance obtains the control over the social labour and aims at the
exploitation of the means of production to a greater extent “from the direct producers (i.e.
ordinary workers) to the smaller and the medium-sized capitalists themselves” (ibid, p.305).
Here the term society, recall from the concept of civil society in chapter five, “transcends the
State and the nation” (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.57). Therefore, the free flow of financial
capital across the globe helps capitalists in the developed economy tap the potential of and
exploit the developing world which postpones the eruption of capitalist crisis, albeit only
temporarily. Gradually, as the movement of financial capital simultaneously promotes the
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movement of commercial and productive capital on a global scale, the interconnectedness
therein eventually accelerates the worldwide crisis.

Viewed in this way, the potential crisis in the case of the global iron ore market will be that
the penetration of financial capitalists (as shown in Figure 4.1) such as Blackrock, HSBC,
J.P. Morgan, and Citicorp into both the major mining corporations (i.e. the Big Three) as well
as the index price publisher (i.e. McGraw Hill Financial) has closely aligned the interest of
financial market in advanced capitalist countries together with the growth potential of
China’s industrial economy (i.e. the Chinese iron and steel industry). Under such
circumstances, the financial sector in the western world lives on the industrial development of
China, as the one of the world’s most up and coming emerging markets, in two aspects. First
of all, at the micro level, while Marx (1959) primarily referred to company shares and private
savings as the tool that grants financial capitalists the access to the property of society, the
indexed iron ore price and its associated financial derivatives such as swaps and forward
contracts have opened the door of the global iron ore market to financial investors (as shown
in Figure 7.3), whereby iron ore becomes a “meaningless form of capital… (and) a
mystification of capital in its most flagrant form” (Marx, 1959, p.256) capable of breaking
the limit upon capital accumulation and centralisation and ultimately accelerating the crisis of
capitalism. Secondly, at the macro level, through holding significant portions of shares at the
Big Three and McGraw Hill Financial, the financial institutions and major investment banks
have converted their access to social capital into the entitlement of sharing the profit as both
the player and the price setter in the conventional physical market of iron ore, equipped with
the “pleasant character mixture of swindler and prophet” (Marx, 1959, p.306). In addition to
the financial sector that has been increasingly involved in the physical market, crisis could
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also arise from the overproduction and stagnation in the Chines iron and steel industry, once
the level of individual consumption could not keep the same pace with the physical
production of iron ore as well as the virtual transaction of financial derivatives.

7.2.2.3. Solution to financialisation
Having discussed the crisis resulting from financialisation both in theory and practice, the
next concern is to explore the solution proposed by Marx and the CISA respectively. First, as
mentioned earlier, Marx (1887) pointed out in the preface to the first German Edition of
Capital that the purpose of his work was to discover “the economic law of motion of modern
society” (p.7). The downside of capitalist development, or in his own words, the “obstacles
offered by the successive phases of its normal development”, cannot be sidestepped or
removed by “bold leaps” or “legal enactments” (ibid, p.7). Thus, it is reasonable to argue that
Marx would not entirely reject the wave of financialisation today. In fact, considering the
accelerating effect that financialisation has on fundamental contradiction between the
capitalist and the working class and hence the pending crisis of capitalism, his solution may
well be, to paraphrase his view on free trade, that
“(i)n a word, (financialisation) hastens the social revolution. It is in this revolutionary
sense alone, (ladies and) gentlemen, that I vote in favour of (it)” (Marx, 1973, p.224).

Turning to the practice of the Chinese iron and steel sector and the CISA in particular, what
stands in vivid contrast with Marx’s opinion above is the association’s attempt to stifle the
concept of financialisation in its Chinese cradle, through introducing and implementing
compulsorily a number of industry regulations and policies. This is not surprising,
considering CISA’s separation of the financial from the productive and commercial capital

303

Chapter 7 Shift to Financialisation of Iron Ore Price—Interaction among Modes of
Production

demonstrated earlier (from 7.2.1.1 to 7.2.1.5). That is, the association took the Chinese iron
and steel industry as one traditional productive economy where only the productive capital
and productive activities were needed and allowed. On the other hand, while Marx
considered the class conflict as the ultimate solution to crisis of capitalism and thus
financialisation, the CISA rarely argued from the class perspective throughout its discourse in
iron ore negotiations. As the industry’s leading organisation, CISA’s management team
consists mostly of former government officials and senior executives from major SOEs (as
shown in Table 6.2), and its member firms are primarily comprised of large size steel plants
and trading companies, most of which are also SOEs. As such, given the affinity between the
CISA, the major SOEs, and the government, the fact that the association made little mention
of the working class interest in its argument against financialisation casts doubt on the
accountability of the CISA.

Taking the above factors into account, the question arises: while chapter six concludes that
the CISA was in the mentality of a productive capitalist throughout its discourse in iron ore
negotiations, the early sections in the current chapter (7.1.1.3., 7.1.2.3. and 7.2.1.) show the
association’s refusal to adapt the new modes of capitalist production (i.e. the commercial
trade of iron ore in the Chinese spot market and the adoption of financialised quarterly index
price), the political background of CISA’s senior management further casts doubt on the
nature of the association. Then what really is the role of the CISA? This question is addressed
in the next chapter, considering the purpose and scope of the current chapter that deal with
the rise of financialisation from the interaction among the three groups concerned.
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In chapter seven, the emergence of financialisation is investigated and perceived through the
interaction among the Big Three, the small and medium size firms in the Chinese iron and
steel industry, and the CISA. The inner connections among the productive, commercial, and
financial capital is presented and discussed in Marx’s concept of civil society where different
modes of capitalist production coordinate and / or conflict with one another beyond the
national boundaries. The change in iron ore pricing mechanisms from the traditional long run
contract based price, to first the spot market price and finally the financialised quarterly price
is analysed through Marx’s interpretation of advancement in capitalist modes of production.
Alongside the analysis, the research question of the thesis as to why the CISA failed in its
attempt to resist the financialised index price of iron ore is addressed in two aspects: first,
financialisation is the structurally inevitable trend in the global iron ore market as the solution
to the conflict between the social relations among the three groups and the corresponding
productive forces; second, the CISA, as the leading association of the Chinese iron and steel
sector, did not recognise the inner connection among production, commerce, and finance, and
thus failed to adapt to the advanced mode of production therein. The end of chapter seven
also poses another factor behind CISA’s failure: the association’s omission of the working
class interest in its argument against financialisation.

Thus, the current chapter examines the role of the CISA from a class perspective, to further
answer the research question as for the reasons behind the association’s failed attempt to
resist financialisation. In particular, CISA’s discourse is analysed from the perspectives of a
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capitalist and of the working class, respectively. In addition, the association’s role as a semigovernment department is also explored for two reasons. First, the political profile of CISA’s
senior management as outlined in Table 6.2 suggests the intimate relationship between the
association and the Chinese government which merits further examination. Second, as the
Chinese government claims to base its political ideology on Marxism (Deng, 1993; Jiang,
2006b, 2006c), Marx’s theory in this thesis, as mentioned in chapter seven, not only serves as
the theoretical framework for financialisation and the methodological tool for discourse
analysis, but also forms part of the Chinese context in which this study is situated and
accomplished. Therefore, the class analysis in the current chapter is threefold, comparing
CISA’s mindset with the perspectives of, first a capitalist, then a proletarian government, and
finally the working class.

The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The first section (8.1.) analyses to what
extent the CISA resembles a productive capitalist. As concluded in the end of chapter six, the
association did exhibit to a certain degree the characteristics of productive capital in its
discourse of iron ore price. While such a conclusion is drawn through comparing the CISA
with the other two groups of corporations including the Big Three and the small and medium
enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry, the analysis in 8.1. is undertaken from a
class perspective to see if the association really acted as a productive capitalist during the iron
ore negotiations. In addition to the productive capitalist, the political connection between
CISA’s senior management and the Chinese government as shown in Table 6.2 suggests the
nature of the association as a form of government. Thus, section 8.2. compares the CISA with
other government organisations involved in the negotiation. In particular, CISA’s discourse is
traced back to the ideas and proposals made by the State Council, in order to determine
whether the association wholeheartedly followed the central government’s advice or it
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worked as the industry representative on behalf of the corporations. In either case, an analysis
of CISA’s discourse from the working class perspective is needed: if the CISA was a type of
government department, and since both the Chinese government (Deng, 1993; Jiang, 2006b)
and the association (CISA, 2011b, 2013b; Liu, 2013) claim to be informed by Marxism, the
question becomes why the CISA still failed in resisting the participation of financial capital in
China’s iron ore market, standing in violent contrast to what Marx projected in The
Communist Manifesto, or; if the CISA served the interest of the corporations in the industry,
it is too worth exploring to what extent the association deviated from Marx’s emphasis on the
proletarian interest. Therefore, the third section (8.3.) investigates CISA’s concern with the
working class interest. In the final section (8.4.), a conclusion is drawn.

8.1. Comparison between CISA and productive capitalist
CISA’s role in the Chinese iron and steel industry in general and the annual iron ore price
negotiation in particular has often been questionable and controversial, as illustrated in
chapters six and seven. While the association was in the mentality of a productive capitalist in
defending the long run contract based price (see section 6.5.1.), it lacked the ability to adapt
to the change in the mode of production as did any other market participants (see sections
7.1.1.3., 7.1.2.3. and 7.2.1.). Moreover, its political background and affinity (see Table 6.2)
with the Chinese government and the major SOEs in the Chinese iron and steel industry
further cast doubt on its identity. However, unlike the analyses in the previous chapters which
compare the CISA with other corporations as different groups of capital, the present section
examines the role of the association from a class perspective by contrasting CISA’s discourse
with the characteristics of a capitalist described by Marx in Capital and The Communist
Manifesto.
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As discussed in chapter five, Marx’s ontological view is dialectical materialism constitutes
the “unifying truth of both (idealism and materialism)” (Marx, 1974, p.135), a constantly
changing process where “circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances”
(Marx & Engels, 1974, p.59). Seeing in this way, capital too is not in its steady state or
equilibrium, but rather in a continual movement which not only (re)generates the monetary
form of capital but also reinforces the dominant social position of capital and the exploited
status of the working class. Thus, Marx considered capital in its form of movement,
constantly metamorphosing itself throughout the capitalist mode of production. In relation to
productive capital, its movement is, as discussed in chapter four and shown in Figure 8.1
below, that the initial capital (M) is spent on the purchase of human labour (L) and raw
material (MP), which, through the process of production (P), will be converted into the
finished product (C’) ready for sale at the price of M’ (Marx, 1956).

Turning to the case of the CISA, it has been demonstrated and concluded in chapter six
(section 6.5.1.) that, in defending the annual negotiation based price of iron ore, the
association’s discourse was constructed in the mentality of a productive capitalist. More
specifically, as shown in Figure 6.7, iron ore is regarded as the means of production (MP), i.e.
the raw material for steel products (C’). As such, China’s steel plants could only purchase
iron ore for the purpose of manufacturing steel, and, subsequent to the fulfilment of
production (P), sell the finished steel product (C’) for M’.
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In fact, it was not just the CISA who considered the iron ore price from the view of
productive capital, the Big Three and the small and medium size steel plants in China were
also in the first place the productive capitalists. More specifically, while the Big Three and
the Chinese steel plants were also productive capitalists in that they produce either iron ore or
steel as the finished product ready for sale, they had also, following the breakdown of the
traditional annual price negotiation between the Big Three and the CISA, adopted the spot
market price and later the financialised quarterly index price. In fact, from Marx’s
perspective, such changes in the iron ore pricing mechanism were not superimposed by any
single party, but as a consequence of the conflict between social relations and the
corresponding productive forces, resulting in the advanced modes of production. The Big
Three, when faced with China’s recovered iron ore demand in the aftermath of the GFC, as
well as the unfinished price negotiation with the CISA, opened their door to China’s spot
market in 2009; and in 2010 when the negotiation still remained unsettled and the CISA
promised to legally eliminate spot market transactions, adopted the quarterly index price
applicable to all participants in the global market. Correspondingly, the acceptance and
adoption of the spot market price and the quarterly index price by the small and medium size
firms in the Chinese iron and steel industry were also a result of the conflict among their
increased iron ore demand, the exhibitive price of the second hand iron ore sold at the major
SOEs, and CISA’s stringent assessment criteria for the official license of iron ore import.

While such shifts in iron ore pricing are discussed and analysed extensively in both theory
and practice in chapters four and seven as the natural development of the capitalist mode of
production, and necessary trend of capital movement that flows to whichever sector that
produces the highest profit, the CISA nevertheless attempted to maintain its perspective as
the productive capitalist. Thus, the significant distinction between the CISA and other
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productive capitalists such as the Big Three that can be drawn here is that the former refused
to adapt to the changed modes of production (i.e. the spot market price and the quarterly
index price). On the surface, the main contributing factor to the refusal is, as illuminated
earlier in 7.2.1., CISA’s omission that finance shall be part of the Chinese iron and steel
industry. In terms of the broad capital movement, it is argued in chapter seven that the CISA
failed to understand the inner connection among production, commerce, and finance.
However, insofar as the current section is concerned, CISA’s rejection of finance can also be
interpreted as the association’s questionable intention to maximise profit. That is, as Marx
(1959) stated that capital’s sole purpose of existence is to expand itself, then the movement
towards financial capital in the cases of the Rizhao Centre, the index price of iron ore, other
financial derivatives associated with iron ore price, and FMG’s request for the 5.5-6 billion
USD financing can too be justified by the same motive. This at the same time casts doubt on
the intention of the CISA, posing the question that whether the association also exhibited its
sole pursuit of profit throughout its discourse in the price negotiation. The following analysis
is thus dedicated towards this end.

8.1.1. CISA as the productive capitalist
Since its appointment under the authority of the State Council and the support from the
Ministry of Commerce (Cao, 2009c) and the Ministry of Industry and Information (Yuan,
2009b) as China’s representative at the iron ore price negotiation table, the association
claimed to represent the interest of the Chinese iron and steel industry as a whole including
both the SOEs and the privately owned small and medium enterprises (Xinhuanet, 17 August
2009). Liu Zhenjiang, the vice chairman and the secretary of the CPC Committee at the
CISA, explained the role of the CISA in the negotiation that,
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“there exists many difficulties in letting an individual enterprises negotiate the national
price. (For instance,) what are the opinions of other firms? What is the opinion of the
small and medium enterprises? What is the opinion of the private enterprises? (In
addition,) it is not convenient for one firm to collect views and information from other
firms, not to mention to unifying different views. It is easy to represent your own firm,
but not easy to represent other firms. Even after the negotiation is concluded, there too
exist difficulties in fulfilling the long term contract (by all Chinese companies).
Therefore, letting the industry organisation (i.e. CISA) coordinate the negotiation is more
convenient than delegating one firm with the same duty.” (Xinhuanet, 17 August 2009).

However, as shown in the political and professional background of CISA’s senior
management which mostly consists of former government officials and directors at major
SOEs, and the association’s entry criterion that requires the minimum steel output of 1
million tons per year (CISA, 2011a), the small and medium size enterprises are somehow
underrepresented. Then the productive capitalist which the CISA was assumed to represent
may have no intention to maximise the profit of the small and medium firms.

8.1.1.1. Suppression of the private transactions in iron ore spot market
This was particularly the case where the CISA disapproved these firms’ ‘private’ purchase
and import from the foreign mining companies. When the iron ore negotiation reached the
stalemate in 2009 and the Big Three first opened their door to other players than the major
SOEs in China’s spot market, the small and medium steel plants and trading companies took
it as the opportunity for fair competition through purchasing the raw material at the same
price as the SOEs. The CISA however criticised the move, and emphasised that
“the small and medium enterprises have neither the power nor the qualification to sign up
the long term iron ore contract. For those who had already signed on the so called
contract, (it) would not be able to go through the custom, (and so) would be nothing but a
piece of wastepaper” (Gold Bull Information, 12 June 2009).

Shan Shanghua, the secretary general of CISA, told the press that
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“have those iron ore import gone to proper buyers with the approved contract? Are the
buyers the manufacturing enterprises which operate according to the country’s industry
policy?... it is not that we did not know about the excessive iron ore import in the first
half of this year (i.e. 2009) by the trading companies. Now (we) first check which one of
them exceeded the (import) quota the most, and then punish whoever violates the
national regulation” (Wang J, 2009c).

Consequently, the association announced to form the iron ore coordination team, together
with relevant government departments including the Ministry of Commerce and the CCCMC,
to investigate the transaction and distribution of iron ore from its origin, and then disqualify
those that breach the regulation (i.e. privately purchase from overseas) as the punishment
(Gold Bull Information, 12 June 2009; Zhang Yi, 2009g; Economy 30 Minutes, 23 June
2009). The immediate closure of the Rizhao Centre best served as the example here, where
five privately owned companies attempted to establish the online iron ore trading platform
and launch the Chinese iron ore index price, which was then shut down within two weeks by
the association. In the meantime, the small and medium firms expressed different opinion that
“in the past because we did not have the license to buy the long term priced iron ore, and
had to purchase from the domestic market with high prices; at present the spot market
price is lower than its long term contract based counterpart, but we are still under
restrictions. In fact, according to normal business logic, as long as I have the money, why
cannot I purchase as much as I can for the rest of the year when the price is low?” (Wang
J, 2009c).

Behind their private purchase from overseas was the purpose of maintaining the current
market share so as to avoid being merged with the major SOEs (Wang J, 2009c). However, in
this regard, the CISA obviously had no intention to help the small and medium size
companies maximise their profits by allowing them to use the spot market price. Thus, it is
most likely that the association, in its mentality of a productive capitalist, did not represent
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the interest of these firms. However, this is not to say that the CISA acted its capitalist role
for the major SOEs; the profit maximisation of SOEs was also curtailed by the association.

At about the same time when the small and medium firms began to directly purchase iron ore
from overseas resources, SOEs too participated in, rather than the traditional long term
contract based channel, but the spot market transactions (Zhu, 2009), for two main reasons.
First, the availability of iron ore in China’s spot market, as a result of the unsettled price
negotiation in 2009, stimulated not only the small and medium players but also the major
SOEs to take part for both meeting their own production demand and reselling the purchase
to other firms (Wang J, 2009c). This was particular the case at that time when the spot price
was much lower than the long term contract based price (Economic Information Daily, 10
November 2009; Ma, 2010b). Second, also because of such significant price difference, many
of the licensed buyers did not even fulfil their annual iron ore contract for 2008. That is, they
would rather pay the penalty for breaking the long term iron ore supply contract, and
purchased from the spot market (Caijing, 27 April 2009; Economic Information Daily, 29
December 2009; Yang LM, 2010b). The participation in spot market transactions by the
SOEs however was lambasted by the CISA. In 2009 June, the association officially
announced that the nation would significantly chastise the domestic trading companies that
kept importing iron ore against the normal market order. The focus of the punishment would
primarily be on the top 10 iron ore importing SOEs (Li XL, 2009).Consequently, when
Japan’s Nippon Steel, Korea’s Posco Steel, and Europe’s ArcelorMittal had, one after
another, reached the annual price agreement with the Big Three, China’s top steel plants such
as Baosteel and Wuhan iron & steel could neither import from overseas nor purchase from
domestic spot market, but only from CISA’s designated trading firms (i.e. Sinosteel and
Ruiganglian) (Zhang XD, 2009a).
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8.1.1.2. Opposition to the steel price increase proposed by major SOEs
Aside from the spot market transaction, another part of the major SOEs’ operation which the
CISA too attempted to restrain was their proposed price increase in steel products. That is, in
mid-2009 when major SOEs, starting with Baosteel, announced to raise the steel price (Gao,
2009), Shan Shanghua, CISA’s secretary general, went to Baosteel in person to discuss the
company’s forthcoming price increase. He expressed the concern that “the association wants
to see each major steel plant could hold on for a while and not increase steel price at this
important moment. (Because) once the steel price goes up, there will be obviously less space
for the price reduction to be achieved in the iron ore negotiation” (Deng, 2009d). In response,
Xu Lejiang, the chairman of Baosteel, argued that
(the price raise) was entirely a market behaviour, and a decision based on the steel
market demand… You can see how prosperous these days the car manufacturing and the
home appliance sectors are. While the raw material demand from these industries has
gone up, naturally the steel price will correspondingly increase. If you asked me to raise
the steel price for the shipbuilding industry (where the demand for steel is not high), I
would not dare to do so.” (Deng, 2009d).

Thus, while the major SOEs proposed the price raise of their product as a corporate matter
responding to the favourable market condition (Dong, 2009d), the CISA however was not
willing to accept the change. In other words, profit maximisation on the parts of the SOEs too
was not the top priority of the association.

8.1.1.3. Restriction on the level of steel output
In addition to the profit making activities such as reselling imported iron ore in the domestic
market and raising prices of steel products which upset the CISA, the increased level of steel
output at the Chinese steel plants is another area which the association did not approve.
Following its repudiation of the private purchase of iron ore from the Big Three, the CISA
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attributed the excessive iron ore demand of the small and medium firms to their production
overcapacity (Chen SS, 2009e).
“Behind the illusionary demand for iron ore, which made this year’s (i.e. 2009) iron ore
negotiation exceptionally difficulty, were the large stockpile of iron ore by trading
companies and the overproduction at small and medium steel plants”, said Shan
Shanghua (Yue & Zhou, 2009).

At the association’s 2009 director meeting, Deng Qilin, CISA’s chairman and the president of
Wuhan Iron & Steel, emphasised that all steel plants in China must base the production
scheme on sales orders, the strictly follow the principle that no production could be carried
out when the product price was lower than its cost. Whichever enterprises that breach this
principle shall be exposed and criticised (Zuo, 2009). However, whilst the CISA urged the
entire industry to lower down the level of steel production (CISA, 2009b), counter argument
was also presented. For instance, Zhu Fengliang, the secretary general at the iron and steel
association of Shangxi province, indicated that although there might exist overcapacity (in
CISA’s statistics), steel plants however did not feel the corresponding sales stagnation in the
steel market; while the steel price might have been lower than before, but everyone could still
sell the products as usual, meaning that the small and medium size plants would purchase the
raw material for production more proactively (Zhai, 2009). Here, regardless of whether the
alleged overcapacity existed or not, one thing which can be certain is that the profit making
activity through manufacturing and selling steel products was again suppressed by the CISA.

8.1.1.4. Imposition of M&A in the Chinese iron and steel industry
Furthermore, the industry wide M&A on CISA’s agenda (Deng & Gao, 2008; Chen JS, 2010)
is another area where most steel plants interests were affected. On the one hand, from the
perspective of the privately owned steel enterprises, their production capacity and the access
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to bank loans were curtailed and restricted by the CISA in the name of the M&A proposed by
the State Council (Deng Y, 2010b; Tan, 2010). The executive vice president of Hebei Jinxi
Group (top 10 private steel plants in China) pointed out that the M&A should not be about
‘the state advances and the private retreats’ where major SOEs merge with private companies
in the name of shutting down the obsolete production (Deng Y, 2010d). Thus, to avoid being
merged with the major SOEs, small and medium size steel plants continued their production
and the purchase of iron ore (Wang J, 2009c; Xu YL, 2009f). For the SOEs, on the other
hand, the proposed M&A too was not something that they were willing to carry out. Ansteel
indicated that, in relation to the steel sector M&A,
“enterprises have no right to act free (of government intervention). Currently, most of the
M&A taken place among China’s domestic steel enterprises reflect the will of the
government, whereas the real market oriented M&A cases have been sparse. When the
director of the SASAC asks you to acquire, you will have to do it even when you do not
want to” (Deng Y, 2010d).

Also, the vice president of Chongqing Steel shared the similar view.
“the first issue to be solved before the M&A is the problem of the government (which
does not consider the interest of corporations). Problems within steel enterprises are easy
to fix… for example, when the government asked Chongqing Steel to acquire Chongqing
Special Steel, the general opinion in the industry regarded the event as ‘the sick carrying
the dead’, that is, while having so many difficulties on its own already, Chongqing Steel
had to acquire another enterprise that had even worse financial performance… (Thus,)
regarding M&A, we have suffered a lot, and learnt the lesson” (Deng Y, 2010d).

However, while recognising that steel enterprises might be able to adjust their corporate
structure within, the CISA emphasised that the layout of the iron and steel sector and the
level of industry concentration still needed government adjustment (via the M&A) (Deng Y,
2010b). Thus, in this aspect, it is more likely that the association played the role of
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government, rather than on behalf of any single steel plants, or, in Marx’s terms, any
productive capitalists.

8.1.2. CISA as the industry regulator
So far it has been demonstrated that the association did not exhibit, as would any other
productive capitalists, the sole intention to maximise the profit of the Chinese steel plants and
trading firms, in terms of the unofficial purchase of iron ore in China’s domestic market, the
proposed price raise of steel products, the increased level of steel output, and the industry
wide M&A proposed by the State Council. It is then highly unlikely that the CISA really
played the role of a productive capitalist. In fact, in order to constrain the profit making
activities mentioned above, the association took the initiative to introduce a number of
industry policies which were supposed to be either implemented through self-discipline or
enforced by the law.

8.1.2.1. Introduction of a unified iron ore price and relevant industry policies
First, in relation to the private transactions of iron ore among the Big Three, the SOEs, and
the small and medium firms, the association in 2009 July proposed to the Ministry of Industry
and Information that the government should completely abolish the spot market transactions
in the country (Xu YL, 2009h). At the same time the association promoted a unified price
exclusive to China’s domestic market. This was to “gradually terminate the chaotic situation
of our nation’s iron ore import market” (Yue & Zhou, 2009), said Shan Shanghua, as the new
price, once adopted, would be able to replace both the long term contract based price and the
spot market price. Then, the profiteering opportunity of reselling iron ore to other participants
in the domestic market, motivated by the significant difference among different prices, would
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come to an end. This has again confirmed that the association was not simply aimed at
maximising profit of any particular firms. For the major SOEs, on the one hand, unifying iron
ore price nationwide would mean that they could no longer resell iron ore to other firms at
prohibitive prices, the profit made from which “even exceeded far beyond their steel making
business” (Wang J, 2009e). On the other hand, for those small and medium companies
already accustomed to the private channel of purchasing iron ore, having another new system
for their procurement may render them more dependent on others (Wang J, 2009e). A small
size steel plant based in the city of Tangshan indicated that
“while the fluctuations in iron ore price do make us worried, what is going to make us
more worried however is the case that (we) could not have the direct access to the import
(once the unified system applies)”(Wang J, 2009e).

Even suppose the access to iron ore could be guaranteed, another question would be
that
“since there will be a stage of iron ore redistribution, it must mean that there will also be
plenty room for profiteering and corruption. Then who can take the lead (in the
redistribution process) to maintain our confidence?” (Wang J, 2009e).

Further doubt was cast on the question that whether major SOEs such as Baosteel would be
willing to share the same price with the small and medium enterprises (Economy 30 Minutes,
2009; Zhang Yi, 2009f). Thus, at its early stage, the proposal for the unified price did not
receive much support from both the SOEs and the small and medium firms (Li & Liu, 2009;
Wang J, 2009e).

8.1.2.2. Proposed abolition of spot market transactions and relevant industry policies
Secondly, to help realise the unified pricing mechanism, the CISA introduce a number of
industry policies to help prevent iron ore spot market transactions. That is, in 2010 April
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when the quarterly index price was officially adopted by the Big Three in the global market
and privately accepted by the small and medium firms in the Chinese market, the association
put forward The 2010 Iron Ore Importing Enterprise Assessment Criteria and Application
Procedure (i.e. Procedure hereafter), Details on the Implementation of Iron Ore Import
Agency System (i.e. Details), and The Record Tracking Standards on Iron Ore Import
Contract (i.e. Trading Standards). The Procedure effectively prevented the small and
medium firms from directly purchasing iron ore from overseas. That is, the stringent
qualification criteria only grant the access to those enterprises with (1) registered assets no
less than RMB 50 million68; (2) credit rating at 2A or above; (3) bank credit level at RMB
400 million69 or above; and (4) annual amount of iron ore import at 1 million tons or above
(Li RX, 2010f).

If, say, the Procedure was aimed at ruling out the possibility of small and medium firms
purchasing iron ore at a cheaper price as their state owned counterparts, then the Details was
to forbid the licensed firms (mostly SOEs) from making profits by reselling their first hand
import to the domestic market. In particular, it stated that China’s iron ore importing
enterprises must strictly implement the agency system where the licensed importers first
purchase iron ore from overseas and then resell the purchase, in addition to their own
consumption amount, to those unlicensed companies with only 3%-5% surcharges (Li RX,
2010f). As such, it was argued that the profiteering activity by the major SOEs through
reselling iron ore to small and medium firms at prohibitive prices would come to an end.
Also, as for those clients of the second hand iron ore who might even resell their purchase to

68

This is equivalent to AUD$ 8.33 million, assuming the exchange rate between Chinese RMB and Australian dollar is 6:1.

69

This is equivalent to AUD$ 66.67 million, assuming the exchange rate between Chinese RMB and Australian dollar is 6:1.
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the third and fourth hand buyers, the Details emphasised that “buyers (of the second hand
iron ore) can only use the steel making ingredient for their own production. That is, the
buyers are forbidden from selling iron ore back to the market (Li RX, 2010f). To ensure the
implementation of Details, the Tracking Standards was introduced and imposed upon the
licensed importing firms which were asked to report, on a monthly basis, the content of their
import contract including the quantity, grade, origin, and destination to the ‘joint office for
iron ore import’ co-established by the CISA and the CCCMC under the guidance of the
Ministry of Commerce (Li RX, 2010f).

8.1.2.3. Production overcapacity and relevant industry policies
Thirdly, in relation to the production overcapacity in the industry, the CISA issued the Steel
Industry Self-discipline Agreement on Standardising the Trade Order of Iron Ore Import (i.e.
Agreement on Iron Ore Import) and the Steel Industry Self-discipline Agreement on
Standardising the Order of Domestic Steel Market (i.e. Agreement on Domestic Steel
Market). The Agreement on Iron Ore Import forbade the imported iron ore from being
distributed to those steel plants whose steel production capacity was deemed obsolete (CISA,
2009c). The Agreement on Domestic Steel Market stated that steel enterprises should
schedule their production based on the market demand, and obey the principle that plants do
not begin the production without receiving the sales contract in the first place (CISA, 2009d).

Summarising the discussions above, it has been demonstrated in 8.1.1.1. that the CISA was
not really in the mentality of a capitalist, as the association did not consider profit
maximisation as the sole purpose of the existence of either the major SOEs or the small and
medium firms. In particular, the private purchase and sale of iron ore in China’s domestic
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market, which helped the Chinese companies make profits, was not approved by the
association. Nor did it allow steel plants, both state and privately owned, to carry out
production at their will. To reinforce such guidelines, the CISA introduced a number of
industry policies which required self-discipline of the industry. These are discussed in
8.1.1.2., suggesting the regulatory role of the association. Then the next question is whether
the CISA can be regarded as a government organisation serving in the interest of the
government, rather than that of the market. The follow section is directed towards this end.

8.2. Comparison between CISA and government organisation
While the political and professional background of CISA’s management team shown in Table
6.2 exhibits the intimate relationship between the association and the Chinese government,
and the previous section indicates the role of the CISA as a regulator in the industry, the
current section investigates CISA’s attitude towards the government, in an attempt to answer
the question that whom the association was held accountable to.

In comparison with the major SOEs and in particular the small and medium size enterprises
whose profit making activities, at least in part, were suppressed by the CISA, the Chinese
government received significant support from the association. While the CISA took the
initiative to forbid the iron ore spot market transaction, promote the import agency system
and the industry wide M&A, and introduce the corresponding industry policies, these ideas
were in fact put forward by the State Council in the Iron & Steel Industry Adjustment and
Revitalisation Plan (i.e. Plan hereafter).
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For instance, in relation to the iron ore import agency system, the Plan stated that
“industry association / chamber of commerce should, through the coordination and the
reinforced self-discipline within the industry, standardise the market order of iron ore
import, and explore and promote the agency system. To grasp the current market
opportunity, coordinate (China’s) domestic buyers with iron ore suppliers, establish the
reciprocal pricing mechanism for iron ore import and the long term stable cooperation
(between China’s buyers and foreign suppliers)”(State Council, 2009) (Emphases added).

Correspondingly, in promoting the agency system, the CISA kept referring to the Plan as the
guideline to the association (Zhang Yi, 2009g; Xu YL, 2009c; CISA, 2009b). Also of
particular interest to note from the above quote is the requirement to establish the long term
reciprocal relationship between iron ore buyers and suppliers. This too is consistent with
CISA’s emphasis on the long run win-win relationship between China’s steel plants and the
Big Three throughout its discourse of market discussed in chapter six. In fact, Shan
Shanghua, the secretary general of the association, specifically pointed out the balanced
interest sharing relationship between the sellers and buyers as the key principle on which the
Chinese side would always insist in the negotiation (Zhou Y, 2009a). While CISA’s emphasis
on the reciprocal relationship can be explained by the mode of production which the
association adopted and exhibited in its discourse throughout the negotiation, relevance can
also be drawn to the close relationship between the CISA and the State Council. That is, on
the one hand, it has been illustrated in chapter six and seven that the association simply
considered steel plants and mining companies as the only two types of players in the global
iron ore market, a physical market from the perspective of a productive capitalist, thereby
emphasising the interest sharing relationship between the only two groups of market
participants, and ignoring the tendency that many other participants from the financial sector
had also took part in iron ore transactions. On the other hand, however, since CISA’s role as
the productive capitalist has been questioned earlier in the current chapter (i.e. 8.1.1.1.) which
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subsequently points the association’s identity to a regulator of the industry (i.e. 8.1.1.2.), the
so called reciprocal relationship between China’s steel plants and the Big Three can then be
traced to the State Council. In other words, the CISA might not in itself act the role of a
productive capitalist, but simply as a government organisation following the Plan put forward
by the State Council, or alternatively a combination of both.

Secondly, in relation to the production overcapacity of the Chinese steel plants, relevance can
also be found between the CISA and the State Council. For instance, Plan regarded the
elimination of production overcapacity as one of its key objective (State Council, 2009). In
particular, the State Council indicated in the Plan that
“(a)ny blast furnaces under 300 cubic metres, and converters and electronic furnaces
under 20 tons shall be considered as obsolete and must be phased out with the
corresponding overcapacity reduced by 53.4 million tons and 3.2 million tons
respectively before the end of 2010.Any blast furnaces under 400 cubic metres, and
converters and electronic furnaces under 20 tons shall be considered as obsolete (by the
2011 standards) and must be phased out with the corresponding overcapacity reduced by
53.4 million tons and 3.2 million tons respectively before the end of 2011” (State
Council, 2009).

Corresponding to the criteria above, the CISA (2009c) stated in the Agreement on Iron Ore
Import that China’s iron ore importing companies were not permitted to sell their import to
those steel plants whose production capacity was deemed outdated by the Plan. Similarly,
while the Plan stated the general guideline that “(steel plants shall) strictly control the
increase in production capacity, (government) will no longer approve or support any
programme that simply increases or expands steel production capacity” (State Council,
2009), the CISA (2009d) put forward the specific requirement in the Agreement on Domestic
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Steel Market that steel plants must base their steel production schedule on the sales contract
which they must have received before commencing the production. In fact, the Ministry of
Industry and Information also called for the strict control on the production expansion of the
domestic steel plants that any new programmes involved with the increase and / or innovation
of production capacity must be based on the pre-condition that the equal amount of obsolete
production capacity will be phased out first (Zhou RX, 2009b).

Thirdly, in relation to the industry wide M&A promoted by the CISA, the State Council also
considered it as the key objective of the Plan that
“(the government) promotes the M&As cross different regions including those between
Anben group (comprised of Anshan Iron & Steel as 3rd largest, and Benxi Iron & Steel
as no.13th largest steel plant), Panzhihua Iron & Steel group (the 11th largest steel plant),
and Dongbei Special Steel group (the 39th largest steel plant), between Baosteel group
(the largest steel plant), Baogang group (the 17th largest steel plant), and Ningbosteel
group, and also the regional M&As including those between Tianjin Pipe group (the 23rd
largest steel plant),Tianjin Tiantie Metallurgy group (the 18th largest steel plant), Tianjin
Iron & Steel group (the 32nd largest steel plant), and Tianjin Metallurgy group, and
between Taiyuan Iron & Steel group and other steel plants within Shanxi province. By
2011, there will be several internationally competitive extra-large steel conglomerates in
the country including Baosteel group, Anben group, and Wuhan Iron & Steel group, each
of which will be equipped with the production capacity at more than 50 million tons; and
a few large steel enterprises with the production capacity ranging from 10 to 30 million
tons” (State Council, 2009).

Similar to the issue of production capacity, the State Council was not the only government
department that encouraged the M&A mentioned above, the Ministry of Industry and
Information was also working on the Steel Industry Mergers and Acquisitions Principles
(Gold Bull Information, 23 July 2009) and the Guidelines on the Promotion of the Mergers
and Acquisitions of Steel Enterprises (Zhang GD, 2010). The minister, Li Yizhong, also
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mentioned at the World Steel Conference in 2009 that government departments should
facilitate the industry wide M&A by introducing the corresponding accounting, taxation,
finance, and industry policies (Zhou RX, 2009b).

To summarise the discussion so far, the views and policies proposed by the CISA can be
traced back to relevant government departments including the State Council and the Ministry
of Industry and Information. This is not surprising given the political background of CISA’s
senior management team shown in Table 6.2. While it remains as a moot point whether it was
the CISA or government organisations which initially introduce those ideas and concepts,
what is certain on the other hand at this stage is that the CISA took the role of a semiregulatory body in the Chinese iron and steel industry to assist the implementation of
government regulations. In other words, the association was in fact accountable to the
government, rather than to any iron and steel enterprises.

However, this leads to yet another question: since the CISA was in fact acting as an unofficial
government department, and considering that the Chinese government claimed itself to be a
socialist political regime based on Marxism (Deng, 1993, p.62; Jiang, 2006b, p.8), why did
the association still fail to resist and / or overthrow the financialised index price of iron ore?
Or, from Marx’s perspective in The Communist Manifesto, why was it not the “fall (of the
financial capitalist) and the victory of the proletariat (represented by the CPC government)”
(Marx & Engels, 2008, p.51)? This becomes particularly obvious in the case of the
financialisation in the global iron ore market where one side of the story corresponds to
Marx’s projection of capitalism:
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“(t)he bourgeoisie 70 cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of
production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of
society … All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable
prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before
they can ossify” (Marx & Engels, 2008, p.38).

Here, the changes in the instruments and relations of production have been explored in
chapter seven, where the shifts in the mode of production, from production to commerce and
finance, are illustrated in the context of the Chinese iron ore market. More specifically, the
traditional annual contract based practicing mechanism which had been adopted for nearly
four decades was abandoned by the Big Three in 2009 as both result of and the solution to the
conflict between their unsettled iron ore price negotiation with the CISA and the growth in
the iron ore supply and demand. Before very long, the newly adopted spot market price had
become ‘antiquated before (it) can ossify’ in that the quarterly index price was then accepted
by the global market in 2010 April, serving as the solution to China’s promised regulation
and intervention of its domestic spot market, the outdated annual price negotiation, and the
recovered global market demand of iron ore. In fact, the rising demand for iron ore in the
world market was also pictured by Marx that
“(t)he need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the
bourgeoisie 71 over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle
everywhere, establish connections everywhere” (ibid, p.38).

The other side of the scenario concerns the CISA and the Chinese government in general,
exhibiting a different picture from Marx’s illumination. That is, While Marx was right about
the CPC that “(the) organisation of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a
70

Here, Engels further explained that bourgeoisie refers to “the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of social
production and employers of wage labour” (Marx & Engels, 2008, p.33).
71

As mentioned in the previous footnote, bourgeoisie purports to the capitalist class.
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political party” (Marx & Engels, 2008, p.47) has been achieved in the context of China, the
promised “overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy” (ibid, p53) and the “(a)bolition of private
property” (ibid, p.54) however are not as expected by Marx. In the context of the Chinese
iron and steel industry, although the CISA considers Marxism as one of the import theoretical
guidance of the association 72 (CISA, 2011b, 2013b; Liu, 2013), there are also private
enterprises in the domestic market, not to mention the Big Three from overseas. Granted, it
can be argued that, in terms of the government control over the iron and steel industry, the
industry policies and regulations (discussed above) introduced by the State Council and the
CISA may to some extent correspond to Marx’s suggestion that
“(t)he proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the
bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., of
the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total productive forces as
rapidly as possible” (Marx & Engels, 2008, pp.63-4).

This is particularly the case for the industry wide M&A in the Plan. That is, despite the
complaint expressed by both private and state-owned corporations regarding the compulsory
government control over market intentions (see Deng Y, 2010b, 2010d), the top five stateowned steel plants were required to acquire other enterprises to form five extra-large
conglomerates. While this emphasis on government control may perhaps be consistent with
Marx’s proposal, what is not contained in the discourse of the CISA, but should have been
from Marx’s perspective, is, as mentioned in section 7.2.2.3., the working class interest.

72

The theoretical guidance of the CISA is emphasised by the CPC committee at the association in different occasions
(CISA, 2011b, 2013b; Liu, 2013). More specifically, the CISA (2011b)stated in 2011 that its operation and development
must always follow Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought (based on the works of Mao Zedong, the first generation national leader
of the CPC), Deng Xiaoping Theory (based on the works of Deng Xiaoping, the second generation national leader), the
Three Represents (based on the works of Jiang Zemin, the third generation national leader), and the Scientific Outlook on
Development (based on the works of Hu Jintao, the fourth generation national leader). Also, the former president Jiang
Zemin (2006b) claimed that Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the Three Represents are all based on the
application of Marxism into the Chinese context. In 2013 when Xi Jinping became the president of China and the party
secretary of the CPC, his new slogan “Zhao Jingzi, Zheng Yiguan, Xixizao, Zhizhibing” (i.e. look into mirror, dress up with
proper hat and clothes, take a shower, and cure disease) (this is translated by the author of the thesis) was introduced and
subsequently installed in CISA’s official document (see CISA, 2013b; Liu, 2013).
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8.3. CISA’s concern with the working class interest
The analysis of the working class interest in the case study here is necessary both
theoretically and methodologically. First, in relation to Marx’s theory, communists “have no
interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole” (Marx & Engels, 2008,
p.52), and “fight for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class” (ibid,
p.82). Thus, as an organisation based on Marx’s theoretical work, how the CISA elaborated
on the interest of the working class is worth exploring. Particularly in the case of
financialisation, it has been demonstrated in chapter four (section 4.3.4.) that the class
conflict between financial capital and the working class does exist where the ‘secondary
exploitation’ is superimposed by the former onto the latter. Moreover, as discussed in
chapters four (section 4.3.5.) and seven (section 7.2.2.3.), the solution to financialisation and
the fundamental crisis of capitalism, according to Marx, concerns the class struggle of the
proletariat. Therefore, the analysis of the working class interest is addressed in the debate of
financialisation is needed. Secondly, in relation to methodology, the thesis adopts a Marxinformed PEA framework. Class relations are thus one key area to address insofar as the
extant PEA literature is concerned (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Tinker & Neimark, 1987) as well
as from Marx’s methodological perspective (Cooper, 1997). While CISA’s identity and role
have been extensively discussed earlier in the current chapter (sections 8.1.1. and 8.1.2.) to
explore the extent to which the association resembles a productive capitalist and / or a
government organisation, what is yet to be analysed is to what extent the CISA considered
the interest of the working class throughout its discourse against financialisation. To this end,
the following section investigates how the interest of the working class was considered in
CISA’s ex ante and ex post resistance against the quarterly index price of iron ore. More
specifically, capital movement and the class conflict therein are analysed.
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8.3.1. CISA as the productive capitalist and the working class
Although it has been illustrated in chapter six that, in the debate over the pricing mechanism
of iron ore between China and the Big Three, the identity of iron ore was one specific area
where different opinions were presented, the role of human labour was nevertheless omitted
from the negotiation. In particular, whilst the CISA defended the annual contract based price
in the mentality of a productive capitalist (as shown in Figure 6.7) which considered iron ore
as only the raw material (MP) to produce steel (C’), the Big Three, as the commercial and
financial capitalists, viewed iron ore as a commodity for not only manufacturing steel
products and but also trading in the global market. However, regardless of whether the
productive capitalist perspective or a financial capitalist view should apply, human labour
(L), as another indispensable component in the production process (P), was not discussed by
any party.

Furthermore, it was not just the human labour as one factor / symbol in the movement of
productive capital that had been ignored, what is more theoretically significant is the class
relation reflected in the circuit of capital. That is, consistent with Marx (1956), the “class
relation between capitalist and wage-laborer… is presupposed from the moment the two face
each other in the act of M – L” (p.18).When the production is accomplished, the resulting
product is “not only a commodity, but a commodity pregnant with surplus-value (including
the value of the productive capital P consumed in the production and the gratuitous labour
performed for the capital)” (p.22).Thus, in the case of the iron and steel industry, what steel
plants produce is not only the steel products therein but also “reproduce to an ever increasing
extent the class of wage-labourers, into whom it transforms the vast majority of direct
producers” (p.20).Viewed in this way, throughout its discourse as a productive capitalist in
supporting the traditional long run based iron ore pricing mechanism, not only did the CISA
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neglect the human labour factor, but it also omitted the implications of the corresponding
class relations. This is not surprising, given that CISA’s participation in the iron ore
negotiation was, as indicated by the association itself (Xinhuanet, 17 August 2009), as well as
the Ministry of Commerce (Gong & He, 2009) and the Ministry of Industry and Information
(China News Service, 13 August 2009; Wang J, 2009f; Jiao, 2010c), a corporate matter free
of government interventions. In other words, the association identified itself, at least on
surface, with all enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry. Thus, the iron ore
negotiation was simply considered as the behaviour of corporations; the concern with the
working class, as reflected in the circuit of productive capital (discussed above), was
neglected.

Stepping outside the discourse of iron ore pricing, the association exhibited the similar
emphasis on corporations and market in suggesting the pricing policies for China’s domestic
steel products. This is also where CISA’s view differs from Marx’s interpretation in terms of
the movement of capital. On the one hand, according to Marx (1956), when the steel product
is sold for the price of M’, it represents not only the quantitative increase from M to M’ (i.e.
the difference is the profit ∆M), but also connotes “at the same time a qualitative relation… a
capital-relation” (p.26) capable of self-expanding by producing surplus value from unpaid
labour. On the other hand, however, judging from CISA’s policies and suggestions on the
steel price, such relation is not considered. Instead, similar to its role suggested by the
Chinese government during the iron ore price negotiation, the association set out the policy
more from a corporation’s perspective. More specifically, it stated in Agreement on Domestic
Steel Market section two that “(steel) products should reflect not only market supply and
demand, but also their own quality” (CISA, 2009d), and in section seven that “(steel)
enterprises should establish an information analysis system that timely and accurately collects
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and analyses market price, a scientific and effective price setting mechanism, and a decision
management system that standardises companies’ internal pricing procedure” (CISA,
2009d).Viewed in this way, the capital-labour class relation was again neglected, since the
price of steel was primarily a result of the market supply and demand mechanism. Moreover,
as demonstrated in chapter six (section 6.4.1.), CISA’s concept of market was confined to
transactions in a highly regulated physical market, with no consideration of the commercial
and financial capital. However, insofar as the index pricing mechanism is concerned, the
participation of financial capital is inevitable and thus the discussion of the relation between
the working class and the financial capital in the global iron ore market is necessary.

8.3.2. Financial capitalist and the working class in the Chinese iron ore market
As demonstrated in chapter four, there does exist the class conflict between financial
capitalists and the working class. On the one hand, in the case of the direct relation between
the two, this is referred to as the “secondary exploitation which runs parallel to the primary
exploitation taking place in the production process itself” (Marx, 1959, p.435): when the
ordinary worker “does any money borrowing, he does so, for instance, at the pawnshop to
secure personal necessities” (ibid, p.425); and when the worker entrusts his or her savings
and pension funds into the hands of bankers and financial investors, the investment returns
received is an implicit form of wages for the regeneration of the working class (Marx, 1974,
p.21; Marx & Engels, 2008, p.43). On the other hand, in the case of the indirect relation
between proletariats and financial capitalists, the invisible exploitation by the latter has also
been illustrated in section 4.3.2. Through demystifying the movement of financial capital M –
M” in Figure 4.1, it has been demonstrated that the surplus value is first extracted from the
production process by productive capitalists and then transferred, in part, to financial
capitalists.
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In relation to the case studied in the thesis, it is the second scenario that corresponds to the
context of the global iron ore market and the debate over the iron ore pricing mechanism in
particular. While the relationship between steel plants as productive capital and traders of
iron ore and of the associated derivatives as financial capital is illustrated in Figure 7.3, the
role of the working class is yet to be discussed. Thus, through incorporating the invisible
exploitation by the financial capital in Figure 4.1 with the expanded capital movement
exhibited in Figure 7.3, it shows that while charging the Chinese steel manufacturers higher
prices on the imported iron ore, the financial capitalists will also be able to take the lion’s
share of the surplus value extracted from the labour force at those steel plants, since the
Chinese steel industry was suffering from losses primarily due to, as claimed by the CISA,
the increased raw material costs (Yao, 2008; Gold Bull Information, 15 May 2009; Jiao,
2009a; Yu X, 2009; Zhang Q, 2009; Zhang XM, 2009; DFdaily, 8 March 2010; Zhang Yi,
2010c).

Although the invisible exploitation as such is pointed out by Marx, it is hardly mentioned by
the CISA. Instead, the association simply attributed the predicament of the Chinese steel
plants to the monopolistic position of the Big Three. In particular, from the perspective of a
productive capitalist, the CISA kept emphasising the interdependent relationship between
steel plants and mining firms, with no consideration of other participants such as those in the
spot market and those from the financial sector. For instance, Qi Xiangdong, CISA’s deputy
secretary general, commented on the 2009 iron ore price negotiation that
“the biggest focus is on a reasonable price relations between steel prices and all other
product prices on the same industrial chain… We want to ensure a reasonable allocation
of interests on the same industrial chain. Last year iron ore suppliers made huge profits,
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whereas steel plants incurred significant losses. This is unreasonable and cannot last long”
(Zhang Yi, 2009d) (emphases added).

Wu Xichun, the honorary chairman of the association, also pointed out such relationship that
“if iron ore suppliers still do not consider a reasonable drop (in iron ore price), there will
be no room for steel plants to survive. If so, the suppliers will also have no place to make
profits from… China does not want to see the further intensified conflict in iron ore
negotiation, after all, our fundamental interests are the same” (Securities Times, 20
March 2009) (emphases added).

Here, both officials hold the same view that the Big Three should decrease iron ore price
dramatically so that steel plants, as the only purchaser of iron ore, could cut their steel
production cost and break even. Consistent with chapter six, this is not surprising, since the
CISA, in the mentality of a productive capitalist, only considered the purpose of iron ore as
the raw material for steel manufacturing throughout its discourses. What is not discussed in
chapter six but of particular interest to note here is the omission of the working class interest.
More specifically, the use of the word ‘interest’ in the above quotes merits special attention.
When Qi Xiangdong argued that the CISA wanted a ‘reasonable allocation of interest’ on the
same industrial chain, the interest was later explained by him as the ‘profits’ made by the Big
Three who did not share the earnings fairly with China’s steel plants. Similarly, Wu Xichun
also pointed out that steel plants and mining companies have the same ‘fundamental interests’
in making profits.

This emphasis on the profit sharing relationship was further used by the association as the
main argument against then the newly agreed annual price reached by the Japanese steel
enterprises in 2009. Shan Shanghua, the secretary general, explained CISA’s refusal of the
price that “because this price agreement does not reflect the interest-sharing and reciprocal
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relationship between steel manufacturers and iron ore suppliers, it will still leave most (steel)
enterprises suffering from losses” (Chen JS, 2009). The same spirit was carried forward in the
2010 price negotiation (Xu YL, 2009j). “How could China not even get a sip of the huge
profits that foreign mining corporations have been making? This is not fair and not moral”
(DFdaily, 8 March 2010) (emphasis added), said Deng Qilin, the chairman of the CISA and
the president of Wuhan Iron and Steel group. Here, the sense of fairness and morality seems
to be only related to a reasonable allocation of profits among steel plants and mining
companies, again leaving the interest of the working class undiscussed.

In addition to the interest as the financial profit discussed above, the other type of interest
emphasised by the CISA is the national interest which might be impaired by the quarterly
index pricing mechanism of iron ore in China’s iron and steel industry. During the 2009 price
negotiation when the small and medium steel plants and trading companies began to trade
with the Big Three in private, the CISA pointed out that all firms in the domestic iron and
steel industry should unite, rather than compete with one another, to protect the national
interest (Tie, 2009). In response, while the small and medium firms commented that the so
called nation-wide unification would be another chance for the major SOEs to profiteer (from
selling the second hand iron ore in the domestic market) (Li RX, 2010a), some licensed SOEs
also disobeyed CISA’s call for unification and turned to the private import of iron ore (Zhang
XD, 2009a). Among those firms, Sinosteel and China National Building Materials Group,
two of China’s largest iron ore importer under the direct supervision of the central
government, were the biggest promoters behind the soaring price in iron ore spot market,
which, according to a private iron ore trader, rendered the marketplace nothing but a joke
(Deng Y, 2010a). Then the question becomes how the CISA would define the ‘national
interest’. The balance seems to lean towards the interests of SOEs and government. This
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becomes most evident in the 2010 negotiation. Whilst the call for unification remained in the
subsequent year, during a vice chairmen’s meeting at the CISA, the association together with
the major SOEs submitted a petition letter to the State Council asking the government to raise
the issue of iron ore negotiation to a national level (21st Century Business Herald, 16 March
2010). “If this issue could not be solved properly, it will damage the national interest”, said
Qi Xiangdong, CISA’s deputy secretary general (Zhang XD, 2010a) (emphasis added). The
vice chairman of the association, Luo Bingsheng, further explained the term national interest
as the “strategic safety of the national economy” (Yu L, 2010e). Specifically, he indicated at
CISA’s industry information press conference for the second quarter of 2010 in Beijing that
“The CISA will consider iron ore import as a strategic issue, and bring it up to the
national level. It aims to fundamentally solve this problem at the strategic level for the
safety of China’s national economic development” (Ruan, 2010).

Another interpretation of the national interest is from Hebei Iron & Steel Group73, which
received support from the CISA (Zhang Yi, 2010c; Yu L, 2010h). According to the group,
since Chinese enterprises were suffering from losses as a result of the soaring price of iron
ore set by the Big Three, it became a significant matter of national interest that the nation
should introduce some measures to intervene the market. Therefore, the group suggested to
the Ministry of Industry and Information to establish a national mining joint stock company
co-founded by China’s top 16 largest steel plants which would unify the country’s
procurement, investment, and redistribution of iron ore. However, counterarguments were
also presented. First, a private iron ore trader did not believe in the unified import channel,
“since there will still be a stage of iron ore redistribution, it must mean that there will also be
plenty room for profiteering and corruption. Then who can take the lead to maintain

73

The group is the parent entity of three top 50 steel plants in China, including Handan Iron & Steel Group, Tangshan Iron
& Steel, and Chengde Iron & Steel, which were ranked number 10, 12, and 41 of the top 50 steel plants respectively in 2009
(CISA, 2009e).
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everyone’s confidence?” (Wang J, 2009e). Second, the small and medium enterprises did not
even show any interest in the unsettled annual price of iron ore. On the one hand, for those
who already had their own private purchase channel, changes in the annual price did not
really matter (Sina Finance, 22 March 2010; Wang & Xu, 2010). On the other hand, those
who welcomed the index price considered it as a good opportunity to quickly adapt to the
new pricing mechanism and would then be able to compete fairly with their state-owned
competitors (Sina Finance, 22 March 2010). Viewed in this way, national interest does not
necessarily refer to that of the small and medium firms. To sum up, having discussed the
twofold meanings of the term ‘national interest’, an emphasis on the interest of the working
class still remains absent from the discourse of the CISA.

8.3.3. Global iron ore market and the working class
Moreover, the overall capital movement among productive, commercial, and financial
capitalists in the global iron ore market has, according to Marx (1973), further exacerbated
the exploitation of the working class. Specifically, the Chinese iron ore market has been
increasingly interweaved with the free flow of financial capital on a global scale due to (1)
Big Three’s opened door towards China’s small and medium size steel plants and trading
firms and (2) the adoption of the quarterly indexed iron ore price which enables the
participation of financial capital in the traditional iron and steel sector. The result is thus that
“(f)ree trade increases productive forces… (which) implies the accumulation and the
concentration of capital (that)… involves a greater division of labour… The greater
division of labour destroys the special skill of the labourer; and by putting in the place of
this skilled work labour which any one can perform, it increases competition among the
workers. This competition becomes fiercer as the division of labour enables a single
worker to do the work of three… The reward of labour diminishes for all, and the burden
of labour increases for some” (Marx, 1973, pp.215-6).
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The intensified exploitation is, for Marx, “cosmopolitan” (ibid, p.222), since the competition
of labour will invite capital to those areas where labour cost is at its lowest. While it has been
illuminated in sections 7.1.1.2., 7.1.2.1.and 7.1.2.2. that the financialisation of the iron ore
pricing mechanism did improve the productive force at the Big Three as well as the Chinese
small and medium size steel plants, what was not discussed is the corresponding increased
level of competition within China’s labour market. In particular, while the productive force at
those small and medium enterprises were able to operate at full production capacity (Zhu,
2009), the CISA did not mention the deteriorated labour conditions therein as a consequence
of the exacerbated competition in the local job market, but, in the same view as other
government departments (Han, 2009c; Zhou RX, 2009b), lambasted the increase in steel
output as the obstacle to the healthy development of the nation’s industry in general (Xu YL,
2009c). In other words, the association did not take the working class interest as the top
priority in its agenda here; it was concerned with the industry from the perspective of a
regulator.

Having demonstrated CISA’s omission of the working class interest in relation to the circuit
of productive capital and the overall movement of the productive, commercial, and financial
capital in the global iron ore market, it can be concluded that whilst the association claimed
to follow Marxism as its theoretical guidance (CISA, 2011b, 2013b; Liu, 2013), it did not
consider the class relations throughout the discourse against financialisation. In other words,
the working class interest was ignored by the association. Then in whose interest did the
CISA operate? Already illustrated in section 8.1.1.is that the association did not act purely as
a productive capitalist but more in the nature of an industry regulator. Subsequently the
problem surfaces itself: while acting as a semi-government organisation, the CISA did not
take the interests of the proletariats into account, as projected by Marx (Marx & Engels,
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2008). Then to whom is the association held accountable? The answer is, as demonstrated in
section 8.1.2., the Chinese government, yet a government beyond Marx’s depiction of the
proletarian class government as outlined in The Communist Manifesto as per the analysis in
section 8.1.3. More specifically, while acting as a semi government organisation formed by
the CPC and trying to “centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state”
(Marx & Engels, 2008, p.64), the association did exhibit interests that were “separate and
apart from those of the proletariat as a whole” (ibid, p.52). That is, rather than focusing on the
working class interest which the CISA was supposed to serve according to Marx, the
association only emphasised the interests of the iron and steel industry in particular and of the
nation as a whole (see e.g. Jiao, 2009c; Li XL, 2009; Zhang XD, 2010a). Thus, it can be
concluded that the association was accountable to the state, or, the stateholder, standing in
violent contrast to the Big Three who claimed to serve the interests of shareholders (see e.g
Zhang Yi, 2009d; Wang J, 2009g).

The discrepancy between the discourse of CISA and Marx’s projection of a communist
society can be explained by Marx’s own words in the preface to the Manifesto’s German
Edition that
“(t)he practical application of the principles will depend, as the Manifesto itself states,
everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and,
for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end
of Section II (in the Manifesto). That passage would, in many respects, be very
differently worded today” (Marx & Engels, 2008, p.86).

He further explained the reason for different interpretations of communism in Manifesto that
“(t)he theoretical conclusions of the communists are in no way based on ideas or
principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal
reformer. They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an
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existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our every eyes” (ibid,
p.53).

Viewed in this way, the deviation of CISA’s discourse from Marx’s theory is justifiable.
Indeed, the CPC government also emphasises that its political foundation has drawn heavily
from Marxism, and in itself is the application of Marx’s theory in the Chinese context (see
Deng, 1993; Jiang, 2006b, 2006c). Thus, while it is not the purpose of the thesis to comment
on the extent to which the contemporary Chinese government and the CISA in particular have
followed Marx’s theory, what is of relevance and certainty here is that the discourse of the
association exhibits a form of state capitalism that takes into account the interests of the
Chinese iron and steel industry and China’s national interest, whereas leaving the working
class interest unrepresented. This also answers in part the research question of the thesis as to
the reasons behind CISA’s failed attempt to resist financialisation in the Chinese iron ore
market: the omission of the working class interest in the association’s ex ante and ex post
discourse against the quarterly indexed price renders the “fall (of the financial capitalist) and
the victory of the proletariat (through class struggle)” (Marx & Engels, 2008, p.51) only a
communist ideal.

8.4. Conclusion
In this chapter, a class analysis of CISA’s role is undertaken in the context of the annual iron
ore price negotiation in particular and the Chinese iron and steel industry in general. Starting
with the comparison between CISA’s interpretation of capital movement and Marx’s
explanation outlined in Capital, the first section 8.1. examines if the association really acted
as a productive capitalist in the Chinese industry from four aspects: (1) the attitude towards
the private purchase and sale of iron ore in China’s domestic market; (2) the increase in steel
product prices by the country’s major steel plants; (3) the increase in the level of steel output
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in the industry; and (4) the industry wide M&A proposed by the CISA. The analysis based on
these respects has demonstrated that CISA’s discourse suggested the opposite to the very
purpose of existence for a capitalist: the association did not operate to help corporations
maximise profits according to Capital, but acted more like an industry regulator.

This then turns the attention to CISA’s identity as a semi-formal government organisation in
section 8.2. By comparing CISA’s discourse with that of the government and in particular
State Council’s Plan, the views and proposals of the association are traced back to relevant
government departments and national policies. Thus, it is concluded in 8.2. that the CISA was
in fact a semi-government organisation regulating the Chinese iron and steel industry. This
has at the same time led to another question that why the association, if acting as the agent of
the CPC government based on Marx’s theory, did not succeed, as predicted by Marx in
Manifesto, in resisting the participation of the financial capital in the iron ore pricing
mechanism.

Since Marx (Marx & Engels, 2008) considered class struggle as the solution to capitalism,
and both the Chinese government (Deng, 1993; Jiang, 2006b, 2006c) and the CISA (CISA,
2011b; Liu, 2013) claimed to follow the theoretical guidance of Marx, the third section (8.3.)
analyses to what extent the CISA considered the interest of the working class throughout its
discourse against financialisation. Through Marx’s interpretation of the capital-labour
relation regarding the movement of productive capital as well as the overall interaction
among production, commerce, and finance in the global iron ore market, it has been
demonstrated that the proletarian interest was not taken into account by any party in iron ore
price negotiations. Instead, the interests which the CISA kept emphasising were (1) the
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financial profit which was supposed to be shared fairly between China’s steel plants and the
Big Three; and (2) the national interest behind a healthy market environment of China’s iron
and steel industry. While this explains in part the reason that the CISA failed in its attempt to
resist financialisation since it did not consider the issue from the class perspective, it also
points the accountability of the CISA towards the central government of CPC.
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In the previous chapter, a class analysis is undertaken to examine the extent to which the
CISA considered the interests of a productive capitalist, the working class, and the central
government. Through analysing and comparing CISA’s discourse with Marx’s interpretation
of capitalists and the proletarian government described in Capital and Manifesto, it has been
demonstrated that the association was primarily accountable to the interests of the state and of
the national economy, while leaving the working class interest unrepresented. This also
answers partly the research question of the thesis as for the reasons behind CISA’s failure in
resisting financialisation. To summarise the analyses thus far from chapters six, seven, and
eight, the current chapter pulls the argument together and presents a comprehensive answer to
the research question.

The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The first section (9.1.) draws from the
findings of the analyses in chapters six to eight and depicts a comprehensive story of
financialisation in the global iron ore pricing mechanism with particular reference to the
Chinese context. In so doing, it answers the research question that why the CISA failed in its
attempt to resist the financialised quarterly index price of iron ore. As the analysis in this
thesis concerns and begins with the accounting discourse regarding iron ore price, the
implication of accounting and accounting discourse in the Chinese context is then discussed
in the second section (9.2.). While the general implication of the current thesis for the extant
accounting literature is discussed in 9.2.1., the specific comparison between the iron ore
pricing mechanisms and the corresponding accounting standards is put forward subsequently.
In particular, the relevant concepts discussed include fair value measurement, historical cost
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accounting, inventory valuation, and concepts of income and capital maintenance. In sections
three (9.3.) and four (9.4.), the suggestions for further research and the contribution of the
study are outlined.

9.1. Reasons behind CISA’s failure in resisting financialisation
As illustrated in the methodology chapter (chapter five), the analysis of this study concerns
three different perspectives: the first refers to the underlying mode of production behind the
debate over the pricing mechanism of iron ore by the CISA and the Big Three; the second
purports to the context of civil society in which different modes of production coordinate and
/ or conflict with one another; and, the third involves a class analysis on the role of the CISA.
Thus, chapters six, seven, and eight have analysed the three perspectives respectively. In so
doing, the research question that concerns the reasons behind CISA’s failed attempt in
resisting the financialised quarterly indexed iron ore price are answered in each chapter
according to the assigned perspectives. The current section is thus dedicated to present a
comprehensive answer to the research question by summarising from the previous three
chapters.

9.1.1. Identifying relevant modes of production underlying the accounting discourse
In chapter six, after introducing the main producers of discourse, the analysis presents the
controversy over the price of iron ore between the CISA and the Big Three. In particular,
there three major areas in the debate which both parties emphasised on the one hand and also
disagreed with one another on the other hand. That is, while the Big Three promoted the
quarterly index price on the ground that the new pricing mechanism was transparent and fair,
and also able to objectively reflect market conditions, the CISA stressed the exactly same
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aspects but only to support the traditional annual contract based price. Faced with the
competing connotations of the same concepts (i.e. reflection of market, transparency,
fairness), the analysis goes further to explore how the price of iron ore is determined.
Specifically, since both parties emphasised the market conditions on which a fair price of iron
ore is based, discourses concerning (1) market, (2) supply and demand relationship, and (3)
the role of iron ore are analysed respectively for the three major groups affected by the iron
ore pricing mechanism in the Chinese iron and steel industry. These include (1) the CISA and
the major SOEs represented by the former; (2) the small and medium enterprises in the
Chinese iron and steel industry; and (3)the Big Three (i.e. BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and
Vale).In so doing, the focus of the analysis is on the underlying modes of production of the
three groups. This is because, according to Marx (Marx & Engels, 1974), “production of
ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material
activity and the material intercourse of men… (which are) conditioned by a definite
development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these” (ibid,
p.47), and also that the mode of production is the result of the productive forces and the
social intercourse therein. Thus, identifying the relevant modes of production74 for the three
groups, which constitute their respective discourse, contributes to the understanding of their
accounting discourse regarding the price of iron ore.

First, the CISA regarded iron ore simply as the raw material for manufacturing steels, and
thus confined the demand, as well as the resulting supply, of iron ore to the level of steel
output. In addition, the association depicted the iron ore market primarily influenced by the
74

Also worth mentioning here is that it is of course unrealistic to narrowly confine any of the enterprises
represented by the three groups above as purely productive, commercial, or financial capitalists, given the
increasingly intricate relationship between financial and non-financial sectors in modern corporations
(Orhangazi, 2008). What has been demonstrated is that the modes of production illuminated above are the bases
of the three group’s discourse regarding iron ore price.
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Chinese consumers and, since iron ore could only be consumed for steel production, the
market was thus based on China’s domestic steel sector. This perspective is interpreted by
Marx as the mindset of a productive capitalist. As shown in Figure 6.7, iron ore is the means
of production (MP), purchased only by steel manufacturers at the price of M, and, when the
production process is accomplished, will become steel products (C’) available for sale at the
price of M’.

Second, the small and medium firms in the Chinese iron and steel industry considered iron
ore not only as the raw material for steel manufacturing but also a tradable commodity for
resale in China’s domestic iron ore market. Thus, apart from its attribute as the means of
production (MP), iron ore was also treated as a normal commodity (C), purchased first by the
small and medium firms from either overseas or domestic suppliers at the price of M, and
sold later to other participants in the Chinese market for M’. This is interpreted through
Marx’s movement of commercial capital as shown in Figure 6.8. In other words, the small
and medium firms were in the mindset of a commercial capitalist.

Third, the Big Three regarded iron ore price from not only the perspectives of the productive
and commercial capitalists but also the view of a financial capitalist. This is because, while
there were the traditional productive and commercial activities undertaken by the three major
iron ore suppliers (as illustrated in Figure 6.9), financial capital also manifested in (1) the
indexed pricing mechanism and (2) the shareholding structure of the Big Three and the index
publisher. On the one hand, in relation to the methodology of the indexed price (i.e. Platts
IODEX), the calculation of iron ore price involves not just the confirmed trades, but also
bids, offers, and expression of interest to trade (see Platts, 2015b) which exhibit considerable
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resemblance to transactions in the financial market. That is, under the index pricing
mechanism, iron ore price would be affected by the virtual transactions through bids and
offers. Furthermore, the rise of the financial derivatives associated with the iron ore index
price also adds the character of financial products to the new pricing mechanism. As such,
iron ore is perceived as a globally tradable commodity, the purpose of which is not only for
steel production, but also for sale in the spot market as well as the financial market. In
relation to the capital movement explained by Marx, apart from the productive and
commercial activities (as shown in Figure 6.9), the adoption of index price depicts the circuit
of financial capital in Figure 6.10: it begins with bids, offers, contracts, swaps, or other
associated financial derivatives at the price of M, and will be sold later for M”.

On the other hand, the shareholding structure of the Big Three brings the mining giants even
closer to the global financial market. According to Tables 4.1-4.6, most of the top 20
shareholders at the Big Three are investment banks and other financial institutions such as
HSBC and J.P. Morgan. The corresponding movement of financial capital is illuminated in
Figure 6.11: the financial institutions first invest M in the Big Three which then undertake the
productive and commercial activities, and later receive their investment return in the form of
dividends (M”) from Big Three’s profit ∆M. Moreover, there are also some overlaps between
the two types of financial capital mentioned above. For instance, some major shareholders of
the big Three such as Capital Group Companies, State Street, The Bank of New York were
also among the key shareholders of McGraw Hill Financial Inc. (i.e. the parent entity of
Platts). Therefore, taking the nature of the indexed price and the shareholder relationship of
the Big Three into account, it is the role of financial capitalist which the Big Three have
played in promoting the indexed price of iron to the Chinese market during negotiations.
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Having identified the relevant perspectives adopted by the three groups, the discrepancies
between CISA and Big Three’s connotations of a fair iron ore price are explained through the
different modes of production. While the traditional long term contract based price was
supported by the CISA from the perspective of a productive capitalist, the quarterly index
based price was promoted and adopted by the Big Three based on a financial capitalist’s
point of view. Also, since financial sector will be “the driving force in its (capitalist)
development to its highest and ultimate form” (Marx, 1959, p.433), it becomes probable, in
the end of chapter six, that perhaps financialisation in the global iron ore market is inevitable.
If so, it will be able to answer, at least in part, the research question concerning the reasons
behind CISA’s failure in resisting the financialised price of iron ore. Therefore, the analysis
continues in chapter seven where the process of financialisation in the Chinese iron ore
market is then extensively discussed.

9.1.2. The inevitable trend of financialisation in the Chinese iron ore market
Consistent with the second aspect of analysis outlined in chapter five, chapter seven focuses
on the interaction among production, commerce, and finance in the context of the Chinese
iron and steel industry. From the perspective of the capitalist mode of production, the
particular process in which commercial and financial capitalists emerge in the Chinese iron
ore market is explored, in order to determine whether financialisation was irresistible even to
the CISA. The analysis is undertaken chronologically by dividing the process into two
different consecutive periods, consistent with not only the range of data collected (as outlined
in chapter five) but also the result of each year’s negotiation. Moreover, the story is
illuminated in accordance with Marx’s interpretation that changes in the mode of production
come from and serve as the solution to the contradiction between productive forces and the

347

Chapter 9 Discussions and Conclusion
corresponding social relations. In so doing, the first reason behind CISA’s failure in resisting
the financialised index pricing mechanism is investigated.

9.1.2.1. Financialisation as the solution to the conflict between social relations and
productive forces
From 2008 to 2009, the Chinese iron ore market witnessed the shift of the small and medium
enterprises and some of the major SOEs from traditional productive capitalists to commercial
capitalists. This is, according to Marx, the result of as well as the solution to the conflict
between the social relations within the Chinese iron ore market and the relevant productive
forces (i.e. the increased iron ore demand). First, in terms of the Big Three, on the one hand,
the traditional annual price negotiation (as the old form of social relation with the Chinese
market)did not produce any outcome, since Vale and Rio Tinto withdrew from the
negotiation one after another (Cao, 2009c), and BHP Billiton was interested in the index
pricing mechanism (Liu, 2009). Faced with the unsettled annual negotiation incapable of
assigning an official price to both parties on the supply and demand chain, on the other hand,
the increased iron ore demand (i.e. the corresponding productive force) from the Chinese
SOEs and the small and medium enterprises (due to China’s economic stimulus package in
2008) could not be satisfied. Thus, the spot market transaction came into existence as the
solution: in 2009 the Big Three began to privately trade in China’s spot market with the small
and medium firms and even some SOEs. Thus, iron ore transaction was no longer limited to
steel producers but became available to commercial capitalists (i.e. the small and medium
firms) who resell the mineral product for profits. While meeting the productive forces at both
the small and medium firms and the Big Three themselves, the spot market transaction as the
new form of social relation gave rise to the new mode of production incorporating the
interaction between productive and commercial capital.
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Second, in terms of the small and medium enterprises, a similar story is perceived, only from
the other end of the supply and demand chain. On the one hand, regardless of the negotiation
outcome, the small and medium firms had to purchase the second hand iron ore, at
prohibitive prices, from the major SOEs which initially imported iron ore from overseas with
the stable annual contract based price. This form of social relations was long argued by the
small players as unfair (Li RX, 2010a). On the other hand, these small and medium firms
needed to purchase an increased amount of iron ore so as to keep the factories operating (i.e.
increase productive forces) due to government’s economic stimulus package as well as the
pressure of being merged with the major SOEs (Wang J, 2009c). Thus, the commercial trade
of iron ore in spot market came as the solution to the conflict between (1) the traditional form
of social relations between the small and medium firms and the major SOEs; and (2) the need
to increase productive forces of the former group.

As a consequence of the emergence of commercial capitalists in the Chinese iron ore market
from the two groups above during the 2009 iron ore negotiation, both parties exhibited the
increased levels of productive efficiency, which was also consistent with Marx’s (1959)
depiction of the interaction between productive and commercial capitalists in Figure 7.1. For
instance, on the one hand, the Big Three announced their forthcoming investments in iron ore
reserves (Dong, 2009c) and indicated that their production reached the full capacity (Xu YL,
2009e). On the other hand, the small and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel
sector showed that they outperformed their state-owned counterparts thanks to Big Three’s
opened door to iron ore spot market (Zhang Yan, 2009).
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In the subsequent year (i.e. 2010), the newly established iron ore spot market did not solve
the fundamental conflicts since the collapse of the 2009 negotiation (1) between the Big
Three’s social relations with the Chinese market and the corresponding productive force; and
(2) between the small and medium firms’ relations with the CISA and the respective level of
steel output therein. First, in terms of Big Three’s social relations with the Chinese market on
the one hand, not only did they lose the interest in the annual contract based pricing
mechanism for both financial (Zhou XY, 2010; Chen SS, 2010b) and political (Zhang HY,
2009a; Yuan, 2010b) reasons, but they also encountered some regulatory obstacles imposed
by the CISA in China’s spot market (Xu YL, 2009i; Yue & Zhou, 2009). On the other hand,
the Big Three kept increasing their level of iron ore output (i.e. productive forces) in the
belief that China’s iron ore demand would increase substantially and the rest of the world
economy could recover gradually (Yang Y, 2009a). The conflict still remained between (1)
the increased level of iron ore output and (2) the time consuming annual price negotiation as
well as a highly regulated spot market. Consequently, the quarterly index pricing mechanism
came into play as the solution: the social relations between the Big Three and their clients
would be, according to the Big Three, more transparent and smoother in that the index price
helped avoid the direct conflict and hostility between the buyer and the sellers at the
traditional closed door meeting each year (Deng, 2009c; Tang, 2009); Big Three’s productive
forces (i.e. iron ore output level) would also be better perceived and predicted on a
continuous basis by the index price (Zhou XY, 2010; Chen SS, 2010b; China Business
Network, 6 May 2010). Coupled with such changes in the new form of the social relation was
the shift in the mode of production from commercial to financial activities.

Second, in terms of the small and medium enterprises, on the one hand, the problem of
unfairness still existed even in the spot market transactions: (1) while some small and
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medium players were able to privately import and sell iron or to make profits, others were not
(Deng, 2009c); (2) for those who did have the private access to iron ore overseas, the major
SOEs such as Sinosteel and China National Building Materials Group could easily push up
the spot price via their financial and political advantages (Deng Y, 2010a). Despite the
unfairness in purchasing iron ore, both trading companies and steel plants in small and
medium size held that iron ore price would increase in any case; the productive forces at
trading companies (i.e. purchase and sell iron ore) and steel plants (i.e. level of steel output)
were expected to increase. Again, the financialised quarterly index price came into effect: the
index pricing mechanism would grant everyone the same access to the seaborn iron ore
market, solving the conflict between the unfair trade in spot market (as the old form of social
relation) and the increased iron ore demand (as the corresponding productive force).

As a result of the adoption of the quarterly index price, operations of the two groups
discussed above were expected to exhibit a certain level of improvement consistent with
Marx’s (1959) illustration of the incorporation of financial capital into the circuit of
productive capital in Figure 7.2. On the one hand, the Big Three argued that the new pricing
mechanism would provide smoother communication between buyers and sellers (Tang,
2009), reflect market information in real time (Liu, 2009), and thus improve market
efficiency (Wan, 2010a). On the other hand, the small and medium firms proved in reality
that they were able to adopt the flexible index price more quickly than their state-owned
counterparts and showed better profit margin ratios (Li Y, 2010b).

To summarise the current section, it has presented a story of the changes in the mode of
production in iron ore trading from between productive capitalists (i.e. the Big Three and the
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Chinese steel plants via the traditional annual price based contract), through between
productive capitalists and commercial capitalists (i.e. the Big Three and the small and
medium enterprises via China’s spot market), and to between productive, commercial, and
financial capitalists (i.e. the Big Three, the Chinese enterprises, and capital investors via the
global financial market). Consistent with Marx’s interpretation of social change (Marx &
Engels, 1974, p.52), the shifts in the modes of production are thus necessary and inevitable,
as a result of the conflict between the social relations involved (including the unsettled annual
price negotiations in 2009 and 2010, the unfair trade of second hand iron ore from major
SOEs to small and medium firms, and a heavily regulated spot market) and the relevant
productive forces therein (including the increased demand for iron ore from the Chinese
market, and the increased level of iron ore output by the Big Three).While the attitude and
reactions of the Big Three and the Chinese small and medium enterprises towards
financialisation are explored, which have demonstrated that the adoption of the financialised
quarterly index price in China is the natural evolution of the capitalist mode of production in
the global capitalist economy, the views and actions of the CISA are also analysed to further
confirm the inevitability of financialisation.

9.1.2.2. Financialisation independent of productive capital and CISA
Standing in vivid contrast with the small and medium enterprises, the CISA attempted to ban
the spot market transactions of iron ore within China in 2009 and stifle the financialised
index price in its own cradle. In particular, the association formed the investigation team with
relevant government departments to shut down the Rizhao Centre in two weeks after its
establishment. Instead of the index price which the Centre was planning to launch, the
association proposed a unified price that would only apply to the Chinese market and thus
replace both the spot price and the traditional annual price (Yue & Zhou, 2009). To help
352

Chapter 9 Discussions and Conclusion
implement the unified price, the association also introduced several policies which required
the self-discipline of the industry. During the 2010 negotiation when the quarterly index price
seemed impending, the association initiated a nationwide boycott against the Big Three,
asking all Chinese firms to stop purchasing iron ore from the three mining giants for two
months (i.e. April and May).

However, despite CISA’s close connection with the Chinese government and its SOE
constituents as the leading players in the domestic industry, the association’s boycott
campaign and the call for a nationwide unified price failed. This is explained through Marx’s
(1959) interpretation of the mystified movement of financial capital: M – M’. That is, the
same party could first take the bid (M) and, before receiving the actual iron ore shipment, and
then sell the offer to other parties for M’. In so doing, iron ore has become an underlying
item, equipped with the same self-expanding capacity of capital (M) from which M’ derives
effortlessly (at least on surface). Correspondingly, the value of iron ore also shifts from
manufacturing steel to creating money straightway independently of the actual production
process. This is particularly the case in the actual practice of iron ore transactions in the
Chinese iron ore market. That is, in addition to the small and medium enterprises (Wang &
Xu, 2010; Zhu, 2010a), even some top 20 steel plants confessed that had they not accepted
the quarterly indexed pricing mechanism in time, iron ore price would have been skyrocketed
afterwards (Sina Finance, 11 April 2010; Li RX, 2010c). In other words, iron ore transactions
began to take place not only in the traditional sphere of productive capital: M – C (L, MP) …
P … C’ – M’ (as shown in Figure 6.7), but also in the simplified circuit of financial capital:
M – M’ (Figure 6.10). As such, even suppose all of the Chinese companies, as proposed by
the CISA, stopped purchasing iron ore, the mineral product would have still been frequently
traded in the financial market around the world, not as the raw material for steel production,
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but as a financial product. To paraphrase Marx’s own words, “(t)he more rapid the process of
reproduction, and the more developed the function of money as a means of payment, (and the
more developed the function of iron ore as capital per se)… the smaller that portion (required
from productive capital) is in relation to the total capital” (Marx, 1959, p.189).

Thus, the political and regulatory limit, which in this case refers to the boycott and relevant
policies introduced by the CISA, upon the financial capital as represented by the Big Three
and the index pricing mechanism in particular becomes “merely quantitative and defies all
fantasy” (Marx, 1959, p.261). This is because (1) iron ore has become a “meaningless form
of capital, the perversion and objectification of production relations in their highest degree”
(ibid, p.256), and (2) financial capital is “a driving force in its (capitalist mode of production)
development to its highest and ultimate form… (as well as) the most potent means of driving
capitalist production beyond its own limits” (ibid, p.433). Viewed in this way, regardless of
how many more policies and regulations that the CISA and the Chinese government impose
upon the Chinese iron and steel industry in the foreseeable future, the financialisation of iron
ore price is again perceived as the expected offspring of the evolved form of iron ore in the
global financial market in particular and the corresponding participation of financial capital
therein.

Having explored the process of financialisation in terms of both the changes in the mode of
production and the relatively independent status of financial capital, the adoption of the
financialised index price in the Chinese iron ore market is demonstrated as a structurally
inevitable trend in the context of global capitalism. Thus, so long as China remains as a part
of the global market economy and the biggest purchaser of iron ore in the world market, any
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attempt to obstruct financialisation is seen as futile in the long run. This answers in part the
research question as for the reasons behind CISA’s failure in resisting the indexed iron ore
price. However, two more questions can still be asked. First of all, if the financialisation of
iron ore price is unavoidable, why did not the CISA resist the Platts index by launching
China’s very own index price? After all, if China’s small and medium enterprises could adapt
to the financialised price, the CISA, as the unofficial industry regulator could also shift its
mentality from a productive capitalist to a financial capitalist. This is possible considering
that China is the largest importer and purchaser of iron ore in the global market, and China’s
spot market (in the port of Qingdao) already serves as the platform on which the assessment
of Platts index is based (Platts, 2015c). By answering this question, the research question of
the thesis can also be addressed via exploring the possibility of the Chinese association
evolving into a financial capitalist. Secondly, suppose that the CISA was not entirely in the
mindset of a productive capitalist, but followed the theoretical guidance of Marx who
predicted the fall of capitalism and the victory of the proletariat (Marx & Engels, 2008,
p.51), why was financialisation of iron ore price still irresistible? This would have been
implausible were it not for the fact that both the Chinese CPC government (Deng, 1993;
Jiang, 2006b, 2006c) in general and the CISA (Liu, 2013; CISA, 2011b, 2013b) in particular
all claimed themselves as the follower of Marxism. Thus, exploring this issue would also help
understand the research question in terms of how much China and the CISA have adopted
and applied Marx’s theory in actual practice. The following two sections (9.1.3. and 9.1.4.)
addresses these questions respectively by summarising the analyses in the second part of
chapter seven (section 7.2.), and chapter eight.
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9.1.3. CISA’s failed recognition of the connection among production, commerce, and
finance
In the second part of chapter seven (section 7.2), the analysis continues with the focus on the
reasons why the CISA did not launch China’s own index price system before the Big Three
did. This is because, if, say, the financialisation of iron ore price was an inevitable trend in
the context of global capitalism, then the CISA, as the semi-formal leader of the Chinese iron
and steel industry, could have been able to develop a Chinese iron ore index by taking
advantage of China’s leading position in global iron ore trade and the country’s unique spot
market. However, a closer examination of CISA’s discourse regarding finance, in the
following four aspects, rules out this possibility.

The first is CISA’s immediate shut down of the Rizhao International Iron Ore Trading Centre
which would have otherwise launched the Chinese iron ore index in 2009 before its Platts
counterpart was generally accepted in 2010. However, the CISA, in its official announcement
regarding the compulsory closure, commented on the Rizhao index as “speculative in nature”
(China Business Times, 16 June 2009). Thus, it is argued that the association simply opposed
any form of index price regardless of its origin. The same attitude was carried forward in
2010 when China’s small and medium enterprises began to use the quarterly index price and
consequently exhibited improved efficiency. While this was consistent with Marx’s
interpretation of the participation of financial capital into the circuit of productive capital (as
shown in Figure 7.2), the CISA chose to chastise the improvement of the small and medium
firms which allegedly gave rise to the chaotic steel market (Xu YL, 2009f).
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It is then not surprising to see the association’s response and reaction after the quarterly index
price was accepted and adopted in the Chinese iron ore market in April. This is the second
aspect which also indicates CISA’s attitude towards finance. In particular, the association and
its key members (namely the major SOEs) were reluctant to learn and use the index price
(He, 2010a), for the reasons that they did not understand the new pricing mechanism (Li RX,
2010d) and entering into transactions of those iron ore associated financial derivatives would
be in itself a huge risk (Yang Y, 2010).

Thirdly, in addition to the iron ore index, the CISA also did not recognise other types of
financial products traded on the same industrial chain. These include steel futures, Forward
Freight Agreements, and the BDI index, all of which have influence on the iron ore market
and are influenced by the financial sector. The CISA however simply treated these associated
products’ price such as the steel price and the shipping cost as something that passively
reacted to changes in the physical demand of iron ore (Yu L, 2009a). Thus, stepping outside
the issue of any form of financial index, it is worth exploring that if the CISA simply wanted
to separate finance from the traditional iron and steel industry.

This is addressed in the fourth aspect which demonstrates that the Chinese iron and steel
industry, in CISA’s opinion, should operate independently of finance. For instance, when the
CISA and FMG reached the price agreement in 2009 August, while FMG announced that,
according to CISA’s agreement, it would receive the 5.5 to 6 billion USD financing from
China with an interest rate lower than the market rate (Dong, 2009a; Zhang XD, 2009b), the
CISA denied this condition. The association stated that “financing is something carried out by
financial institutions” (Xiao, 2009). Furthermore, in response to the tightened credit
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environment in the Chinese iron and steel sector, the CISA somehow welcomed the credit
crunch. This is because (1) the major SOEs were “not short of money” (Deng Y, 2010b) and
(2) the industry wide M&A could be accelerated when the small and medium enterprises
would be running out of capital under the credit crunch (Tan, 2010).In fact, the proposal for
the industry wide M&A promoted by the CISA serves as another area reflecting the divide
between the iron and steel industry and the financial sector. This is illustrated through a
comparison between the institutional arrangement of the Japanese iron and steel sector and its
Chinese counterpart contained in the proposal: while the ‘Japanese model’ comprises a
triangular alliance among production, commerce, and finance through the cooperation
between steel plants and sogo shosha (Wang & Qin, 2009), its Chinese counterpart foresaw a
production oriented M&A plan where there were only the top five SOEs to take over other
steel plants in the iron and steel sector (State Council, 2009), downplaying the influence of
commerce and finance.

Through the four instances above, it is demonstrated that, even provided with the unique spot
market from which index related data is collected and assessed and the pioneering attempt to
establish China’s own iron ore index (i.e. Rizhao index), the CISA still opposed the concept
of the financialised index price of iron ore. For the association, finance is always harmful and
toxic to the development of the iron and steel industry. This has thus partly answered the
research question that the CISA failed to resist the Platts index price by being unable to
develop a Chinese index price. Furthermore, deeply rooted in the association’s separation
between the domestic iron and steel industry and the financial sector is its omission of the
connection among production, commerce, and finance. That is, while the interaction among
the three is illustrated both in theory in chapter four and in practice through the first part of
chapter seven (section 7.1), the CISA failed to recognise that finance has to date become
358

Chapter 9 Discussions and Conclusion
increasingly intertwined with the traditional iron and steel industry. Therefore, it did not
proactively adapt to the advanced modes of production (i.e. the spot market transactions and
the index pricing mechanism) in the Chinese iron ore market like the Big Three and, to a
lesser extent, the small and medium enterprises did.

Granted, while the participation of financial capital did help improve the performance of the
traditional productive capital as shown in theory (as shown in Figure 7.2) and practice
(sections 7.1.2.1 and 7.1.2.2.), finance does however have the potential to damage the
conventional industry. Based on the comparison between Marx’s interpretation of the
potential threat posed by financialisation and CISA’s repudiation of finance (section 7.2.2.), it
confirms that the association did not understand the inner mechanism between production,
commerce, and finance. In particular, unlike Marx’s (1973, p.214) methodology in the study
of political economy that takes into account the prosperity, overproduction, stagnation, and
crisis of the subject matter, the CISA straightaway jumped to the point that the
financialisation of iron ore price would destabilise the iron and steel industry. By applying
Marx’s concepts of overproduction, and crisis resulting from financialisation in the Chinese
iron and steel industry, it is demonstrated that the financialisation in question has yet to reach
the stage of overproduction and crisis. Moreover, comparing Marx’s solution (i.e. class
struggle) to the crisis of financialisation and capitalism in general with CISA’s equivalent
(i.e. regulations) further confirms the latter’s ignorance of the necessary, however painful it
may be, shift to financialisation in the development of capitalism. While this underpins
CISA’s reluctance to launch the Chinese index price serving as the second perspective by
which the research question is answered, it also leads the analysis to the third level— a class
analysis of the identity of the CISA.
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9.1.4. CISA’s role as a state capitalist
Consistent with the methodology illustrated in chapter five, chapter eight examines the
identity of the CISA, in order to further explore the reasons behind CISA’s failure in resisting
the quarterly index price of iron ore. This is accomplished through exploring the extent to
which the CISA resembled a productive capitalist and / or a government organisation, and the
extent to which the association was concerned with the working class interest.

9.1.4.1. CISA’s deviation from a productive capitalist
In comparing CISA’s mindset with that of a productive capitalist, the key question is asked
regarding whether the association exhibited the sole pursuit of profit as Marx’s concept of
capitalists’ only purpose of existence. This is addressed in four aspects. Firstly, the CISA
chastised and promised to punish both the small and medium firms (Wang J, 2009c; Zhang
Yi, 2009g) and the major SOEs (Li XL, 2009) which participated in the private and unofficial
transactions in China’s iron ore spot market. While these firms rationalised their action as to
minimise the cost of inventory purchase and maximise profit, the CISA however did not
approve their activities. It even introduced relevant industry policies that were aimed at
abolishing iron ore spot market transactions, including Procedure, Details, and Tracking
Standards. Secondly, the association attempted to intervene in the proposed price increase of
steel products by the major SOEs. As such, profit maximisation on the parts of the SOEs was
not the top priority of the association. Thirdly, the increased level of steel output in the
industry as a whole was criticised by the CISA as overcapacity (Yue & Zhou, 2009). While
other counter argument existed to prove otherwise, the CISA (2009b) urged the entire
industry to lower down the steel output, and thus showed no intention to maximise profits in
this regard. Moreover, the association introduced Agreement on Iron Ore Import and
Agreement on Domestic Steel Market to restrain the country’s steel production. Fourthly, the
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industry wide M&A promoted by the CISA was not based on the will of the companies
involved (including both major SOEs and the small and medium firms), but reflected the will
of government (Deng Y, 2010d). This renders CISA’s role further away from a productive
capitalist, and therefore brings it closer to a government organisation.

9.1.4.2. CISA’s resemblance to a government organisation
While the above four aspects demonstrate that profit maximisation was not CISA’s sole
purpose of existence, the discourse involved in the instances actually characterises the
association more like a government organisation. In particular, the comparison between
CISA’s industry policies discussed above and the relevant government documents shows that
the specific policies of the former can be traced back to the general principles and plans of
the latter. For instance, the concept of iron ore import agency system was assigned by State
Council’s Plan as one important objective of the CISA. The association, in turn, kept
referring to Plan (Zhang Yi, 2009g; CISA, 2009b), while promoting the system, and
subsequently introduced Procedure, Details, and Tracking Standards. In addition, while Plan
stated the criteria for obsolete production and set up the annual target for overcapacity
elimination, CISA’s Agreement on Iron Ore Import and Agreement on Domestic Steel Market
laid down the specific requirement for steel plants to achieve the target. The MII also
proposed similar measures at the World Steel Association conference in 2009.
Unsurprisingly, the industry wide M&A promoted by the CISA also has its origin in State
Council’s Plan, and MII’s forthcoming Steel Industry Mergers and Acquisitions Principles
and Guidelines on the Promotion of the Mergers and Acquisitions of Steel Enterprises.

361

Chapter 9 Discussions and Conclusion
The consistency between CISA’s discourse and the corresponding government documents
discussed above, coupled with the political background of the senior management team at the
association, suggests that the CISA was held accountable to the government, rather than to
any iron and steel enterprises. This gave rise to a couple of questions: since the Chinese
government (Deng, 1993; Jiang, 2006b, 2006c) and the CISA (CISA, 2011b, 2013b; Liu,
2013) claimed to be the follower of Marx’s theory, and given that The Communist Manifesto
(Marx & Engels, 2008) expects that a proletarian government would finally take over
capitalism, why did the association still fail to resist the financialised index price? Was it
because that the Manifesto did not foresee the emergence of financialisation, or that the CISA
became another type of government organisation different from Marx’s depiction in the
Manifesto? Therefore, the analysis went on to see whether The Communist Manifesto could
explain financialisation, and, if so, whether the CISA really followed the path of the
proletarian government described in the Manifesto.

On the one hand, although financialisation was something that Marx did not specifically
analyse in his time, he did point out the general characteristics of capitalism where “(t)he
bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production,
and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society” (Marx
& Engels, 2008, p.38). In the actual practice of the Chinese iron ore market, this refers to the
shifts from the traditional annual contract based price, through the spot market price in 2009,
and ultimately the quarterly index price in 2010, with the corresponding changes in the social
relations therein among the Big Three, CISA, and the small and medium enterprises. On the
other hand, while the CISA, and particularly the industry wide M&A, exhibited a certain
level of consistency with the Manifesto in terms of its political control over the iron and steel
industry, it rarely mentioned the interest of the working class which would be able to,
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according to the Manifesto, overthrow capitalism. This is the key to answer the research
question from a class perspective, since class struggle is considered by Marx as the solution
to capitalism in general (and thus to financialisation).

9.1.4.3. CISA’s ignorance of the working class interest
Subsequently, the working class interest is analysed in the context of the financialisation of
iron ore price from three aspects: (1) productive capitalist; (2) financial capitalists and the
working class; and (3) global iron ore market. First, in relation to CISA’s view of the Chinese
iron and steel industry as a productive capitalist, while insisting on the traditional use value of
iron ore as the means of production (MP) for steel, the association ignored human labour (L)
as another indispensable component in the circuit of productive capital (as shown in Figure
6.7). Moreover, also contained within the movement of productive capital and too was
neglected by the CISA is the class relation between capital and labour (Marx, 1956, p.18).
Rather, the association considered its participation in iron ore price negotiation as a corporate
matter (Xinhuanet, 17 August 2009), with no mention of the working class.

Second, in relation to CISA’s response to the index price, the association did not recognise
the invisible exploitation (as shown in Figure 4.1 and expanded in Figure 7.3) by the financial
capitalists who will be able to take the lion’s share of the surplus value extracted from the
Chinese steel workers. Instead, the association emphasised the interest of China’s enterprises
in that there must exist an interdependent relationship between the Big Three and the Chinese
firms. Although the word interest was frequently referred to by the CISA which argued for “a
reasonable allocation of interests on the same industrial chain” (Zhang Yi, 2009d), it was
interpreted as the economic profit for steel plants (Zhang Yi, 2009d; Securities Times, 20
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March 2009). Furthermore, the term national interest was also used by the CISA to unite all
Chinese firms in the iron and steel industry (see Tie, 2009). Yet this was considered as the
interests of the major SOEs (Li RX, 2010a) and of the government in general (Yu L, 2010e;
Ruan, 2010). In other words, there is no evidence that the association considered the working
class interest as one area affected by financialisation.

Third, in relation to the global iron ore market as a whole, the movement of productive,
commercial, and financial capital would, according to Marx (1973, pp.215-6), further
exacerbate the exploitation of the working class. While dismissing the improved efficiency of
the small and medium enterprises, the CISA did not recognise the corresponding intensified
competition in China’s labour market. Rather, it held the same view as other government
departments (Han, 2009c; Zhou RX, 2009b) that the increase in steel output was the obstacle
to the healthy development of the Chinese iron and steel industry (Xu YL, 2009c).

Summarising the class analysis above, a unique group of stakeholders to which the CISA is
held accountable emerges. First of all, it is not the productive capitalist which the association
was acting during its negotiation with the Big Three. Thus, it is more in the nature of a
government organisation. This is particularly so when the CISA dealt with issues such as the
iron ore agency system and the industry wide M&A within China’s domestic sector.
However, the concept of government by the CPC in the Chinese context differs from the
proletarian government described by Marx in The Communist Manifesto: While emphasising
the political control over the nation’s iron and steel industry, the association made no mention
of the working class interest throughout its discourse in iron ore price negotiation. This
explains partly the research question as for the reasons behind CISA’s failure in resisting the
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financialised index price of iron ore, since the concept of the working class and its class
struggle against capitalists is considered by Marx in the Manifesto as the solution to
capitalism. The CISA, in contrast, simply relied upon government control, which is consistent
with its interpretation of interests as those of the major SOEs and the central government.

9.1.5. Summary of the findings
The main purpose of the thesis is to investigate the reasons behind CISA’s failure in resisting
the financialised index price of iron ore and the association’s corresponding use of
accounting discourse. Based on a Marxist informed discourse analysis illuminated in chapter
five, chapters six, seven, and eight are dedicated to analyse, respectively, the relevant modes
of production underlying the accounting discourse concerned, the interaction among the
productive, commercial, and financial capital in the Chinese iron ore market, and the class
status of the CISA in the iron ore negotiation in particular and the Chinese iron and steel
industry in general. In so doing, the research question is explored in the three aspects above.

First of all, the financialisation of iron ore price is an inevitable trend in the context of the
global capitalist economy, as a result of the conflicts between (1) the social relations among
the Big Three, the CISA, as well as the small and medium enterprises and (2) the increased
iron ore demand in the Chinese market as the corresponding productive force. Under such
circumstances, the index price exhibits the ability to operate independent of the actual iron
ore consumption in the physical market, thus defying the political and regulatory constraints
imposed by the CISA. Secondly, the CISA had no intention to launch the Chinese iron ore
index which might have otherwise taken the priority in pricing iron ore before the Platts
index promoted by the Big Three came into effect. This is because the CISA considered
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finance as harmful and toxic to the traditional iron and steel industry, and the development of
the industry itself did not need much help from finance. Deeply rooted in this view is CISA’s
failed recognition of the interaction among the productive, commercial, and financial capital.
Thirdly, unlike Marx’s projection in The Communist Manifesto that a proletarian government
would be able to overthrow capitalism through the proletarian class struggle, the CISA did
not relate the working class interest with the impending financialisation in the Chinese iron
ore market, but primarily resorted to government control. This is also consistent with the
special group of stakeholders to whom the association is held accountable: the CISA was
concerned with the interests of neither the small and medium enterprises nor the major SOEs,
but the central government of CPC.

9.2. Implications for accounting and accounting discourse
The analysis begins with the respective accounting discourse by the CISA and the Big Three
regarding the price of iron ore, and then draws from Marx’s concepts of mode of production,
productive forces, social relations, movement of capital, and class interests. This is based on
Marx’s (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.47) emphasis on the material production by the producers of
discourse. Implications for accounting in general and accounting discourse are discussed
below.

9.2.1. Implication for accounting discourse and financialisation
While the extant accounting literature on financialisation concerns a variety of issues such as
financialisation as a tool for management control (Alvehus & Spicer, 2012), the rise of fair
value accounting in the context of financialisation (Power, 2010), financial accounting
standards and practice as the contributor to financialisation (Nolke & Perry, 2008; NewBerry
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& Robb, 2008; Arnold, 2009; Muller, 2014) and the GFC (Hatherly & Kretzschmar, 2011),
how the accounting Conceptual Framework has facilitated and sustained financialisation
beyond the GFC (Zhang & Andrew, 2014), and how management accounting accommodates
financialisation (Froud et al., 2014), research regarding the case where accounting language
is used to resist financialisation has been sparse. Therefore, the current case study of the
financialisation of iron ore price in the Chinese iron and steel industry presents the other side
of the coin: the accounting discourse such as fair price, transparency, representation of
market, cost control, production budget, and so forth were put forward by the CISA in order
to resist the financialised quarterly index pricing mechanism. Yet the Big Three on the other
hand used the similar discourse to promote the index price. This reinforces the view that
accounting is a malleable tool capable of accommodating different social and political
contexts (Funnell, 1998; Ordelheide, 2004; Ezzamel et al., 2007).

9.2.2. Implications for accounting standards and financialisation
By presenting the productive, commercial, and financial capital as represented by the CISA,
the small and medium enterprises, and the Big Three respectively in Marx’s concept of civil
society where the three groups interacted with one another, the analysis provides a live story,
in the practice of the Chinese iron ore market, of the shift in the focus of contemporary
financial reporting from historical cost accounting (HCA) to fair value accounting (FVA).
Granted, neither the CISA nor the Big Three did actually mention such accounting concepts;
it is argued however that these concepts do share similar theoretical underpinnings with the
traditional annual contract based price vis-à-vis the index price. Therefore, it is also of
practical and theoretical relevance to examine in the following sections (9.2.2.1.–9.2.2.4.)
how the shift in the accounting measurement method has contributed to, whether directly or
otherwise, the emergence of the index pricing mechanism of iron ore. Relevant concepts are
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also explored including different views of income, inventory valuation, and the concepts of
capital where conceptual connections are made with Marx’s circuits of capital.
9.2.2.1. Annual price Vs. Index price and Historical cost Vs. Fair value
HCA measurement has long served as the “basis in which assets are measured at historical
acquisition cost (less accumulated depreciation and accumulated impairment losses) and
liabilities are measured at face or nominal amount” (Henderson et al., 2014, p.81). In iron ore
transactions, the annual contract price exhibits the same nature of HCA in that iron ore was
priced once a year as per the outcome of the annual negotiation between sellers and buyers.
As such, from CISA’s perspective as a productive capitalist, once the annual price is settled,
iron ore can be purchased by steel plants as the raw material inventory for the coming
financial year. Even there were price fluctuations, both expected and otherwise, the Chinese
iron and steel industry shall not be affected, since (1) licensed importers would still be able to
use the annual price for their procurement, and (2) those unlicensed firms could also purchase
from the licensed ones at a fixed price which contains the fixed annual price plus a 3%-5%
premium (Economy 30 Minutes, 23 June 2009). This also corresponds to HCA’s inability to
reflect market price changes (IASB Exposure Draft Conceptual Framework 2015, para.6.6).

However, as the Big Three found it difficult to reach an agreed annual price with the CISA
and the Chinese market demand was dramatically increased thanks to China’s economic
stimulus package (e.g. Chen, 2008a; Caijing, 27 April 2009), the mining giants turned to the
spot market where the price was more flexible and the buyers were no longer limited to those
licensed firms. Spot market transactions naturally give rise to fluctuating prices which,
according to some accounting scholars (e.g. Sweeny, 1964; Edwards & Bell, 1961;
Chambers, 1966; Deegan, 2009), would impair the reliability and relevance of HCA. Thus,
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similar to the academics’ call for the current cost based accounting 75 and the adoption of
FVA, the Big Three began to use the spot price and finally adopted the index price in 2010.
At this point, the question is whether these new pricing methods exhibit the resemblance to
FVA. A close examination of the theoretical relationship between the newly installed index
pricing mechanism of iron ore and fair value accounting is presented as follows.

Fair value is the “price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in
an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date” (IFRS 13,
para.9). The three key elements of FVA are, as indicated by Loftus et al. (2013),
“1. it is a current exit price
2. the asset is sold or the liability is transferred in an orderly transaction
3. the transaction is between market participants” (p.102).

In China’s iron ore market, parallels can be drawn between FVA and the spot price and the
quarterly index price, with reference to the three elements above. First, regarding current exit
price, IFRS 13 para.27 states that the price measurement of a non-financial asset, which in
this thesis refers to iron ore, takes into account “a market participant’s ability to generate
economic benefits by using the asset in its highest and best use or by selling it to another
market participant that would use the asset in its highest and best use” (p.13). In para.29, the
term ‘highest and best use’ is interpreted as the price perceived from the market participants’
perspective, “even if the entity intends a different use” (p.14). Para.31 then specifies two
different bases on which assets’ fair value can be assessed: (a) in-combination and (b) standalone, the adoption of which depending on the ability to ‘provide maximum value to market
participants’. In the Chinese market, this relates to the role of iron ore, which can be either
75

According to Deegan (2009), HCA has long been held by some accounting scholars as irrelevant in times of rising prices.
They proposed various solutions to this problem, which, for the sake of simplicity in the thesis, I call them generally as the
current cost based accounting. Specifically, Sweeny (1964) proposed the current purchasing power accounting. Edwards and
Bell (1961) supported the current cost accounting. Chambers (1966) introduced the continuously contemporary accounting.
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consumed as the means of production, combined with other raw materials, for steel
production (i.e. in-combination basis), or resold as an individual commodity (i.e. stand-alone
basis). As such, China’s iron ore importing enterprises would neither price iron ore based on
its use value as a productive capitalist nor resell their first hand import to those unlicensed
firms at fixed premiums suggested by the CISA. This is because, with China’s rising demand,
iron ore price would have kept increasing even after the annual price was settled. Under such
circumstances, selling iron ore in the spot market at the current exit price will evidently
generate more value than leaving the steel making ingredient in production as sunk cost at
entry prices. Nor is the transfer of iron ore to the unlicensed firms with CISA’s fixed
premium rates a better deal. Thus, IFRS’s logic of highest and best use leads these licensed
importers to iron ore’s exchange value as a commercial capitalist who sells the mineral
product, rather than consumes within, to outside parties.

Another implication of IFRS 13 para.29 is that while assessing the value of iron ore from the
perspective of other market participants, the actual transaction of iron ore does not have to
occur: ‘even if the entity intends a different use’ means that even if the Chinese importer
chose to keep their import for steel production, they would still need to measure the iron ore
price based on a hypothetical transaction. This is also confirmed by para.20 that “the entity
does not need to be able to sell the particular asset… on the measurement date to be able to
measure fair value” (IFRS 13, para.20), and para.3 that “an entity’s intention to hold an
asset… is not relevant when measuring fair value” (IFRS 13, para.3). In this aspect, relevance
can also be found in the Platts index assessment method which is based on not only
“confirmed trades, (but also) firms bids… firm offers… expression of interests to trade with
published bids and offers… indicative values (and so forth)” (Platts, 2015b, p.3). Moreover,
similar to the contrast between entry price and exit price where the latter is chosen to be the
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fair value (IFRS 13 para.2), Platts also states that “firms bids and offers that are available to
the entire market take precedence over trades that have been concluded earlier in the
assessment process when establishing the value of the market (p.5).

Furthermore, the specific calculation of the Platts index is also somehow similar to the
valuation technique used by FVA. While recognising that the “time of transactional
activity… quality of iron ore, delivery location, and other specific terms of trade may be
varied in the physical commodity markets” (p.5), Platts employs an adjustment procedure that
“normalizes disparate information from the diverse physical commodity markets back to
the standard (i.e. iron ore fines with an iron content of 62%) reflected in Platts price
assessment… by analysing freight rates (for locational differences), quality differentials
(for quality differences), the movements of all market through time (for time differences)
and other differentials associated with the size of trades and delivery terms” (p.5).

This corresponds to FVA’s hierarchy of inputs (IFRS 13, para.76-90), the priority of which is
set out in a descending order from Level 1 to Level 3. Specifically, Level 1 inputs refer to the
quoted prices in an active market for identical assets or liabilities which provide the most
reliable evidence (IFRS 13, para.76-77). In this thesis, it refers to those iron ore with the
exact 62% iron content in China’s spot market (Platts, 2015c). As for those that do not
contain an exact 62% Fe content and/or are not traded in the Chinese spot market (i.e.
Qingdao Port), Level 2 inputs are required. These, as informed by the IFRS, could include
quoted prices for similar assets in active markets (dealing with qualify difference), quoted
prices for identical or similar assets in non-active markets (dealing with locational
difference), and/or other inputs than quoted prices (dealing with other differentials such as
transaction time). Level 3 inputs purport to the unobservable inputs when market data are not
available. In the case of the Platts index assessment however, this is not applicable.
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The second key element to FVA is orderly transaction. This also effectively distinguishes the
spot market price and the index price from the traditional annual price. Unlike CISA’s
concept of order in the context of the Chinese domestic market where iron ore is first
imported and then sold to unlicensed firms with certain fixed surcharges, IFRS’s definition of
orderly transaction requires that the asset or liability in question be exposed to the principal
market (or the most advantageous market) for a period before the measurement date (IASB
13, 2013). The term order(ly) here merits special attention. While the CISA insisted on a
‘Chinese price’ (a fixed annual price exclusive to domestic buyers) and introduced a number
of industry policies (e.g. Procedure, Details, and Tracking Standards) to ensure the
implementation of the fixed price, IFRS 13 however ruled out this scenario in that orderly
transaction “is not a forced transaction” (IFRS 13, Appendix A). IFRS 13 Appendix B section
B43 (d) specifically points out one of the transactions that is not orderly when “(t)he seller
was required to sell to meet regulatory or legal requirements”. Based on this section alone,
the annual price of iron ore, whether it be the outcome of the bilateral negotiation between
the buyers and sellers or the result of CISA’s agency system, does not reflect fair value.

In a similar vein, the so called principal market in which orderly transactions take place and
fair value is measured also renders the traditional annual price insisted by the CISA far from
being fair. IFRS 13 Appendix A defines principal market as the “market with the greatest
volume and level of activity for the asset or liability”. Prior to the 2009 iron ore negotiation,
this might well be the case in China’s domestic market where most of the country’s iron ore
import were resold to the small and medium firms by the major SOEs. However, as the Big
Three began to trade iron ore in the Chinese spot market since 2009 and ultimately adopted
the quarterly index price in 2010, the market “with greatest volume and level of iron ore
transaction” became the country’s own spot market. As recognised by Platts (2015c),
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“(t)he global spot market for iron ore fines… is dominated by China’s import market…
China demonstrates the greatest level of daily spot price transparency, due to high
frequency of spot cargo transactions and a high volume of spot tonnage imported as a
proportion of total imports. Much of iron ore bought and supplies in the rest of the world,
by contract, is captive or termed. For these reasons, the CFR China price76 functions as a
global benchmark for all iron ore prices” (p.1) (emphasis added).

To paraphrase the above quote in the language of IFRS 13, the principal market for iron ore,
insofar as the Chinese purchasers and the global importers are concerned, is China’s spot
market. Thus, spot market price has been given legitimacy via accounting standards and in
particular the logic of FVA. Furthermore, as for the index price, Platts (2015c) further stated
that since its index assessment “enjoys the most use for price settlement in physical supply
contracts of any information provider with millions of tons of material destined for delivery
to China” (p.1), the Platts Index has become the most widely used indicator of iron ore prices.
In other words, building upon its spot price derived from China’s spot market, Platts claims
that its index is now being used widely as the global benchmark price. Again, in this sense,
the principal market in which iron ore index price is assessed refers to the Chinese market.

In contrast to the Big Three, Platts, and IFRS who considered China as the principal market
and the spot price and index price as the fair value of iron ore, the CISA held the opposite
view. It was not that the association did not recognise China’s position as the world’s largest
iron ore importing country (see Wan, 2009b; Zhang XD, 2009c) (and thus as the principal
market for the steel making ingredient); it is due to CISA’s different interpretation of market
(see section 6.4.1.1.). Unlike the Big Three which recognised and participated in spot market,
the CISA perceived a highly regulated market where the price and the (re)distribution of iron
ore shall be fixed and supervised. Between these two interpretations of (principal) market,

76

CFR refers to Cost and Freight, including the cost of the product being shipped and the shipping cost. Platts’ inclusion of
shipping cost is consistent with FVA. IFRS 13 para.26 states that fair value measurement involves transport cost if location
is one attribute of the asset. In this case, Platts (2015b) recognises the significance of location to pricing iron ore and takes
into account the shipping cost in the form of CFR.
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FVA has chosen the former, as more and more transactions took place in the spot market via
the index price and only a few major SOEs stayed in CISA’s market. Also, CISA’s concept
of market is inconsistent with the logic of FVA. Compared with the association’s requirement
that iron ore shall be traded at specific fixed premium rates from the licensed importing
enterprises (mostly SOEs) to their unlicensed counterparts, IFRS 13 para.2 states that “fair
value is a market-based measurement, not an entity-specific measurement”. Further, even
suppose CISA’s notion of market could to some extent be realised, still the resulting price
would not have been regarded as fair value because the “market in which the transaction
takes place is different from the principal market” (IFRS 13, Appendix B4 (b)).

Thirdly, IFRS’s definition of market participant is also against CISA’s concept of annual
price. In particular, the IFRS defines market participants as
“(b)uyers and sellers in the principal (or most advantageous market) market for the asset
or liability that have all of the following characteristics:
(a) They are independent of each other, i.e. they are not related parties as defined in IAS
24…
(b) They are knowledgeable, having a reasonable understanding about the asset or
liability and the transaction using all available information…
(c) They are able to enter into a transaction for the asset or liability.
(d) They are willing to enter into a transaction for the asset or liability, i.e. they are
motivated but not forced or otherwise compelled to do so” (IFRS 13 Appendix A)

Comparing this with CISA’s discourse regarding the iron ore price and the Chinese market, a
few inconsistencies are identified. First, the notion of market participant is presupposed upon
the existence of a principal market, which, as demonstrated earlier, is not the CISA’s highly
regulated and supervised market. Second, most participants within China’s domestic iron ore
market who engaged in those iron ore transactions approved by the CISA are, arguably, not
entirely independent of one another. This is because most of these firms are the major SOEs
ultimately under the control of the SASAC (see Figures 6.2-6.6). Further, in the case of the
2009 annual price between FMG and the CISA, the independent participant criterion is still
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not met, since, among the few participants in China who had the procurement contract with
FMG, Hunan Valin Iron and Steel group also held 17.30% shares of FMG, ranking as the
second largest shareholder at the Australian mining firm (FMG, 2009). According to IAS 24
Related Party Disclosures para.9 (b) (viii), if one entity provides key management personnel
to the other entity, then the two firms are deemed related. In this aspect, FMG and Huanan
Valin are related parties, since FMG (2009, p.35) acknowledged, based on AASB 124, that Li
Xiaowei as one of the key management personnel, who also served as the chairman of Hunan
Valin Iron and Steel, and the vice president of the CISA. As such, the annual price jointly
achieved by FMG and the CISA is arguably not fair by the IFRS.

Even suppose there could be many other market participants, particularly the small and
medium firms, than those major SOEs which adopted the annual fixed price and engaged in
the transactions as per CISA’s policy, the third and fourth factors that set the Chinese annual
price apart from fair value are contained in criteria (c) and (d). On the one hand, the small and
medium enterprises were unable to use the price in the actual purchase of iron ore, as FMG’s
supply was limited to a few major SOEs (see Yue et al., 2009). Criterion (c) thus does not
recognise them as market participants still. On the other hand, the Big Three showed no
interest in accepting the price either (see Xinhuanet, 18 August 2009; Zhang C, 2009b),
which, according to criterion (d), too disqualifies the iron ore suppliers as market participants.
In fact, neither the Big Three (Wang J, 2009d; Cao, 2009c; Caijing, 27 April 2009; Liu, 2009;
Zhou XY, 2010; Chen SS, 2010b; Yang LM, 2010b) nor the small and medium firms (Deng,
2009c; Zhang C, 2009a; Li RX, 2010a) exhibited much confidence or interest in adopting any
annual price in general. As such, the ‘able’ and ‘willingness’ stated in (c) and (d) are not met.
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Through a detailed reading of IFRS 13 above, the similarities and distinctions between the
annual fixed price, the quarterly index price, and FVA are explored. It has been demonstrated
that, although none of the parties involved in iron ore price negotiations had referred to the
term ‘fair value’, the index price is actually in the same nature of FVA, and the annual fixed
price against it. This is not to say that the triumph of index price over the annual price is a
direct consequence of the shift in accounting reporting from HCA to FVA, or vice versa; it is
to point out that the rationale for the financialised index pricing does share similar theoretical
ground with FVA. In fact, IFRS 13 does allow the use of quoted prices provided by third
parties; “if an entity has determined that the quoted prices provided by those parties are
developed in accordance with this IFRS” (IFRS 13 para.B45-47). As illustrated, the Platts
index price has met the criteria, whereas the traditional annual fixed price after 2009 shows
little consistence with IFRS 13. Furthermore, it can be argued here that the comparison
between FVA and the index price also helps address the research question as to why the
Chinese iron and steel industry failed to resist the financialisation of iron ore price. That is,
the shift to the financialised index pricing mechanism is not only the direct consequence of
the contradictions between (1) the social relations among the buyers and sellers in China’s
iron ore market and (2) the corresponding productive forces (see section 7.1.), but also the
result, however indirectly it might be, of the rising significance of FVA.
9.2.2.2. Concept of income and the financialisation of iron ore price
Beyond the change in accounting measurement approaches from HCA to FVA is, according
to the extant accounting literature (e.g. Zhang & Andrew, 2014), the shift in the concepts of
financial statement elements such as income and expenses stated in the accounting
Conceptual Framework (CF hereafter). This is because CF provides the conceptual and
logical consistency to standard setters so as to assist the understanding, development,
evaluation, and interpretation of accounting standards (IFRS, 2015; Henderson et al., 2014).
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Thus, the current section explores the theoretical connection between the concepts of income
and other related items defined in the CF and the corresponding discourse discussed by the
Big Three, the CISA, and the small and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel
industry, to further investigate the relevance and relationship between accounting regulations
and the shift in iron ore pricing mechanisms. Specifically, the conceptual work analysed in
this thesis refers to the current CF which originated from IASC’s 1989 framework, and has
been revised by the IASB in 2010 (the 2010 framework hereafter) as a result of the joint
project between the FASB and the IASB (IFRS, 2015). However, the 2010 framework was
not considered complete, and the IASB restarted the CF project in 2010 (IFRS, 2015). At the
time of writing this thesis, IASB published the Exposure Draft for a revised CF in May 2015.
Nevertheless, relevant analyses in this thesis draw primarily from IASB’s 2010 framework
because: (1) both the major Chinese steel plants introduced in chapter six (e.g. Baosteel,
Shougang, Anshan Iron & Steel, and Wuhan Iron & Steel) and the Big Three are listed in
stock exchanges that require the accounting disclosure based on the IASB; (2) the period for
which the case study is concerned ended in May 2010, which corresponds to the underlying
emphasis stated in CF by the IASB at nearly the same time; (3) although the Exposure Draft
of the revised CF is released in May 2015, it is considered not as the final version, and
relevant revisions could arguably be the result of recent developments (after 2010) in both
accounting practice and standard setting that are beyond the scope of this thesis.

According to the 2010 CF, income is defined as “increases in economic benefits during the
accounting period in the form of inflows or enhancements of assets or decreases of liabilities
that result in increases in equity, other than those relating to contributions from equity
participants” (IASB, para.4.25). This is based on the asset-liability view as opposed to the
conventional matching principle derived from the revenue-expense dichotomy (Erhard, 2004;
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Bullen & Crook, 2005; Henderson et al., 2014). Specifically, the asset-liability view is
grounded in the work of the English economist John Hicks (1946) that income is the net
change in the entity’s wealth and what the entity consumed throughout the period. In contrast,
the revenue-expense view attempts to match revenue with expenses within the same period.

Among the two views77, it is the former that has long been adopted by the IASB and the
FASB in their original CF (respectively released in 1989 and in 1978). Financial market
regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US also consider
that such a view “most appropriately anchors the standard setting process by providing the
strongest conceptual mapping to the underlying economic reality” (SEC, 2003). Conversely,
the revenue-expense concept on the other hand is labelled as inappropriate by standard setters
and regulators even before the issue of the 2010 CF (Bullen & Crook, 2005). For instance, in
its 1976 Discussion Memorandum (Scope and Implications of the Conceptual Framework
Project), FASB stated that, unless elements such as income, revenue, and expenses can be
clearly defined independently of assets, liabilities, or other subjective terminologies, income
derived from revenue-expense perspective is highly subjective (FASB, 1976). The SEC
shared the similar point that “(w)ithout first having an understanding of the wealth at the
beginning of the period, it is not possible to determine the change in wealth during the
period… the revenue/expense approach can become ad hoc and incoherent” (SEC, 2003).

At present, the 2010 CF also places less emphasis on the revenue-expense view, since it has
replaced traditional ideas of revenue and expense with concepts and recognition criteria of

77

This section is not concerned with which particular view is superior to the other. Rather, the attitude of accounting
standard setters and regulators are presented and compared with relevant discourse of the CISA. For an in-depth theoretical
discussion of both views by accounting scholars, please see Michael et al. 2008.
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income and expense (para.4.24). CF’s concept of income comprises revenue and gains, and
the concept of expense consists of expenses and losses: while revenue and expenses arise
from the ordinary business activities of the entity, gains and losses could arise from either
ordinary or non-ordinary activities (para.4.29-30&4.33-34). By giving clear definition and
recognition criteria to these elements, CF allows the independent determination and
measurement of relevant items, and thus relies less on the matching between revenue and
expense where items of expense need to be identified according to relevant revenue accounts
(Henderson et al., 2014). Moreover, unlike the conventional depiction based on the revenueexpense view, CF’s categorisation and labelling of these income-related items enable the
measurement of entity’s performance to be presented in different ways with varying degrees
of inclusiveness for decision making purposes (para.4.27-28). One example is the
presentation of the statement of profit or loss and other comprehensive income (OCI).
According to IAS 1 para.10A, the format of the statement shall be presented as either a single
statement containing profit or loss and OCI in two sections, or a separate statement of profit
or loss immediately followed by the statement of comprehensive income. Here, the concept
of profit/loss includes not only the traditional revenue and expenses, but also gains and losses
arising from the derecognition (para.82 (aa)) or reclassification adjustment (para.82 (ca)) of
financial assets (IAS 1 para.82). The OCI section presents other types of gains and losses
arising from (1) the changes in the fair value of assets (i.e. available-for-sale financial assets,
property, plant and equipment, intangible assets, etc.), liability (e.g. defined benefit plans),
and financial instruments (e.g. hedges, forward contracts), and (2) translating the financial
statement of foreign operations (IAS 1 para.7). In fact, the IASB has also recognised the
conceptual significance of gains and losses.
“Gains represent increases in economic benefits and as such are no different in nature
from revenue. Hence, they are not regarded as constituting a separate element in this
Conceptual Framework… Losses represent decreases in economic benefits and as such
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they are no different in nature from other expenses. Hence, they are not regarded as a
separate element in this Conceptual Framework” (para.4.30 & 4.33) (emphases added).

Also, in terms of OCI, “the Board places on presenting profit or loss and other
comprehensive income together and with equal prominence” (IAS 1 para.IN4). As such, the
distinction between profit or loss statement and the section of OCI comes from “prescriptions
of accounting standards and accounting policy choices, rather than being driven by
conceptual differences” (Loftus et al., 2013, p.624). Obviously, the CF has adopted a more
comprehensive perspective than the traditional revenue-expense view in measuring,
recording, and communicating the financial performance of an entity.

Although the two views of income were rarely mentioned by any party throughout their
discourse studied in the thesis, parallels can still be found between the CF and relevant
argument set forth by related groups. On the one hand, it is argued here that the CISA, as the
semi-formal industry regulator, adopted the revenue-expense perspective while defending the
annual contract based price and chastising the private trade of iron ore in the spot market.
This is because, from the association’s point of view, the correct lifecycle of iron ore should
only be first extracted by mining companies and then sold to steel plants for steel production.
That is, the flow of iron ore is expected to be within the ordinary activities of both mining
firms as well as steel plants on the same industrial chain where the former sells iron ore for
revenue and the latter consumes the raw material as part of the expense for steel
manufacturing. As such, the financialised quarterly index price that links iron ore price to
financial market index means that the ordinary transaction in traditional physical market is no
longer the primary determinant of iron ore price. Participants from other market will be
invited to trade iron ore and its associated derivatives. Thus, for the CISA, the use of index
price that directs iron ore market outside the conventional revenue-expense view is not to be
welcomed and accepted. This is also part of the reasons behind CISA’s attempt to forbid the
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spot market transactions in China: the private purchase and (re)sale of iron ore were
considered beyond the ordinary business scope of the Chinese steel plants that were expected
to focus on manufacturing steels, instead of trading iron ore. In this respect, net income of
steel enterprises should only be the result of matching revenue with expenses.

On the other hand, the asset-liability view, which is adopted by the CF, has received
recognition by China’s small medium firms and the Big Three. First, in relation to the small
and medium enterprises, iron ore served not only as the raw material for steel manufacturing
but also a tradable commodity. That is, apart from those iron ore consumed in the production
process as ordinary activities, the rest of the steel making ingredients were stockpiled and
later to be sold at higher prices (Zhai, 2009; Zhang C, 2009a). While steel plants’ sale of iron
ore to other market participants was not strictly perceived as falling outside the category of
ordinary business activities, it can arguably be, from CISA’s point of view (which forbade
the spot market transaction of iron ore in China), something that did not meet the definition
of revenue stated in the CF (para.4.29). Thus, income derived from such activities is
considered as gains which “represent other items that meet the definition of income and may,
or may not, arise in the course of the ordinary activities of an entity” (paragraph 4.30).
However, unlike the CISA who disapproved the private sale and purchase of iron ore in the
Chinese market and thus dismissed the corresponding gain as the result of market
speculations, the CF stated that “gains represent increases in economic benefits and as such
are no different in nature from revenue” (para.4.30). Therefore, it is argued that the unofficial
trade of iron ore in China’s spot market by the small and medium enterprises can be justified
under the CF and in particular the concept of income based on the asset-liability view.
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9.2.2.3. Concept of inventory: iron ore as raw material / commodity
This also means that, since gains arise from the revaluation and/or disposal of non-current
assets and marketable securities (para.4.31), iron ore has been given a new identity, instead of
its ordinary account as raw material inventory. Specifically, while the traditional accounting
treatment of iron ore by steel plants is to record the steel making ingredient as: raw material
(when it is first purchased)—work in progress (during the steel production process)—finish
goods (when the production is completed)—cost of sales (when the resulting steel product is
sold), the identity of other iron ore for resale requires further exploration. The first question is
whether, insofar as the Chinese steel plants are concerned, these iron ore can also be
considered as inventory. According to IAS 2 Inventories, inventories are assets
(a) held for sale in the ordinary course of business;
(b) in the process of production for such sale; or
(c) in the form of materials or supplies to be consumed in the production process or in
the rendering of services (para.6).

While it is relatively obvious that CISA’s definition of iron ore as the raw material for steel
easily fits such definition, it is highly unlikely that iron ore held and resold by steel plants
would be able to meet any of the criteria above, since selling iron ore was not steel plants’
ordinary course of business (para.6 (a)), and nor was the mineral product going to be put into
steel production ((b) and (c)). This is where the investigation proceeds to two further aspects.

The first step is to suppose steel plants held iron ore for sale in China’s domestic market as
one of their ordinary activities, albeit not officially recognised by the CISA. Although iron
ore in this sense can be considered as inventory (IAS 2 para.6 (a) & 8), the way in which it is
measured remains different from the traditional approach in IAS 2. This is because the role of
iron ore was no longer limited to the raw material for steel production (section 6.4.3.), but
became, as claimed by the Big Three, a globally traded commodity in the same nature as oil,
copper, and soybean (21st Century Business Herald, 1 June 2010). Those steel plants engaged
382

Chapter 9 Discussions and Conclusion
in the resale of iron ore in China’s spot market as one of their ordinary business activities
have become commodity traders like iron ore trading firms. Thus, compared to IAS 2 para.9
that normal78 inventories are measured at the lower of cost and net realisable value, those
commodity (iron ore) traders “measure their inventories at fair value less cost to sell”
(para.3(b)), which corresponds to the spot market price and the quarterly index price. Also
noticeable is that the net realisable value is not necessarily equal to fair value, as the former is
an entity-specific value derived from how much an entity expects to realise from the sale of
inventory in the ordinary course of business (IAS 2 para.7), whereas the latter uses a marketbased measurement regardless of any individual entity’s decision (IFRS 13, para.B42).

Furthermore, para.3 (b) states that changes in the fair value of iron ore (as commodity) are
recognised in profit or loss during the period, which also reinforces the concept of income
based on the asset-liability view (discussed in section 9.2.3.1.). Therefore, it is argued that the
distinction between the measurement approaches above lends the conceptual legitimacy to
the resale of iron ore in the Chinese market: while para.9 applies to the traditional status of
the mineral product as the raw material for steel production and requires it be measured at the
lower of cost and net realisable value, para.3 (b) acknowledges the profit derived from the
unofficial trade of iron ore inside China which the CISA did not approve.

It is not only the commodity trader that is exempt from the traditional measurement of
inventory stated in IAS 2, iron ore producers also measure their inventories at “net realisable
value in accordance with well-established practices in those industries” (para.3(a)). In the

78

Here, the word normal refers to inventories other than those agricultural, forest, and/or mineral products traded by their
producers (IAS 2 para.3 (a)), and those traded by commodity brokers or traders (para.3 (b)), since the measurement of these
types of inventories does not follow the one stated in para.9 (lower of cost and net realisable value) (see para.3).
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case of the Big Three, well-established practices refer to the annual pricing mechanism till
2009 and the quarterly index pricing mechanism since 2010. In this sense, accounting
standards for inventory serve to distinguish the role of iron ore accounted by (1) the Big
Three and (2) the small and medium firms in the Chinese iron and steel industry from the one
considered by (3) the CISA, allowing the former two groups to measure iron ore at its fair
value, and the CISA at the historical cost. Moreover, IAS 2 para.3 (a) states that “changes in
that (net realisable) value are recognised in profit or loss in the period of the change”. In other
words, similar to what para.3 (b) enables iron ore traders to recognise changes in the fair
value of iron ore as profit or loss, para.3 (b) justifies Big Three’s replacement of the annual
fixed pricing mechanism. This is because, with Big Three’s firm belief in the rising demand
in the global iron ore market (Chen, 2008a; Gold Bull Information, 20 May 2009; Deng,
2009a; Yang Y, 2009a; Wang J, 2010a; Wan, 2010b; Chen SS, 2010a) where the quarterly
index price would be higher than the annual benchmark price, more profits could be realised
from just holding the mineral products and recognised in the statement of comprehensive
income. As such, it is demonstrated that the measurement of iron ore as inventory reinforces
the concept of income based on the asset-liability view by rationalising and sustaining the
different accounting treatment of the mineral product between (1) the Big Three and the small
and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron ore market and (2) the CISA: while the former
group measures iron ore as a commodity based on FVA and recognises profits from simply
holding the steel making ingredient, the latter follows the traditional approach that treats
inventory as raw material measured at the lower of historical cost and net realisable value.

While the above sections analyse relevant financial reporting standards (IFRS 13 and IAS 2)
and the CF regarding the identity and measurement of iron ore, one thing which underpins
these concepts and yet which has not been discussed is the concept of capital (see CF
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para.4.57-4.65). Thus, the following section first discusses capital and its conceptual
relationship with fair value, inventory, and the concept of income. Then, the connection is
made between CF’s concept of capital and Marx’s counterpart.
9.2.2.4. Concept of capital: physical vs. financial
According to the 2010 CF, two concepts of capital—financial capital and physical capital—
are offered to the preparers of financial statements.
“Under a financial concept of capital… capital is synonymous with the net assets or
equity of the entity. Under a physical concept of capital… capital is regarded as the
productive capacity of the entity based on, for example, units of output per day” (para.
4.57).
“a financial concept of capital should be adopted if the users of financial statements are
primarily concerned with the maintenance of nominal invested capital or the purchasing
power of invested capital. If, however, the main concern of users is with the operating
capability of the entity, a physical concept of capital should be used” (para.4.58).

While the CF allows the entity to choose in between these concepts “based on the needs of
the users of its financial statements” (para.4.58), the concept of financial capital is “adopted
by most entities” (para.4.57). Indeed, a close examination of the term users in para.4.58
suggests that the CF actually leans towards financial capital. Specifically, para.OB5 points
out that the primary users of financial reports are the participants in capital market including
existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors. Thus, while “regulators and
members of the public other than investors, lenders and other creditors may also find general
purpose financial reports useful… those reports are not primarily directed to these other
groups” (para.OB10). Too excluded from the group of primary users is management who has
the access to additional information (if needed) other than financial reports (para.BC1.19).
Thus, with the CF’s emphasis on the information need of capital market (para.BC1.16(b)), it
is highly likely that the primary users of financial reports are more concerned with their
invested capital, and thus the financial concept of capital is adopted (see para.4.58). This also
suggests a remote possibility of the adoption of physical capital by other interested parties
such as management who might concentrate more on the operating capacity of the firm.
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Furthermore, CF’s preference for financial capital can also be linked to the concepts of
income, inventory, and FVA discussed earlier. First of all, in relation to income, while the CF
states that “(t)he recognition and measurement of income expenses, and hence profits,
depends in part on the concept of capital and capital maintenance” (para.4.24), its definition
of income does exhibit certain level of resemblance to that under the financial concept of
capital. In particular, whilst CF’s general concept of income is the increase in assets and/or
decrease in liabilities that result in a net increase in the entity’s equity (para. 4.25(a)), profit
(net income) based on the financial concept of capital refers to the increase in the nominal
money capital which is “synonymous with the net assets or equity” (para.4.57). In other
words, both versions emphasise on the increase in net asset. The profit under the physical
concept of capital, in contrast, is the increase in the physical productive capacity, the
adoption and measurement of which, according to para.4.58, might be difficult.

In fact, it is not only the definition of income, the components of income, and in particular
gains, also indicate relevant conceptual consistency between the two. Granted, para.4.63 and
4.64 provide two types of profit based on the two concepts of capital respectively that
“(u)nder the concept of financial capital maintenance… increases in the prices of assets
held over the period, conventionally referred to as holding gains, are, conceptually,
profits…Under the concept of physical capital maintenance…All price changes affecting
the assets and liabilities of the entity… are treated as capital maintenance adjustments
that are part of equity and not as profit” (para.4.63-4.64) (emphases added).

Although two treatments of holding gains are given under different concepts of capital, CF’s
definition of income is more consistent with financial capital, as it recognises unrealised
gains from value changes in assets and liabilities (para.4.31). The particular phrase used in
para.4.30 that gains are “no different in nature from revenue” bears similar theoretical basis
as the gains under financial capital described in para.4.63 which “are, conceptually, profits”.
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The physical concept of capital, in contrast, does not recognise holding gains as income but
rather as capital maintenance adjustments as part of equity (2010 CF para.4.64).

Secondly, in relation to inventory, parallels can be drawn to the physical and financial
concepts of capital. Particularly, there are two streams of inventory measurement approaches
corresponding to the two concepts of capital: (1) the lower of cost and net realisable value
and (2) fair value less cost to sell. The first stream is based on the role of inventory as raw
materials for production defined in IAS 2 para.6 (b) and (c), where inventory is measured at
the lower of net realisable value and historical cost. In this regard, the focus of inventory
recording is more on the productive capacity of the entity, and less on the invested capital,
thus connoting the physical concept of capital.

The second stream rests upon other types of inventories to which IAS 2 measurement does
not apply, including financial instruments, commodities, and biological, agricultural, forest,
and mineral products held by their producers (IAS 2, para.2-3). Specifically, financial
instruments (IFRS 9 Financial Instruments), biological assets related to agricultural activity
and agricultural produce at the point of harvest (IAS 41 Agriculture), and commodities (IAS
2 para.3 (b)) are measured at fair value with transaction cost adjustments, whereas
agricultural and forest products after harvest and minerals (IAS 2 para.3 (a)) are assessed by
the net realisable value in the respective industries. To measure these types of inventories, it
is more likely that the financial concept of capital applies. This is because neither the fair
value nor the net realisable value concerned in the cases above fits the physical concept of
capital that focuses on entities’ productive capacity, as both values are the exit price based on
the assumption that the inventory is a complete product at the stage ready for sale. Fair value,
for instance, presupposes the existence of a hypothetical transaction in an active market, and
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thus disregards the potential continued use of inventory in the production process (IFRS 13
para.29). Similarly, the use of net realisable value also assures the incoming sale of
inventories (IAS 2 para.4). Moreover, the way in which value changes of these inventories
are recorded (IAS 41 IN4; IAS 2 para.3) also corresponds to the idea of profit under the
financial concept of capital that encompasses holding gains (2010 CF para.4.63). Thus, it is
argued here that this stream of inventory is measured under the financial concept of capital.

Furthermore, there also exists the relationship between FVA and the financial concept of
capital. Granted, the concept of financial capital maintenance, as per the CF, does not require
any definitive measurement method (among historical cost and current value), and nor is use
of HCA necessary under the physical capital maintenance concept (2010 CF, para.4.61).
However, in the present case study, it is argued that connections can be made between HCA
and the physical concept of capital, and between FVA and the financial concept of capital.

On the one hand, in relation to physical capital, while the CF requires the adoption of the
current cost basis of measurement (2010 CF, para.4.61), the concept of current cost in the
Chinese iron ore market prior to 2009 is no different than HCA. First, both are after all the
entry value “in the market in which the entity acquires the asset or incurs the liability” (2015
CF Exposure Draft, para.6.18). Second, the conventional annual pricing mechanism of iron
ore actually equates the historical cost to the current cost of the mineral product: once the
original fixed price (as the historical cost) was set up by the annual negotiation, it would
remain unchanged for the rest of the financial year. Third, CISA’s iron ore import agency
system based on the annual fixed price also corresponds to the accounting treatment of
holding gains under the physical concept capital: while the former sets out that iron ore shall
not be resold within the domestic market for profit-making purposes, the latter indicates that
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increases in the value of iron ore inventory are not recognised as profits. Last but not least,
the CISA, while defending the annual fixed pricing mechanism throughout the 2009 and 2010
negotiation, equated iron ore demand with the steel production demand in China’s domestic
market (Chen, 2008a; Gold Bull Information, 12 June 2009), and thus was primarily
concerned with the productive capacity of the Chinese steel plants (China Business Network,
2 April 2010). This is consistent with the adoption of the physical concept of capital stated in
the CF (para.4.57) as CISA’s main focus was on the operating and productive capacity of
steel plants. As such, even though these accounting concepts are not discussed or clarified by
any parties concerned in the iron ore pricing negotiation, conceptual connections can be made
between the annual fixed price, HCA, and the physical concept of capital.

On the other hand, in relation to financial capital, the quarterly index price as the fair value of
iron ore (see 9.2.2.1.) is more likely to apply. First, FVA is an exit value based on a
hypothetical transaction from the perspective of market participants, and thus it is less likely
that this measurement would be concerned with the entity-specific productive capacity with
which the physical concept of capital might otherwise be concerned. Regardless of the
intended use of iron ore by steel plants, the index price is assessed based on, not the
immediate use into steel production, but the bids and offers in the spot market (Platts, 2015b).
Secondly, coupled with the change in the price assessment method is a widened range of
buyers and sellers. The adoption of iron ore spot market price, the index price, and the
associated financial derivatives invites other market participants within China and around the
globe than the licensed steel plants and trading firms, linking iron ore price to financial
market movements. Not only the iron ore traders who purchase and sell iron ore for profit
making purposes (Suo, 2010), steel plants also characterise their purchase and storage of the
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steel making material as strategic investment decisions (Zhu, 2009; Baosteel, 2010, p.32). As
such, the index price, FVA, and the financial concept of capital are also conceptually linked.
Summarising how the iron ore pricing mechanism shift is related to accounting standards,
two groups of concepts are presented in Table 9.1, with connections between CF’s physical
and financial concepts of capital and Marx’s productive, commercial, and financial capital.
Table 9.1 iron ore pricing mechanisms and accounting concepts
measurement basis
concept of income
concept of inventory
CF’s concepts of capital
Marx’s circuits of capital

annual fixed price
historical cost
revenue-expense view
raw material
physical capital
productive capital

quarterly index price
fair value
asset-liability view
commodity
financial capital
commercial and financial capital

For the first group which is consistent with the circuit of productive capital presented in
Figure 9.1 below, the traditional annual fixed price depicted by the CISA measures iron ore
based on historical cost (i.e. the annual fixed price) as raw material (MP) for steel production
(P). Profit in this regard only comes from consuming iron ore into steel manufacturing, with
relevant input of manufacturing labour (L), in the first place and selling the resulting steel
product (CP) later at the price of MP. In the language of Marx’s circuit of productive capital,
profit = MP – (L + MP). Correspondingly, a physical concept of capital is adopted which
focuses on the productive capacity of (the Chinese) steel plants.

For the second group to which the quarterly index price corresponds, Marx’s concepts of
commercial and financial capital are present. The Platts index price resembles the
characteristics of fair value. Profit is based on an asset-liability view: net income is not only
obtained from the matching of revenue against expense but also realised by the holding gains.
While giving a new identity to the Chinese iron ore buyers as commodity traders, this view
also rationalises the unofficial trade of iron ore in China’s domestic market and reinforces the
different accounting treatments of inventory measurement. On the one hand, the CISA
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considers iron ore as raw material (MP) measured at the lower of historical cost and net
realisable value; on the other hand, the Big Three and the small and medium firms in the
Chinese iron and steel industry regard the mineral product as a commodity (CC) assessed at
fair value (MC). Thus, other than the traditional form of productive capital presented in Figure
9.1, the circuit of commercial capital is also formed and shown in Figure 9.2.In this sense,
profit not only derives from the sale of steel products as shown in Figure 9.1 [i.e. MP – (L +
MP)], but also the (re)sale of iron ore as an individual commodity (i.e. MC – M).
Figure 9.2 movement of commercial capital under quarterly index pricing mechanism
M—CC—MC

Figure 9.3 movement of financial capital under quarterly index pricing mechanism
M—MF

Furthermore, increases in the fair value of iron ore are recognised as profits (IAS 2 para.3 (b))
which are no different in nature from revenue (2010 CF, para.4.30). This is interpreted in
Marx’s circuit of financial capital (Figure 9.3): while iron ore is purchased at the price M, its
fair value as at the end of the financial reporting period is M F. In this aspect, profit is MF –M.
Iron ore has gone beyond a commodity, as it has been equipped with the same self-expanding
capacity of capital M, from which MF derives. Indeed, coupled with the changed role of iron
ore to commodity, the opened door to other market participants than steel plants has added
“an apparent financial attribute” (Baosteel, 2010, p.25; Baosteel, 2011) to iron ore pricing.
Thus, the financial concept of capital is more likely to apply. Taking into account the circuits
of productive, commercial, and financial capital, profit = MP – (L + MP) + MC – M + MF –M.

In the current section (9.2.2.), the relationship between iron ore pricing mechanisms and the
relevant accounting concepts and standards is explored. The financialisation of iron ore price
serves as the result of as well as the background in which accounting regulations and
practices have undergone significant changes. Similar to the findings of previous literature
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(Nolke & Perry, 2008; NewBerry & Robb, 2008; Arnold, 2009; Muller, 2014; Zhang &
Andrew, 2014), the discussion presents a certain level of association between accounting
regulation and financialisation where the former promotes the latter. At the same time, it also
helps to explain, at least in part, reasons behind CISA’s failure to resist the index price of iron
ore: the adoption of the iron ore index price is not only the direct consequence of the shift in
iron ore pricing mechanism but a result of the underlying social, economic, and political
structure comprised of contradictions in social relations and productive forces from which
neither the shift in iron ore pricing nor the evolution of accounting concepts and standards
can escape. Specifically, the way in which the CISA interpreted accounting primarily stayed
at the technical level. For instance, during the 2009 and 2010 annual price negotiations, the
CISA’s secretary general proposed that the effective period to which annual price applies
should begin from January to December each year to accommodate the Chinese accounting
reporting period, to produce better financial budgets and corporate strategies on the parts of
the Chinese enterprises (Gold Bull Information, 30 September 2009; Guan, 2010). Also, with
particular reference to income, expense, and profit, the CISA simply confined these terms to
the traditional purview of steel plants as productive capitalists: income refers to the sales
revenue of steel products (Zhang Yi, 2010d); expense is the price of iron ore as the raw
material cost for steel (Yao, 2008; Zuo, 2009; Guan, 2010); and thereby profit only derives
from sales revenue less raw material cost [or, in Marx’s terms, MP – (L + MP)] (Xiao, 2008;
Xu Y, 2009; Yu, 2010i). In this regard, it is argued that, although China has gradually opened
its door to the rest of the world since the opening reform in the late 1970s and adopted the
IFRS in 2007, the way in which the Chinese government and the CISA in particular
understood and interpreted accounting did not keep the same pace with the global market and
especially the financialisation of iron ore price.
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9.3. Contribution
9.3.1. Contribution to literature
The thesis has studied financialisation in the context of the Chinese iron and steel industry
which passively participated in the process and accepted the resulting financialised index
price of iron ore. Unlike some of the extant PEA literature, the case study involves not only
the Chinese market in which the financialised iron ore price is adopted but also the interactive
process between China (represented by the CISA) and the Big Three that, as demonstrated in
chapter seven, has inevitably resulted in the shift in iron ore pricing mechanism from
traditional annual negotiation to quarterly index assessment.

Also distinguished from the previous research in the area of financialisation is that the thesis
has studied the issue from the other side: while being the largest iron ore importing and
consuming market, the Chinese iron and steel sector was somewhat at the periphery of the
global financial sector, standing in vivid contrast with the Big Three whose key shareholders
consist of the major financial conglomerates around the world (see Tables 4.1-4.7), not to
mention the inextricably entangled web weaved by financial market investors among the Big
Three and the Platts index (see Figure 4.2). In other words, the story depicts how and why the
world’s largest emerging economy, with the powerful government control and state-owned
conglomerates, has been forced to accept the financialisation of iron ore price.

In relation to accounting literature in particular, the thesis has studied accounting discourse in
the debate over iron ore price between the Big Three and the CISA. With the same set of
discourse including market representation, transparency, and fair price put forward by the two
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groups to support their own interpretation of iron ore price, the case study has shown that
accounting is a malleable tool which can be used both for and against financialisation.
Furthermore, by connecting the annual contract based price and the quarterly index price with
the corresponding accounting concepts including HCA, FVA, income, inventory, and capital
based on a detailed reading of IASB and CF, the close relationship between accounting and
financialisation, consistent with the extant literature (Nolke & Perry, 2008; NewBerry &
Robb, 2008; Arnold, 2009; Muller, 2014; Zhang & Andrew, 2014), has been demonstrated
and reaffirmed. This also indicates how accounting is understood, interpreted, and used in the
Chinese iron and steel industry, which largely stays at the technical level. Despite the fact
that China has adopted IFRS in 2007, the way in which accounting concepts such as fair
value, income, inventory valuation, and capital maintenance are interpreted and imposed
upon the domestic industry by the CISA is limited within the confine of productive capital,
while leaving the theoretical connection between accounting and financialisation untouched.

9.3.2. Methodological and Theoretical contribution
The thesis contributes to the study and application of Marx’s theory in three aspects. First, it
applies Marx’s analysis of capitalism to the contemporary issue of financialisation and has
developed a Marx-informed theoretical framework for financialisation. More specifically, not
only are the connections made in between the circuits of productive, commercial, and
financial capital, the corresponding productive forces and social relations which promote the
shifts in the mode of production in the Chinese iron and steel industry are explored. In so
doing, a detailed story of the financialisation of iron ore pricing mechanism is depicted and
analysed that involves both the promoters of financialisation (i.e. the Big Three) and the
passive receiver (i.e. CISA). It has thereby shown the feasibility of applying Marx’s theory in
the study of financialisation.
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Secondly, the thesis has also developed a methodological framework based on Marx’s work
to analyse accounting discourse. In particular, based on Marx’s ontological, epistemological,
and methodological perspectives, three levels of analyses have been established and
conducted with the respective focuses on material production, civil society, and class
perspective. The first step is to explore the underlying mode of production which constitutes
and conditions the basis of the (accounting) discourse on the surface (Marx & Engels, 1974,
p.47); then the interaction among different modes of production is analysed in Marx’s
concept of civil society which transcends national contexts and lays down the foundation of
the “state and of the rest of the idealistic superstructure” (ibid, p.57); in the third stage a class
analysis is carried out from perspectives of both the ruling class and the ruled to explore the
capacity of the discourse to change the status quo. In the current case study, this method is
particularly consistent with Marx’s theory for financialisation. The interaction of productive,
commercial, and financial capital is examined through first identifying the types of capital
underneath the discourse concerned, then investigating the conflict between the
corresponding social relations and productive forces, and thirdly exploring the potential
solution to financialisation via a class analysis. In so doing, it can be argued that both the
theoretical and methodological frameworks developed in the thesis are useful to the study of
political economy accounting, and particularly accounting discourse and financialisation.

Thirdly, the thesis considers Marx’s theory as part of the socio-political background of China.
Thus, while the Chinese government labels the dominant ideology as the application of
Marxism in the Chinese context (see Jiang, 2006a, p.157, 2006b, p.8; Hu, 2006), and the
CISA claims to be the follower of Marxism (CISA, 2011b, 2013b), this thesis applies the
Marx-informed theory for financialisation and methodology for discourse analysis to such a
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context to shed light on both the application of Marxism in the Chinese context as well as the
contemporary significance of Marx in modern capitalist economy.

9.4. Further research directions
In relation to the global iron ore market in general, the ex post effect that the financialisation
of iron ore price has upon the iron ore as well as the steel industry needs to be explored. The
thesis has explored the process of financialising the iron ore price for the period from 2008
October to 2010 May that witnessed the transition of iron ore pricing mechanism from the
conventional annual negotiation model to the quarterly index model. In the end of this period,
iron ore price skyrocketed by nearly 200%. However, there has been a dramatic decrease in
the price of the mineral product from 2012 to 2015. It is thus of interest to investigate the
factors behind the price plunge, with particular reference to Marx’s view regarding the limits
upon the movement of commercial and financial capital as discussed in chapter seven (see
section 7.2.2.1.). Specifically, while “the time of production” and “the velocity and volume of
the total individual consumption” (Marx, 1959, p.203) are considered as the limit upon the
operation of commercial capital, the participation of financial capital helps release
commercial capital from these limits via derivatives and credit driving “capitalist mode of
production beyond its own limits… to its highest and ultimate form” (p.433). Financial
capital, in this regard, is viewed by Marx as the “one of the most effective vehicles of crises
and swindle” (p.433). Bear in mind such limits, further research attention can be drawn to the
relationship between the iron and steel sector both globally and within China and the price
movement of iron ore index, which will also be a good opportunity to apply Marx’s political
economy framework in a post-financialisation context. From the perspective of accounting
standards, the drastic price drop of iron ore is also worth further examination. While FVA has
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been considered as one of the contributing factors to capital market instability during the
GFC (Biondi, 2011; Biondi & Giannoccolo, 2015), it will also be interesting to explore to
what extent the financialised index price has contributed to the price fluctuations of iron ore,
given the similar theoretical underpinnings shared by FVA and the newly installed pricing
mechanism.

In relation to the Chinese iron and steel industry, the industrial development needs to be
further examined. For instance, while it has been discussed in chapter seven (see section
7.2.1.) that the CISA simply wanted to separate the domestic iron and steel sector from
financial market and failed to do so by being forced to accept the quarterly index price, the
association’s view of finance afterwards is of interest to further explore. In particular,
although it quickly shut down the Rizhao centre that attempted to launch the Chinese iron ore
index in 2009 May (China Business Times, 16 June 2009) and reiterated in 2010 that the
financialised iron ore index was always speculative and could easily be manipulated (Li RX,
2010d, 2010e), yet the association, together with the CCCMMC, launched the China Iron Ore
Price Index (CIOPI hereafter) just one year later (in 2011 October). However, it was not until
2015 that major iron ore suppliers such as BHP Billiton first adopted the CIOPI (Chen, 2015;
Zhu, 2015). Even with Big Three’s acceptance of the CIOPI, commentators including
researchers at the Ministry of Commerce pointed out that such adoption of the Chinese iron
ore index serves more in a symbolic sense, and so China still has a long way to go to obtain
the pricing right of iron ore in the global market (Zhu, 2015). There are at least three areas of
interest to be explored further. The first is CISA’s changed attitude towards finance and the
index price in particular. Factors behind the association’s dramatic turn need to be studied
from a class perspective: has the CISA finally adopted the perspective of financial capital and
indeed connected the nation’s iron and steel industry with the financial sector? To what
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extent does the association balance the interests (1) among the productive, commercial, and
financial capital, (2) between major SOEs and small and medium firms, and (3) between iron
and steel enterprises and the working class at large? Also, in comparison with its
interpretation of accounting concepts during the negotiation which largely stayed at the
technical level, how would the association understand and use the corresponding accounting
concepts after its promotion of the Chinese index price? Secondly, it is also interesting to
undertake a comparative study between the CIOPI and the Platts index to investigate the
overlaps and distinctions in terms of data assessment methods and the organisational structure
therein. Thirdly, the reason behind Big Three’s acceptance of the CIOPI merits further
attention. For instance, to what extent do the Big Three actually adopt the CIOPI? What are
the socio-political and economic contexts in which the Chinese iron ore index is accepted?

In relation to the identity of the CISA, the institutional arrangement is also of particular
interest to further analyse. More specifically, in the context of the Chinese President Xi
Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign since 2013, high ranking government officials have been
arrested for bribery and corruption. The nation’s iron and steel industry has also been under
investigation. Shan Shanghua, the then secretary general and the spokesperson of the CISA
which represented the Chinese iron ore buyers at the iron ore price negotiation table from
2008 to 2010, is charged with ‘distributing state assets to private individuals’, sentenced to
three years imprisonment and suspended for three years (Tencent Finance, 21 January 2014).
Deng Qilin, the then chairman of the CISA and also the president, the chairman of the board
of directors and the deputy party secretary at Wuhan Iron and Steel group, is also found
guilty of corruption. Ironically, while calling for government punishment upon those
enterprises that break the order of the country’s iron ore import market by engaging in and
profiteering from speculative activities (Yu, 2010i), Deng Qilin also engaged Wuhan Iron and
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Steel group into reselling iron ore import to private enterprises for personal gain. In particular,
from 2007 to 2008 while the annual contract based iron ore price was lower than its spot
market counterpart, the group sold its own iron ore import at the annual contact price to a
private trading company owned by Deng’s family which then sold the same mineral product
back to the group at the spot market rate (Mi, 2015). After the spot market price plunge in the
same year when the spot market price became lower than the annual contract price, the
private company began to sell iron ore back to Wuhan Iron and Steel at the annual rate,
rendering greater losses for the group (Sina Finance, 5 February 2016). This stands in violent
contrast with how Deng commented on the dramatic drop of iron ore price in the aftermath of
the GFC in 2008: “if steel plants continued to purchase iron ore at the annual contract rate, it
would have been no different than suicide” (Xu YL, 2009f). Therefore, comparing the
discourse of these officials regarding iron ore price during the 2009 and 2010 annual
negotiations with what they have been charged, the institutional arrangement at the CISA and
its associated accountability are worthy of further investigation in a wider social and political
atmosphere.
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